Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Tracy McReath filed a petition for divorce from Timothy McReath in circuit court. Upon entering the order of divorce, the circuit court divided the marital property and awarded maintenance to Tracy, ordering that Timothy pay Tracy $796,720 to equalize the property division as well as $16,000 per month for twenty years in maintenance. Timothy appealed, arguing that (1) the circuit court erred as a matter of law when it treated Timothy's personal goodwill in his orthodontic practice as divisible property, and (2) the circuit court improperly double counted his personal goodwill in the orthodontic practice when it based Tracy's maintenance award on Timothy's expected future earnings from the orthodontic practice. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the personal goodwill was salable and that the circuit court did nor err in its approach in determining the property division and maintenance award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the entire value of the salable professional goodwill was properly counted as divisible property in the marital estate, and (2) the circuit court did not double count the professional goodwill from the orthodontic practice in the maintenance award. View "McReath v. McReath" on Justia Law

Steven Kilian leased a Mercedes-Benz vehicle with financing by Mercedes-Benz Financial. After the car required numerous repairs, Kilian returned the car to Mercedes-Benz USA and sought a refund under Wisconsin's Lemon Law. Mercedes-Benz USA accepted the returned vehicle and refunded $20,847 to Kilian. Because Mercedes-Benz USA did not immediately pay off the lease with Mercedes-Benz Financial, Mercedes-Benz Financial commenced collection actions to obtain payment from Kilian. Kilian filed suit under the Lemon Law to stop enforcement of the lease. While Kilian's action was pending in circuit court, Mercedes-Benz paid off the lease to Mercedes-Benz Financial. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Mercedes-Benz Financial, finding that Kilian did not suffer a pecuniary loss when Mercedes-Benz Financial continued to enforce the lease after the vehicle was returned. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Kilian could maintain an action for equitable relief under the Lemon Law and Mercedes-Benz Financial's actions violated the Lemon Law; and (2) Kilian prevailed in his action when Mercedes-Benz Financial voluntarily ceased enforcement of the lease after Kilian filed suit, and as the prevailing party, Kilian was entitled to attorney fees, disbursements, and costs. Remanded. View "Kilian v. Mercedes-Benz USA, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Charles Swenson sustained a work-related injury while working as a driver for deBoer Transportion. Upon returning to work, Swenson completed the company's orientation requirements with the exception a check-ride, which required him to be away from his terminally ill father. DeBoer then discharged Swenson. Swenson sought benefits under Wis. Stat. 102.35(3), alleging that deBoer unreasonably refused to rehire him. Following a hearing, the ALJ for the Department of Workforce Development concluded deBoer unreasonably refused to rehire Swenson and was, therefore, liable to Swenson for a year of lost wages. DeBoer appealed to the Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC), which concurred with the order of the ALJ and concluded that deBoer failed to show reasonable cause for its refusal to rehire Swenson. On review, the circuit court affirmed, and the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that (1) in reaching its conclusion that deBoer failed to show reasonable cause, LIRC applied an unreasonable interpretation of Wis. Stat. 102.35(3), and (2) LIRC's conclusion that deBoer failed to show reasonable cause based on LIRC's finding that the check-ride policy was pretext was not supported by credible and substantial evidence. Remanded. View "DeBoer Transp., Inc. v. Swenson" on Justia Law

Patrick and Ellen Topolski were divorced in 1995. Under a marital settlement agreement setting forth division of the parties' property, Patrick was awarded all retirement and pension benefits when received by him less the sum of $912 per month he was to pay Ellen. In 2001, when he was fifty-three years old, Patrick began receiving disability pension payments of $2,348 monthly under a pension plan. In 2008, Ellen brought a motion in the circuit court seeking a qualified domestic relations order for $912 per month pursuant to the relief provided in the agreement as well as payment from the time Patrick began receiving benefits. The circuit court interpreted the agreement as requiring Patrick to pay Ellen $912 per month from his disability benefits and awarded judgment in the amount of $83,072 to Ellen. The court of appeals reversed, finding Ellen was not entitled to receive payments from the disability pension benefit but was entitled to receive monthly payments when Patrick reached sixty-five, the normal retirement age under the pension plan. The Supreme Court modified the appellate court's decision and as modified, affirmed, holding Ellen was entitled to $912 per month from the disability pension when Patrick turned sixty-two years old. View "Topolski v. Topolski" on Justia Law

John Steffens, a beneficiary under an ERISA plan provided by BlueCross, required surgery after an automobile accident. BlueCross paid for a significant portion of Steffens' medical expenses as it was required to do under the Plan. Steffens then sued the other individual in the accident, naming BlueCross as a defendant. Steffens asked for a judgment against BlueCross foreclosing any claim it may have had for subrogation. BlueCross filed a counterclaim against Steffens, alleging it had paid $67,477 on behalf of Stevens and that under the Plan, Steffens was obligated to reimburse BlueCross. The circuit court ordered Steffens to reimburse BlueCross $64,751 plus attorney fees. The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's order and remanded, holding that BlueCross must prove that the surgery-necessitating injuries were related to the accident. The Supreme Court granted review and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that it was not arbitrary and capricious for the Plan administrator to interpret the Plan and conclude that BlueCross was entitled to reimbursement because the expenses that BlueCross paid arose from an accident for which a third party may have been liable. View "Steffens v. BlueCross BlueShield" on Justia Law

Defendant Esteban Gonzales was convicted of exposing a child to harmful material. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction. At issue on appeal was whether Defendant had shown there was a reasonable likelihood that a jury instruction misled the jury into believing that the State did not need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted knowingly. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) that the jury was not instructed that it had to determine whether Defendant had knowingly exhibited the harmful material to the child, as distinguished from accidentally or unknowingly exhibiting harmful material to the child; and (2) Defendant established a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instruction in a way that relieved the State of its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore applied the instruction in an unconstitutional manner. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, David Funk was found guilty of two counts of sexual assault. The circuit court vacated the jury verdict and ordered a new trial based on its post-trial discovery that one juror had not revealed during voir dire that she had been a victim of two prior incidents of sexual assault, finding that these experiences made the juror biased against Funk and deprived him of his constitutional right to an impartial jury. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the guilty verdict and judgment of conviction, concluding (1) the circuit court's finding that the juror was subjectively biased against Funk was unsupported by facts of record and was clearly erroneous; and (2) the circuit court's conclusion that the juror was objectively biased was erroneous because the facts necessary to ground a court's reasonable legal conclusion that a reasonable person in the juror's position could not be impartial were not developed in this case. View "State v. Funk" on Justia Law

Olsen's Mill, a grain elevator, and BNP Paribas, the elevator's largest creditor, entered into a voluntary assignment agreement for the benefit of creditors under Wis. Stat. 128 after Olsen's Mill defaulted on its obligations to Paribas. The circuit court approved of the assignment and ordered the sale of certain assets free and clear of Paribas's security interest without its consent. The court of appeals affirmed the order. On review, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding (1) the circuit court erred by ordering the sale of Paribas's collateral free and clear of Paribas's security interest without its consent; and (2) the court contravened the statute by approving an offer that circumvented the order of distribution mandated by Ws. Stat. 128.17(1). Remanded for a determination of what remedy was available under the circumstances. View "BNP Paribas v. Olsen's Mill, Inc." on Justia Law

In the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) issued a permit to the village of East Troy to construct a municipal well. Lake Beulah Management District (LBMD) sought a declaratory action in circuit court seeking to enforce its ordinance, which purports to regulate and require permits for certain wells that withdraw water from the area around Lake Beulah. The village moved for summary judgment, asserting that the ordinance was invalid as preempted by state law. The circuit court granted the village's motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ordinance was preempted by state law. The ordinance was invalid because it conflicted with, defeated the purpose of, and violated the spirit of the legislature's delegation of authority to the DNR to regulate high capacity wells. View "Lake Beulah Mgmt. Dist. v. Village of East Troy" on Justia Law

After the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) issued a permit to the village of East Troy to construct a municipal well, two conservancies challenged the DNR's decision to issue the permit without considering the well's potential impact on nearby Lake Beulah. The circuit court denied the petition for review, concluding that the DNR did not violate its obligations by issuing the permit because there was no evidence that the well would harm Lake Beulah. On appeal, the court of appeals held that (1) the DNR has the duty to consider the environmental impact of a proposed high capacity well if presented with sufficient scientific evidence suggesting potential harm to waters of the state, and (2) the DNR was presented with such evidence in this case. Therefore, the court remanded the case to the circuit court with directions to remand to the DNR. The Supreme Court affirmed the first part of the appellate court decision but reversed the second part, holding that, based on the record, the DNR was not presented with sufficient concrete, scientific evidence of the well's potential harm to waters of the state. Thus, the Court affirmed the DNR's decision to issue the permit. View "Lake Beulah Management District v. DNR" on Justia Law