Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The City of Oshkosh levied special assessments against a corner lot property owned by CED Properties, LLC (“CED”). The City issued two special assessments, one for the portion of CED’s property bordering Jackson Street and one for the portion running alongside Murdock Avenue. CED appealed the special assessments by filing a complaint with the circuit court. CED then filed an amended complaint well past the ninety-day time limit to appeal. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment to the City, holding that CED failed to appeal the Jackson Street special assessment within the required ninety-day time limit. The court of appeals affirmed but on different grounds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) CED’s original complaint, which was filed within the required ninety-day time period, was sufficient to appeal not only the Murdock Avenue special assessment but also the Jackson Street special assessment; and (2) CED’s complaint was sufficient to place the City on notice that CED intended to appeal both the Jackson Street and Murdock Avenue special assessments. View "CED Props., LLC v. City of Oshkosh" on Justia Law

The Town Assessor valued Taxpayer’s real property at $27,500, classified the property as “productive forest land,” and assessed the property at $27,500. Taxpayer claimed that the Assessor’s classification of his property was erroneous and that the Town Board of Review should change the classification to “undeveloped land,” which would result in an assessment of $13,750. The Board refused to lower the assessment. The circuit court and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in light of the evidence that the Board received, the Board could reasonably conclude that Taxpayer did not demonstrate that the classification was incorrect and that the assessment should be lowered. View "Sausen v. Town of Black Creek Bd. of Review" on Justia Law

Ronald Belding was injured in an accident with an uninsured driver. Belding and his wife had two policies with State Farm Automobile Insurance Company, which provided coverage for their two vehicles, a Ford Ranger, which was involved in the accident, and a Mercury Villager. State Farm paid the Beldings the maximum uninsured motorist coverage under the Ford Ranger policy, and the Beldings sought to collect excess damages through the uninsured motorist coverage in their Mercury Villager policy. The circuit court granted summary judgment for State Farm, concluding that a “drive-other-car exclusion” in the Mercury Villager policy precluded coverage. The court of appeals reversed, determining that Wis. Stat. 632.32(6)(d), which prohibited anti-stacking clauses, barred the drive-other-car exclusion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, pursuant to the prohibition on anti-stacking clauses in section 632.32(6)(d), State Farm could not use the drive-other-car exclusion in the Mercury Villager policy to prevent the Beldings from stacking the uninsured motorist coverage of up to three vehicles owned and insured by them. View "Belding v. Demoulin" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with sexually assaulting his niece. During trial, the jury asked the circuit court if it needed to agree on the location of the assault, and the court responded, “no.” The court of appeals remanded for a new trial, concluding that this exchange permitted the jury to speculate beyond the evidence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court’s response of “no” did not deprive Defendant of a unanimous verdict because, where the location of the crime was not one of the essential elements of the crime, the jurors did not need to unanimously agree on the location; and (2) Defendant failed to show that the court’s response of “no” was ambiguous or reasonably likely to cause the jury to apply the jury instructions in a manner that violated due process, as the response was unlikely to mislead the jury into believing that the victim’s credibility was irrelevant and that it could speculate beyond the evidence. View "State v. Badzinski" on Justia Law

Mother and Father chose to treat their eleven-year-old daughter's undiagnosed illness with prayer rather than medicine. Their daughter subsequently died from diabetic ketoacidosis resulting from untreated juvenile onset diabetes mellitus. In separate trials with different juries, Mother and Father were each convicted of second-degree reckless homicide. The parents appealed, arguing (1) their convictions for choosing treatment through prayer violated due process fair notice requirements; and (2) their convictions should be reversed because the real controversy was not fully tried due to erroneous jury instructions and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding, inter alia, (1) the second-degree reckless homicide statute and the criminal child abuse statute provided sufficient notice that the parents' conduct could have criminal consequences if their daughter died; (2) the jury instructions on parents' duty to provide medical care were not erroneous, as the statutory provision protecting treatment through prayer does not negate the legal duty to provide medical care in a second degree reckless homicide prosecution; (3) trial counsels did not provide ineffective assistance; and (4) the controversy was fully tried where the circuit court properly refused to instruct the jury on the parents' sincerely held religious belief in prayer.View "State v. Neumann" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a minority shareholder in Defendant, a company that served the fantasy football league market. Plaintiff sought specific performance of the stock repurchase agreement that he and the majority shareholder had signed. At issue was whether Defendant should pay only the appraised value for Plaintiff's shares or whether Defendant should pay the stipulated share price, which was approximately six times more, where Defendant delayed terminating Plaintiff's employment until the stipulated price expired. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that this case required balancing of the equities that were due to a specific performance claim and consideration of the potential application of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded for the circuit court's determination of "where the bulk of the equities lie, including an evaluation of what the parties intended when they agreed to the stock repurchase agreement, and whether it should grant specific performance" as Plaintiff requested.View "Beidel v. Sideline Software, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree reckless homicide by use of a dangerous weapon. During trial, in support of his self-defense theory, Defendant filed a motion to admit evidence regarding both the victim’s reputation for violence and the victim’s specific violent acts. The circuit court denied the motion in part because Defendant did not know of the victim’s reputation at the time of the offense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant’s motion to admit character evidence because, in a homicide case where a claim of self-defense is raised, character evidence may be admissible so long as Defendant had knowledge of the prior acts at the time of the offense; and (2) the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to admit testimony that the victim had a reputation for violence because Defendant failed to establish a proper foundation for the trial court to determine that evidence of the victim’s reputation for violence was admissible. View "State v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated and refused a chemical test to ascertain his blood alcohol concentration. Defendant filed a request for a refusal hearing but did not file his request within the required ten-day time limit. Defendant then sought to extend that time limit. The circuit court denied the motion to extend the ten-day time limit and dismissed Defendant's request for a refusal hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court was without competency to hear Defendant's request to extend the ten-day time limit, as the time limit is a mandatory requirement that may not be extended due to excusable neglect.View "Village of Elm Grove v. Brefka" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged and convicted of two counts of conspiracy to commit theft by fraud of property in excess of $10,000. The charges stemmed from Defendant's conspiracy, while in prison, that defrauded AT&T out of approximately $28,000 of phone services by furnishing the company with fraudulent information. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant made "false representations" to AT&T under the theft-by-fraud statute by submitting fictitious names and stolen personal identifying information; and (2) "property" under the theft-by-fraud statute is all forms of tangible property, including electricity, and therefore, because Defendant stole electricity from AT&T , the conspiracy perpetrated against AT&T deprived the company of its property.View "State v. Steffes" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with possession of child pornography. Defendant moved to suppress the seized evidence, claiming that law enforcement violated his Fourth Amendment rights by entering his residence and viewing suspicious files on his computer after the woman he was dating invited the officer to enter the residence. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the woman had the authority to extend the invitation to the officer to cross the threshold and validly consented to the officer's entry and search. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the woman had actual authority to consent to the officer's entry into the home and the living room and to consent to the officer's search of the laptop.View "State v. Sobczak" on Justia Law