Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal concerned an agreement between Oneida County and Waste Management for the disposal of municipal solid waste. E-Z Roll Off brought suit against Oneida County, alleging the agreement created an illegal restraint of trade and seeking damages pursuant to Wis. Stat. 133.18. The circuit court granted Oneida County's motion for summary judgment, holding that E-Z could not bring suit because E-Z had not filed a timely notice of claim in accordance with Wis. Stat. 893.80(1)(a). The court of appeals reversed, holding that antitrust actions brought pursuant to Section 133.18 are exempt from the notice of claim requirements found in Section 893.80(1). The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that (1) antitrust actions brought pursuant to Section 133.18 are not exempt from the notice of claim requirements found in Section 893.80(1); and (2) E-Z did not meet the requirements of Section 893.80(1)(a) when it failed to give Oneida County notice of its claim within the 120-day limitations period. View "E-Z Roll Off, L.L.C. v. County of Oneida" on Justia Law

After Dimitri Henley was convicted of five counts of second degree sexual assault, Henley made several attempts to seek a new trial. Henley also moved Justice Roggensack to recuse herself from the review of his case. Roggensack denied the motion. The current appeal involved a motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Court's decision reversing the circuit court's order granting Henley a new trial. Henley argued that by denying him a new trial and by providing no court procedures for reviewing Justice Roggensack's decision not to recuse, the Court denied Henley's right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court held (1) the motion for reconsideration met none of the criteria for granting a motion for reconsideration and was therefore denied; (2) determining whether to recuse is the sole responsibility of the individual justice for whom disqualification from participation is sought; (3) a majority of the Court does not have the power to disqualify a judicial peer from performing the constitutional functions of a Supreme Court justice on a case-by-case basis; and (4) Henley received due process. View "State v. Henley" on Justia Law

Court-appointed receiver Michael Polsky filed a complaint against defendants Daniel Virnich and Jack Moores, owners and officers of Communications Products, for breach of their fiduciary duties to the corporation after Communications Products defaulted on a loan to its largest creditor. The Supreme Court accepted review but split three to three. On return to the court of appeals, the judgment was reversed. Polsky filed a petition to review, which the Supreme Court granted. The Court then affirmed the court of appeals. The current action involved Polsky's motion to disqualify Justice Roggensack, asserting that because Justice Roggensack had not participated in the case when it was previously certified to the Court and when the Court's decision remanded the matter to the court of appeals, she should have been disqualified from participation in the decision to affirm the court of appeals. The Supreme Court denied Polsky's motion, holding (1) the Court does not have the power to remove a justice from participating in an individual proceeding, on a case-by-case basis, and (2) due process is provided by the decisions of the individual justices who participate in the cases presented to the court. View "Polsky v. Virnich" on Justia Law

Tracy McReath filed a petition for divorce from Timothy McReath in circuit court. Upon entering the order of divorce, the circuit court divided the marital property and awarded maintenance to Tracy, ordering that Timothy pay Tracy $796,720 to equalize the property division as well as $16,000 per month for twenty years in maintenance. Timothy appealed, arguing that (1) the circuit court erred as a matter of law when it treated Timothy's personal goodwill in his orthodontic practice as divisible property, and (2) the circuit court improperly double counted his personal goodwill in the orthodontic practice when it based Tracy's maintenance award on Timothy's expected future earnings from the orthodontic practice. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the personal goodwill was salable and that the circuit court did nor err in its approach in determining the property division and maintenance award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the entire value of the salable professional goodwill was properly counted as divisible property in the marital estate, and (2) the circuit court did not double count the professional goodwill from the orthodontic practice in the maintenance award. View "McReath v. McReath" on Justia Law

Steven Kilian leased a Mercedes-Benz vehicle with financing by Mercedes-Benz Financial. After the car required numerous repairs, Kilian returned the car to Mercedes-Benz USA and sought a refund under Wisconsin's Lemon Law. Mercedes-Benz USA accepted the returned vehicle and refunded $20,847 to Kilian. Because Mercedes-Benz USA did not immediately pay off the lease with Mercedes-Benz Financial, Mercedes-Benz Financial commenced collection actions to obtain payment from Kilian. Kilian filed suit under the Lemon Law to stop enforcement of the lease. While Kilian's action was pending in circuit court, Mercedes-Benz paid off the lease to Mercedes-Benz Financial. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Mercedes-Benz Financial, finding that Kilian did not suffer a pecuniary loss when Mercedes-Benz Financial continued to enforce the lease after the vehicle was returned. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Kilian could maintain an action for equitable relief under the Lemon Law and Mercedes-Benz Financial's actions violated the Lemon Law; and (2) Kilian prevailed in his action when Mercedes-Benz Financial voluntarily ceased enforcement of the lease after Kilian filed suit, and as the prevailing party, Kilian was entitled to attorney fees, disbursements, and costs. Remanded. View "Kilian v. Mercedes-Benz USA, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Charles Swenson sustained a work-related injury while working as a driver for deBoer Transportion. Upon returning to work, Swenson completed the company's orientation requirements with the exception a check-ride, which required him to be away from his terminally ill father. DeBoer then discharged Swenson. Swenson sought benefits under Wis. Stat. 102.35(3), alleging that deBoer unreasonably refused to rehire him. Following a hearing, the ALJ for the Department of Workforce Development concluded deBoer unreasonably refused to rehire Swenson and was, therefore, liable to Swenson for a year of lost wages. DeBoer appealed to the Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC), which concurred with the order of the ALJ and concluded that deBoer failed to show reasonable cause for its refusal to rehire Swenson. On review, the circuit court affirmed, and the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that (1) in reaching its conclusion that deBoer failed to show reasonable cause, LIRC applied an unreasonable interpretation of Wis. Stat. 102.35(3), and (2) LIRC's conclusion that deBoer failed to show reasonable cause based on LIRC's finding that the check-ride policy was pretext was not supported by credible and substantial evidence. Remanded. View "DeBoer Transp., Inc. v. Swenson" on Justia Law

Patrick and Ellen Topolski were divorced in 1995. Under a marital settlement agreement setting forth division of the parties' property, Patrick was awarded all retirement and pension benefits when received by him less the sum of $912 per month he was to pay Ellen. In 2001, when he was fifty-three years old, Patrick began receiving disability pension payments of $2,348 monthly under a pension plan. In 2008, Ellen brought a motion in the circuit court seeking a qualified domestic relations order for $912 per month pursuant to the relief provided in the agreement as well as payment from the time Patrick began receiving benefits. The circuit court interpreted the agreement as requiring Patrick to pay Ellen $912 per month from his disability benefits and awarded judgment in the amount of $83,072 to Ellen. The court of appeals reversed, finding Ellen was not entitled to receive payments from the disability pension benefit but was entitled to receive monthly payments when Patrick reached sixty-five, the normal retirement age under the pension plan. The Supreme Court modified the appellate court's decision and as modified, affirmed, holding Ellen was entitled to $912 per month from the disability pension when Patrick turned sixty-two years old. View "Topolski v. Topolski" on Justia Law

John Steffens, a beneficiary under an ERISA plan provided by BlueCross, required surgery after an automobile accident. BlueCross paid for a significant portion of Steffens' medical expenses as it was required to do under the Plan. Steffens then sued the other individual in the accident, naming BlueCross as a defendant. Steffens asked for a judgment against BlueCross foreclosing any claim it may have had for subrogation. BlueCross filed a counterclaim against Steffens, alleging it had paid $67,477 on behalf of Stevens and that under the Plan, Steffens was obligated to reimburse BlueCross. The circuit court ordered Steffens to reimburse BlueCross $64,751 plus attorney fees. The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's order and remanded, holding that BlueCross must prove that the surgery-necessitating injuries were related to the accident. The Supreme Court granted review and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that it was not arbitrary and capricious for the Plan administrator to interpret the Plan and conclude that BlueCross was entitled to reimbursement because the expenses that BlueCross paid arose from an accident for which a third party may have been liable. View "Steffens v. BlueCross BlueShield" on Justia Law

Defendant Esteban Gonzales was convicted of exposing a child to harmful material. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction. At issue on appeal was whether Defendant had shown there was a reasonable likelihood that a jury instruction misled the jury into believing that the State did not need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted knowingly. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) that the jury was not instructed that it had to determine whether Defendant had knowingly exhibited the harmful material to the child, as distinguished from accidentally or unknowingly exhibiting harmful material to the child; and (2) Defendant established a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instruction in a way that relieved the State of its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore applied the instruction in an unconstitutional manner. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, David Funk was found guilty of two counts of sexual assault. The circuit court vacated the jury verdict and ordered a new trial based on its post-trial discovery that one juror had not revealed during voir dire that she had been a victim of two prior incidents of sexual assault, finding that these experiences made the juror biased against Funk and deprived him of his constitutional right to an impartial jury. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the guilty verdict and judgment of conviction, concluding (1) the circuit court's finding that the juror was subjectively biased against Funk was unsupported by facts of record and was clearly erroneous; and (2) the circuit court's conclusion that the juror was objectively biased was erroneous because the facts necessary to ground a court's reasonable legal conclusion that a reasonable person in the juror's position could not be impartial were not developed in this case. View "State v. Funk" on Justia Law