Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Vicki Blasing was the named insured in an automobile liability insurance policy issued by American Family Insurance Company. Blasing was injured when lumber fell on her foot that was being loaded into her pickup truck by an employee of Mernard, Inc. Blasing filed a personal injury lawsuit against Menard and Menard’s insurer. Menard, in turn, claimed its employee was an insured under the American Family policy as a permissive user of Blasing’s pickup truck. At issue in this case was whether American Family had a duty to defend and indemnify Menard when Menard’s employee was a permissive user of the injured insured’s vehicle. The court of appeals concluded that permissive user coverage was required in this case under the omnibus statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the American Family policy explicitly provided coverage in the present case. View "Blasing v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Jeffrey S. Decker, a former student of the University of Wisconsin (UW), was suspended from campus. Decker subsequently trespassed on UW property four documented times to attend UW meetings. The UW Board of Regents (Board) petitioned the circuit court for a temporary restraining order against Decker. The circuit court granted a harassment injunction against Decker based on the Board’s petition. The court of appeals reversed, determining that Decker had a legitimate purpose for his actions, which was to protest university student fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Wis. Stat. 813.125 can extend injunctive protection to institutions as well as natural persons; (2) sufficient evidence existed for the circuit court to find that Decker’s conduct constituted harassment and lacked a legitimate purpose; but (3) the injunction in this case was overbroad. Remanded to the circuit court to refine the harassment injunction and clarify its terms. View "Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents v. Decker" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with three counts of sexual assault of a child. At trial, Defendant told the court that she wanted to testify to “tell what actually happened. The circuit court concluded that Defendant was not “intelligently and knowingly waiving her right against self-incrimination” and refused to allow Defendant to testify. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court violated her constitutional rights and that she was automatically entitled to a new trial because the denial of a defendant’s right to testify is not subject to harmless error review. The State conceded that the circuit court erred in refusing to allow Defendant to testify but argued that harmless error review applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the harmless error doctrine applies to the denial of a defendant’s right to testify; and (2) given the nature of Defendant’s defense and the overwhelming evidence of her guilt, the alleged error in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped by police officers after the officers observed an unlit light bulb in the vehicle’s tail lamp. The officers searched the vehicle during the stop and discovered a gun. Defendant pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant then sought an order vacating his conviction and guilty plea and suppressing all evidence seized during the stop, contending that the police lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop the vehicle. The circuit court denied Defendant’s motion. At issue on appeal was whether Wis. Stat. 347.13(1) requires every single light bulb in a tail lamp to be lit. The court of appeals reversed, concluding a vehicle’s tail lamps do not need to be fully lit or in perfect condition to be in good working order. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding (1) section 347.13(1) requires only that “a tail lamp emit a red light visible from 500 feet behind the vehicle during hours of darkness”; and (2) because the only basis for the stop of Defendant’s vehicle was the unlit bulb, the stop was unconstitutional, and so too was the search of the vehicle. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of a felony during the guilt phase of a bifurcated criminal trial. Defendant intended to plead not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect (NGI) during the second phase of trial in which the jury was to determine Defendant’s responsibility for the crime. The trial court, however, concluded that there was no evidence to sustain that plea and dismissed Defendant’s NGI plea before commencement of the second phase. The court of appeals upheld Defendant’s conviction. The court of appeals affirmed, holding (1) as a general rule, a defendant is not required to present expert testimony to prove the elements of his NGI defense; (2) a defendant is competent to testify as to his mental condition in the responsibility phase of a criminal trial, but a lay defendant does not have an unlimited, categorical right to give opinion testimony on the issue of mental disease or defect; (3) normally, a court should permit a defendant to offer his evidence in the responsibility phase of a trial before the court rules on his NGI defense; but (4) in this case, the evidence to support Defendant’s NGI defense was insufficient as a matter of law. View "State v. Magett" on Justia Law

In order to seek commitment of a sexually violent person under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 the State is required to allege that the individual has committed a sexually violent offense, referred to a “predicate offense.” At issue in this case was whether a petition filed under Chapter 980 can be invalidated when the predicate offense recited in the petition is later reversed. In the instant case, the State filed a petition in 2010 to commit Joseph Spaeth as a sexually violent person under Wis. Stat. 980.02 The Petition referred to convictions for child enticement that occurred in 2009. In 2012, the Supreme Court reversed Spaeth’s 2009 convictions. The circuit court subsequently dismissed Spaeth’s Chapter 980 conviction, concluding that once the 2009 convictions were reversed and the charges dismissed, the State could no longer rely on those convictions as a predicate offense to support its petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the sufficiency of a Chapter 980 petition should be assessed as of the time of filing; and (2) at the time the State’s petition was filed the statutory requirements in section 980.02 were satisfied, and therefore the Chapter 980 petition to commit Spaeth should not have been dismissed. View "State v. Spaeth" on Justia Law

Robert Kraft formed Electronic Printing Systems, Inc. (the company), which was rebranded, restructured, and sold to various entities. This case involved several leases that the company and its progenies had with Anthony Gagliano & Co., Inc. (Gagliano). Gagliano filed claims against defendants New Electronic Printing Systems, LLC; Openfirst, LLC; Robert Kraft; and Quad/Graphics, Inc. concerning rent allegedly owned under several commercial leases. The circuit court granted (1) granted summary judgment for Quad/Graphics, the last entity to acquire assets of the company; and (2) after trial, directed a verdict in favor of Defendants, concluding that Gagliano did not give sufficient notice to extend the leases to the time when the alleged breach occurred. The court of appeals reversed summary judgment in favor of Quad/Graphics and reversed the circuit court’s directed verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Gagliano’s notice was valid because Gagliano gave sufficient notice to extend the leases to the time when the alleged breach occurred; and (2) Qaud/Graphics was not liable to Gagliano because Quad/Graphics was a subtenant of the lessee, not an assignee of the leases. View "Anthony Gagliano & Co., Inc. v. Openfirst, LLC" on Justia Law

SB1 Waukesha County, LLC and Decade Properties, Inc. were two judgment creditors of defendant Jack Collier. SB1 purchased from Associated Bank, N.A. a portion of a default judgment against Collier. Subsequently, Decade obtained a judgment against Collier personally. Each party claimed that they were entitled to collect on Collier’s personal property. The Supreme Court held (1) because SB1 was the first judgment creditor with a docketed money judgment to levy specific, non-exempt personal property of Collier, SB1 had priority over Decade in regard to specific personal property that SB1 identified and levied; but (2) there was no blanket lien in favor of SB1 or Decade that prevented other creditors from pursuing collection from Collier’s personal property. View "Associated Bank N.A. v. Collier" on Justia Law

Defendants, Heartland Wisconsin Corp. and Town Bank, were creditors of a Milwaukee real estate investor and landlord (Debtor). The issue in this case was which defendant had priority over proceeds of the Debtor’s legal malpractice claim that was held in escrow pending resolution of their dispute. Heartland claimed that the Debtor validly assigned the proceeds of his legal malpractice claim, which gave Heartland a security interest in those proceeds that was superior to Town Bank’s interest. Town Bank claimed that it obtained a superior interest in the proceeds by levy and that proceeds from legal malpractice claims are not assignable. The Supreme Court concluded (1) the debtor lawfully assigned the potential proceeds from his legal malpractice claim as collateral for a debt to Heartland; and (2) Heartland perfected a security interest in the proceeds before Town Bank obtained a superior interest in the proceeds, and therefore, Heartland was entitled to the proceeds. View "Attorney's Title Guar. Fund, Inc. v. Town Bank" on Justia Law

Randy Betz hired attorney Vincent Megna to represent him in a dispute with Diamond Jim’s Auto Sales. Megna filed a lawsuit on Betz’s behalf under two fee-shifting statutes. During the litigation, Betz and Diamond Jim’s settled the case without their attorneys’ knowledge or approval. The settlement agreement did not address statutory attorney’s fees. Megna moved to recover his statutory fees from Diamond Jim. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the statutory right to recover attorney’s fees belonged to Betz and not his attorneys and that the settlement agreement was a binding contract between Betz and Diamond Jim’s. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the settlement agreement was void due to public policy concerns with enforcing settlements made “behind the backs” of the attorneys in cases brought under fee-shifting statutes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the statutory right to recover attorney’s fees belonged to Betz, and Betz did not assign his right to recover those fees to Megna in their fee agreement; and (2) therefore, Megna’s remedy against Diamond Jim’s was foreclosed. View "Betz v. Diamond Jim's Auto Sales" on Justia Law