Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was a suspect in two arsons committed in a nearby town. On March 30, a detective met with Defendant and asked him about the two arsons. Defendant requested counsel, and the detective ceased questioning him. On April 20, the detective arrested Defendant for the arson fires. Defendant asked if his attorney could be "present for this" before being brought into an interrogation room. After waiving his Miranda rights, Defendant made incriminating statements to the detective. Defendant was charged with the arsons and moved to suppress the statements he made after he waived his right to counsel on April 20. The circuit court granted the motion, finding that the detective violated Defendant's right to counsel on April 20 when he interrogated Defendant after Defendant unequivocally, unambiguously requested counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because nineteen days had passed between when Defendant was released from custody and when he was reinterrogated, the March 30 invocation did not bar the interrogation on April 20; but (2) after Defendant's request for an attorney on April, police should have ceased questioning him, and because they did not, Defendant's statements made after that request must be suppressed. View "State v. Edler" on Justia Law

The Outagamie County petitioned for Melanie L.'s mental heath commitment. The circuit court granted the petition and committed Melanie to the County's custody for six months. The court also issued an order for involuntary medication and treatment. Before the end of the six month period, the County sought an extension of both orders for an additional twelve months. The circuit court granted the petition. Melanie appealed the extension of the involuntary medication order, contending that the County did not meet its burden of proving her incompetent to refuse treatment under Wis. Stat. 51.61(1)(g)(4.b). The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the County failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Melanie was substantially incapable of making an informed choice as to whether to accept or refuse the medication, and therefore did not overcome Melanie's presumption of competence to make an informed choice to refuse medication. View "Outagamie County v. Melanie L." on Justia Law

Samuel J.H. was committed to the care and custody of the County Human Services Department. After Samuel's initial placement in outpatient care, the Department transferred him to an inpatient facility because of his erratic and delusional behavior. Samuel petitioned for a review of his transfer and a transfer back to outpatient status, contending that he was entitled to a hearing within ten days of his transfer to the inpatient facility. The circuit court denied Samuel's petitions, concluding (1) a patient is entitled to a hearing within ten days of his transfer to a more restrictive placement only when the transfer is based on a violation of treatment conditions; and (2) Samuel's transfer to the inpatient facility was not based on a violation of his treatment conditions but rather on reasonable medical and clinical judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Wis. Stat. 51-35(1)(e) does not require a hearing to be conducted within ten days of a transfer to a more restrictive placement when the transfer is based on reasonable medical and clinical judgment. View "Manitowoc County v. Samuel J. H." on Justia Law

David and Marcia Rosecky entered into a parentage agreement (agreement) with Monica and Cory Schissel under which the parties agreed that Monica would become pregnant and carry a child for the Roseckys. Through artificial insemination using Monica's egg and David's sperm, Monica became pregnant and later gave birth to a child. Shortly before the child's birth, Monica decided she did not want to give up her parental rights and sought custody and placement of the child. David, in response, sought enforcement of the agreement. The circuit court concluded that the agreement was not enforceable and awarded sole custody of the child to David, primary placement to David, and secondary placement to Monica. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a parentage agreement is a valid, enforceable contract unless its enforcement is contrary to the best interests of the child; (2) none of the traditional defenses to the enforcement of a contact applied in this case to render the agreement unenforceable; and (3) the circuit court erred in rendering its custody and placement decision without consideration of the agreement. Remanded for a hearing on custody and placement. View "Rosecky v. Schissel" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to two felonies. The Department of Corrections prepared a presentence investigation report (PSI) to assist in Defendant's sentencing, but when the circuit court and the parties received the PSI, Defendant disputed some of the information in the report. The circuit court judge ordered that a second PSI be prepared omitting the disputed information and that the first PSI be destroyed. The judge's successor modified the destruction order after Defendant was sentenced, ordering that the first PSI be sealed rather than destroyed because he questioned the court's authority to order the destruction of PSIs. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) courts do not have either express or implied statutory authority to order the destruction of PSIs; and (2) courts lack the inherent authority to order the destruction of PSIs on the facts before the Court because that power is not necessary to a court's administration of justice. View "State v. Melton" on Justia Law

After receiving a work-related injury during his employment by Employer, Employee applied for worker's compensation benefits. An ALJ ordered that further medical procedures were required to determine whether Employee was permanently and totally disabled, but the Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) proceeded to award benefits to Employee for his permanent total disability. Employer filed a complaint seeking judicial review of LIRC's decision. The circuit court affirmed. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the circuit court was required to dismiss Employer's complaint for lack of competency based on Employer's failure to name its insurer (Insurer) as an "adverse party" pursuant to Wis. Stat. 102.23(1)(a). The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to affirm LIRC's decision, holding (1) the circuit court had competency to adjudicate Employer's complaint notwithstanding Employer's omission of Insurer because Insurer was not an "adverse party" for purposes of section 102.23(1)(a); and (2) LIRC did not exceed its authority in awarding Employee permanent total disability benefits, and its finding that Employee was entitled to benefits on an odd-lot basis was supported by credible and substantial evidence. View "Xcel Energy Servs., Inc. v. Labor & Ind. Review Comm'n " on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted first-degree intentional homicide. Defendant had previously entered pleas of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect but later withdrew the not guilty pleas as part of a plea agreement. After he was sentenced, Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel and trial court error because he was not informed about the possibility of a bifurcated plea with the right to a jury trial focused on the issue of his mental responsibility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's claim alleging ineffective assistance was insufficient, as Defendant never alleged (i) his trial counsel failed to inform him that he had the option of pleading guilty to the crimes but also not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, or (ii) if trial counsel had informed him of the option of a trial focused solely upon mental responsibility, he would have chosen that option; and (2) Defendant's second claim was also insufficient because Defendant failed to state that, due to a defect in the plea colloquy, he did not enter his pleas knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. View "State v. Burton" on Justia Law

Petitioner was a minor diagnosed with aplastic anemia. Petitioner opposed any life-saving blood transfusions on religious grounds. Petitioner's parents supported her position. The circuit court ultimately appointed a temporary guardian for the purpose of deciding whether to consent to medical treatment. While Petitioner's appeal was pending, the order appointing the temporary guardian expired. The court of appeals dismissed Petitioner's appeal, finding that the issues presented were moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the issues presented in this case were moot; and (2) it was unwise to address the moot issues because the legislature was far better able to decide substantial social policy issues such as those presented in this case. View "In re Sheila W." on Justia Law

Amjad Tufail leased property to Midwest Hospitality pursuant to a lease agreement. The City Board of Zoning Appeals ultimately approved Midwest's application for a special use permit to operate a Church's Chicken fast-food restaurant with a drive-through on the property but placed conditions on the permit. Midwest subsequently notified Tufail that it was no longer responsible for lease payments because Tufail made a false representation to Midwest regarding the terms of the lease. Specifically, Midwest contended that Tufail represented that Midwest may not be prevented from using the property for certain specified purposes. Tufail brought this breach of contract action against Midwest. Midwest counterclaimed for breach of contract, deceptive advertising, and unjust enrichment. The trial court ruled in favor of Tufail. The court of appeals reversed, determining that Midwest's early termination of the lease was justified by Tufail's misrepresentation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Tufail's representation was not false where (1) the representation did not include any use of the property as a Church's Chicken fast-food restaurant with a drive-through; and (2) the circuit court found Midwest was not prevented from using the property for the uses specified in the lease. Remanded. View "Tufail v. Midwest Hospitality, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioners commenced this action against Defendants - a voluntary firefighter (Firefighter), the fire department of which Firefighter was a member, and their insurers - alleging that Firefighter negligently caused their injuries when he drove his vehicle through a red stop signal and collided in the intersection with a vehicle carrying Petitioners. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that Firefighter was subject to public officer immunity and that his acts did not fall within the ministerial duty exception to that immunity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because Firefighter was within the scope of his employment when the collision occurred, he was within the class of individuals that may be shielded by public officer immunity; but (2) Firefighter was not entitled to that immunity because his acts in proceeding through the red stop signal without an audible signal violated a ministerial duty. Remanded. View "Brown v. Acuity, A Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law