Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Patti Roberts was injured at a charity event sponsored by Green Valley Enterprises when she was waiting in line to ride in a hot air balloon and was struck by the balloon’s basket. Sundog Ballooning, LLC was the owner and operator of the hot air balloon providing tethered rides at the event. Roberts filed suit against Sundog, alleging negligence. Sundog moved for summary judgment, arguing that Wisconsin’s recreational immunity statute barred Roberts’s claims and that her claims were barred by a waiver of liability form that she signed. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Sundog, concluding that Sundog was entitled to recreational immunity and that the waiver of liability form Roberts signed was valid as a matter of law. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Sundog was not entitled to immunity under Wis. Stat. 895.52 because it was not an “owner” under the statute; and (2) the waiver of liability form violated public policy and was unenforceable as a matter of law. View "Roberts v. T.H.E. Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In four separate, unrelated cases, Appellant was charged with seventeen criminal counts. Pursuant to a single plea agreement, Appellant pleaded guilty or no-contest to felony theft as a party to a crime, felony bail jumping, burglary while armed with a dangerous weapon, and misdemeanor theft. The circuit court accepted Appellant’s plea and sentenced him to consecutive prison sentences totaling twenty-six years. Appellant subsequently filed a motion seeking post-conviction relief, asserting (1) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object after the State allegedly breached the plea agreement by recommending consecutive sentences, and (2) there was an insufficient factual basis for the trial court to accept his guilty plea to the charge of party to the crime of felony theft. The circuit court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant failed to establish that his counsel provided ineffective assistance, as the State did not breach the plea agreement by arguing for consecutive sentences; and (2) there was a sufficient factual basis to accept Appellant’s guilty plea to the charge of party to the crime of felony theft. View "State v. Tourville" on Justia Law

The underlying coverage dispute arose from the supplying of a defective ingredient for incorporation into Wisconsin Pharmacal Company (Pharmacal) probiotic supplement tablets. Pharmacal brought this action against Jeneil Biotech, Inc. and Nebraska Cultures of California, Inc. (the Insureds) and the Netherlands Insurance Company and Evanston Insurance Company (the Insurers), alleging numerous tort and contract claims. The Insurers moved for summary judgment, arguing that their respective insurance policies did not cover any damages that arose out of the causes of action against the Insureds. The circuit court granted the Insurers’ motions for summary judgment, determining that the facts of this case did not trigger the Insurers’ duties to defend. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the policies provided coverage. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no “property damage” caused by an “occurrence” in this case, and even if there were, certain exclusions in both policies applied to negate coverage. View "Wis. Pharmacal Co., LLC v. Neb. Cultures of Cal., Inc." on Justia Law

United Foods & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1473 filed a class action against Hormel Foods Corporation alleging that Hormel violated Wisconsin wage and hour laws by failing to pay employees for time spent putting on and taking off company-required clothing and equipment before and after shifts at one of Hormel’s canning plants. The circuit court ruled in favor of the Union, ordered Hormel to compensate its employees for time spent “donning” and “doffing” the required clothing and equipment, and awarded the class monetary damages of $195,087. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Hormel is required to compensate its employees for the 5.7 minutes per day spent donning and doffing the clothing and equipment at the beginning and end of the day; and (2) the required donning and doffing of clothing and equipment at the beginning and end of the day does not fall within the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex, as the wages involved are not a “trifle” either for the employees or Hormel. View "United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Hormel Foods Corp." on Justia Law

Kenneth Burgraff was injured when an employee of Menard, Inc. loaded materials onto Burgraff’s trailer using a forklift. Burgraff sued Menard for damages. Burgraff’s vehicle and trailer were insured under a policy issued by Millers First Insurance Company. Millers First agreed to defend Menard under the policy as a permissive user of Burgraff’s vehicle. Menard was also insured for excess coverage under a commercial general liability policy that included a self-insured retention endorsement. Millers First eventually settled Burgraff’s claim for $40,000, after which Millers First withdrew its defense of Menard. The circuit court determined that Menard’s self-insured retention was “other applicable liability insurance” under the Millers First policy’s “other insurance” clause. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s determination that Menard’s self-insured retention was “other insurance” and reversed the circuit court’s determination that Menard no longer had a duty to defend. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the terms of the policy, Millers First was required to provide a defense for Menard until it paid its $100,000 limit of liability and breached its duty to defend when it withdrew its defense of Menard; and (2) Menard’s self-insured retention is “other insurance” under the Miller’s First policy’s “other insurance” clause. View "Burgraff v. Menard, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to possession of narcotic drugs. Defendant appealed, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress a warrantless draw of his blood. Later testing of Defendant’s blood indicated the presence of opiates and morphine. The circuit court held that the warrantless draw of Defendant’s blood was justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirements of the federal and state Constitutions. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, but on different grounds, determining that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied to prevent suppression of the drug-related evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the warrantless blood draw was constitutional because it was supported by exigent circumstances. View "State v. Parisi" on Justia Law

Police obtained evidence of marijuana production in Defendant’s home while investigating the source of injuries sustained by Defendant’s brother. Defendant was subsequently charged with possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of THC, and manufacture or delivery of THC. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence as unconstitutionally conducted without a warrant and without consent. The circuit court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the officers were not exercising a bona fide community caretaker function and that the officers’ search did not constitute a lawful protective sweep. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the officers reasonably exercised a bona fide community caretaker function when they searched Defendant’s home, and therefore, the search was lawful. View "State v. Matalonis" on Justia Law

The Department of Transportation (DOT) eliminated Hoffer Properties, LLC’s direct driveway connections to a controlled-access highway and separately exercised its power of eminent domain to acquire .72 acres of Hoffer’s land to extend Frohling Lane westward so as to connect Hoffer’s property to the highway. Hoffer appealed the amount of compensation, arguing that compensation for the .72 acre must include the diminution of value of the property due to the loss of direct access to the highway. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment to DOT, concluding that Hoffer’s direct access to the highway was a noncompensable exercise of the police power and that reasonable access had been given as a matter of law. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that summary judgment was proper because DOT provided alternate access to Hoffer’s property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Hoffer was precluded from compensation under Wis. Stat. 32.09(6)(b) because alternate access to the property was provided by the Frohling Lane extension. View "Hoffer Props., LLC v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to various drug-related offenses in three separate cases. The circuit court’s colloquies with Defendant failed to adhere to Wis. Stat. 971.08(1)(c) because neither of the circuit courts warned Defendant that her pleas and subsequent convictions may have immigration consequences. Defendant later filed a motion under Wis. Stat. 971.08(2) to withdraw her guilty pleas. Under section 971.08(2), if a circuit court fails to advise a defendant of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea and if the defendant shows that the plea is “likely” to result in the defendant’s deportation, the circuit court “shall” permit withdrawal of the plea. In this case, the circuit court denied Defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty pleas, concluding that Defendant had not met the statutory standard of “likely” to suffer immigration consequences because she was not presently the object of a proceeding for deportation, exclusion from admission, or denial of naturalization. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty pleas, as the circuit court did not comply with section 971.08(1)(c), and Defendant showed that her guilty pleas were “likely” to result in her exclusion from admission to this country. View "State v. Valadez" on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped by police inside the parking garage underneath his apartment building and subsequently arrested for operating while intoxicated. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because the officers’ conduct occurred during a warrantless entry into a constitutionally protected area - the curtilage of his home. The circuit court denied the motion to suppress, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the parking garage under the apartment building did not constitute curtilage of Defendant’s home; (2) Defendant failed to show a reasonable expectation of privacy in the parking garage; and (3) therefore, Defendant’s stop and subsequent arrest in the garage did not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures. View "State v. Dumstrey" on Justia Law