Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was a juvenile when he was charged with attempted first-degree intentional homicide, which is an offense enumerated in Wis. Stat. 938.183(1)(am). At the preliminary hearing held pursuant to Wis. Stat. 970.032(1), the circuit court stated that “there is probable cause to believe a felony has been committed” and ordered that the adult court retain original jurisdiction over Defendant. At issue on appeal was whether the adult court failed to find probable cause of a violation of the specific crime charged under section 938.183(1), as required by 970.032(1) for an adult court to retain exclusive original jurisdiction over a juvenile. The Supreme Court concluded that the bindover and prosecution of Defendant in adult court were proper, holding that the circuit court made the finding required by section 970.032(1) that there was probable cause to believe Defendant committed the specific section 938.183(1) crime charged in the complaint. View "State v. Toliver" on Justia Law

After Defendant-directors decided to sell their interest in Renaissance Learning, Inc. to Permira Advisers, LLC, Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit, contending that Defendants breached their fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders by selling Renaissance because Defendants “put their personal interest in monetizing their holdings in the Company…ahead of…the Company’s minority shareholders.” The circuit court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, concluding that the business judgment rule protected the directors’ actions and that Defendants violated no legal duty when they chose to sell Renaissance to Permira. The court of appeals reversed in part, concluding that the business judgment rule should not be used to dismiss a complaint. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the business judgment rule, which is a substantive law, unequivocally sets forth the terms on which directors may be held liable for their decisions, and as such, a party challenging the decision of a director must plead facts sufficient to plausibly show that he or she is entitled to relief; and (2) Plaintiffs’ complaint did not plead facts sufficient to plausibly show that Defendants’ actions came within the terms of potential liability or that the directors received an improper material benefit at the expense of the minority shareholders. View "Data Key Partners v. Permira Advisers, LLC" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of second degree sexual assault with force or violence by use of a dangerous weapon. The court of appeals reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the circuit court erred by excluding evidence of prior sexual conduct between Defendant and the complainant because the evidence fit within a statutory exception to Wisconsin’s rape shield law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court’s refusal to admit the proffered evidence of the previous sexual relationship was proper under the rape shield law because Defendant failed to establish that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its inherent prejudice. Remanded. View "State v. Sarfraz" on Justia Law

The Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) generally preempts state law claims relating to train speed. Federal preemption, however, does not foreclose a lawsuit against a railroad for breaching the duty to slow or stop when confronted with a “specific, individual hazard.” This case arose from a collision between a train and a minivan during a Memorial Day parade in the Village of Elm Grove. The injured parties and their insurance companies (collectively, Plaintiffs) sued the Soo Line Railroad Company, a rail police officer, and unknown insurance companies for negligence, arguing that Soo Line should have issued an order for trains to go more slowly through the Elm Grove crossings because the potential increase in traffic was a “specific, individual hazard.” The defendants asserted that the FRSA preempted Plaintiffs’ claims. The Supreme Court held (1) the Memorial Day parade was not a “specific, individual hazard” because the parade created only a generally dangerous traffic condition; but (2) the vehicle on the tracks in front of the approaching train was a specific, individual hazard, and therefore, the circuit court properly denied the defendants’ summary judgment motion as it related to claims regarding the train’s reaction to the vehicle on the tracks. View "Partenfelder v. Rohde" on Justia Law

Russell Adams sustained injuries while plowing snow for his employer, the Village of Fontana. Adams sued Northland Equipment Company, which had repaired the plow before the accident, and its insurer, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 102.29(1). The Village’s worker’s compensation insurer accepted Northland’s offer to settle Adams’ claim and moved the circuit court to compel Adams to accept the settlement as well. The circuit court granted the motion. Adams appealed, arguing that a worker’s compensation insurer cannot compel an employee to accept settlement of a third party tort claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a circuit court may compel an employee to accept settlement of the claim the legislature created in Wis. Stat. 102.29(1); and (2) the circuit court’s authority to compel an employee to accept settlement does not violate the employee’s right to a jury trial or procedural due process. View "Adams v. Northland Equip. Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Billy Joe Force, the deceased, died in a collision with another vehicle driven by Jeffrey Brown. The deceased’s estranged spouse, Linda Force, and the deceased's three nonmarital minor children (the children), sought compensation from Brown and two insurance companies, claiming that Brown’s negligence caused the deceased’s death. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that Linda Force had no compensable damages under the wrongful death statutes and that the children did not have a cause of action for wrongful death. The children appealed. The defendants argued on appeal that because Linda Force was still living, she was a “surviving spouse” under the wrongful death statutes, that her recovery for the wrongful death of the deceased was zero, and that, consequently, the children did not have any set-aside from Linda Force’s recovery. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court against the children and in favor of the defendants, holding that the children had a cause of action against the defendants for wrongful death as if Linda Force were not alive at the death of the deceased. View "Force v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether unpaid interns are entitled to the anti-retaliation protections of Wis. Stat. 146.997, Wisconsin’s health care worker protection statute. In the instant case, Asma Masri’s position as an uncompensated intern at the Medical College of Wisconsin (MCW) was terminated after Masri reported “clinical/ethical” concerns to an MCW administrator. Masri filed a retaliation complaint against MCW with the Equal Rights Division (ERD) of the Department of Workforce Development (DWD). ERD determined that Masri was not entitled to anti-retaliation protection under section 146.997 because the statute is limited to employees, and Masri was not an employee where she received no financial compensation. The Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) affirmed. Granting due weight deference to LIRC’s decision, the circuit court and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) LIRC’s decision is accorded due weight deference because LIRC has experience interpreting the meaning of “employee” and various statutes and is charged with administering section 146.997; and (2) LIRC correctly found that section 146.997 applies only to employees, a category that does not include interns who do not receive compensation or tangible benefits. View "Masri v. State Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a law enforcement officer’s knock on a car window constitutes a “seizure.” Defendant argued that he was seized when a sheriff’s deputy knocked on the driver’s side of Defendant’s vehicle and asked Defendant to roll down the window. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence obtained after he rolled down the window and was subsequently found guilty of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that “when a uniformed officer approaches a vehicle at night and directs the driver to roll down his or her window, a reasonable driver would not feel free to ignore the officer.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a law enforcement officer’s knock on a car window does not by itself constitute a show of authority sufficient to give rise to the belief in a reasonable person that the person is not free to leave; and (2) under the totality of the circumstances of this case, the officer did not show a level of intimidation or exercise of authority sufficient to implicate the Fourth Amendment until after Defendant rolled down his window and exposed the grounds for the seizure. View "County of Grant v. Vogt" on Justia Law

Circuit Judge Richard J. Nuss presided over two jury trials, State v. Pinno and State v. Seaton. In both voir dire proceedings, Judge Nuss asked the public to leave the courtroom to make room for large jury panels. Defendants were subsequently convicted after jury trials open to the public. Defendants filed postconviction motions, alleging violations to their right to a public trial. Judge Nuss denied all postconviction motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extends to voir dire, and a judge’s decision to close or limit public access to a courtroom in a criminal case requires the analysis set forth in Waller v. Georgia; (2) the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial may be asserted by the defendant at any time during a trial; (3) because neither Defendant in this case objected to the alleged courtroom closure, Defendants both forfeited their rights to a public trial; (4) defendants must demonstrate prejudice to prove ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel fails to object to the closure of the courtroom, and Defendants in this case failed to prove that their counsel was ineffective; and (5) Seaton was not denied his right to an impartial judge. View "State v. Seaton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured when he slipped or tripped on a curb outside a Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC convenience store. Plaintiff sued, alleging that Speedway violated its common law duty of care and the safe-place statute. During trial, based on Speedway’s decision not to call any former employees who had been on duty at the time of the accident as witnesses, Plaintiff requested and the trial court gave an absent witness instruction. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff, and the circuit court affirmed the jury’s verdict. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the circuit court erroneously gave the absent witness instruction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court erred in giving the absent witness instruction, and the instruction was prejudicial. Remanded for a new trial. View "Kochanski v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC" on Justia Law