Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Todd Olson filed suit against Robert Farrar, alleging he was liable for property damage to Olson's trailer home and vehicle. Farrar's insurer, Mt. Morris Mutual Insurance Company, sought a declaration that it had neither a duty to defend nor a duty to indemnify Farrar under the terms of its insurance policy. The circuit court granted a declaratory and summary judgment in favor of Mt. Morris. The court of appeals reversed. Mt. Morris appealed, arguing that it had no duty to defend or indemnify because of certain coverage exclusions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the policy provisions at issue were ambiguous; therefore, the Court construed them in favor of coverage. Remanded. View "Olson v. Farrar" on Justia Law

Jason Goss was pulled over for a traffic stop, after which the officer discovered that Goss had a revoked license and, due to four prior drunk driving convictions, was subject to a .02 prohibited alcohol content (PAC) standard. While arresting Goss for the license offense, the officer noticed the odor of alcohol and asked Goss to provide a breath sample for a preliminary breath test (PBT). Goss was subsequently convicted for fifth offense drunk driving. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the officer's request for a PBT sample was made in violation of Wis. Stat. 343.303, which states that such requests may be made only where there is probable cause to believe the driver is operating a vehicle in violation of one of the statutes related to drunk driving. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under these circumstances, where Goss was known to be subject to a .02 PAC standard, the officer knew it would take very little alcohol for Goss to exceed that limit, and the officer smelled alcohol on Goss, there was probable cause to request a PBT breath sample. View "State v. Goss" on Justia Law

Pursuant to its power of eminent domain, the Wisconsin DOT acquired the property of 260 North 12th Street, LLC and Basil Ryan (collectively, Ryan). A jury awarded Ryan $2,001,725 as just compensation. Over Ryan's objection, the jury was presented evidence concerning the environmental contamination of Ryan's property and the cost to remediate it. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) evidence of environmental contamination and of remediation costs are admissible in condemnation proceedings subject to the circuit court's discretion; (2) the circuit court appropriately exercised its discretion when it admitted at trial testimony by the DOT's appraiser over Ryan's objection that the testimony was speculative; (3) the circuit court did not err when it excluded Ryan's expert witness as a result of Ryan's failure to timely disclose the witnesses in accordance with the court's scheduling order; and (4) the circuit court appropriately exercised its discretion when it rejected Ryan's proposed jury instructions in favor of the standard jury instruction on fair market value in the case of a total taking. View "260 North 12th St., LLC v. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

While representing a criminal defendant on appeal, the Office of the State Public Defender was sanctioned by the court of appeals in a footnote after the court found that the appendix to the assistant state public defender's brief was deficient and the attorney's certification of the appendix was false in violation of Wis. Stat. 809.19(2)(a). The Public Defender objected to the summary procedure used by the court of appeals in finding a violation of Rule 809.19(2)(a) without giving notice to counsel and without giving counsel an opportunity to be heard in writing. On review, the Supreme Court suggested that hereafter when the court of appeals considers imposing a sanction in such a situation, an order to show cause should be issued directing counsel to explain why a violation of Rule 809.12(2)(a) and (b) should not be found and why the attorney should not pay a stated amount of money to the clerk of the court as a sanction. Remanded with instructions to modify the footnote. View "State v. Nielsen" on Justia Law

A jury convicted David Domke of repeatedly sexually assaulting his ten-year-old stepdaughter. Domke moved for postconviction relief and a new trial based on the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. The circuit court denied the motion after concluding that while Domke had shown that counsel had performed deficiently, Domke had failed to show that the deficient performance had prejudiced him. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that Domke had established cumulative prejudice from three instances of deficient performance. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the circuit court's judgment of conviction, holding (1) Domke was not entitled to a new trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel because, although counsel performed deficiently in three aspects during trial, those errors did not prejudice Domke; and (2) under the totality of the circumstances, Domke received a fair trial. View "State v. Domke" on Justia Law

In 1997, a jury found that Edwin West was a sexually violent person. West was committed under Wis. Stat. 980.08(1), which allows persons committed under chapter 980 to petition for supervised release into the community. In 2005, the legislature amended the statute, removing language that allocated the burden of proof to the State to prove that supervised release was not warranted. In 2008, West filed a motion with the circuit court to interpret whether the amended statute continued to allocate the burden on the State. The circuit court denied West's motion, finding that the amendments unambiguously placed the burden of proof with the committed individual. West appealed, arguing that the burden of proof did not rest with the committed person, and if it did, such allocation would violate due process and equal protection. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute unambiguously places the burden of proof with the committed individual, and the appropriate burden of persuasion is clear and convincing evidence; and (2) this allocation does not violate due process and equal protection. View "State v. West" on Justia Law

In 2001, Glen Nordberg was committed as a sexually violent person pursuant to Wis. Stat. 980. Subsequently, Nordberg submitted several petitions for supervised release or discharge, including a petition in 2009 from which this appeal stemmed. The circuit court denied Nordberg's petition after reading Wis. Stat. 980.08(4)(cg) as placing the burden on the committed individual to prove by clear and convincing evidence that supervised release is warranted and finding that Nordberg had not met that burden. Nordberg filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the statute does not allocate the burden of proof to any party, and if the burden were on the individual, a clear and convincing evidence standard would be too onerous. The circuit court denied the motion. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court, holding that (1) Wis. Stat. 980.08(4) unambiguously places the burden of proof on the committed individual, and policy considerations dictate that the individual bear his burden of persuasion by clear and convincing evidence; and (2) requiring an individual lawfully committed under chapter 980 to carry the burden of proof in a petition for supervised release does not violate the due process or equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions. View "State v. Nordberg" on Justia Law

In 2005, after the Town of Linwood assessed property owned by Stupar River for property tax purposes, Stupar River filed an objection with the town Board of Review, arguing that the 2005 assessment was significantly higher than its fair market value in violation of Wis. Stat. 70.32(1). The Board affirmed the assessed value. The circuit court remanded the action to the Board with instructions to reassess the subject property. The circuit court then affirmed the Board's determination. The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the circuit court. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that the assessment upheld by the Board was made according to law and was supported by a reasonable view of the evidence. View "State ex rel. Stupar River L.L.C. v. Town of Linwood Board of Review" on Justia Law

Gregg Kandutsch was convicted for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. The evidence was based in large part upon inference from a report generated by an electronic monitoring device (EMD) that Kandutsch was wearing. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, holding (1) neither the EMD itself nor the report derived from it was so unusually complex or esoteric that expert testimony was required to lay a foundation for the admission of the report into evidence, and the testimony of two Department of Corrections (DOC) agents was sufficient to provide a foundation for the report's accuracy and reliability; and (2) a computer-generated report is not hearsay when it is the result of an automated process free from human input or intervention. View "State v. Kandutsch" on Justia Law

David Balliette was convicted of, inter alia, homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle. Balliette filed a motion for postconviction relief, raising four claims, including two for ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The trial court denied all four postconviction claims, and the court of appeals affirmed. Balliette then filed a motion for a new trial, alleging ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel for counsel's failure to raise certain claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The circuit court denied the motion, holding Balliette had made merely conclusory allegations and did not provide a sufficient reason for raising the claim now rather than previously, and, therefore, an evidentiary hearing was not warranted. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, ruling that Balliette's motion alleged sufficient material facts that, if true, would warrant relief, and concluding that Balliette alleged a sufficient reason for not previously raising the claim. On review, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that Balliette was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because the allegations in his motion for a new trial did not provide sufficient material facts that, if proven, demonstrated an entitlement to the relief sought. View "State v. Balliette" on Justia Law