Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this breach of contract case, the jury found that a contract existed between Erie Insurance Exchange and Best Price Plumbing but that Erie did not breach the contract. The circuit court granted Best Price's motion after verdict to change the jury's answer. The court then concluded as a matter of law that a breach occurred, and it entered judgment in favor of Best Price. The court of appeals reversed and reinstated the jury verdict. Best Price appealed, asserting that under State. v. Kenosha Home Telephone Co., it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) any error in the jury instructions was forfeited because the jury was not asked to answer any questions that would support the application of the Kenosha Home Telephone rule as a matter of law; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict, and the circuit court was clearly wrong when it changed that answer to the verdict question. View "Best Price Plumbing, Inc. v. Erie Ins. Exch." on Justia Law

Thomas and Barbara Jandre filed an action against, inter alia, a physician and her insurer, asserting (1) the physician negligently diagnosed Thomas with Bell's palsy, and (2) the physician breached her duty to inform a patient by failing to inform Thomas of a diagnostic test that was available to rule out the possibility of a stroke. The circuit court found that the physician's diagnosis of Bell's palsy was not negligent but that the physician was negligent with respect to her duty to inform the patient. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision after applying the reasonable patient standard, holding that under circumstances of the present case involving a non-negligent diagnosis of Bell's palsy, the circuit court could not determine, as a matter of law, that the physician had no duty to inform Thomas of the possibility that the cause of his symptoms might be a blocked artery and of the availability of alternative, non-invasive means of ruling out or confirming the source of his symptoms. View "Jandre v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis." on Justia Law

Defendant Devin Felix was convicted of second-degree intentional homicide. The court of appeals reversed, holding that statements and physical evidence obtained from Defendant outside of the home after Miranda warnings were given and waived following a warrantless in-home arrest made in violation of Payton v. New York were not sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful arrest as to be lawful. At issue before the Supreme Court was which analysis governed the admissibility of such evidence, Brown v. Illinois or New York v. Harris, both decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals after adopting the Harris exception to the exclusionary rule for certain evidence obtained after a Payton violation, holding that, where police had probable cause to arrest before the unlawful entry, a warrantless arrest from Defendant's home in violation of Payton required neither the suppression of statements outside of the home after Miranda rights were given and waived nor the suppression of physical evidence obtained from Defendant outside of the home. View "State v. Felix" on Justia Law

Michael May sought to reduce his child support payments to his former wife, Suzanne May, approximately one year after entry of an order by the circuit court establishing a thirty-three-month unmodifiable floor for child support payments pursuant to a stipulation entered into by the parties. The court of appeals certified the appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court, holding that the Mays' stipulation and order for child support was enforceable, as (1) the parties freely and knowingly entered into the stipulation at issue, and the terms of the stipulation were fair and equitable to the parties; (2) the agreement was not contrary to public policy because the circuit court retained its equitable power to consider circumstances in existence when the stipulation was challenged that were unforeseen by the parties when they entered into the agreement if those circumstances adversely affected the best interests of the children; and (3) Michael did not demonstrate the existence of such circumstances. View "May v. May" on Justia Law

Robert Johnson filed a summons and complaint against Cintas Corporation, alleging he had automobile liability insurance coverage through Cintas. Johnson subsequently served his summons and complaint upon the registered agent for Cintas Corporation No. 2, a wholly owned subsidiary of Cintas. Johnson then amended his summons and complaint to name Cintas No. 2 as the correct defendant. The circuit court granted default judgment against Cintas No. 2 and denied that Cintas No. 2 was entitled to notice of the amended summons and complaint. The court of appeals reversed, holding that because Johnson's summons and complaint did not name Cintas No. 2 as a defendant, the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over Cintas No. 2, and therefore, the default judgment was void. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that service in this case was fundamentally defective because Johnson failed to name Cintas No. 2 as a defendant in his summons and complaint, and therefore, the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over Cintas No. 2, regardless of the manner in which Cintas No. 2 held itself out to the public or to Johnson specifically. View "Johnson v. Cintas Corp. No. 2 " on Justia Law

After Employer and Employee settled a suit Employee brought against Employer, Employer's Insurer paid the policy's maximum of $2 million pursuant to an oral funding agreement. Insurer then filed an action against Employer, seeking a declaration that its policies provided no coverage for Employee's claim and reimbursement of the $2 million. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Employer on March 26, but the parties agreed to delay entry of a final judgment. On July 8, the circuit court entered a final judgment. Insurer appealed on August 12. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely, concluding that the circuit court's March 26 decision and order was the final order for purposes of appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Insurer's appeal was timely because although the March 26 order arguably disposed of the entire matter in litigation between the parties, it did not unambiguously do so, and therefore, the July 8 judgment was final for purposes of appeal; (2) the funding agreement was an enforceable contract; (3) under these circumstances, an insurer cannot recover payments based on an unjust enrichment theory; and (4) Insurer's asserted mistake of fact did not provide grounds for voiding the contract. View "Admiral Ins. Co. v. Paper Converting Machine Co." on Justia Law

Crown Castle USA, Inc. commenced an action against Orion Construction Group, LLC in Pennsylvania seeking monetary damages to satisfy an account receivable. The court entered default judgment against Orion Construction, and Crown Castle filed its foreign judgment in the office of the clerk of court of Outagamie County. The county court commissioner ordered Orion Logistics, LLC, a non-judgment debtor third party, to testify at a supplemental proceeding. The court of appeals affirmed the order. At issue on appeal was whether Orion Logistics could be compelled to testify at the supplemental proceeding under Wis. Stat. 816.06 when it was not a judgment debtor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 816.06 does not grant a judgment creditor the right to compel a non-judgment debtor third party to testify at supplemental proceedings. View "Crown Castle USA, Inc. v. Orion Logistics, LLC" on Justia Law

Employee was employed by Employer as a driver. Due to lack of work, Employee was laid off indefinitely. Three months later, Employer recalled Employee. Employee was required to submit to a pre-employment drug test, to which he tested positive. Subsequently, Employer discharged Employee. The Labor and Industry Review Commission determined that Employee was eligible for unemployment benefits after rejecting Employer's argument that Employee was discharged for misconduct connected with his work under Wis. Stat. 108.04(5). The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted review but dismissed it as improvidently granted, concluding that a decision by the Court in the instant case would not develop or clarify the law, as a Wis. Stat. 108.04(8)(b), enacted while the case was proceeding, clarified that an employee is ineligible for benefits if the employer withdraws or fails to extend an offer of work due to a positive test result for illegal drugs. View "Michael J. Waldvogel Trucking, LLC v. State Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n" on Justia Law

Petitioners asked the Supreme Court to take jurisdiction of an original action challenging rules adopted by the Government Accountability Board (GAB). Before the Court accepted the original action, four justices voted to enjoin the GAB from enforcing the rules Petitioners were challenging. The Court then accepted the original action, leaving the injunction in place. The participating justices then unanimously agreed that the order enjoining Respondents from enforcing the rules should be vacated. However, the court was equally divided on the rationale: half of the justices would conclude that the GAB had the authority to promulgate the amendments, and half of the justices would dismiss the action on the ground that an original action was improvidently granted. The action was subsequently dismissed, and the order enjoining Respondents from enforcing the rules was vacated. View "Wis. Prosperity Network v. Myse" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this action consisted of Heritage Farms and several other landowners whose properties were damaged as a result of a forest fire. A jury determined the fire was negligently caused by Jeffrey Knaack. Post-verdict, Plaintiffs moved for judgment against Knaack, the campground, and their respective insurers (Defendants) for double damages and attorney fees and costs under Wis. Stat. 26.21(1). The circuit court awarded Heritage Farms its attorney fees and costs but declined to double Heritage Farms' damages. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) pursuant to section 26.21(1), if it is determined that the owner's property was injured or destroyed by a forest fire that occurred through willfulness, malice, or negligence, the property owner is entitled to double damages; (2) because the jury determined Heritage Farms' property was damaged by a forest fire caused by Knaack's negligence, Heritage Farms was entitled to double damages; (3) pursuant to Wis. Stat. 841.04(4), Heritage Farms was entitled to twelve percent interest on its double damages award from the date of the jury's verdict and to twelve percent interest on its award of attorney fees and costs from the date of that award; and (4) section 814.04(4) was constitutional. View "Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co." on Justia Law