Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case involved Wis. Stat. 346.65(2)(am)(6), the penalty statute for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) as the seventh, eighth, or ninth offense. The statute states that the “confinement portion of a bifurcated sentence impose on the person…shall be not less than 3 years.” At issue before the Supreme Court was whether section 346.65(2)(am)(6) requires a sentencing court to impose a bifurcated sentence. In the underlying OWI case, Defendant pled guilty to his seventh OWI offense and asked the circuit court to place him on probation. The court determined that section 346.65(2)(am)(6) requires imposition of a bifurcated sentence with at least three years of initial confinement. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the circuit court was mistaken in believing that section 346.65(2)(am)(6) imposes a mandatory minimum period of initial confinement. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that section 346.65(2)(am)(6) requires sentencing courts to impose a bifurcated sentence with at least three years of initial confinement for a seventh, eighth, or ninth OWI offense. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant’s conviction for possession of a narcotic arose from a warrantless search of his briefcase. Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped for equipment violations. When the officer asked if he could search the car the driver gave his consent. When the officer discovered the briefcase, Defendant said, “Got a warrant for that?” Defendant argued that, with this question, he asserted ownership of the briefcase and withdrew the driver’s consent. The Supreme Court held that the search of the briefcase was reasonable under the circumstances, as (1) Defendant did not effectively withdraw the driver’s consent by asking “Got a warrant for that?”; and (2) police officers confronted with ambiguous statements are not under a duty to ask follow-up questions to clarify the ambiguity. View "State v. Wantland" on Justia Law

In 2002, the Wilcoxes purchased property from the Somas. A strip of land separated the Wilcox’s property from a lake. In 2011, the Wilcoxes brought a claim for title by adverse possession against the owners of the lakefront strip. The circuit court dismissed the adverse possession claim after noting that the Somas had specifically disclaimed ownership of the lakefront strip and had sought and received permission to make improvements to the property from an entity the Somas mistakenly believed was its true owner. The court of appeals reversed, holding that evidence of the Somas’ permission to use the lakefront strip came from a non-owner and was therefore irrelevant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court properly considered the Somas’ subjective intent and did not err in concluding that the Wilcoxes failed to establish adverse possession for the requisite statutory period. View "Wilcox v. Estate of Hines" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree intentional homicide, as a party to a crime, with use of a dangerous weapon. Defendant brought a postconviction motion alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to present testimony at trial of potentially exculpatory witnesses, including an eyewitness other than the State's witnesses. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that defense trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call a particular eyewitness to testify at trial, and prejudice against Defendant resulted from counsel’s deficient performance. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first-degree reckless homicide and other crimes arising from a high-speed collision involving Defendant’s vehicle and two motorcycles. During trial, the State introduced the preliminary breath test (PBT) result obtained from Defendant by an emergency room (ER) nurse for diagnostic purposes. The trial court also admitted testimony from Dr. William Falco, an ER physician who treated Defendant, that Defendant appeared to be intoxicated at the time he was undergoing treatment in the ER. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Dr. Falco’s testimony; and (2) assuming without deciding that the circuit court erred in admitting the PBT result into evidence and in instructing the jury in regard to the PBT, the alleged errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Rocha-Mayo" on Justia Law

The State filed a criminal complaint alleging ten counts against Defendant. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to three of the charges against him. After he was sentenced, Defendant filed a postconviction motion arguing that the State materially and substantially breached the plea agreement by implying that the court should impose a longer sentence than the term of imprisonment the State recommended and that his trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to object and for failing to consult with him regarding the alleged breaches. The circuit court denied relief. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the prosecutor’s comments at the sentencing hearing materially and substantially breached the plea agreement and that Defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the prosecutor’s comments during the sentencing hearing did not constitute a material and substantial breach of the plea agreement. View "State v. Bokenyi" on Justia Law

Raphael Lyfold Myrick was involved in an incident in which Justin Winston shot Marquise Harris. The State charged Myrick with first-degree intentional homicide as a party to the crime. Myrick subsequently testified at Winston’s preliminary hearing, at which Myrick made incriminating statements about his involvement in Harris’ murder. The circuit court allowed the State to introduce Myrick’s testimony from Winston’s preliminary hearing, concluding that his testimony was not given in connection with an offer to plead guilty but after a plea agreement had been reached. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Wis. Stat. 904.10 prohibited the use of Myrick’s preliminary hearing testimony at trial because, while the prosecutor made the initial overture to begin the plea bargaining process, Myrick offered to plead guilty and testified at the preliminary hearing in connection with that offer. View "State v. Myrick" on Justia Law

In 2009, Plaintiff purchased a condominium unit. Before closing, the sellers’ attorney informed Plaintiff that a mortgage from 2001 was mistakenly listed on the title commitment. The information was incorrect, however, and the mortgage, purportedly owed to Defendant, went unsatisfied at the time of closing. Plaintiff sought a declaration that the 2001 mortgage was not an enforceable lien at the time because Defendant was unable to produce documentation indicating that the mortgage was assigned to Defendant at the time of closing in violation of the statute of frauds. The Supreme Court concluded that Defendant could properly enforce the mortgage at the time Plaintiff purchased the property because the doctrine of equitable assignment, which exempts mortgage assignments from the statute of frauds, applied in this case. The Court then remanded on the issue of whether Defendant had the necessary documents to enforce the note in question. View "Dow Family, LLC v. PHH Mortgage Corp." on Justia Law

The newly enacted Wis. Stat. 970.038 permits hearsay evidence at a preliminary examination, the purpose of which is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a defendant felony has committed a felony. Petitioners in separate actions were charged with several criminal offenses. Both sets of Petitioners sought to preclude hearsay evidence at their preliminary examinations, arguing that section 970.038 violated their constitutional rights. The circuit court denied the motions. The court of appeals accepted and consolidated interlocutory appeals from Petitioners and concluded that the admission of hearsay evidence pursuant to section 970.038 presents no blanket constitutional problems. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there is no constitutional right to confrontation at a preliminary examination; and (2) due to the limited scope of preliminary examinations, the admission of hearsay evidence does not violate defendants’ rights to compulsory process, effective assistance of counsel, or due process. View "State v. Butts" on Justia Law

Petitioner pled guilty to one count of first-degree reckless homicide by use of a dangerous weapon and was sentenced to forty years imprisonment. After the deadline for filing a notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief had passed, Petitioner sought to reinstate the deadline to file a notice of intent through a writ of habeas corpus. The court of appeals denied relief, concluding that Petitioner’s claim was an allegation of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, and therefore, Petitioner should have filed his petition in the circuit court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court lacks the authority to extend the deadline to file a notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief, and therefore, the proper forum for Petitioner to bring his petition is in the court of appeals; (2) where such a claim is made to the court of appeals it should be in the form of a habeas petition; and (3) Petitioner’s habeas petition set forth sufficient facts to entitle him to an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Remanded. View "Kyles v. Pollard" on Justia Law