Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondents, Dale and Gudrun Dawson and Edward Thomas, applied to the town boards of Cedarburg and Jackson to vacate part of a jointly owned public highway, which was surrounded by land Respondents owned. At a joint meeting of the town boards, the Jackson board members voted in favor of the application to discontinue the road, but the Cedarburg members voted against it. Respondents sought a declaratory judgment that the joint action of the town board resulted in discontinuance of the road. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Respondents, and the court of appeals affirmed. On review, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, holding (1) the approval of both governing bodies is necessary to approve a joint application like the one from Respondents; (2) Respondents should have proceeded under Wis. Stat. 68.13 to seek a determination that Cedarburg's refusal to issue a highway order was not in accordance with law; and (3) the fact that the circuit court should have dismissed Respondents' request for a declaratory judgment as untimely under section 68.13 did not deprive the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to address an issue of law. View "Dawson v. Town of Jackson" on Justia Law

Covenant Healthcare, the sole member of a regional medical center that owns an outpatient clinic, constructed a building in the City of Wauwatosa to house the outpatient clinic. Covenant sought a tax exemption with the City for the clinic as property used exclusively for the purpose of a hospital under Wis. Stat. 70.11(4m)(a). The city assessor denied the exemption. After paying the assessed tax, Covenant brought an action to recover the amount of the City's allegedly unlawful assessment. The circuit court concluded that the clinic was exempt from taxation pursuant to the statute. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed. On review, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, holding (1) the outpatient clinic is used for the primary purposes of a hospital and therefore qualifies as tax-exempt property under the statute; (2) the outpatient clinic is neither a doctor's office nor a property used for commercial purposes within the meaning of the statute; and (3) no benefit inures to any member of the medical center because the term "member" under the statute does not include not-for-profit entities. View "Covenant Healthcare Sys., Inc. v. City of Wauwatosa" on Justia Law

This case arose out of an accident that occurred when a truck collided with the Casper family's minivan. The Caspers brought suit against several defendants, including the truck driver, his two employers, an employer CEO, and an employer's excess insurer. The Supreme Court granted review, affirming in part and reversing in part the decision of the court of appeals. The Court (1) affirmed the decision of the appellate court in finding the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in (a) finding excusable neglect and granting the insurer's motion to enlarge time by seven days to answer the amended complaint, and (b) denying the Caspers' motion for default judgment; (2) reversed the decision of the appellate court affirming the lower court's ruling that a liability insurance policy needs to be delivered or issued for delivery in Wisconsin in order to subject the insurer to a direct action under Wis. Stat. 632.24 and 803.04(2); and (3) affirmed that a corporate officer may be liable for non-intentional torts committed in the scope of his employment but reversed the decision of the appellate court because in this instance, the CEO's actions were too remote to provide a basis for personal liability. View "Casper v. Am. Int'l S. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In this case, the court of appeals reversed Defendant Olu Rhodes's conviction of first-degree intentional homicide and first-degree recklessly endangering safety. Defendant had argued that the circuit court violated his constitutional right to confront a witness when it cut off his cross-examination of a prosecution witness, Defendant's sister, Nari. Defendant's cross-examination sought to cast doubt on the State's theory of the motive in the case, that Rhodes had killed the victim because the victim was responsible for Nari being beaten the day before the shooting of the homicide victim. On review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court reasonably limited Defendant's cross-examination of his sister about incidents of domestic abuse against her by the victim of the homicide to avoid confusing the issues and misleading the jury. This limitation did not prevent Defendant from presenting evidence to rebut the State's theory of Defendant's motive for the crime and to make that argument in closing. Remanded. View "State v. Rhodes" on Justia Law

The dispute in this case involved a circuit court's order requiring a school district to develop and implement an educational plan for a juvenile who was adjudged delinquent after the district expelled him from school. The court of appeals granted the district a writ of prohibition and vacated the circuit court order, concluding that the circuit court did not act within its authority in entering the order. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that (1) the school district had statutory authority to expel the student from school; (2) the circuit court did not have statutory authority to order a school district to provide alternative educational services to a juvenile who had been expelled from school by a lawful and unchallenged expulsion order but was still residing in the community; and (3) the court of appeals did not err in utilizing a supervisory writ to review the district court's order to provide appropriate educational resources in this case. View "Madison Metropolitan Sch. Dist. v. Circuit Court for Dane County" on Justia Law

This case centered on a dispute between Jack Link and his two sons, Jay and Troy. Jack and Troy filed suit against Jay seeking specific performance of an agreement that would require Jay to surrender his shares in Link Snacks. Jay filed counterclaims alleging Jack and Troy had breached fidicuiary duties owed to Jay by squeezing Jay out of Link Snacks to buy Jay's shares. The circuit court (1) granted specific enforcement of the agreement; (2) concluded that Jay had not been oppressed by Jack and Troy; and (3) remitted the jury's punitive damages award against Jack for breaching fiduciary duties to Jay. The court of appeals granted Jack partial dismissal of Jay's appeal and reversed the circuit court order remitting the punitive damages award against Jack. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court erred in remitting the award of punitive damages against Jack; (2) the court of appeals properly rejected Jay's oppression claim; and (3) Jay did not, under the benefit-estoppel doctrine, waive his right to appeal the circuit court's decision to limit the evidence Jay could present regarding his theory of damages relating to his breach of fiduciary duty claims. Remanded. View "Link Snacks, Inc. v. Link " on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Rickey Denson was found guilty of recklessly endangering safety as a lesser included offense of attempted first-degree intentional homicide and false imprisonment. Denson moved the circuit court for a judgment acquitting him of the charges or, alternatively, an order granting him a new trial on the grounds that the circuit court failed to engage him in an on-the-record colloquy regarding his right not to testify. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied Denson's postconviction motion, concluding that Denson knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right not to testify. The court of appeals affirmed. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) circuit courts are not required to conduct an on-the-record colloquy to determine whether a defendant is knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right not to testify; (2) once a defendant properly raises in a postconviction motion the issue of an invalid waiver of the right not to testify, an evidentiary hearing is an appropriate remedy to ensure the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right not to testify; and (3) the circuit court properly concluded that Denson knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right not to testify. View "State v. Denson" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned an agreement between Oneida County and Waste Management for the disposal of municipal solid waste. E-Z Roll Off brought suit against Oneida County, alleging the agreement created an illegal restraint of trade and seeking damages pursuant to Wis. Stat. 133.18. The circuit court granted Oneida County's motion for summary judgment, holding that E-Z could not bring suit because E-Z had not filed a timely notice of claim in accordance with Wis. Stat. 893.80(1)(a). The court of appeals reversed, holding that antitrust actions brought pursuant to Section 133.18 are exempt from the notice of claim requirements found in Section 893.80(1). The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that (1) antitrust actions brought pursuant to Section 133.18 are not exempt from the notice of claim requirements found in Section 893.80(1); and (2) E-Z did not meet the requirements of Section 893.80(1)(a) when it failed to give Oneida County notice of its claim within the 120-day limitations period. View "E-Z Roll Off, L.L.C. v. County of Oneida" on Justia Law

After Dimitri Henley was convicted of five counts of second degree sexual assault, Henley made several attempts to seek a new trial. Henley also moved Justice Roggensack to recuse herself from the review of his case. Roggensack denied the motion. The current appeal involved a motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Court's decision reversing the circuit court's order granting Henley a new trial. Henley argued that by denying him a new trial and by providing no court procedures for reviewing Justice Roggensack's decision not to recuse, the Court denied Henley's right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court held (1) the motion for reconsideration met none of the criteria for granting a motion for reconsideration and was therefore denied; (2) determining whether to recuse is the sole responsibility of the individual justice for whom disqualification from participation is sought; (3) a majority of the Court does not have the power to disqualify a judicial peer from performing the constitutional functions of a Supreme Court justice on a case-by-case basis; and (4) Henley received due process. View "State v. Henley" on Justia Law

Court-appointed receiver Michael Polsky filed a complaint against defendants Daniel Virnich and Jack Moores, owners and officers of Communications Products, for breach of their fiduciary duties to the corporation after Communications Products defaulted on a loan to its largest creditor. The Supreme Court accepted review but split three to three. On return to the court of appeals, the judgment was reversed. Polsky filed a petition to review, which the Supreme Court granted. The Court then affirmed the court of appeals. The current action involved Polsky's motion to disqualify Justice Roggensack, asserting that because Justice Roggensack had not participated in the case when it was previously certified to the Court and when the Court's decision remanded the matter to the court of appeals, she should have been disqualified from participation in the decision to affirm the court of appeals. The Supreme Court denied Polsky's motion, holding (1) the Court does not have the power to remove a justice from participating in an individual proceeding, on a case-by-case basis, and (2) due process is provided by the decisions of the individual justices who participate in the cases presented to the court. View "Polsky v. Virnich" on Justia Law