Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Based on evidence obtained from a search of Defendant’s home, the State charged Defendant with possession with several drug-related offenses. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from his home, contending that the warrant was unlawfully obtained because it was based on information gained from a prior illegal search. Specifically, Defendant contended that the police officers needed, but did not have, a warrant to conduct the dog sniff, and because the warrant relied on an affidavit detailing the dog’s alert to the presence of drugs, the warrant was invalid and the evidence must be suppressed. The circuit court denied the motion. While Defendant’s appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court issued Florida v. Jardines. Based on Jardines, the court of appeal determined that Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the officers brought the drug-sniffing dog to his home without a search warrant. The court nevertheless affirmed the conviction because the police subsequently obtained a search warrant upon which they relied in good faith. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied because the evidence at issue was obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate. View "State v. Scull" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with one count of first-degree intentional homicide. At trial, Defendant indicated that he wished to testify. Defendant insisted that he would inform the jury of allegedly wrongful prior conviction for armed robbery. The circuit court decided that Defendant’ proposed testimony concerning the prior conviction was irrelevant. Defendant, however, promised that, if permitted to testify, he would disobey the circuit court’s evidentiary ruling. The circuit court determined, over timely defense objection, that Defendant forfeited his right to testify at trial by exhibiting stubborn and defiant conduct that threatened both the fairness and reliability of the criminal trial process and the preservation of dignity, order and decorum in the courtroom. The jury subsequently convicted Defendant of first-degree intentional homicide. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant the right to testify, as the court’s forfeiture determination was not arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes it was designed to serve; and (2) even if the court assumed error, such error was subject to harmless error analysis, and in this case, the assumed error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Anthony" on Justia Law

Wisconsin’s notice-prejudice statutes provide that an insured’s failure to furnish timely notice of a claim as required by the terms of a liability policy will not bar coverage unless timely notice was reasonably possible and the insurer was prejudiced by the delay. Plaintiffs sued their former attorney (“Attorney”) for legal malpractice. Attorney’s professional liability insurer ("Insurer") intervened in the lawsuit and sought summary judgment declaring that the insurance policy it issued to Attorney did not cover Plaintiffs’ suit. At issue in this case was whether the notice-prejudice statutes superseded Insurer’s policy requirement that claims be reported during the policy period. Plaintiffs’ claim against Attorney was made during the policy period, but Attorney did not report the claim during the policy period. The circuit court granted the Insurer’s motion for summary judgment, but the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the notice-prejudice statutes did not supersede Insurer’s policy requirement that claims be reported within the policy period. View "Anderson v. Aul" on Justia Law

After Shirley Carson defaulted on loan payments, Bank sought a judgment of foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged premises. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Bank of New York Mellon (“the Bank”). More than sixteen months after the judgment of foreclosure was entered, the Bank had not sold the property. Carson filed a motion to amend the judgment to include a finding that the property was abandoned and an order that the Bank bring the property to sale within five weeks from the date of entry of the amended judgment. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that it lacked the authority to order the Bank to sell the property at a specific time under Wis. Stat. 846.102. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the court may use its contempt authority to order a sale under these circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when the circuit court determines that a property is abandoned, section 846.102 authorizes the court to order a mortgagee to bring the property to sale after the redemption period; and (2) because the circuit court in this case did not reach the issue of whether the property had been abandoned, the case must be remanded. View "Bank of New York v. Carson" on Justia Law

A Milwaukee County General Ordinance prospectively eliminated Medicare Part B premium reimbursement upon retirement for employees who did not retire before retirement dates established by Milwaukee County. Plaintiffs were of retirement age, had fifteen years of credited service to the County, but did not retire by the dates established in the ordinance. Plaintiffs claimed that the ordinance impaired their vested contract right to reimbursement of Medicare Part B premiums when they retire. The court of appeals granted summary judgment to Milwaukee County. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the County did not abrogate a vested contract right when it prospectively modified a health insurance benefit it offered for employees who had not yet retired; (2) County employees have a vested contract right to Medicare Part B premium reimbursement when they fulfill all three criteria for its payment, including actual retirement; and (3) because Plaintiffs did not meet all three criteria in this case, they did not fulfill the requirements necessary to establish a vested contract right to reimbursement. View "Wis. Fed’n of Nurses and Health Prof’ls v. Milwaukee County" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to felony forgery. After Defendant was sentenced he filed a motion for resentencing, arguing that his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was violated because compelled, self-incriminating statements to his probation agent were appended to the report of the presentence investigation the circuit court reviewed at sentencing. The circuit court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed and granted resentencing based on ineffective assistance of counsel, which the court of appeals raised sua sponte. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) assuming, without deciding, that Defendant’s statements to his probation agent were compelled, Defendant failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by actually relying on Defendant’s compelling, incriminating statements in imposing sentence; and (2) therefore, Defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel’s lack of objection to those statements. View "State v. Alexander" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of three offenses. Defendant filed two postconviction motions requesting a new trial, asserting that the circuit court judge, Jon M. Counsell, had no authority to preside over Defendant’s trial or sentencing because Defendant had filed a proper request for substitution of judge and the request had been granted. The circuit court denied the postconviction motions. The court of appeals summarily reversed the judgment of conviction and postconviction order and remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant did not forfeit his statutory right to peremptory substitution of the judge; and (2) harmless error did not apply in this case when the circuit court erred by presiding over Defendant’s trial, sentencing, and postconviction motions. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Harrison" on Justia Law

In these two consolidated cases, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit courts’ orders denying Defendants’ petitions for discharge from involuntary commitment under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 as a sexually violent person. Defendants argued, inter alia, that the circuit courts erred by declining to apply the Daubert evidentiary standard under Wis. Stat. 907.02(1) to the prosecution’s expert witnesses who testified in Defendants’ discharge petition trials because the petitions commenced “actions” or “special proceedings” after the Daubert standard’s first date of applicability. (The underlying chapter 980 commitments commenced several years before the Daubert standard’s first date of applicability.) The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Daubert evidentiary standard under section 907.02(1) did not apply to expert testimony in Defendants’ chapter 980 discharge petition trials because their discharge petitions did not “commence” “actions” or “special proceedings”; and (2) Defendants’ equal protection and due process rights were not violated because the legislature had a rational basis for not applying the Daubert evidentiary standard to expert testimony in post-Daubert chapter 980 discharge petitions that seek relief from pre-Daubert chapter 980 commitments. View "State v. Knipfer" on Justia Law

Fred and Tina Preisler operated a dairy farm and raised cattle. The Preislers hired Kuettel’s Septic to apply septage, which is primarily composed of human urine and fecal material, to their farm fields. The Preislers subsequently experienced problems with their well water. The Preislers sued Kuettel’s Septic, other defendants, and their insurers, alleging, among other claims, negligence in storing and in applying septage resulting in nuisance and trespass. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the insurers, concluding that a pollution exclusion clause precluded coverage for harm resulting from the Preislers’ water supply’s contamination. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that “a reasonable insured would understand that decomposing septage is a ‘contaminant’ and therefore a ‘pollutant’ as defined in the policies when it has decomposed and seeps into a water supply.” View "Preisler v. Kuettel's Septic Serv., LLC" on Justia Law

In 2011, Robert and Jane Falk spread liquid cow manure onto their farm fields for the purpose of fertilization. The manure leeched into and contaminated the wells of the Falks’ neighbors. Wilson Mutual Insurance Company, the Falks’ insurer, filed a declaratory judgment motion claiming it did not have a duty to defend or indemnify the Falks against allegations that they negligently spread manure on their property and thereby polluted their neighbors’ wells. The circuit court granted the motion, concluding that the Wilson Mutual policy issued to the Falks contained an exclusion for pollution and that manure is unambiguously a pollutant. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that manure is not a pollutant because, to a reasonable farmer, manure is “liquid gold.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the pollution exclusion in the policy unambiguously excludes coverage for well contamination caused by the seepage of cow manure. View "Wilson Mut. Ins. Co. v. Falk" on Justia Law