Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

These five John Doe proceedings, referred to as the “John Doe investigation,” were overseen by a single John Doe judge and organized by a single special prosecutor. The purpose of the John Doe investigation was to root out allegedly illegal campaign coordination between certain issue advocacy groups and a candidate for elective office. The special prosecutor obtained wide-ranging subpoenas and search warrants for twenty-nine organizations and individuals seeking millions of documents. The John Doe judge granted the the motions of various targets to quash the subpoenas and search warrants and ordered the return of all seized property. The Supreme Court invalidated the special prosecutor’s theory of the case and ended the unconstitutional John Doe investigation, holding that the special prosecutor employed theories of law that do not exist in order to investigate citizens who were wholly innocent of any wrongdoing. View "Schmitz v. Hon. Gregory A. Peterson" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle, hit and run resulting in death, and related crimes. After Defendant was sentenced, he filed a postconviction motion seeking resentencing by a different judge, asserting that the circuit court’s statements at sentencing supported a conclusion that the judge was biased. The court of appeals denied relief, determining that the circuit court judge’s statements at sentencing were insufficient to support a conclusion that she was biased. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to rebut the presumption that the judge acted fairly, impartially, and without prejudice. View "State v. Herrmann" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession of THC with intent to deliver following the circuit court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop. Defendant appealed, arguing that the stop was not an investigatory stop and that the officer lacked probable cause to stop Defendant’s vehicle, making the subsequent search unlawful. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of conviction. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) an officer’s reasonable suspicion that a motorist is violating or has violated a traffic law is sufficient for the officer to initiate a stop of the offending vehicle, and an officer’s objectively reasonable mistake of law may form the basis for a finding of reasonable suspicion; and (2) although the officer in this case wrongly interpreted the law in stopping Defendant for violating a traffic law, the officer’s mistake of law was objectively reasonable, and therefore, the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant’s vehicle. View "State v. Houghton" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to possession of methamphetamine and child neglect after the circuit court denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his truck. At issue in this case was the reasonableness of police conduct after a lawful traffic stop. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence recovered from his truck, as (1) the officer who stopped Defendant for a seat belt violation had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop to administer field sobriety tests; and (2) Defendant’s consent to search his truck was valid. View "State v. Hogan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate at Redgranite Correctional Institution, was injured during a baseball game in Redgranite’s recreational yard. Plaintiff filed a complaint against the State, the Department of Corrections (DOC), and Redgranite. The circuit court dismissed Plaintiff’s tort action against the State and the DOC, concluding that recovery was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ determination that Plaintiff’s suit against the DOC was barred by sovereign immunity, holding (1) the DOC is not independent from the State, and therefore, the DOC was entitled to the sovereign immunity accorded to the State; and (2) the statutory grant of power to the DOC to sue and be sued should not be interpreted as an express waiver of the DOC’s sovereign immunity. View "Mayhugh v. State" on Justia Law

When Defendant and two accomplices attempted to rob Michael Parker, Parker and a houseguest, Authur Robinson, were shot and killed. During trial, the jury was instructed that it could convict Defendant of the felony murder of the Robinson if the defendants had attempted to rob Robinson and the attempted robbery caused Robinson’s death. The State, however, presented insufficient evidence that the defendants had attempted to rob Robinson. The jury convicted Defendant of felony murder in Robinson’s death even though it found Defendant not guilty of the attempted robbery of Robinson. A valid theory of felony murder for the death of Robinson would be that Defendant, as a party to the crime, caused the death of Robinson while engaged in an attempted armed robbery of Parker. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) a jury instruction may be considered erroneous when it describes a theory of criminal culpability that was not presented to the jury or it omits a valid theory of criminal culpability that was presented to the jury; and (2) the defect in the jury instructions in this case was harmless error. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant, who came to the United States from Mexico in 1997, pleaded no contest to substantial battery as an act of domestic abuse. After Defendant completed his jail sentence Immigration and Customs Enforcement commenced removal proceedings against him. Defendant subsequently filed a postconviction motion to withdraw his no-contest plea to substantial battery on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Defendant alleged that his trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to inform him that his no-contest plea to substantial battery, with a domestic abuse enhancer, was certain to result in his deportation. The circuit court denied Defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was not entitled to withdraw his no-contest plea to substantial battery because his trial counsel did not perform deficiently. View "State v. Ortiz-Mondragon" on Justia Law

Defendant, an Egyptian foreign national, pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to deliver marijuana, as party to a crime. Defendant subsequently moved to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Defendant argued that, under Padilla v. Kentucky, his trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to inform him that his conviction would absolutely result in deportation. The circuit court denied Defendant’s post-conviction motion, concluding that Defendant had not received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, where Defendant’s attorney correctly advised Defendant that his guilty plea carried a “strong chance” of deportation, Defendant received effective assistance of counsel. View "State v. Shata" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy of violating RICO. Approximately seven years later, Defendant was arrested for possession of cocaine in violation of Wis. Stat. 961.41(3g)(c). Defendant’s prior RICO conviction was listed as a prior conviction to enhance the penalty for cocaine possession conviction. The circuit court found Defendant guilty of violating section 961.41(3g)(c). Under the enhancement, Defendant’s cocaine possession constituted a felony. The court also convicted Defendant of felony bail jumping. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court improperly enhanced the penalty for conviction of cocaine possession due to his prior RICO conspiracy conviction. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s prior RICO conviction enhanced the penalty for cocaine possession under section 961.41(3g)(c) to a second offense as a Class I felony; and (2) Defendant’s bail-jumping offense was properly a felony conviction. View "State v. Guarnero" on Justia Law

Ash Park, LLC entered into a one-party listing contract with Re/Max Select, LLC providing that Ash Park shall pay a broker’s commission to Re/Max if Ash Park enters into an “enforceable contract” for the sale of a parcel of vacant land. Ash Park entered into a contract for the sale of the land with Alexander & Bishop, LLC, but Alexander & Bishop later breached the purchase contract, and the sale of the land was never consummated. The circuit court declared that Ash Park owed no broker’s commission to Re/Max and ordered Re/Max’s broker lien discharged from the property. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the purchase contract between Ash Park and Alexander & Bishop constituted an “enforceable contract” within the meaning of the listing contract between Ash Park and Re/Max, and therefore, Re/Max was entitled to a broker’s commission even though Alexander & Bishop breached the purchase contract and the sale was never consummated. View "Ash Park, LLC v. Alexander & Bishop, Ltd." on Justia Law