Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Bostco LLC and Parisian, Inc. (hereinafter, Bostco) filed a complaint against Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District (MMSD), claiming that MMSD's negligent operation and maintenance of a sewerage tunnel beneath Bostco's property resulted in excessive groundwater seepage into the tunnel, causing significant damage to Bostco's buildings. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the circuit court. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals on all but one of the issues, holding (1) MMSD was not entitled to immunity for its construction and maintenance of the tunnel; (2) the court of appeals erred in denying the equitable relief of abatement, as MMSD's duty to abate the private nuisance that MMSD caused by its negligent maintenance of the deep tunnel was not statutorily abrogated; (3) the damage cap capping the damages recoverable in an action against governmental entities at $50,000 does not violate equal protection; and (4) MMSD had sufficient notice of Bostco's claim. Remanded. View "Bostco LLC v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist." on Justia Law

Musson Brothers, Inc. was conducting sewer removal and installation as a contractor for the Wisconsin Department of Transportation (DOT) when Mark Showers' property was flooded. Showers filed a complaint against Musson and the City alleging that the two entities were jointly and severally liable for the negligent acts or omissions that caused Showers' building to flood. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the City and Musson, finding that the entities were entitled to governmental immunity. The court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment for Musson, finding that Musson was entitled to governmental contractor immunity as a statutory "agent" under Wis. Stat. 893.80(4). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Musson failed to show it was acting as a governmental entity's agent for purposes of the alleged injury-causing conduct because it was not acting pursuant to "reasonably precise specifications" as required under section 893.80(4); and (2) in asserting the defense of immunity Musson failed to assert that the acts for which it claimed immunity were "acts done in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial functions" as required under section 893.80(4). Remanded. View "Showers Appraisals, LLC v. Musson Bros., Inc. " on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of second-degree sexual assault by use of force. Defendant appealed, contending that his right to confrontation was violated when the circuit court allowed a state crime lab analyst to testify that an out-of-state lab produced DNA profiles of semen found on the victims' swabs, which the analyst discovered resulted in a match to Defendant. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Defendant's confrontation rights were not violated because the DNA profiles produced by the out-of-state lab were not testimonial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the expert's testimony did not violate Defendant's right to confrontation; and (2) even assuming that the admission of the expert's testimony violated Defendant's right to confrontation, the error was harmless in light of Defendant's previous admissions of sexual intercourse with the victims. View "State v. Deadwiller" on Justia Law

Defendant condemned a pair of easements on the residential property of Plaintiffs to facilitate the placement of high-voltage transmission lines. Plaintiffs filed a right-to-take action, arguing that because the proposed easements would cover more than half of their property and render their residential improvements obsolete, they would be left with an "uneconomic remnant" under Wis. Stat. 32.06(3m). The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, concluding that Plaintiffs' property, after the taking of the easements, was an uneconomic remnant, and ordered Defendant to acquire the entire property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that after Defendant took two easements for transmission lines, Plaintiffs' property was an uneconomic remnant because its condition was such that it was of substantially impaired economic viability as either a residential or an industrial parcel. View "Waller v. Am. Transmission Co." on Justia Law

Several entities filed a petition to raise the water levels of Lake Koshkonong designated by the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR). The DNR rejected the petition, and an ALJ affirmed. The circuit court and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the DNR's conclusions of law were subject to a de novo review; (2) the DNR has broad statutory authority to protect non-navigable wetlands and other non-navigable water resources and may consider the water level impact on all adjacent property under Wis. Stat. 31.02(1); (3) the DNR may consider Wis. Admin. Code NR 103 water quality standards when making a water level determination under section 31.02(1) that affects wetlands and may apply these standards when appropriate after weighing the factors in the statute; and (4) the DNR erroneously excluded most testimony on the economic impact of lower water levels in the lake on the residents, businesses, and tax bases adjacent to and near the lake. Remanded. View "Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. Wis. Dep't of Natural Res." on Justia Law

Joseph McLeod, Decedent's husband, filed a petition for formal administration of Decedent's estate and his appointment as personal representative. McLeod also asserted his right to a share of Decedent's estate. Patricia Mudlaff, Decedent's stepdaughter, also filed a petition for formal administrative and appointment as personal representative, contending that Decedent's marriage to McLeod was invalid because Decedent lacked the mental capacity to consent to the marriage and requesting that the circuit court declare Decedent's marriage void. The circuit court rejected Mudlaff's argument, concluding that annulment was the only method to void a marriage and that Wisconsin law prohibits annulment after the death of one of the parties to the marriage. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) annulment is not the exclusive remedy to challenge the validity of a marriage; and (2) in an estate action challenging a marriage, a court may use its declaratory judgment powers to declare that a marriage prohibited by law was void and incapable of validation by the parties to the marriage. Remanded. View "Mudlaff v. McLeod" on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased certain batches of concrete from Defendant that were allegedly defective. Plaintiff used the concrete to pour outdoor installations at various properties. When problems arose with the installations, several property owners transferred their putative right to sue Defendant over to Plaintiff. Plaintiff then sued Defendant in both its own name and in that of the assignees, alleging tort and contract claims, among others. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding, inter alia, (1) Plaintiff's claims through the property owners and its tort claims were barred by the economic loss doctrine, and (2) damages were insufficiently established to support the remaining claims. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in determining that the claims Plaintiff asserted through the assignments were valid when, with two exceptions, the economic loss doctrine barred the homeowners from suing Defendant and thus barred Plaintiff from suing in their name; but (2) the court of appeals correctly reversed the circuit court for finding all of the asserted damages speculative. Remanded with directions to dismiss the claims asserted through the assignments and to allow the remaining claims to proceed to trial. View "United Concrete & Constr., Inc. v. Red-D-Mix Concrete, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of reckless homicide and possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant's convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a motion pursuant to Wis. Stat. 974.06, alleging that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. The circuit court dismissed the motion for exceeding the page length limit. Two days later, Defendant filed a Cherry motion to vacate his assessed DNA surcharge, which the circuit court denied as untimely. Defendant subsequently refiled his original section 974.06 motion within the page limit requirement. The circuit court denied the motion on the merits. The court of appeals affirmed but on different grounds, holding that Defendant's second section 974.06 was procedurally barred because Defendant did not raise his ineffective assistance of counsel arguments in his Cherry motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a defendant is not required to raise postconviction ineffective assistance of counsel arguments in a Cherry motion; but (2) Defendant's appellate attorney was not ineffective. View "State v. Starks" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree intentional homicide. Defendant subsequently sought postconviction relief, arguing that his constitutional and statutory rights were violated when the trial judge held separate in-chambers discussions with two jurors regarding a potential bias issue outside Defendant's presence. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the circuit court's decision to exclude Defendant from the in-chambers meetings with the jurors did not deprive Defendant of a fair and just hearing because his attorneys were present at the in-chambers meetings and Defendant would not have been able to contribute anything to the circuit court's inquiry of the jurors; and (2) Defendant's statutory right to be present during voir dire was not violated because, in this case, the trial had already commenced and the jurors had been selected when the in-chambers meeting took place. View "State v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Defendant hosted an underage drinking party in which one of the guests known to become belligerent when intoxicated assaulted and seriously injured another guest. The victim sued Defendant and his insurer (Insurer) for damages for his injuries. Insurer disputed coverage, arguing that it had no duty to defend and indemnify Defendant because there was no "accident" or "occurrence" under Defendant's family's homeowner's insurance policy where Defendant's actions were intentional. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Insurer. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that there was an occurrence because the assault was an accident when viewed from the standpoint of the injured person or Defendant, the insured. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) viewed from the standpoint of a reasonable insured, Defendant's intentional actions in setting up a drinking party and procuring alcohol for underage guests, including one known to become belligerent when intoxicated, created a direct risk of harm resulting in bodily injury; and (2) thus, the victim's bodily injury was not caused by an "occurrence" within the meaning of the policy, and Insurer was not obligated to provide insurance coverage for Defendant. View "Schinner v. Gundrum" on Justia Law