Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant pled guilty to first-degree reckless homicide. At issue on appeal was whether law enforcement officers (1) violated Appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights by contacting Appellant’s cell phone provider to obtain Appellant’s cell phone location information without first securing a court order; and (2) violated Appellant’s Fifth Amendment right to counsel when they continued to interview him after he asked how he could get an attorney. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. While the Court was deeply divided on the issues presented in this case, the lead opinion contained the following conclusions: (1) assuming without deciding that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell phone location data and that police conduct a search under the Fourth Amendment when they track a cell phone’s location, and assuming there was a search in this case, police did have probable cause for a warrant, and the exigent circumstances of this case created an exception to the warrant requirement; and (2) Appellant in this case failed to unequivocally invoke his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, and therefore, Appellant’s Fifth Amendment rights were not violated when officers continued to question Appellant after he asked how he could get an attorney. View "State v. Subdiaz-Osorio" on Justia Law

Law enforcement obtained evidence by tracking Appellant’s cell phone using cell site location information and a stingray. Before tracking Appellant’s cell phone, law enforcement obtained an order approving the procedures used to track Appellant’s cell phone. Appellant pled no contest to first-degree reckless homicide. Appellant then appealed the circuit court’s denial of his motion to suppress, arguing (1) law enforcement violated his constitutional right against unreasonable searches; and (2) the order authorizing the tracking of his cell phone required statutory authority, which the court lacked. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) assuming that law enforcement’s activities constituted a search, the search was reasonable because it was executed pursuant to an order that met the Fourth Amendment’s requirements; and (2) specific statutory authorization was not necessary for the circuit court judge to issue the order that authorized the tracking of Appellant’s cell phone through cell site information and a stingray because the order was supported by probable cause. View "State v. Tate" on Justia Law

In these two cases, State v. Cummings and State v. Smith, the court of appeals affirmed the orders of the circuit courts denying Defendants’ motions to suppress. Defendants appealed, contending that they unequivocally invoked the right to remain silent prior to making incriminating statements to the police, and therefore, their statements should have been suppressed. Cummings argued separately that his sentence was unduly harsh. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals in both cases, holding (1) neither Cummings nor Smith unequivocally invoked the right to remain silent during their interrogations, and therefore, the circuit court properly denied each Defendant’s motion to suppress; and (2) Cummings’ sentence was not unduly harsh. View "State v. Cummings" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with possession of marijuana as a party to a crime. After a preliminary hearing, Defendant filed a timely motion with the circuit court to compel disclosure of the identity of a confidential informer. After a hearing, the circuit court denied Defendant’s motion to disclose the identity of the informer, determining that the defense had not made a sufficient showing to warrant an in camera review. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the circuit court erred in denying Defendant’s motion without first conducting an in camera review of the confidential informer’s expected testimony. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) in order to trigger an in camera review, a defendant must show a reasonable possibility that a confidential informer may have information necessary to the defendant’s theory of defense; and (2) Defendant in this case failed to meet this burden. Remanded. View "State v. Nellessen" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to first-degree sexual assault of a child. Thereafter, Defendant filed three postconviction motions for relief. The third postconviction motion was brought under Wis. Stat. 974.06 and alleged ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel for failing to raise a strong argument for plea withdrawal. The circuit court denied Defendant’s section 974.06 motion because it did not demonstrate why postconviction counsel was ineffective. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a defendant who alleges in a section 974.06 motion that his postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to bring certain viable claims must demonstrate that the claims he wishes to bring are clearly stronger than the claims postconviction counsel actually brought; (2) because Defendant did not offer a sufficient reason in his third postconviction motion for failing to raise his section 974.06 claim in his second postconviction motion, Defendant’s section 974.06 claim was barred; and (3) even if the section 974.06 motion was not barred, the motion did not allege sufficient facts that, if true, would entitle Defendant to relief. View "State v. Romero-Georgana" on Justia Law

Defendant was a juvenile when he was charged with attempted first-degree intentional homicide, which is an offense enumerated in Wis. Stat. 938.183(1)(am). At the preliminary hearing held pursuant to Wis. Stat. 970.032(1), the circuit court stated that “there is probable cause to believe a felony has been committed” and ordered that the adult court retain original jurisdiction over Defendant. At issue on appeal was whether the adult court failed to find probable cause of a violation of the specific crime charged under section 938.183(1), as required by 970.032(1) for an adult court to retain exclusive original jurisdiction over a juvenile. The Supreme Court concluded that the bindover and prosecution of Defendant in adult court were proper, holding that the circuit court made the finding required by section 970.032(1) that there was probable cause to believe Defendant committed the specific section 938.183(1) crime charged in the complaint. View "State v. Toliver" on Justia Law

After Defendant-directors decided to sell their interest in Renaissance Learning, Inc. to Permira Advisers, LLC, Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit, contending that Defendants breached their fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders by selling Renaissance because Defendants “put their personal interest in monetizing their holdings in the Company…ahead of…the Company’s minority shareholders.” The circuit court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, concluding that the business judgment rule protected the directors’ actions and that Defendants violated no legal duty when they chose to sell Renaissance to Permira. The court of appeals reversed in part, concluding that the business judgment rule should not be used to dismiss a complaint. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the business judgment rule, which is a substantive law, unequivocally sets forth the terms on which directors may be held liable for their decisions, and as such, a party challenging the decision of a director must plead facts sufficient to plausibly show that he or she is entitled to relief; and (2) Plaintiffs’ complaint did not plead facts sufficient to plausibly show that Defendants’ actions came within the terms of potential liability or that the directors received an improper material benefit at the expense of the minority shareholders. View "Data Key Partners v. Permira Advisers, LLC" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of second degree sexual assault with force or violence by use of a dangerous weapon. The court of appeals reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the circuit court erred by excluding evidence of prior sexual conduct between Defendant and the complainant because the evidence fit within a statutory exception to Wisconsin’s rape shield law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court’s refusal to admit the proffered evidence of the previous sexual relationship was proper under the rape shield law because Defendant failed to establish that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its inherent prejudice. Remanded. View "State v. Sarfraz" on Justia Law

The Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) generally preempts state law claims relating to train speed. Federal preemption, however, does not foreclose a lawsuit against a railroad for breaching the duty to slow or stop when confronted with a “specific, individual hazard.” This case arose from a collision between a train and a minivan during a Memorial Day parade in the Village of Elm Grove. The injured parties and their insurance companies (collectively, Plaintiffs) sued the Soo Line Railroad Company, a rail police officer, and unknown insurance companies for negligence, arguing that Soo Line should have issued an order for trains to go more slowly through the Elm Grove crossings because the potential increase in traffic was a “specific, individual hazard.” The defendants asserted that the FRSA preempted Plaintiffs’ claims. The Supreme Court held (1) the Memorial Day parade was not a “specific, individual hazard” because the parade created only a generally dangerous traffic condition; but (2) the vehicle on the tracks in front of the approaching train was a specific, individual hazard, and therefore, the circuit court properly denied the defendants’ summary judgment motion as it related to claims regarding the train’s reaction to the vehicle on the tracks. View "Partenfelder v. Rohde" on Justia Law

Russell Adams sustained injuries while plowing snow for his employer, the Village of Fontana. Adams sued Northland Equipment Company, which had repaired the plow before the accident, and its insurer, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 102.29(1). The Village’s worker’s compensation insurer accepted Northland’s offer to settle Adams’ claim and moved the circuit court to compel Adams to accept the settlement as well. The circuit court granted the motion. Adams appealed, arguing that a worker’s compensation insurer cannot compel an employee to accept settlement of a third party tort claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a circuit court may compel an employee to accept settlement of the claim the legislature created in Wis. Stat. 102.29(1); and (2) the circuit court’s authority to compel an employee to accept settlement does not violate the employee’s right to a jury trial or procedural due process. View "Adams v. Northland Equip. Co., Inc." on Justia Law