Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Billy Joe Force, the deceased, died in a collision with another vehicle driven by Jeffrey Brown. The deceased’s estranged spouse, Linda Force, and the deceased's three nonmarital minor children (the children), sought compensation from Brown and two insurance companies, claiming that Brown’s negligence caused the deceased’s death. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that Linda Force had no compensable damages under the wrongful death statutes and that the children did not have a cause of action for wrongful death. The children appealed. The defendants argued on appeal that because Linda Force was still living, she was a “surviving spouse” under the wrongful death statutes, that her recovery for the wrongful death of the deceased was zero, and that, consequently, the children did not have any set-aside from Linda Force’s recovery. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court against the children and in favor of the defendants, holding that the children had a cause of action against the defendants for wrongful death as if Linda Force were not alive at the death of the deceased. View "Force v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether unpaid interns are entitled to the anti-retaliation protections of Wis. Stat. 146.997, Wisconsin’s health care worker protection statute. In the instant case, Asma Masri’s position as an uncompensated intern at the Medical College of Wisconsin (MCW) was terminated after Masri reported “clinical/ethical” concerns to an MCW administrator. Masri filed a retaliation complaint against MCW with the Equal Rights Division (ERD) of the Department of Workforce Development (DWD). ERD determined that Masri was not entitled to anti-retaliation protection under section 146.997 because the statute is limited to employees, and Masri was not an employee where she received no financial compensation. The Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) affirmed. Granting due weight deference to LIRC’s decision, the circuit court and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) LIRC’s decision is accorded due weight deference because LIRC has experience interpreting the meaning of “employee” and various statutes and is charged with administering section 146.997; and (2) LIRC correctly found that section 146.997 applies only to employees, a category that does not include interns who do not receive compensation or tangible benefits. View "Masri v. State Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a law enforcement officer’s knock on a car window constitutes a “seizure.” Defendant argued that he was seized when a sheriff’s deputy knocked on the driver’s side of Defendant’s vehicle and asked Defendant to roll down the window. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence obtained after he rolled down the window and was subsequently found guilty of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that “when a uniformed officer approaches a vehicle at night and directs the driver to roll down his or her window, a reasonable driver would not feel free to ignore the officer.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a law enforcement officer’s knock on a car window does not by itself constitute a show of authority sufficient to give rise to the belief in a reasonable person that the person is not free to leave; and (2) under the totality of the circumstances of this case, the officer did not show a level of intimidation or exercise of authority sufficient to implicate the Fourth Amendment until after Defendant rolled down his window and exposed the grounds for the seizure. View "County of Grant v. Vogt" on Justia Law

Circuit Judge Richard J. Nuss presided over two jury trials, State v. Pinno and State v. Seaton. In both voir dire proceedings, Judge Nuss asked the public to leave the courtroom to make room for large jury panels. Defendants were subsequently convicted after jury trials open to the public. Defendants filed postconviction motions, alleging violations to their right to a public trial. Judge Nuss denied all postconviction motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extends to voir dire, and a judge’s decision to close or limit public access to a courtroom in a criminal case requires the analysis set forth in Waller v. Georgia; (2) the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial may be asserted by the defendant at any time during a trial; (3) because neither Defendant in this case objected to the alleged courtroom closure, Defendants both forfeited their rights to a public trial; (4) defendants must demonstrate prejudice to prove ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel fails to object to the closure of the courtroom, and Defendants in this case failed to prove that their counsel was ineffective; and (5) Seaton was not denied his right to an impartial judge. View "State v. Seaton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured when he slipped or tripped on a curb outside a Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC convenience store. Plaintiff sued, alleging that Speedway violated its common law duty of care and the safe-place statute. During trial, based on Speedway’s decision not to call any former employees who had been on duty at the time of the accident as witnesses, Plaintiff requested and the trial court gave an absent witness instruction. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff, and the circuit court affirmed the jury’s verdict. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the circuit court erroneously gave the absent witness instruction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court erred in giving the absent witness instruction, and the instruction was prejudicial. Remanded for a new trial. View "Kochanski v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC" on Justia Law

Vicki Blasing was the named insured in an automobile liability insurance policy issued by American Family Insurance Company. Blasing was injured when lumber fell on her foot that was being loaded into her pickup truck by an employee of Mernard, Inc. Blasing filed a personal injury lawsuit against Menard and Menard’s insurer. Menard, in turn, claimed its employee was an insured under the American Family policy as a permissive user of Blasing’s pickup truck. At issue in this case was whether American Family had a duty to defend and indemnify Menard when Menard’s employee was a permissive user of the injured insured’s vehicle. The court of appeals concluded that permissive user coverage was required in this case under the omnibus statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the American Family policy explicitly provided coverage in the present case. View "Blasing v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Jeffrey S. Decker, a former student of the University of Wisconsin (UW), was suspended from campus. Decker subsequently trespassed on UW property four documented times to attend UW meetings. The UW Board of Regents (Board) petitioned the circuit court for a temporary restraining order against Decker. The circuit court granted a harassment injunction against Decker based on the Board’s petition. The court of appeals reversed, determining that Decker had a legitimate purpose for his actions, which was to protest university student fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Wis. Stat. 813.125 can extend injunctive protection to institutions as well as natural persons; (2) sufficient evidence existed for the circuit court to find that Decker’s conduct constituted harassment and lacked a legitimate purpose; but (3) the injunction in this case was overbroad. Remanded to the circuit court to refine the harassment injunction and clarify its terms. View "Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents v. Decker" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with three counts of sexual assault of a child. At trial, Defendant told the court that she wanted to testify to “tell what actually happened. The circuit court concluded that Defendant was not “intelligently and knowingly waiving her right against self-incrimination” and refused to allow Defendant to testify. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court violated her constitutional rights and that she was automatically entitled to a new trial because the denial of a defendant’s right to testify is not subject to harmless error review. The State conceded that the circuit court erred in refusing to allow Defendant to testify but argued that harmless error review applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the harmless error doctrine applies to the denial of a defendant’s right to testify; and (2) given the nature of Defendant’s defense and the overwhelming evidence of her guilt, the alleged error in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped by police officers after the officers observed an unlit light bulb in the vehicle’s tail lamp. The officers searched the vehicle during the stop and discovered a gun. Defendant pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant then sought an order vacating his conviction and guilty plea and suppressing all evidence seized during the stop, contending that the police lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop the vehicle. The circuit court denied Defendant’s motion. At issue on appeal was whether Wis. Stat. 347.13(1) requires every single light bulb in a tail lamp to be lit. The court of appeals reversed, concluding a vehicle’s tail lamps do not need to be fully lit or in perfect condition to be in good working order. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding (1) section 347.13(1) requires only that “a tail lamp emit a red light visible from 500 feet behind the vehicle during hours of darkness”; and (2) because the only basis for the stop of Defendant’s vehicle was the unlit bulb, the stop was unconstitutional, and so too was the search of the vehicle. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of a felony during the guilt phase of a bifurcated criminal trial. Defendant intended to plead not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect (NGI) during the second phase of trial in which the jury was to determine Defendant’s responsibility for the crime. The trial court, however, concluded that there was no evidence to sustain that plea and dismissed Defendant’s NGI plea before commencement of the second phase. The court of appeals upheld Defendant’s conviction. The court of appeals affirmed, holding (1) as a general rule, a defendant is not required to present expert testimony to prove the elements of his NGI defense; (2) a defendant is competent to testify as to his mental condition in the responsibility phase of a criminal trial, but a lay defendant does not have an unlimited, categorical right to give opinion testimony on the issue of mental disease or defect; (3) normally, a court should permit a defendant to offer his evidence in the responsibility phase of a trial before the court rules on his NGI defense; but (4) in this case, the evidence to support Defendant’s NGI defense was insufficient as a matter of law. View "State v. Magett" on Justia Law