Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, referred to collectively as the Wisconsin Realtors Association (WRA), filed a complaint against Defendant, the Public Service Commission of Wisconsin (Commission), arguing that Wis. Admin. Code ch. PSC 128 - titled “Wind Energy Systems” - is invalid because it was promulgated by the Commission without compliance with statutory rule-making procedures. The specific issue presented in this case was whether, under Wis. Stat. 227.115(2), the Department of Commerce was required as a matter of law to prepare a housing impact report before Wis. Admin. Code ch. PSC 128 was submitted to the Legislative Council staff for review. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the Commission, concluding that Wis. Admin. Code ch. PSC 128 was duly promulgated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) WRA did not demonstrate that a housing impact report was required as a matter of law for Wis. Admin. Code ch. PSC 128; and (2) invalidating Wis. Admin. Code ch. PSC 128 under the circumstances would infringe on the role of the legislature, which the Court declined to do. View "Wis. Realtors Ass’n v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Wis." on Justia Law

In 2006, Plaintiffs, former employees and the estates and beneficiaries of former employees at an Eau Claire tire manufacturing plant, filed suit against multiple defendants alleging that the initial plaintiffs were exposed to benzene during their employment at the tire manufacturing facility, causing injury and, in some cases, death. In 2012, the circuit court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that Plaintiffs’ claims had accrued at death and were therefore barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that their claims did not accrue until they had reason to believe that Defendants were responsible for the injuries giving rise to their claims. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the discovery rule permits the accrual of both survival claims and wrongful death claims after the date of the decedent’s death; and (2) under the circumstances of this case, the applicable statute of limitations began to run when the survival claims and wrongful death claims were discovered provided that Plaintiffs would be able to show that they exercised reasonable diligence in investigating and discovering their claims. Remanded. View "Christ v. Exxon Mobil Corp." on Justia Law

The Journal Times of Racine and its editor (collectively, the Newspaper) commenced this mandamus action under Wis. Stat. 19.37(1)(a) after the City of Racine Board of Police and Fire Commissioners (Commission) denied the Newspaper’s request seeking information pertaining to a special meeting that the Commission held in closed session. The Commission subsequently provided the Newspaper the information it had requested. The circuit court granted the Commission’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the Newspaper’s record request had become moot. The court of appeals reversed and remanded solely for a determination of whether the Newspaper was entitled to attorney fees and costs. The Newspaper appealed, arguing that the court of appeals erred in remanding the matter where the award should instead by made as a matter of law. The Commission also appealed, arguing that the Newspaper did not prevail in its lawsuit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Newspaper did not prevail in substantial part in the action and was therefore not entitled to its requested relief. View "Journal Times v. City of Racine Bd. of Police & Fire Comm’rs" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court took this opportunity to clarify the law on waiver of the right to counsel after a defendant has been charged with a crime. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of delivering heroin, second or subsequent offense, as a repeater and as party to a crime. Defendant appealed, arguing that statements he made to investigators while he was incarcerated and after his initial appearance should have been suppressed in accordance with State v. Dagnall. Before the interview, Defendant waived his Miranda rights and did not ask for counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Montejo v. Louisiana effectively overruled Dagnall by establishing that a waiver of Miranda rights is sufficient to waive the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and such a waiver is not presumed invalid simply because the defendant is already represented by counsel; and (2) Wis. Const. art. I, 7 does not provide greater protections than the Sixth Amendment of the federal Constitution in the context of a waiver of the right to have counsel present during questioning. View "State v. Delebreau" on Justia Law

After the circuit court denied his motion to suppress certain statements he made during police questioning, Defendant pled guilty to second-degree reckless homicide as party to a crime. Defendant was fifteen years old at the time of the crime. Defendant requested that he be allowed to withdraw his plea, arguing that his confession to police was involuntary and, alternatively, that the incriminating statements he made that were not recorded during his custodial interrogation as a juvenile were inadmissible. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s rulings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s statements were voluntary; and (2) the police violated Wis. Stat. 938.195 by turning off the device recording Defendant’s interrogation during questioning, but the error in not suppressing some of Defendant’s statements was harmless. View "State v. Moore" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to operating with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC), sixth offense. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to four years' imprisonment. The State appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by excluding additional evidence that the State sought to submit to prove that Defendant possessed six, rather than five, prior drunk-driving related convictions. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of conviction, concluding that the circuit court erred in excluding the additional evidence and that the evidence was sufficient to prove the additional prior conviction. The remanded with instructions to enter an amended judgment of conviction for operating with a PAC as a seventh offense and to impose a sentence accordingly. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and upheld Defendant’s conviction, holding that because a conviction of operating a PAC as a seventh offense carries a greater range of punishment than does a sixth offense, the court of appeals’ remedy rendered Defendant’s plea unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary. Further, a remedy that requires a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea is violative of due process. View "State v. Chamblis" on Justia Law

Oneida Seven Generations Corporation proposed a renewable energy facility and sought a conditional use permit to install the facility in the City of Green Bay. The City voted to approve the conditional use permit but later voted to rescind the permit on the grounds that it was obtained through misrepresentation. The circuit court affirmed the City’s decision to rescind. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the City’s decision that the permit was obtained through misrepresentation was not supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on the evidence presented, the City could not reasonably conclude that the statements by Oneida Seven’s representative regarding the facility’s operations were misrepresentations. View "Oneida Seven Generations Corp. v. City of Green Bay" on Justia Law

MS Real Estate Holdings, LLC contracted with the Foxes for a right of first refusal to purchase or lease the Fox land. Years later, the Foxes sued, arguing that their revocation of the right of first refusal contract was valid. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Foxes, concluding that the right of first refusal contract was indefinite as to duration and that the revocation by the Foxes was reasonable. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a right of first refusal contract is definite as to duration when it specifies an event that triggers the right and requires the right holder to either exercise or waive the right within a specific period of time thereafter, even if the triggering event is not certain to occur; and (2) the right of first refusal contract at issue in this case was not terminable at will because, by the terms of the contract, the right of first refusal continued until there was a sale of the property, either to MS Real Estate, or to a third party in the event that MS Real Estate declined to exercise its right of first refusal to purchase, thereby waiving its right. View "MS Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. Donald P. Fox Family Trust" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree intentional homicide and attempted first-degree intentional homicide. Defendant filed a postconviction motion seeking a new trial based on the trial court’s decision to exclude testimony proffered by Defendant that a third party committed the homicide. The court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, determining that the third party had the opportunity to kill the victim and that the State failed to show that the circuit court’s alleged error in not admitting Defendant’s proffered evidence was harmless. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State v. Denny test is the appropriate test for courts to use to determine the admissibility of third-party perpetrator evidence; (2) for a defendant to show that a third party had the opportunity to commit a crime by employing gunmen to kill the victim, the defendant must provide some evidence that the third party had the realistic ability to engineer such a scenario; and (3) because Defendant failed to show that the alleged third party perpetrator had the opportunity to kill the victim, directly or indirectly, the circuit court did not err in excluding Defendant’s proffered evidence. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

After receiving a complaint from Defendant’s wife, police officers conducted an investigatory stop of Defendant’s vehicle. Defendant did not comply with police orders after being stopped and also complained of chest pain. The police transported Defendant to a hospital for medical assessment and then conducted a legal blood draw. Results of the blood test demonstrated that Defendant had operated his vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC). Defendant was subsequently charged with operating while intoxication (OWI) and with a PAC. The circuit court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress the blood test results. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Defendant’s transportation to the hospital exceeded the scope of the investigatory detention and violated Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant’s stop and detention satisfied the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment because they were supported by reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory detention; (2) Defendant’s arrest when he was transported to the hospital was constitutional because the officers had probable cause to arrest Defendant; and (3) the transportation to the hospital was lawful as a community caretaker function of law enforcement. View "State v. Blatterman" on Justia Law