Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellants David, Joyce, and Alan Affeldt objected to the county's removal of trees and fences along their farm property on a county highway. Appellants sought a judgment declaring that the trees and fences were not within the county's four rod right-of-way and enjoining their removal. The circuit court granted the county's motion for summary judgment, finding that appellants failed to set forth sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption under Wis. Stat. 82.31(1) that the county highway was laid out four rods wide. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed, but on the grounds that it was an undisputed fact that the highway was a recorded, laid out highway and hence had a four rod right-of-way as a matter of law. On review, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that appellants set forth sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning the width of the county highway and whether the highway was laid out or instead was created by user. View "Affeldt v. Green Lake County" on Justia Law

David Rasmussen filed a class-action complaint against several automobile companies, including Nissan Japan and its wholly owned subsidiary, Nissan North America. The complaint alleged that the automobile company defendants violated Wisconsin's antitrust and conspiracy laws. The circuit court dismissed Nissan Japan from the lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court of appeals affirmed the order of dismissal. At issue was whether Wisconsin's long-arm statute granting personal jurisdiction over individuals engaged in substantial and not isolated activities within Wisconsin subjected Nissan Japan to personal jurisdiction in Wisconsin. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statutory prerequisites for general personal jurisdiction were not met because (1) the activities of the subsidiary corporation, Nissan North America, were insufficient to subject its nonresident parent corporation, Nissan Japan, to general personal jurisdiction, and (2) Rasmussen did not meet his burden to show that the corporate separateness of Nissan Japan and Nissan North America should be disregarded such that the activities of Nissan North America in Wisconsin should be imputed to Nissan Japan. View "Rasmussen v. General Motors Corp." on Justia Law

In 1995, David Bushard and Steven Reisman formed a partnership called PressEnter. After Bushard dissolved the partnership in 1999 he withdrew from its day-to-day operations. Reisman continued to run day-to-day operations and to direct PressEnter to pay partnership distributions to both partners. In 2004, Reisman started taking a salary. In 2007, Bushard filed a complaint against Reisman and PressEnter, alleging breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment and demanding a money judgment, including the amount of Reisman's salary. Reisman counterclaimed with two counts of unjust enrichment, damage to business reputation, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court concluded that the dissolution of PressEnter resulted in a wind-up, ordered the equal distribution of PressEnter's profits to both partners, and granted summary judgment in favor of Bushard. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the distribution of PressEnter's profits and losses was governed by Wis. Stat. 178.15, and Reisman's equitable arguments were insufficient to overcome the plain language of the statute; and (2) because there was no genuine dispute of material fact, the circuit court appropriately ordered summary judgment in favor of Bushard. View "Bushard v. Reisman" on Justia Law

Defendant Charles Lamar pleaded guilty and was sentenced for aggravated battery and misdemeanor bail jumping, both as a habitual offender, for severely beating his girlfriend. One year later, Lamar filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the aggravated battery as a habitual offender charge. The circuit court granted Lamar's motion, and the sentence was vacated. Lamar subsequently pleaded guilty to aggravated battery and a second misdemeanor bail jumping charge. The circuit court resentenced Lamar. Lamar petitioned the circuit court for an order granting additional sentence credit for the days in confinement he previously served pursuant to Wis. Stat. 973.04. The circuit court denied Lamar's motion, ruling that the sentence credit should not be granted for two sentences being served consecutively to each other. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that (1) under State v. Boettcher, Lamar was not entitled to additional sentence credit, and (2) Lamar was not entitled to additional sentence credit by virtue of the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. View "State v. Lamar" on Justia Law

A state trooper pulled defendant Deandre Buchanan's vehicle over when it was traveling in excess of the posted speed limit. The trooper saw Buchanan make a movement indicating he was putting an item out of sight beneath the driver's seat and observed that Buchanan was visibly nervous. The trooper also discovered Buchanan had an arrest record for violent crimes and drug trafficking. The officer then did a protective search of Buchanan and his vehicle and discovered plant material in the car. The officer seized the item, which was marijuana. Buchanan was convicted for possessing marijuana with intent to deliver. The court of appeals affirmed. Buchanan appealed, arguing the evidence he sought to suppress in the trial court was seized in violation of the federal and state constitutional provisions barring unreasonable search and seizure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the initial protective search of Buchanan and his vehicle was valid; and (2) the piece of marijuana plant that the state trooper discovered on the car floor during the protective search was in plain view and there was probable cause to justify seizing it. Therefore there was no basis for suppressing the evidence. View "State v. Buchanan" on Justia Law

While she was present in defendant's apartment, police obtained consent from defendant Brian St. Martin's girlfriend to search the attic in defendant's apartment. Defendant, who was in police custody in a police van parked nearby, refused to consent to the search. The police proceeded to search the attic and found cocaine and currency. A warrant was subsequently obtained and after a second search police seized cell phones, currency, a scale, and documents. Defendant was later charged based on the evidence seized in the searches. Defendant pleaded guilty and was convicted. Defendant then appealed the court's order denying his motion to suppress the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the rule regarding consent to search a shared dwelling in Georgia v. Randolph, which states that a warrantless search cannot be justified when a physically present resident expressly refuses consent, does not apply where the resident remains in close physical proximity to the residence but was not physically present at the residence. Instead, the applicable rule is the one stated in United States v. Matlock, which holds that a co-tenant's consent to search is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting co-tenant. View "State v. St. Martin" on Justia Law

Wanda Brethorst submitted an uninsured motorist (UM) claim to her insurer, Allstate. Brethorst made a demand for settlement, and Allstate responded with only a partial settlement. Brethorst rejected the offer then filed suit against Allstate for bad faith. Allstate filed a motion asking that Brethorst's contract claim for UM coverage be bifurcated from her bad faith claim and that discovery on the bad faith claim be stayed until the contract claim was resolved. Brethorst opposed the motion on the grounds that she had filed only one claim, and thus no bifurcation or stay of discovery was appropriate. The circuit court agreed with Brethorst and denied Allstate's motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an insured may file a bad faith claim without also filing a breach of contract claim; and (2) Brethorst had supplied the insurer and the court with sufficient evidence of a breach of contract by the insurer to proceed with discovery on her bad faith claim. View "Brethorst v. Allstate Property & Casualty Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case involved litigation expenses under Wis. Stat. 32.28(3)(d) in a condemnation proceeding between defendant and plaintiffs, the condemnees, when defendant initiated condemnation proceedings against the condemnees under Wis. Stat. 32.06 for an easement to construct an electrical transmission line across the condemnees' property. At issue was whether litigation expenses should be awarded when an appeal was taken from a negotiated price recorded in a certificate of compensation. The court held that an owner who accepted the negotiated price under section 32.06(2a), timely appealed that price, and subsequently received an award from the county condemnation commission that exceeded the thresholds under section 32.28, should be awarded litigation expenses. The court also considered, but was not persuaded by various other arguments defendant made criticizing the circuit court's and the court's interpretation of section 32.06(a) and section 32.28(3)(d) that the condemnees in the present case should be awarded litigation expenses.

Plaintiffs filed a personal injury slip-and-fall action against defendants and defendants moved to disqualify plaintiffs' attorney. At issue was whether defendants had standing to bring a motion to disqualify plaintiffs' attorney where plaintiffs' attorney's law firm had previously represented defendants' exclusive property manager. Also at issue was whether the circuit court erred as a matter of law in applying an "appearance of impropriety" standard in deciding the motion for disqualification. The court held that defendants had standing to move to disqualify opposing counsel where defendants have shown that plaintiffs' attorney's prior representation was so connected with the current litigation that the prior representation was likely to affect the just and lawful determination of defendants' position. The court also held that the circuit court incorrectly applied the standard of law and should have determined the motion for disqualification based on an attorney's duty to a former client in SCR 20:1.9. Accordingly, the court reversed the order of the circuit court and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs, injured in an automobile accident, sought $10,000 from defendant, the driver, the amount received by plaintiffs from plaintiffs' insurer. At issue was whether the circuit court erred in denying plaintiffs a judgment of $10,000 against defendant when defendant did not pay plaintiffs' insurer $10,000, a sum that represented the insurer's subrogation claim. The court concluded that the collateral source rule did not, under the facts of the case, entitle plaintiffs to recover $10,000 when the case was indistinguishable from Paulson v. Allstate. Ins. where the Paulson court determined that the injured party's recovery from the tortfeasor was not affected by the subrogated insurer's settlement of its subrogation claim with the tortfeasor.