Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State filed a criminal complaint alleging that Defendant had engaged in two counts of sexual assault of a child under thirteen years of age. Defendant move to dismiss the complaint and information on the grounds that he was not adequately informed of the charges against him because the time periods in which the alleged crimes were committed were too vague. The circuit court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint and information. The court of appeals reversed, relying on State v. Fawcett as a basis for its determination that Defendant received adequate notice as to the charges against him. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded to the circuit court with instructions to reinstate the complaint and information against Defendant, holding (1) in child sexual assault cases, courts may apply the factors outlined in Fawcett and may consider any other relevant factors necessary to determine whether the complaint and information states an offense to which the defendant can plead and prepare a defense; and (2) the complaint and information in this case provided Defendant adequate notice of the charges against him. View "State v. Kempainen" on Justia Law

Acuity, A Mutual Insurance Company and Chartis Specialty Insurance Company both issued liability policies to Dorner, Inc, a construction company. The Chartis policy was a contractors’ pollution liability (CPL) policy, and the Acuity policy was a Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) policy. Acuity defended and indemnified Dorner in four lawsuits seeking recovery for bodily injury and property damage caused by a natural gas-fueled explosion and fire, which occurred after Dorner’s employees damaged an underground natural gas pipeline during an excavation project. Acuity sought reimbursement from Chartis, asserting that Chartis’s CPL policy provided coverage for Dorner in these lawsuits. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Acuity and ordered Chartis to share with Acuity one-half the cost of defending and indemnifying Dorner. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the claims asserted against Dorner were not covered under the CPL policy. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the circuit court to reinstate the judgment in favor of Acuity, holding that Chartis’s CPL policy covered Dorner’s liability arising from the natural gas-field explosion and fire. View "Acuity v. Chartis Specialty Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Milwaukee City Housing Authority brought an eviction action against Defendant, who lives in federally subsidized housing, because Defendant violated the terms of his lease by engaging in “drug-related criminal activity” - i.e., smoking marijuana inside his apartment. Defendant argued that he could not be evicted because Wis. Stat. 704.17(2)(b) required the notice of eviction to provide him with an opportunity to remedy his lease violation. The circuit court issued a restitution order and writ of eviction. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that 42 U.S.C. 1437d(1)(6) preempts the right-to-remedy provision of section 704.14(2)(b) when a public housing tenant is evicted for engaging in “drug-related criminal activity” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 1437d(1). View "Milwaukee City Housing Auth. v. Cobb" on Justia Law

Based on evidence obtained from a search of Defendant’s home, the State charged Defendant with possession with several drug-related offenses. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from his home, contending that the warrant was unlawfully obtained because it was based on information gained from a prior illegal search. Specifically, Defendant contended that the police officers needed, but did not have, a warrant to conduct the dog sniff, and because the warrant relied on an affidavit detailing the dog’s alert to the presence of drugs, the warrant was invalid and the evidence must be suppressed. The circuit court denied the motion. While Defendant’s appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court issued Florida v. Jardines. Based on Jardines, the court of appeal determined that Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the officers brought the drug-sniffing dog to his home without a search warrant. The court nevertheless affirmed the conviction because the police subsequently obtained a search warrant upon which they relied in good faith. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied because the evidence at issue was obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate. View "State v. Scull" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with one count of first-degree intentional homicide. At trial, Defendant indicated that he wished to testify. Defendant insisted that he would inform the jury of allegedly wrongful prior conviction for armed robbery. The circuit court decided that Defendant’ proposed testimony concerning the prior conviction was irrelevant. Defendant, however, promised that, if permitted to testify, he would disobey the circuit court’s evidentiary ruling. The circuit court determined, over timely defense objection, that Defendant forfeited his right to testify at trial by exhibiting stubborn and defiant conduct that threatened both the fairness and reliability of the criminal trial process and the preservation of dignity, order and decorum in the courtroom. The jury subsequently convicted Defendant of first-degree intentional homicide. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant the right to testify, as the court’s forfeiture determination was not arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes it was designed to serve; and (2) even if the court assumed error, such error was subject to harmless error analysis, and in this case, the assumed error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Anthony" on Justia Law

Wisconsin’s notice-prejudice statutes provide that an insured’s failure to furnish timely notice of a claim as required by the terms of a liability policy will not bar coverage unless timely notice was reasonably possible and the insurer was prejudiced by the delay. Plaintiffs sued their former attorney (“Attorney”) for legal malpractice. Attorney’s professional liability insurer ("Insurer") intervened in the lawsuit and sought summary judgment declaring that the insurance policy it issued to Attorney did not cover Plaintiffs’ suit. At issue in this case was whether the notice-prejudice statutes superseded Insurer’s policy requirement that claims be reported during the policy period. Plaintiffs’ claim against Attorney was made during the policy period, but Attorney did not report the claim during the policy period. The circuit court granted the Insurer’s motion for summary judgment, but the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the notice-prejudice statutes did not supersede Insurer’s policy requirement that claims be reported within the policy period. View "Anderson v. Aul" on Justia Law

After Shirley Carson defaulted on loan payments, Bank sought a judgment of foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged premises. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Bank of New York Mellon (“the Bank”). More than sixteen months after the judgment of foreclosure was entered, the Bank had not sold the property. Carson filed a motion to amend the judgment to include a finding that the property was abandoned and an order that the Bank bring the property to sale within five weeks from the date of entry of the amended judgment. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that it lacked the authority to order the Bank to sell the property at a specific time under Wis. Stat. 846.102. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the court may use its contempt authority to order a sale under these circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when the circuit court determines that a property is abandoned, section 846.102 authorizes the court to order a mortgagee to bring the property to sale after the redemption period; and (2) because the circuit court in this case did not reach the issue of whether the property had been abandoned, the case must be remanded. View "Bank of New York v. Carson" on Justia Law

A Milwaukee County General Ordinance prospectively eliminated Medicare Part B premium reimbursement upon retirement for employees who did not retire before retirement dates established by Milwaukee County. Plaintiffs were of retirement age, had fifteen years of credited service to the County, but did not retire by the dates established in the ordinance. Plaintiffs claimed that the ordinance impaired their vested contract right to reimbursement of Medicare Part B premiums when they retire. The court of appeals granted summary judgment to Milwaukee County. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the County did not abrogate a vested contract right when it prospectively modified a health insurance benefit it offered for employees who had not yet retired; (2) County employees have a vested contract right to Medicare Part B premium reimbursement when they fulfill all three criteria for its payment, including actual retirement; and (3) because Plaintiffs did not meet all three criteria in this case, they did not fulfill the requirements necessary to establish a vested contract right to reimbursement. View "Wis. Fed’n of Nurses and Health Prof’ls v. Milwaukee County" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to felony forgery. After Defendant was sentenced he filed a motion for resentencing, arguing that his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was violated because compelled, self-incriminating statements to his probation agent were appended to the report of the presentence investigation the circuit court reviewed at sentencing. The circuit court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed and granted resentencing based on ineffective assistance of counsel, which the court of appeals raised sua sponte. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) assuming, without deciding, that Defendant’s statements to his probation agent were compelled, Defendant failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by actually relying on Defendant’s compelling, incriminating statements in imposing sentence; and (2) therefore, Defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel’s lack of objection to those statements. View "State v. Alexander" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of three offenses. Defendant filed two postconviction motions requesting a new trial, asserting that the circuit court judge, Jon M. Counsell, had no authority to preside over Defendant’s trial or sentencing because Defendant had filed a proper request for substitution of judge and the request had been granted. The circuit court denied the postconviction motions. The court of appeals summarily reversed the judgment of conviction and postconviction order and remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant did not forfeit his statutory right to peremptory substitution of the judge; and (2) harmless error did not apply in this case when the circuit court erred by presiding over Defendant’s trial, sentencing, and postconviction motions. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Harrison" on Justia Law