Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to operating with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC), sixth offense. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to four years' imprisonment. The State appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by excluding additional evidence that the State sought to submit to prove that Defendant possessed six, rather than five, prior drunk-driving related convictions. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of conviction, concluding that the circuit court erred in excluding the additional evidence and that the evidence was sufficient to prove the additional prior conviction. The remanded with instructions to enter an amended judgment of conviction for operating with a PAC as a seventh offense and to impose a sentence accordingly. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and upheld Defendant’s conviction, holding that because a conviction of operating a PAC as a seventh offense carries a greater range of punishment than does a sixth offense, the court of appeals’ remedy rendered Defendant’s plea unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary. Further, a remedy that requires a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea is violative of due process. View "State v. Chamblis" on Justia Law

Oneida Seven Generations Corporation proposed a renewable energy facility and sought a conditional use permit to install the facility in the City of Green Bay. The City voted to approve the conditional use permit but later voted to rescind the permit on the grounds that it was obtained through misrepresentation. The circuit court affirmed the City’s decision to rescind. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the City’s decision that the permit was obtained through misrepresentation was not supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on the evidence presented, the City could not reasonably conclude that the statements by Oneida Seven’s representative regarding the facility’s operations were misrepresentations. View "Oneida Seven Generations Corp. v. City of Green Bay" on Justia Law

MS Real Estate Holdings, LLC contracted with the Foxes for a right of first refusal to purchase or lease the Fox land. Years later, the Foxes sued, arguing that their revocation of the right of first refusal contract was valid. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Foxes, concluding that the right of first refusal contract was indefinite as to duration and that the revocation by the Foxes was reasonable. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a right of first refusal contract is definite as to duration when it specifies an event that triggers the right and requires the right holder to either exercise or waive the right within a specific period of time thereafter, even if the triggering event is not certain to occur; and (2) the right of first refusal contract at issue in this case was not terminable at will because, by the terms of the contract, the right of first refusal continued until there was a sale of the property, either to MS Real Estate, or to a third party in the event that MS Real Estate declined to exercise its right of first refusal to purchase, thereby waiving its right. View "MS Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. Donald P. Fox Family Trust" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree intentional homicide and attempted first-degree intentional homicide. Defendant filed a postconviction motion seeking a new trial based on the trial court’s decision to exclude testimony proffered by Defendant that a third party committed the homicide. The court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, determining that the third party had the opportunity to kill the victim and that the State failed to show that the circuit court’s alleged error in not admitting Defendant’s proffered evidence was harmless. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State v. Denny test is the appropriate test for courts to use to determine the admissibility of third-party perpetrator evidence; (2) for a defendant to show that a third party had the opportunity to commit a crime by employing gunmen to kill the victim, the defendant must provide some evidence that the third party had the realistic ability to engineer such a scenario; and (3) because Defendant failed to show that the alleged third party perpetrator had the opportunity to kill the victim, directly or indirectly, the circuit court did not err in excluding Defendant’s proffered evidence. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

After receiving a complaint from Defendant’s wife, police officers conducted an investigatory stop of Defendant’s vehicle. Defendant did not comply with police orders after being stopped and also complained of chest pain. The police transported Defendant to a hospital for medical assessment and then conducted a legal blood draw. Results of the blood test demonstrated that Defendant had operated his vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC). Defendant was subsequently charged with operating while intoxication (OWI) and with a PAC. The circuit court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress the blood test results. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Defendant’s transportation to the hospital exceeded the scope of the investigatory detention and violated Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant’s stop and detention satisfied the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment because they were supported by reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory detention; (2) Defendant’s arrest when he was transported to the hospital was constitutional because the officers had probable cause to arrest Defendant; and (3) the transportation to the hospital was lawful as a community caretaker function of law enforcement. View "State v. Blatterman" on Justia Law

David Friedlen had worked for Runzheimer International, Ltd. for more than fifteen years when Runzheimer began requiring its employees to sign restrictive covenants or be fired. Friedlen signed the covenant and continued to work for Runzheimer for more than two years until he was terminated. Friedlen subsequently began working at Corporate Reimbursement Services (CRS), one of Runzheimer’s competitors. Runzheimer sued Friedlen and CRS, alleging that Friedlen’s employment at CRS constituted a breach of the restrictive covenants. Defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming that the covenant was unenforceable because it lacked consideration. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) an employer’s forbearance in exercising its right to terminate an at-will employee constitutes lawful consideration for signing a restrictive covenant; and (2) because the circuit court made no determination as to the reasonableness of the covenant’s terms, the cause must be remanded for further proceedings. View "Runzheimer Int’l, Ltd. v. Friedlen" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of first-degree intentional homicide as party to a crime and armed burglary as party to a crime. Petitioner’s defense counsel later asked for a ruling regarding Petitioner’s competency to seek postconviction relief. In a postconviction competency hearing, the circuit court concluded that Petitioner’s defense counsel failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner was incompetent. The court of appeals remanded for a new competency hearing, determining that the circuit court erred by failing to apply the lower preponderance of the evidence burden of proof. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that once a defense attorney raises the issue of competency at a postconviction hearing, the burden is on the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is competent to proceed. Remanded to the circuit court to apply the correct standard if Petitioner’s competency is still challenged. View "State v. Daniel" on Justia Law

Defendants in these two separate cases were found guilty of operating a motor vehicle with a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in the blood, among other crimes. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions, concluding that the State did not violate Defendants’ due process rights when the Wisconsin State Laboratory of Hygiene had destroyed their blood samples in accordance with routine procedures before each defendant had the opportunity to test the samples. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in accordance with Arizona v. Youngblood, because Defendants’ blood samples were neither apparently exculpatory nor destroyed in bad faith, the State did not violate Defendants’ due process rights; and (2) operating a motor vehicle with a detective mount of a restricted controlled substance in the blood under Wis. Stat. 346.63(1)(am) is a strict liability offense that does not require scienter, and the statute is constitutional. View "State v. Luedtke" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, third offense. Defendant appealed, arguing that his right of confrontation was violated when the circuit court admitted an expert witness’s testimony that established Defendant’s blood alcohol concentration while he was operating his vehicle. The expert witness based his opinion in part on forensic tests conducted by an analyst at the Wisconsin State Laboratory of Hygiene, who was unavailable for trial. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s admission of the witness’s testimony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the witness’s review of Defendant’s laboratory file, including the forensic test results at issue in this case, to form an independent opinion to which he testified did not violate Defendant’s right of confrontation. View "State v. Griep" on Justia Law

After exhausting their administrative remedies, Plaintiffs, six employees of Husco International, Inc., brought this wage claim case behalf of themselves and others similarly situated seeking back pay for unpaid twenty-minute meal breaks taken during the two-year period preceding the filing of their complaint. The union had previously agreed to unpaid meal breaks in every collective bargaining agreement (CBA) negotiated since 1983 at the company’s Waukesha plant. This provision, however, was in conflict with a Department of Workforce Development (DWD) regulation that requires employers to pay employees for meal breaks that are shorter than thirty minutes. The practice was later ended. The circuit court denied both parties’ summary judgment motions. The court of appeals granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs, reasoning that the CBA could not trump the DWD meal-break regulation. The Supreme court reversed, holding that the employees were not entitled, under the DWD regulation, to back pay for the unpaid meal breaks in this case. View "Aguilar v. Husco Int’l, Inc." on Justia Law