Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Defendant of two counts of robbery, party to a crime. Twelve years later, Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief, arguing that he was entitled to a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence and in the interest of justice. Defendant's arguments stemmed from new expert analysis of a video of one of the robberies. By applying new technology - digital photogrammetry - one expert concluded that Defendant was too tall to be the robber in the video. The circuit court denied relief. The court of appeals reversed, finding that Defendant was entitled to a new trial based on the photogrammetry evidence and in the interest of justice because the jury was precluded from hearing photogrammetry evidence, and therefore, the real controversy was not fully tried. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) there was not a reasonable probability that a jury, looking at both the evidence presented at trial and the new digital photogrammetry evidence, would have a reasonable doubt as to Defendant's guilt; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to a new trial in the interest of justice because the controversy was fully tried even though the jury did not hear the photogrammetry evidence. View "State v. Avery" on Justia Law

Petitioner's child care license was revoked by the Department of Children and Families pursuant to Wis. Stat. 48.685(5)(br), the "caregiver law," which permanently bars those who have ever been convicted of specified predicate crimes from holding a child care license. An ALJ dismissed Petitioner's appeal of the revocation without a hearing based on her conviction on a guilty plea of violating Wis. Stat. 49.12(1) and (6) for a food stamp offense twenty years earlier. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that a remand for an administrative hearing was required to determine whether the facts underlying the conviction established it as a conviction barred under the caregiver law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) due deference should be accorded the Department's interpretation and application of the caregiver law; (2) Petitioner had a right to a hearing; and (3) because genuine issues of material fact existed, the ALJ erred in dismissing Petitioner's appeal without a hearing for factual development. View "Jamerson v. Dep't of Children & Families" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first degree sexual assault of a child. Prior to trial, Defendant moved to suppress statements he made during an undisputedly non-custodial interrogation, claiming they were involuntary. The circuit court found Defendant's statements were voluntary under the totality of the circumstances and allowed admission of the statements at trial. Defendant then testified at trial and was convicted. Defendant appealed on the grounds that the statements were involuntary and were thus improperly admitted. The court of appeals assumed the statements were involuntary but held that, in light of the other evidence produced at trial, the admission of the statements was harmless error. The Supreme Court affirmed but under a different analysis, holding that the admission of Defendant's statements at trial was not error because, under the totality of the circumstances, the statements were voluntary. View "State v. Lemoine" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from litigation against Juneau County relating to an employee of the county sheriff's department. The County's defense was conducted by a law firm, which was retained to represent the County by the County's insurance company. The law firm prepared and sent to the insurance company invoices for its legal services rendered. Relying on the Public Records Law, the Juneau County Star-Times sought access to these invoices. The circuit court denied the Star-Times' claims, concluding that the invoices generated by the law firm did not fall within Wis. Stat. 19.36(3) of the Public Records Law, the "contractors' records" provision, because the County had not contracted with the insurance company for the purposes of collecting the information the Star-Times was seeking. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the matter to the circuit court to order the County to provide unredacted copies of the invoices to the Star-Times, holding that section 19.36(3) applied to the invoices. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 19.36(3) governed the accessibility of the invoices in this case. View "Juneau County Star-Times v. Juneau County" on Justia Law

This case arose out of an automobile accident involving a vehicle owned by the State and driven by Respondent. Petitioners were the estate of Danny Hopgood and individuals who suffered injuries arising from the accident. Petitioners filed complaints, alleging that Respondent was negligent and that his negligence caused the injuries. Because Respondent was an agent of the State Petitioners served notices of claims upon the attorney general. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Respondent, concluding that the notices were not properly "sworn to" pursuant to Wis. Stat. 893.82.(5). The court of appeals summarily affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) to the extent that Newkirk v. Dep't of Transp. expanded the requirements set forth under Kellner v. Christian for a notice of claim to be properly sworn to, it misapplied Kellner, and that language was heretofore withdrawn; and (2) the notices in this case met the two requirements set forth in Kellner for a notice of claim to be properly "sworn to" under section 893.82(5). View "Estate of Hopgood v. Boyd" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded no contest to three felonies on the morning of a scheduled trial in which he was facing six felony charges. As part of the plea bargain, the State agreed to dismiss three felony charges, but there was no agreement that the dismissed charges would be "read-in" under Wis. Stat. 973.20(1g)(b). At sentencing, the circuit court explicitly considered the dismissed charges in explaining and imposing Defendant's sentence. Defendant subsequently challenged the validity of the sentence. The circuit court denied Defendant's motion for resentencing, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a circuit court may consider dismissed charges in imposing sentence; (2) the circuit court here did not use the dismissed charges for an improper purpose; and (3) Defendant had adequate opportunity to refute the purported inaccuracies of the facts underlying the dismissed charges. View "State v. Frey" on Justia Law

The circuit court dismissed the inverse condemnation claims of several landowners whose property was close or immediately adjacent to the regional airport. The landowners alleged that an extension of the airports runway by 1500 feet amounted to the compensable taking of an easement because the resulting overflights had adverse effects on their properties. The circuit court acknowledged that the subject properties had been adversely affected but concluded that for a taking to be compensable, the property owner must be deprived of practically all of the beneficial use of the property. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the standard for regulatory takings does not apply to physical occupation cases. At issue on appeal was what standard to apply in airplane overflight cases for determining a taking. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a taking occurs in airplane overflight cases when government action results in aircraft flying over a landowner's property low enough and with sufficient frequency to have a direct and immediate effect on the use and enjoyment of the property. View "Brenner v. City of New Richmond" on Justia Law

The circuit court suppressed an incriminating statement that Defendant made to police during custodial interrogation. The court of appeals reversed, holding that even though Defendant invoked his right to counsel during questioning, he later initiated conversation with his police interrogator and thereafter knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights before making the incriminating statement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendants' Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and his equivalent right under the Wisconsin Constitution were not violated, as Defendant withdrew his request for an attorney by voluntarily initiating a request to resume the questioning; and (2) the court of appeals was not required to disregard State v. Middleton, but Middleton was factually distinguishable from this case and was now overruled in its entirety. View "State v. Stevens" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions of four counts of child enticement after the circuit court declined to suppress an incriminating statement Defendant made to police officers who were conducting a follow up investigation of incriminating admissions that Defendant made to his probation agent during a compelled polygraph examination. Defendant claimed that his admissions to the agent were subject to use and derivative use immunity, and that the derivative use immunity covered the subsequent statement he made to the police, even though this statement was preceded by a valid Miranda warning. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) Defendant's statement to officers was subject to derivative use immunity and could not be used in any subsequent criminal trial; and (2) Defendant's compelled statement to his probation agent, his subsequent statement to the police, and any evidence derived from either statement must be suppressed in any criminal trial. View "State v. Spaeth" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty by a jury of one count of possession of a firearm by a felon and one count of carrying a concealed weapon. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Defendant made incriminating statements while in police custody and while being subjected to interrogation by police officers, he had a Fifth Amendment right to receive Miranda warnings; (2) accordingly, it was error to admit the incriminating statements at trial; and (3) because the State did not meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found Defendant guilty absent the error, the error was not harmless. View "State v. Martin" on Justia Law