Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff purchased certain batches of concrete from Defendant that were allegedly defective. Plaintiff used the concrete to pour outdoor installations at various properties. When problems arose with the installations, several property owners transferred their putative right to sue Defendant over to Plaintiff. Plaintiff then sued Defendant in both its own name and in that of the assignees, alleging tort and contract claims, among others. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding, inter alia, (1) Plaintiff's claims through the property owners and its tort claims were barred by the economic loss doctrine, and (2) damages were insufficiently established to support the remaining claims. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in determining that the claims Plaintiff asserted through the assignments were valid when, with two exceptions, the economic loss doctrine barred the homeowners from suing Defendant and thus barred Plaintiff from suing in their name; but (2) the court of appeals correctly reversed the circuit court for finding all of the asserted damages speculative. Remanded with directions to dismiss the claims asserted through the assignments and to allow the remaining claims to proceed to trial. View "United Concrete & Constr., Inc. v. Red-D-Mix Concrete, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of reckless homicide and possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant's convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a motion pursuant to Wis. Stat. 974.06, alleging that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. The circuit court dismissed the motion for exceeding the page length limit. Two days later, Defendant filed a Cherry motion to vacate his assessed DNA surcharge, which the circuit court denied as untimely. Defendant subsequently refiled his original section 974.06 motion within the page limit requirement. The circuit court denied the motion on the merits. The court of appeals affirmed but on different grounds, holding that Defendant's second section 974.06 was procedurally barred because Defendant did not raise his ineffective assistance of counsel arguments in his Cherry motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a defendant is not required to raise postconviction ineffective assistance of counsel arguments in a Cherry motion; but (2) Defendant's appellate attorney was not ineffective. View "State v. Starks" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree intentional homicide. Defendant subsequently sought postconviction relief, arguing that his constitutional and statutory rights were violated when the trial judge held separate in-chambers discussions with two jurors regarding a potential bias issue outside Defendant's presence. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the circuit court's decision to exclude Defendant from the in-chambers meetings with the jurors did not deprive Defendant of a fair and just hearing because his attorneys were present at the in-chambers meetings and Defendant would not have been able to contribute anything to the circuit court's inquiry of the jurors; and (2) Defendant's statutory right to be present during voir dire was not violated because, in this case, the trial had already commenced and the jurors had been selected when the in-chambers meeting took place. View "State v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Defendant hosted an underage drinking party in which one of the guests known to become belligerent when intoxicated assaulted and seriously injured another guest. The victim sued Defendant and his insurer (Insurer) for damages for his injuries. Insurer disputed coverage, arguing that it had no duty to defend and indemnify Defendant because there was no "accident" or "occurrence" under Defendant's family's homeowner's insurance policy where Defendant's actions were intentional. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Insurer. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that there was an occurrence because the assault was an accident when viewed from the standpoint of the injured person or Defendant, the insured. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) viewed from the standpoint of a reasonable insured, Defendant's intentional actions in setting up a drinking party and procuring alcohol for underage guests, including one known to become belligerent when intoxicated, created a direct risk of harm resulting in bodily injury; and (2) thus, the victim's bodily injury was not caused by an "occurrence" within the meaning of the policy, and Insurer was not obligated to provide insurance coverage for Defendant. View "Schinner v. Gundrum" on Justia Law

Defendant was a suspect in two arsons committed in a nearby town. On March 30, a detective met with Defendant and asked him about the two arsons. Defendant requested counsel, and the detective ceased questioning him. On April 20, the detective arrested Defendant for the arson fires. Defendant asked if his attorney could be "present for this" before being brought into an interrogation room. After waiving his Miranda rights, Defendant made incriminating statements to the detective. Defendant was charged with the arsons and moved to suppress the statements he made after he waived his right to counsel on April 20. The circuit court granted the motion, finding that the detective violated Defendant's right to counsel on April 20 when he interrogated Defendant after Defendant unequivocally, unambiguously requested counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because nineteen days had passed between when Defendant was released from custody and when he was reinterrogated, the March 30 invocation did not bar the interrogation on April 20; but (2) after Defendant's request for an attorney on April, police should have ceased questioning him, and because they did not, Defendant's statements made after that request must be suppressed. View "State v. Edler" on Justia Law

The Outagamie County petitioned for Melanie L.'s mental heath commitment. The circuit court granted the petition and committed Melanie to the County's custody for six months. The court also issued an order for involuntary medication and treatment. Before the end of the six month period, the County sought an extension of both orders for an additional twelve months. The circuit court granted the petition. Melanie appealed the extension of the involuntary medication order, contending that the County did not meet its burden of proving her incompetent to refuse treatment under Wis. Stat. 51.61(1)(g)(4.b). The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the County failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Melanie was substantially incapable of making an informed choice as to whether to accept or refuse the medication, and therefore did not overcome Melanie's presumption of competence to make an informed choice to refuse medication. View "Outagamie County v. Melanie L." on Justia Law

Samuel J.H. was committed to the care and custody of the County Human Services Department. After Samuel's initial placement in outpatient care, the Department transferred him to an inpatient facility because of his erratic and delusional behavior. Samuel petitioned for a review of his transfer and a transfer back to outpatient status, contending that he was entitled to a hearing within ten days of his transfer to the inpatient facility. The circuit court denied Samuel's petitions, concluding (1) a patient is entitled to a hearing within ten days of his transfer to a more restrictive placement only when the transfer is based on a violation of treatment conditions; and (2) Samuel's transfer to the inpatient facility was not based on a violation of his treatment conditions but rather on reasonable medical and clinical judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Wis. Stat. 51-35(1)(e) does not require a hearing to be conducted within ten days of a transfer to a more restrictive placement when the transfer is based on reasonable medical and clinical judgment. View "Manitowoc County v. Samuel J. H." on Justia Law

David and Marcia Rosecky entered into a parentage agreement (agreement) with Monica and Cory Schissel under which the parties agreed that Monica would become pregnant and carry a child for the Roseckys. Through artificial insemination using Monica's egg and David's sperm, Monica became pregnant and later gave birth to a child. Shortly before the child's birth, Monica decided she did not want to give up her parental rights and sought custody and placement of the child. David, in response, sought enforcement of the agreement. The circuit court concluded that the agreement was not enforceable and awarded sole custody of the child to David, primary placement to David, and secondary placement to Monica. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a parentage agreement is a valid, enforceable contract unless its enforcement is contrary to the best interests of the child; (2) none of the traditional defenses to the enforcement of a contact applied in this case to render the agreement unenforceable; and (3) the circuit court erred in rendering its custody and placement decision without consideration of the agreement. Remanded for a hearing on custody and placement. View "Rosecky v. Schissel" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to two felonies. The Department of Corrections prepared a presentence investigation report (PSI) to assist in Defendant's sentencing, but when the circuit court and the parties received the PSI, Defendant disputed some of the information in the report. The circuit court judge ordered that a second PSI be prepared omitting the disputed information and that the first PSI be destroyed. The judge's successor modified the destruction order after Defendant was sentenced, ordering that the first PSI be sealed rather than destroyed because he questioned the court's authority to order the destruction of PSIs. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) courts do not have either express or implied statutory authority to order the destruction of PSIs; and (2) courts lack the inherent authority to order the destruction of PSIs on the facts before the Court because that power is not necessary to a court's administration of justice. View "State v. Melton" on Justia Law

After receiving a work-related injury during his employment by Employer, Employee applied for worker's compensation benefits. An ALJ ordered that further medical procedures were required to determine whether Employee was permanently and totally disabled, but the Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) proceeded to award benefits to Employee for his permanent total disability. Employer filed a complaint seeking judicial review of LIRC's decision. The circuit court affirmed. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the circuit court was required to dismiss Employer's complaint for lack of competency based on Employer's failure to name its insurer (Insurer) as an "adverse party" pursuant to Wis. Stat. 102.23(1)(a). The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to affirm LIRC's decision, holding (1) the circuit court had competency to adjudicate Employer's complaint notwithstanding Employer's omission of Insurer because Insurer was not an "adverse party" for purposes of section 102.23(1)(a); and (2) LIRC did not exceed its authority in awarding Employee permanent total disability benefits, and its finding that Employee was entitled to benefits on an odd-lot basis was supported by credible and substantial evidence. View "Xcel Energy Servs., Inc. v. Labor & Ind. Review Comm'n " on Justia Law