Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

MS Real Estate Holdings, LLC contracted with the Foxes for a right of first refusal to purchase or lease the Fox land. Years later, the Foxes sued, arguing that their revocation of the right of first refusal contract was valid. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Foxes, concluding that the right of first refusal contract was indefinite as to duration and that the revocation by the Foxes was reasonable. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a right of first refusal contract is definite as to duration when it specifies an event that triggers the right and requires the right holder to either exercise or waive the right within a specific period of time thereafter, even if the triggering event is not certain to occur; and (2) the right of first refusal contract at issue in this case was not terminable at will because, by the terms of the contract, the right of first refusal continued until there was a sale of the property, either to MS Real Estate, or to a third party in the event that MS Real Estate declined to exercise its right of first refusal to purchase, thereby waiving its right. View "MS Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. Donald P. Fox Family Trust" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree intentional homicide and attempted first-degree intentional homicide. Defendant filed a postconviction motion seeking a new trial based on the trial court’s decision to exclude testimony proffered by Defendant that a third party committed the homicide. The court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, determining that the third party had the opportunity to kill the victim and that the State failed to show that the circuit court’s alleged error in not admitting Defendant’s proffered evidence was harmless. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State v. Denny test is the appropriate test for courts to use to determine the admissibility of third-party perpetrator evidence; (2) for a defendant to show that a third party had the opportunity to commit a crime by employing gunmen to kill the victim, the defendant must provide some evidence that the third party had the realistic ability to engineer such a scenario; and (3) because Defendant failed to show that the alleged third party perpetrator had the opportunity to kill the victim, directly or indirectly, the circuit court did not err in excluding Defendant’s proffered evidence. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

After receiving a complaint from Defendant’s wife, police officers conducted an investigatory stop of Defendant’s vehicle. Defendant did not comply with police orders after being stopped and also complained of chest pain. The police transported Defendant to a hospital for medical assessment and then conducted a legal blood draw. Results of the blood test demonstrated that Defendant had operated his vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC). Defendant was subsequently charged with operating while intoxication (OWI) and with a PAC. The circuit court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress the blood test results. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Defendant’s transportation to the hospital exceeded the scope of the investigatory detention and violated Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant’s stop and detention satisfied the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment because they were supported by reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory detention; (2) Defendant’s arrest when he was transported to the hospital was constitutional because the officers had probable cause to arrest Defendant; and (3) the transportation to the hospital was lawful as a community caretaker function of law enforcement. View "State v. Blatterman" on Justia Law

David Friedlen had worked for Runzheimer International, Ltd. for more than fifteen years when Runzheimer began requiring its employees to sign restrictive covenants or be fired. Friedlen signed the covenant and continued to work for Runzheimer for more than two years until he was terminated. Friedlen subsequently began working at Corporate Reimbursement Services (CRS), one of Runzheimer’s competitors. Runzheimer sued Friedlen and CRS, alleging that Friedlen’s employment at CRS constituted a breach of the restrictive covenants. Defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming that the covenant was unenforceable because it lacked consideration. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) an employer’s forbearance in exercising its right to terminate an at-will employee constitutes lawful consideration for signing a restrictive covenant; and (2) because the circuit court made no determination as to the reasonableness of the covenant’s terms, the cause must be remanded for further proceedings. View "Runzheimer Int’l, Ltd. v. Friedlen" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of first-degree intentional homicide as party to a crime and armed burglary as party to a crime. Petitioner’s defense counsel later asked for a ruling regarding Petitioner’s competency to seek postconviction relief. In a postconviction competency hearing, the circuit court concluded that Petitioner’s defense counsel failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner was incompetent. The court of appeals remanded for a new competency hearing, determining that the circuit court erred by failing to apply the lower preponderance of the evidence burden of proof. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that once a defense attorney raises the issue of competency at a postconviction hearing, the burden is on the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is competent to proceed. Remanded to the circuit court to apply the correct standard if Petitioner’s competency is still challenged. View "State v. Daniel" on Justia Law

Defendants in these two separate cases were found guilty of operating a motor vehicle with a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in the blood, among other crimes. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions, concluding that the State did not violate Defendants’ due process rights when the Wisconsin State Laboratory of Hygiene had destroyed their blood samples in accordance with routine procedures before each defendant had the opportunity to test the samples. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in accordance with Arizona v. Youngblood, because Defendants’ blood samples were neither apparently exculpatory nor destroyed in bad faith, the State did not violate Defendants’ due process rights; and (2) operating a motor vehicle with a detective mount of a restricted controlled substance in the blood under Wis. Stat. 346.63(1)(am) is a strict liability offense that does not require scienter, and the statute is constitutional. View "State v. Luedtke" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, third offense. Defendant appealed, arguing that his right of confrontation was violated when the circuit court admitted an expert witness’s testimony that established Defendant’s blood alcohol concentration while he was operating his vehicle. The expert witness based his opinion in part on forensic tests conducted by an analyst at the Wisconsin State Laboratory of Hygiene, who was unavailable for trial. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s admission of the witness’s testimony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the witness’s review of Defendant’s laboratory file, including the forensic test results at issue in this case, to form an independent opinion to which he testified did not violate Defendant’s right of confrontation. View "State v. Griep" on Justia Law

After exhausting their administrative remedies, Plaintiffs, six employees of Husco International, Inc., brought this wage claim case behalf of themselves and others similarly situated seeking back pay for unpaid twenty-minute meal breaks taken during the two-year period preceding the filing of their complaint. The union had previously agreed to unpaid meal breaks in every collective bargaining agreement (CBA) negotiated since 1983 at the company’s Waukesha plant. This provision, however, was in conflict with a Department of Workforce Development (DWD) regulation that requires employers to pay employees for meal breaks that are shorter than thirty minutes. The practice was later ended. The circuit court denied both parties’ summary judgment motions. The court of appeals granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs, reasoning that the CBA could not trump the DWD meal-break regulation. The Supreme court reversed, holding that the employees were not entitled, under the DWD regulation, to back pay for the unpaid meal breaks in this case. View "Aguilar v. Husco Int’l, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of one count of engaging in repeated acts of sexual assault of the same child and sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment. Defendant subsequently filed a post-conviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. The circuit court concluded that the prosecutor’s remarks during closing argument were improper and ordered a new trial in the interest of justice. The court of appeals affirmed on other grounds, concluding that the amended complaint and information charging Defendant failed to provide adequate notice to satisfy Defendant’s due process rights and that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in admitting other-acts evidence. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the circuit court with instructions that the judgment of conviction be reinstated, holding (1) the amended complaint and information provided adequate notice and, thus, did not violate Defendant’s due process rights; (2) the circuit court did not err in admitting the other-acts evidence; and (3) the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in granting a new trial in the interest of justice because of the prosecutor’s remarks during closing argument. View "State v. Hurley" on Justia Law

An arbitration panel ordered James Graham to pay First Weber Group Inc. for a disputed real estate brokerage commission. Graham failed to pay, and First Weber filed an action to confirm the arbitration award. The circuit court ordered Graham to pay First Weber the commission awarded in the arbitration but denied First Weber’s request for costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, concluding that no costs may be awarded when confirming an arbitration award. Thereafter, First Weber filed an arbitration request with the Realtors Association of South Central Wisconsin, Inc., of which Graham was a member, asking the Association to arbitrate the dispute over costs and reasonable attorney’s fees because judicial confirmation of the commission award was necessary. Graham refused to attend the arbitration hearing. First Weber subsequently filed a petition to compel arbitration of the dispute regarding fees and costs. The circuit court denied the petition, concluding that First Weber’s arbitration request was untimely. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the arbitration agreement, Graham’s timeliness and estoppel defenses against arbitration are to be determined in the arbitration proceedings, not by a court in a proceeding to compel arbitration, and therefore, Graham has not overcome the presumption in favor of arbitration. View "First Weber Group, Inc. v. Synergy Real Estate Group, LLC" on Justia Law