Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In order to seek commitment of a sexually violent person under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 the State is required to allege that the individual has committed a sexually violent offense, referred to a “predicate offense.” At issue in this case was whether a petition filed under Chapter 980 can be invalidated when the predicate offense recited in the petition is later reversed. In the instant case, the State filed a petition in 2010 to commit Joseph Spaeth as a sexually violent person under Wis. Stat. 980.02 The Petition referred to convictions for child enticement that occurred in 2009. In 2012, the Supreme Court reversed Spaeth’s 2009 convictions. The circuit court subsequently dismissed Spaeth’s Chapter 980 conviction, concluding that once the 2009 convictions were reversed and the charges dismissed, the State could no longer rely on those convictions as a predicate offense to support its petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the sufficiency of a Chapter 980 petition should be assessed as of the time of filing; and (2) at the time the State’s petition was filed the statutory requirements in section 980.02 were satisfied, and therefore the Chapter 980 petition to commit Spaeth should not have been dismissed. View "State v. Spaeth" on Justia Law

Robert Kraft formed Electronic Printing Systems, Inc. (the company), which was rebranded, restructured, and sold to various entities. This case involved several leases that the company and its progenies had with Anthony Gagliano & Co., Inc. (Gagliano). Gagliano filed claims against defendants New Electronic Printing Systems, LLC; Openfirst, LLC; Robert Kraft; and Quad/Graphics, Inc. concerning rent allegedly owned under several commercial leases. The circuit court granted (1) granted summary judgment for Quad/Graphics, the last entity to acquire assets of the company; and (2) after trial, directed a verdict in favor of Defendants, concluding that Gagliano did not give sufficient notice to extend the leases to the time when the alleged breach occurred. The court of appeals reversed summary judgment in favor of Quad/Graphics and reversed the circuit court’s directed verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Gagliano’s notice was valid because Gagliano gave sufficient notice to extend the leases to the time when the alleged breach occurred; and (2) Qaud/Graphics was not liable to Gagliano because Quad/Graphics was a subtenant of the lessee, not an assignee of the leases. View "Anthony Gagliano & Co., Inc. v. Openfirst, LLC" on Justia Law

SB1 Waukesha County, LLC and Decade Properties, Inc. were two judgment creditors of defendant Jack Collier. SB1 purchased from Associated Bank, N.A. a portion of a default judgment against Collier. Subsequently, Decade obtained a judgment against Collier personally. Each party claimed that they were entitled to collect on Collier’s personal property. The Supreme Court held (1) because SB1 was the first judgment creditor with a docketed money judgment to levy specific, non-exempt personal property of Collier, SB1 had priority over Decade in regard to specific personal property that SB1 identified and levied; but (2) there was no blanket lien in favor of SB1 or Decade that prevented other creditors from pursuing collection from Collier’s personal property. View "Associated Bank N.A. v. Collier" on Justia Law

Defendants, Heartland Wisconsin Corp. and Town Bank, were creditors of a Milwaukee real estate investor and landlord (Debtor). The issue in this case was which defendant had priority over proceeds of the Debtor’s legal malpractice claim that was held in escrow pending resolution of their dispute. Heartland claimed that the Debtor validly assigned the proceeds of his legal malpractice claim, which gave Heartland a security interest in those proceeds that was superior to Town Bank’s interest. Town Bank claimed that it obtained a superior interest in the proceeds by levy and that proceeds from legal malpractice claims are not assignable. The Supreme Court concluded (1) the debtor lawfully assigned the potential proceeds from his legal malpractice claim as collateral for a debt to Heartland; and (2) Heartland perfected a security interest in the proceeds before Town Bank obtained a superior interest in the proceeds, and therefore, Heartland was entitled to the proceeds. View "Attorney's Title Guar. Fund, Inc. v. Town Bank" on Justia Law

Randy Betz hired attorney Vincent Megna to represent him in a dispute with Diamond Jim’s Auto Sales. Megna filed a lawsuit on Betz’s behalf under two fee-shifting statutes. During the litigation, Betz and Diamond Jim’s settled the case without their attorneys’ knowledge or approval. The settlement agreement did not address statutory attorney’s fees. Megna moved to recover his statutory fees from Diamond Jim. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the statutory right to recover attorney’s fees belonged to Betz and not his attorneys and that the settlement agreement was a binding contract between Betz and Diamond Jim’s. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the settlement agreement was void due to public policy concerns with enforcing settlements made “behind the backs” of the attorneys in cases brought under fee-shifting statutes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the statutory right to recover attorney’s fees belonged to Betz, and Betz did not assign his right to recover those fees to Megna in their fee agreement; and (2) therefore, Megna’s remedy against Diamond Jim’s was foreclosed. View "Betz v. Diamond Jim's Auto Sales" on Justia Law

This case involved Wis. Stat. 346.65(2)(am)(6), the penalty statute for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) as the seventh, eighth, or ninth offense. The statute states that the “confinement portion of a bifurcated sentence impose on the person…shall be not less than 3 years.” At issue before the Supreme Court was whether section 346.65(2)(am)(6) requires a sentencing court to impose a bifurcated sentence. In the underlying OWI case, Defendant pled guilty to his seventh OWI offense and asked the circuit court to place him on probation. The court determined that section 346.65(2)(am)(6) requires imposition of a bifurcated sentence with at least three years of initial confinement. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the circuit court was mistaken in believing that section 346.65(2)(am)(6) imposes a mandatory minimum period of initial confinement. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that section 346.65(2)(am)(6) requires sentencing courts to impose a bifurcated sentence with at least three years of initial confinement for a seventh, eighth, or ninth OWI offense. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant’s conviction for possession of a narcotic arose from a warrantless search of his briefcase. Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped for equipment violations. When the officer asked if he could search the car the driver gave his consent. When the officer discovered the briefcase, Defendant said, “Got a warrant for that?” Defendant argued that, with this question, he asserted ownership of the briefcase and withdrew the driver’s consent. The Supreme Court held that the search of the briefcase was reasonable under the circumstances, as (1) Defendant did not effectively withdraw the driver’s consent by asking “Got a warrant for that?”; and (2) police officers confronted with ambiguous statements are not under a duty to ask follow-up questions to clarify the ambiguity. View "State v. Wantland" on Justia Law

In 2002, the Wilcoxes purchased property from the Somas. A strip of land separated the Wilcox’s property from a lake. In 2011, the Wilcoxes brought a claim for title by adverse possession against the owners of the lakefront strip. The circuit court dismissed the adverse possession claim after noting that the Somas had specifically disclaimed ownership of the lakefront strip and had sought and received permission to make improvements to the property from an entity the Somas mistakenly believed was its true owner. The court of appeals reversed, holding that evidence of the Somas’ permission to use the lakefront strip came from a non-owner and was therefore irrelevant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court properly considered the Somas’ subjective intent and did not err in concluding that the Wilcoxes failed to establish adverse possession for the requisite statutory period. View "Wilcox v. Estate of Hines" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree intentional homicide, as a party to a crime, with use of a dangerous weapon. Defendant brought a postconviction motion alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to present testimony at trial of potentially exculpatory witnesses, including an eyewitness other than the State's witnesses. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that defense trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call a particular eyewitness to testify at trial, and prejudice against Defendant resulted from counsel’s deficient performance. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first-degree reckless homicide and other crimes arising from a high-speed collision involving Defendant’s vehicle and two motorcycles. During trial, the State introduced the preliminary breath test (PBT) result obtained from Defendant by an emergency room (ER) nurse for diagnostic purposes. The trial court also admitted testimony from Dr. William Falco, an ER physician who treated Defendant, that Defendant appeared to be intoxicated at the time he was undergoing treatment in the ER. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Dr. Falco’s testimony; and (2) assuming without deciding that the circuit court erred in admitting the PBT result into evidence and in instructing the jury in regard to the PBT, the alleged errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Rocha-Mayo" on Justia Law