Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

George Kontos owned property that his daughter lived in with her family and multiple dogs. Plaintiff was injured on Kontos’ property when she was bitten multiple times by the dogs. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Kontos and his insurance company, alleging that Kontos was liable for her injuries under Wis. Stat. 174.02(1), which imposes strict liability on dog owners for injuries caused by their dogs. The circuit court determined that Kontos was a statutory owner because he gave shelter to his daughter and her dogs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) mere ownership of the property on which a dog resides is not sufficient to establish that an individual is an owner of a dog under section 174.02; and (2) Kontos was not an “owner” under the statute where he did not legally own or keep the dogs and because he was not a “harborer” as evidenced by the totality of the circumstances. View "Augsburger v. Homestead Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of operating a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, sixth offense. Defendant subsequently filed a post-conviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court denied the motion, and Defendant’s post-conviction counsel filed a no-merit report with the court of appeals. The court of appeals accepted the no-merit report and affirmed the conviction. Defendant petitioned for review. While the petition was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Missouri v. McNeely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) McNeely applies retroactively to the facts of this case, rending the warrantless nonconsensual blood draw performed on Defendant unconstitutional, but the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule precludes suppression of the evidence; and (2) the court of appeals properly accepted post-conviction counsel’s no-merit report. View "State v. Foster" on Justia Law

Defendant was the driver of a vehicle that struck the victim as she crossed a street. Defendant was transported to a hospital, where hospital personnel conducted a warrantless investigatory blood draw upon the orders of the police. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle. At issue on appeal was whether the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Missouri v. McNeely did rendered unconstitutional the warrantless blood draw performed on Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s arrest was lawful because the police had probable cause to believe that Defendant had committed a drunk-driving related crime; and (2) assuming, without deciding, that the warrantless investigatory blood draw performed on Defendant was not supported by exigent circumstances, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. View "State v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Defendant was involved in a single-vehicle accident that killed one of the occupants of the vehicle. Defendant, who denied being the driver, was being treated at the hospital when the hospital staff performed a warrantless blood draw at the instructions of a sheriff’s deputy. Defendant moved to suppress the blood draw as an unreasonable search without a warrant. The circuit court denied the motion to suppress. Defendant was subsequently found guilty of homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle and other crimes. The court of appeals upheld the conviction, concluding that probable cause and exigent circumstances supported the blood draw. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the warrantless blood draw was constitutional because it was supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances. View "State v. Tullberg" on Justia Law

Milwaukee County calculates pension payments for its retired employees by multiplying a retiree’s final average salary by a certain percentage known as a multiplier. The resulting number is then multiplied by the retiree’s total years of county service. Suzanne Stoker and her labor union filed a complaint against the County and the Milwaukee County Pension Board, arguing that an ordinance passed by the County in 2011 that reduced the multiplier for all county service performed on or after the effective date of the ordinance was a breach of contract because she had a vested right to have the former, higher multiplier apply to her post-2011 county service and because she did not personally consent to the reduction. The circuit court granted summary judgment and declaratory and injunctive relief to Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the County did not breach Stoker’s contractual right to retirement system benefits earned and vested when it amended the pension multiplier, and the County did have the ability to make the reductions of the multiplier without Stoker’s personal consent. Remanded. View "Suzanne Stoker v. Milwaukee County" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to deliver THC. At Defendant’s sentencing, the circuit court found him eligible for expungement on the condition that he successfully complete probation. After successfully completing probation, Defendant petitioned for expungement, but the circuit court denied the petition. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the expungement statute required Defendant to forward his certificate of discharge to the circuit court and to petition the circuit court for expungement in a timely fashion, and Defendant’s failure to petition the circuit court until a year after his discharge rendered his petition for expungement tardy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the successful completion of probation automatically entitled Defendant to expungement; (2) the expungement statute places no burden on Defendant to petition for expungement within a certain period of time; and (3) the circuit court abused its discretion when it reversed the decision it made at sentencing to find Defendant eligible for expungement. Remanded with instructions that the clerk of court expunge Defendant’s record. View "State v. Hemp" on Justia Law

Outagamie County filed a petition for the involuntary commitment of Michael H. A jury found that Michael was mentally ill, was a proper subject for treatment, and was dangerous. Based on the verdict, the circuit court ordered Michael committed for treatment pursuant to Wisconsin’s involuntary commitment statute, Wis. Stat. 51.20. On appeal, Michael challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, specifically, the evidence that he was dangerous. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the evidence supported a finding of dangerousness under subsection (1)(a)(2)(a) relating to threats of suicide or self-harm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that credible evidence existed in the record supporting inferences that there was a substantial probability that Michael was dangerous to himself within the meaning of subsection (1)(a)(2)(1) based on threats of suicide or serious bodily harm, and (1)(a)(2)(c) based on impaired judgment, manifested by a pattern of recent acts. View "Outagamie County v. Michael H." on Justia Law

118th Street Kenosha, LLC (the LLC) owned commercial property in the City of Kenosha. Before 2010, the commercial property had direct access to 118th Avenue. In 2010, the Wisconsin Department of Transportation (DOT) relocated 118th Avenue, leaving the commercial property with no direct access to the street. The LLC sought to recover damages under Wis. Stat. 32.09(6g) for the commercial property’s diminution in value caused by the relocation of 118th Avenue. The circuit court granted the DOT’s motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence of damages caused by the LLC’s loss of direct access and proximity to 118th Avenue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the LLC was precluded from seeking damages under section 32.09(6g) for the commercial property’s diminution in value resulting from its loss of direct access and proximity to 118th Avenue due to the 118th Avenue relocation. View "118th Street Kenosha, LLC v. Wis. Dep’t of Transp." on Justia Law

This case arose from an attack by multiple people on an inmate in the county jail. Defendant was charged with battery by a prisoner, as a party to a crime. During Defendant’s trial, a witness testified that the victim had identified one of his attackers as a fellow inmate with platinum teeth. The prosecutor then requested, over defense objection, that Defendant reveal his teeth to the jury. Defendant complied, revealing platinum teeth. Defendant was convicted as charged. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that this case did not offend constitutional principles against self-incrimination, where (1) the evidence of Defendant’s platinum teeth was physical evidence that did not have a testimonial aspect sufficient to implicate constitutional protections, as it did not express, make use of, reveal, or disclose the contents of Defendant’s mind; and (2) Defendant’s teeth were material to identification because they were probative of Defendant’s identity. View "State v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded no contest to armed robbery. Defendant later filed a postconviction motion to withdraw his no-contest plea, arguing that his plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because the State, the court, and trial counsel mistakenly advised him when deciding whether to accept the State’s plea offer that he was facing a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of extended supervision. The circuit court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed and remanded to the circuit court to allow Defendant to withdraw his no-contest plea, concluding that Defendant’s plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and that Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the totality of the circumstances, Defendant had the right to withdraw his no-contest plea; and (2) Defendant proved that the no-contest plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. View "State v. Dillard" on Justia Law