Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State filed a criminal complaint alleging ten counts against Defendant. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to three of the charges against him. After he was sentenced, Defendant filed a postconviction motion arguing that the State materially and substantially breached the plea agreement by implying that the court should impose a longer sentence than the term of imprisonment the State recommended and that his trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to object and for failing to consult with him regarding the alleged breaches. The circuit court denied relief. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the prosecutor’s comments at the sentencing hearing materially and substantially breached the plea agreement and that Defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the prosecutor’s comments during the sentencing hearing did not constitute a material and substantial breach of the plea agreement. View "State v. Bokenyi" on Justia Law

Raphael Lyfold Myrick was involved in an incident in which Justin Winston shot Marquise Harris. The State charged Myrick with first-degree intentional homicide as a party to the crime. Myrick subsequently testified at Winston’s preliminary hearing, at which Myrick made incriminating statements about his involvement in Harris’ murder. The circuit court allowed the State to introduce Myrick’s testimony from Winston’s preliminary hearing, concluding that his testimony was not given in connection with an offer to plead guilty but after a plea agreement had been reached. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Wis. Stat. 904.10 prohibited the use of Myrick’s preliminary hearing testimony at trial because, while the prosecutor made the initial overture to begin the plea bargaining process, Myrick offered to plead guilty and testified at the preliminary hearing in connection with that offer. View "State v. Myrick" on Justia Law

In 2009, Plaintiff purchased a condominium unit. Before closing, the sellers’ attorney informed Plaintiff that a mortgage from 2001 was mistakenly listed on the title commitment. The information was incorrect, however, and the mortgage, purportedly owed to Defendant, went unsatisfied at the time of closing. Plaintiff sought a declaration that the 2001 mortgage was not an enforceable lien at the time because Defendant was unable to produce documentation indicating that the mortgage was assigned to Defendant at the time of closing in violation of the statute of frauds. The Supreme Court concluded that Defendant could properly enforce the mortgage at the time Plaintiff purchased the property because the doctrine of equitable assignment, which exempts mortgage assignments from the statute of frauds, applied in this case. The Court then remanded on the issue of whether Defendant had the necessary documents to enforce the note in question. View "Dow Family, LLC v. PHH Mortgage Corp." on Justia Law

The newly enacted Wis. Stat. 970.038 permits hearsay evidence at a preliminary examination, the purpose of which is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a defendant felony has committed a felony. Petitioners in separate actions were charged with several criminal offenses. Both sets of Petitioners sought to preclude hearsay evidence at their preliminary examinations, arguing that section 970.038 violated their constitutional rights. The circuit court denied the motions. The court of appeals accepted and consolidated interlocutory appeals from Petitioners and concluded that the admission of hearsay evidence pursuant to section 970.038 presents no blanket constitutional problems. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there is no constitutional right to confrontation at a preliminary examination; and (2) due to the limited scope of preliminary examinations, the admission of hearsay evidence does not violate defendants’ rights to compulsory process, effective assistance of counsel, or due process. View "State v. Butts" on Justia Law

Petitioner pled guilty to one count of first-degree reckless homicide by use of a dangerous weapon and was sentenced to forty years imprisonment. After the deadline for filing a notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief had passed, Petitioner sought to reinstate the deadline to file a notice of intent through a writ of habeas corpus. The court of appeals denied relief, concluding that Petitioner’s claim was an allegation of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, and therefore, Petitioner should have filed his petition in the circuit court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court lacks the authority to extend the deadline to file a notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief, and therefore, the proper forum for Petitioner to bring his petition is in the court of appeals; (2) where such a claim is made to the court of appeals it should be in the form of a habeas petition; and (3) Petitioner’s habeas petition set forth sufficient facts to entitle him to an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Remanded. View "Kyles v. Pollard" on Justia Law

Defendant hired an independent contractor to spray herbicide on his property. The spraying caused extensive, permanent damage to seventy-nine trees on the property of his neighbors, Plaintiffs. At issue in this case was whether Defendant could be liable for the negligence of the independent contractor he hired to spray herbicides under the “inherently dangerous” exception to the independent contractor rule. The Supreme Court held here that Defendant could be liable for the acts of the independent contractor on the grounds that the spraying was an inherently dangerous activity because it posed a risk of naturally expected harm, and it was possible to reduce the risk. Remanded for determinations to be made as to whether Defendant exercised ordinary care to prevent damage to Plaintiffs’ property. View "Brandenburg v. Luethi" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Milwaukee County sheriff’s deputy, was injured while on duty by a motorist to whom she had just given directions and was allegedly helping to get back into the lane of moving traffic. Plaintiff sought coverage under her employer’s underinsured motorist policy, which pays sums owed by an underinsured tortfeasor to an insured person who is injured while “using an automobile” within the scope of her employment or authority. Plaintiff claimed that she was “using” the automobile that hit her because she was essentially controlling the vehicle. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the insurer. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that Defendant was not using the vehicle at the time of her injury. View "Jackson v. Wis. County Mut. Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

In Milwaukee County Circuit Court Defendant pled guilty to criminal charges. At the time of her arrest, Defendant was on probation after pleading guilty to three criminal charges in Waukesha County. Consequently, the Waukesha County Circuit Court sentenced Defendant to a term of confinement and a term of probation. The Milwaukee County Circuit Court subsequently sentenced Defendant to a term of confinement and extended supervision. The next day, the Milwaukee County Circuit Court sua sponte recalled the case and modified Defendant’s sentences due to the court’s mistaken belief in the length of Defendant’s Waukesha County sentence. The result was a nine-month increase in Defendant’s overall time of incarceration. Defendant filed a post-conviction motion to reinstate her original sentence, arguing that the circuit court violated her constitutional protection against double jeopardy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of finality, and therefore double jeopardy principles were not implicated, and the circuit court acted appropriately in resentencing Defendant. View "State v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought recovery for her husband’s death, which occurred at a snowmobile event in Michigan. Plaintiff moved for a declaratory order determining that Michigan’s Wrongful Death Act applied to the damage issues in her lawsuit because Wisconsin’s wrongful death statute does not apply to deaths caused outside Wisconsin. The circuit court determined that Wisconsin law would apply to the damage issues in this case. The court of appeals disagreed and concluded that the Michigan law on wrongful death would apply. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Michigan law applied in this case. View "Waranka v. Wadena Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to the manufacture or delivery of THC. After announcing that it would place Defendant on probation, the circuit court declined defense counsel’s request to withhold its discretion on whether to expunge Defendant’s record until the end of the probationary period. In denying the request, the circuit court concluded that its decision whether to expunge an offender’s record must be made at the time of sentencing. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, if a circuit court is going to exercise its discretion to expunge a record, the discretion must be exercised at the time of the sentencing proceeding. View "State v. Matasek" on Justia Law