Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, several residents of the Town of Cooks Valley, brought a declaratory judgment action against the Town to declare the Town's nonmetallic mining ordinance invalid because the ordinance did not have county board approval. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. At issue on appeal was whether the mining ordinance was a zoning ordinance. If the ordinance was not a zoning ordinance, county board approval was not required. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court, holding that, even though the ordinance at issue had some similarities to traditional zoning ordinances, it was not to be classified as a zoning ordinance. Rather, it was a non-zoning ordinance adopted under the Town's police power. View "Zwiefelhofer v. Town of Cooks Valley" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of battery to a law enforcement officer and disorderly conduct. Although the circuit court judge's daughter-in-law was not a member of the jury, she was in the pool of potential jurors, and Defendant used a peremptory challenge to remove the judge's daughter-in-law from the jury. The circuit court denied defendant's motion for a new trial, noting that neither party moved to strike the daughter-in-law for cause and neither the State nor Defendant suggested that the daughter-in-law was not a suitable juror. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of conviction and the order denying post-conviction relief, holding that presiding judges must sua sponte remove their immediate family members from the panel of potential jurors. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Defendant exercised a peremptory strike to remove the judge's daughter-in-law from the jury, and because Defendant did not claim the jury was unfair or partial, a new trial was not required under the circumstances. View "State v. Sellhausen" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Daniel Hanson was found guilty of fleeing a traffic officer, a felony under Wis. Stat. 346.04(3). The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court properly instructed the jury on the requirements of section 346.04(3); (2) there does not exist a subjective, good-faith exception to the fleeing law, and Hanson's opportunity to demonstrate any justification for his behavior was through his self-defense claim, which the jury considered and rejected; (3) the circuit court was correct to exclude testimony about the traffic officer's alleged confrontational character because the officer was not a "victim" for purposes of admitting character evidence under Wis. Stat. 904.04(1)(b); and (4) neither the Constitution nor the interests of justice warranted a new trial, as no constitutional infirmities were raised on appeal and the real controversy was tried. View "State v. Hanson" on Justia Law

Todd Olson filed suit against Robert Farrar, alleging he was liable for property damage to Olson's trailer home and vehicle. Farrar's insurer, Mt. Morris Mutual Insurance Company, sought a declaration that it had neither a duty to defend nor a duty to indemnify Farrar under the terms of its insurance policy. The circuit court granted a declaratory and summary judgment in favor of Mt. Morris. The court of appeals reversed. Mt. Morris appealed, arguing that it had no duty to defend or indemnify because of certain coverage exclusions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the policy provisions at issue were ambiguous; therefore, the Court construed them in favor of coverage. Remanded. View "Olson v. Farrar" on Justia Law

Jason Goss was pulled over for a traffic stop, after which the officer discovered that Goss had a revoked license and, due to four prior drunk driving convictions, was subject to a .02 prohibited alcohol content (PAC) standard. While arresting Goss for the license offense, the officer noticed the odor of alcohol and asked Goss to provide a breath sample for a preliminary breath test (PBT). Goss was subsequently convicted for fifth offense drunk driving. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the officer's request for a PBT sample was made in violation of Wis. Stat. 343.303, which states that such requests may be made only where there is probable cause to believe the driver is operating a vehicle in violation of one of the statutes related to drunk driving. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under these circumstances, where Goss was known to be subject to a .02 PAC standard, the officer knew it would take very little alcohol for Goss to exceed that limit, and the officer smelled alcohol on Goss, there was probable cause to request a PBT breath sample. View "State v. Goss" on Justia Law

Pursuant to its power of eminent domain, the Wisconsin DOT acquired the property of 260 North 12th Street, LLC and Basil Ryan (collectively, Ryan). A jury awarded Ryan $2,001,725 as just compensation. Over Ryan's objection, the jury was presented evidence concerning the environmental contamination of Ryan's property and the cost to remediate it. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) evidence of environmental contamination and of remediation costs are admissible in condemnation proceedings subject to the circuit court's discretion; (2) the circuit court appropriately exercised its discretion when it admitted at trial testimony by the DOT's appraiser over Ryan's objection that the testimony was speculative; (3) the circuit court did not err when it excluded Ryan's expert witness as a result of Ryan's failure to timely disclose the witnesses in accordance with the court's scheduling order; and (4) the circuit court appropriately exercised its discretion when it rejected Ryan's proposed jury instructions in favor of the standard jury instruction on fair market value in the case of a total taking. View "260 North 12th St., LLC v. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

While representing a criminal defendant on appeal, the Office of the State Public Defender was sanctioned by the court of appeals in a footnote after the court found that the appendix to the assistant state public defender's brief was deficient and the attorney's certification of the appendix was false in violation of Wis. Stat. 809.19(2)(a). The Public Defender objected to the summary procedure used by the court of appeals in finding a violation of Rule 809.19(2)(a) without giving notice to counsel and without giving counsel an opportunity to be heard in writing. On review, the Supreme Court suggested that hereafter when the court of appeals considers imposing a sanction in such a situation, an order to show cause should be issued directing counsel to explain why a violation of Rule 809.12(2)(a) and (b) should not be found and why the attorney should not pay a stated amount of money to the clerk of the court as a sanction. Remanded with instructions to modify the footnote. View "State v. Nielsen" on Justia Law

A jury convicted David Domke of repeatedly sexually assaulting his ten-year-old stepdaughter. Domke moved for postconviction relief and a new trial based on the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. The circuit court denied the motion after concluding that while Domke had shown that counsel had performed deficiently, Domke had failed to show that the deficient performance had prejudiced him. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that Domke had established cumulative prejudice from three instances of deficient performance. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the circuit court's judgment of conviction, holding (1) Domke was not entitled to a new trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel because, although counsel performed deficiently in three aspects during trial, those errors did not prejudice Domke; and (2) under the totality of the circumstances, Domke received a fair trial. View "State v. Domke" on Justia Law

In 1997, a jury found that Edwin West was a sexually violent person. West was committed under Wis. Stat. 980.08(1), which allows persons committed under chapter 980 to petition for supervised release into the community. In 2005, the legislature amended the statute, removing language that allocated the burden of proof to the State to prove that supervised release was not warranted. In 2008, West filed a motion with the circuit court to interpret whether the amended statute continued to allocate the burden on the State. The circuit court denied West's motion, finding that the amendments unambiguously placed the burden of proof with the committed individual. West appealed, arguing that the burden of proof did not rest with the committed person, and if it did, such allocation would violate due process and equal protection. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute unambiguously places the burden of proof with the committed individual, and the appropriate burden of persuasion is clear and convincing evidence; and (2) this allocation does not violate due process and equal protection. View "State v. West" on Justia Law

In 2001, Glen Nordberg was committed as a sexually violent person pursuant to Wis. Stat. 980. Subsequently, Nordberg submitted several petitions for supervised release or discharge, including a petition in 2009 from which this appeal stemmed. The circuit court denied Nordberg's petition after reading Wis. Stat. 980.08(4)(cg) as placing the burden on the committed individual to prove by clear and convincing evidence that supervised release is warranted and finding that Nordberg had not met that burden. Nordberg filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the statute does not allocate the burden of proof to any party, and if the burden were on the individual, a clear and convincing evidence standard would be too onerous. The circuit court denied the motion. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court, holding that (1) Wis. Stat. 980.08(4) unambiguously places the burden of proof on the committed individual, and policy considerations dictate that the individual bear his burden of persuasion by clear and convincing evidence; and (2) requiring an individual lawfully committed under chapter 980 to carry the burden of proof in a petition for supervised release does not violate the due process or equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions. View "State v. Nordberg" on Justia Law