Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of fleeing or attempting to elude a traffic officer. Defendant appealed, contending that the jury instructions given in this case required the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant violated Wis. Stat. 346.04(3) "by increasing the speed of the vehicle to flee" and that there was no evidence that Defendant increased the speed of his vehicle after law enforcement officers began to pursue him. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the disputed jury instruction was erroneous because it added a requirement to the statutory definition of the crime; but (2) it was clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found Defendant guilty of the crime of fleeing or attempting to elude an officer, and therefore, there was sufficient evidence to convict Defendant.View "State v. Beamon" on Justia Law

A six-person jury found Milwaukee County met its burden to involuntarily commit Appellant for mental illness treatment under Wis. Stat. 51.20, and the circuit court entered an order that committed Appellant for a period no longer than six months. Appellant appealed, arguing that the six-person non-unanimous jury available to her under section 51.20 violated equal protection guarantees. Specifically, Appellant argued that her equal protection rights were violated because only a six-person jury with a five/six determination is available to those subject to involuntary commitment under Chapter 51 when compared to the twelve-person jury with a requirement of unanimity for individuals subject to involuntary civil commitment proceedings under Chapter 980. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the differences in the jury provisions for initial commitment hearings under Chapter 51 and Chapter 980 do not violate Appellant's constitutional right to equal protection. View "Milwaukee County v. Mary F.-R." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case filed an amended complaint seeking a declaration that certain portions of 2011 Wis. Acts 10 and 32 violated the Wisconsin Constitution and asking for injunctive relief. The circuit court entered a declaratory judgment that granted partial summary judgment to Plaintiffs. During the pendency of the appeal, the circuit court held Defendant Commissioners in contempt. Thereafter, State Defendants brought an emergency motion to stay the contempt order, which the court of appeals denied. State Defendants subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court to stay the declaratory judgment and any subsequent circuit court orders. The Supreme Court (1) vacated the contempt order, which rendered State Defendants' motion to stay the contempt order moot, holding that the contempt order constituted an impermissible interference with the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; and (2) declined to rule on the stay of the declaratory judgment. View "Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker" on Justia Law

Petitioner and Respondent were divorced according to a judgment of divorce filed on July 20, 1989. The judgment awarded Petitioner half the value of Respondent's pension accrued during the span of the marriage and stated that a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) was required to be submitted to secure those rights. On September 13, 2010, Petitioner filed a motion seeking to compel Respondent to provide pension information so that the necessary QDRO could be prepared and his Wisconsin Retirement System (WRS) pension could be divided in accordance with the judgment of divorce. The circuit court denied Petitioner's motion for the entry of a QDRO on the grounds that the motion was barred by Wis. Stat. 893.40, a statute of repose, which states that an action upon a judgment or decree "shall be commenced within 20 years after the judgment or decree is entered or be barred." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Petitioner's motion was not barred by the operation of section 893.40 because (1) it was not until 1998 that legislation required WRS to accept QDROs for marriages that were terminated previously; and (2) therefore, the statute of repose will bar actions on such provisions after 2018. Remanded.View "Johnson v. Masters" on Justia Law

After a hearing, the City of Wausau decided not to renew Thomas and Suporn Nowell's Class B alcohol license. The circuit court affirmed the City's decision after reviewing the municipal decision under Wis. Stat. 125.12(2)(d). The court of appeals reversed, concluding that section 125.12(2)(d) required the circuit court to employ a de novo standard of review rather than the certiorari review employed by the circuit court in this case. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that certiorari is the correct standard of review for a court to apply when, pursuant to section 125.12(2)(d), it reviews a municipal decision not to renew an alcohol license. View "Nowell v. City of Wausau" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to first-degree sexual assault with a child. Defendant was convicted to a violation of Wis. Stat. 948.02(1)(d). The court of appeals ordered the judgment of conviction to be amended in accordance with the plea agreement and ordered the circuit court to list the correct crime, a violation of Wis. Stat. 948.02(1)(e). The court then remanded for resentencing because a structural error occurred when the circuit court imposed the sentence relying on the penalty provision for a violation of section 948.02(d) instead of the penalty provision for a violation of section 948.02(e). The State appealed. At issue on appeal was whether a circuit court's imposition of a sentence using inaccurate information that Defendant was subject to a mandatory minimum five-year period of confinement is structural error or subject to the application of harmless error analysis. The Supreme Court affirmed, but on different grounds, holding (1) the error in this case was subject to a harmless error analysis and was not a structural error; and (2) the error was not harmless.View "State v. Travis" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to charges of uttering a forgery as a repeater. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to a six-year term of imprisonment for the conviction. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief moving to withdraw his contest plea, arguing that it was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The circuit court denied Defendant's motion without requiring the State to prove that Defendant entered his plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The court stated that since Defendant was informed that he faced a six-year term of imprisonment and he received a six-year term of imprisonment, any error was harmless. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, as Defendant knew the maximum penalty that could be imposed and was verbally informed at the plea hearing of the penalty that he received; and (2) withdrawal of Defendant's plea was not necessary to correct a manifest injustice. View "State v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Assistant State Public Defender Steven Grunder was appointed as postconviction counsel for Michael Buchanan. On Buchanan's behalf, Grunder successfully filed a motion with the court of appeals seeking permission to cite Buchanan's presentence investigation report (PSI) in his appellate brief. The State filed a motion seeking the same permission to use the PSI for its own appellate brief. The court of appeals placed under seal all copies of Buchanan's brief and denied the State's motion for permission to cite the PSI. The State Public Defender (SPD) petitioned the Supreme Court to issue a supervisory writ vacating the court of appeals' order and clarifying that the parties in Buchanan's case did not need to ask permission before citing the PSI in their appellate briefs. The Supreme Court concluded (1) the SPD did not meet the requirements for issuance of a supervisory writ; and (2) pursuant to the Court's superintending and administrative authority, in a merit appeal, parties who are entitled "to have and keep a copy" of a PSI pursuant to Wis. Stat. 972.15(4m) need not ask any court's permission to reference a PSI in an appellate brief if the information does not reveal confidential information and is relevant to the appeal.View "Office of State Pub. Defender v. Court of Appeals" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty and was convicted of child abuse-recklessly causing great bodily harm and neglecting a child resulting in the child's death. Defendant's appealed the denial of his motion to suppress statements he made after he stated that he wanted an attorney on the grounds that an Edwards v. Arizona violation had occurred. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court properly denied the motion to suppress because Defendant was not in custody when he asked for an attorney, and therefore, Miranda's rule requiring that the interrogation cease upon a request for an attorney did not apply, and there was no constitutional violation and no bar to using Defendant's subsequent statements.View "State v. Lonkoski" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a claim with their insurer (Insurer) for underinsured motorist benefits after a car accident. Pursuant to a provision of the insurance policy, the parties submitted the dispute to an arbitration panel. Prior to the arbitration hearing, Insurer sought broad discovery under Wis. Stat. 804. Plaintiffs refused to comply with such discovery on the grounds that Wis. Stat. 788.07 controlled and permitted only the taking of certain depositions. The arbitration panel decided that Insurer was entitled to chapter 804 discovery. The circuit court reversed and directed that arbitration discovery would proceed as allowed by section 788.07. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiffs were not allowed to seek an interlocutory appeal, and that full chapter 804 discovery was available to Insurer. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) because no unusual circumstances justified an interlocutory appeal, Plaintiffs' action in the circuit court was premature; and (2) because Insurer failed to include an explicit, specific, and clearly drafted arbitration clause stating otherwise, discovery in this case was limited to that provided for in section 788.07. Remanded.View "Marlowe v. IDS Prop. Cas. Ins. Co." on Justia Law