Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Department of Transportation (DOT) eliminated Hoffer Properties, LLC’s direct driveway connections to a controlled-access highway and separately exercised its power of eminent domain to acquire .72 acres of Hoffer’s land to extend Frohling Lane westward so as to connect Hoffer’s property to the highway. Hoffer appealed the amount of compensation, arguing that compensation for the .72 acre must include the diminution of value of the property due to the loss of direct access to the highway. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment to DOT, concluding that Hoffer’s direct access to the highway was a noncompensable exercise of the police power and that reasonable access had been given as a matter of law. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that summary judgment was proper because DOT provided alternate access to Hoffer’s property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Hoffer was precluded from compensation under Wis. Stat. 32.09(6)(b) because alternate access to the property was provided by the Frohling Lane extension. View "Hoffer Props., LLC v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to various drug-related offenses in three separate cases. The circuit court’s colloquies with Defendant failed to adhere to Wis. Stat. 971.08(1)(c) because neither of the circuit courts warned Defendant that her pleas and subsequent convictions may have immigration consequences. Defendant later filed a motion under Wis. Stat. 971.08(2) to withdraw her guilty pleas. Under section 971.08(2), if a circuit court fails to advise a defendant of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea and if the defendant shows that the plea is “likely” to result in the defendant’s deportation, the circuit court “shall” permit withdrawal of the plea. In this case, the circuit court denied Defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty pleas, concluding that Defendant had not met the statutory standard of “likely” to suffer immigration consequences because she was not presently the object of a proceeding for deportation, exclusion from admission, or denial of naturalization. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty pleas, as the circuit court did not comply with section 971.08(1)(c), and Defendant showed that her guilty pleas were “likely” to result in her exclusion from admission to this country. View "State v. Valadez" on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped by police inside the parking garage underneath his apartment building and subsequently arrested for operating while intoxicated. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because the officers’ conduct occurred during a warrantless entry into a constitutionally protected area - the curtilage of his home. The circuit court denied the motion to suppress, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the parking garage under the apartment building did not constitute curtilage of Defendant’s home; (2) Defendant failed to show a reasonable expectation of privacy in the parking garage; and (3) therefore, Defendant’s stop and subsequent arrest in the garage did not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures. View "State v. Dumstrey" on Justia Law

While Christopher S. was serving his sentence for mayhem, Winnebago County filed a petition for the involuntary commitment of Christopher for mental health care under Wis. Stat. 51.20(1)(ar). The County also filed a petition for the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication and treatment to Christopher. The circuit court granted both petitions. Thereafter, Christopher filed a motion challenging both orders. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Wis. Stat. 51.21(1)(ar) does not violate an inmate’s substantive due process rights because it is reasonably related to the State’s legitimate interest in providing care and assistance to inmates suffering from mental illness; and (2) the circuit court did not err when if found that the County established by clear and convincing evidence that Christopher was incompetent to refuse psychotropic medication and treatment. View "Winnebago County v. Christopher S." on Justia Law

The Equal Rights Division of the Department of Workforce Development (DWD) concluded that Joell Schigur had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the Department of Justice (DOJ) took unlawful retaliatory action against her because she lawfully disclosed, or the DOJ believed that she lawfully disclosed, information under Wis. Stat. 230.81. The circuit court reversed the decision of the DWD. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an opinion alone, as to the lawfulness or appropriateness of government activity, is not “information” as defined in section 230.80(5); (2) the communication at issue in this case was not a “disclosure” under section 230.81 because the information was already known to the persons receiving the communication; and (3) Schigur’s assertion that the DOJ believed that she disclosed information rested on a misinterpretation of section 230.80(8)(c) and therefore failed. View "State Dep’t of Justice v. State Dep’t of Workforce Dev." on Justia Law

At issue here was the authority of Attorney Francis Schmitz to act as the special prosecutor throughout proceedings known as “John Doe II.” Unnamed Movants challenged whether Attorney Schmitz retained any authority to act as the special prosecutor and argued that two motions filed by Attorney Schmitz - a motion for reconsideration of a previous decision issued by the Supreme Court and a stay of the Court’s mandate regarding certain information gathered during an investigation - be denied. The Supreme Court held (1) Attorney Schmitz’s appointment as the special prosecutor in the John Doe II proceedings pending in each of five counties at issue was invalid; (2) the authority of someone who is appointed as a special prosecutor ends at the point in time when a court makes a legal ruling that the appointment was invalid and orders that the individual’s authority is terminated; (3) because of the invalidity of his appointment, Attorney Schmitz must cease taking any actions as the John Doe II special prosecutor as of the date of this opinion and order; and (4) Attorney Schmitz’s motion for reconsideration and motion for a stay are hereby denied. View "Schmitz v. Hon. Gregory A. Peterson" on Justia Law

A state traffic patrol officer stopped Defendant’s vehicle after observing a cigarette butt being thrown from the passenger side of the vehicle. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence of drunk driving obtained by the officer during the stop, claiming that the officer lacked authority to seize his vehicle to investigate the violation of a state statute prohibiting littering. The circuit court granted the motion. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) an officer of the state traffic patrol is constitutionally authorized to stop a vehicle based solely on the officer’s observation of the commission of a non-traffic civil forfeiture offense by an occupant of that vehicle; and (2) in this case, the officer had probable cause to believe that an occupant of Defendant’s vehicle had violated the statute prohibiting littering by throwing a cigarette butt onto the highway. Remanded. View "State v. Iverson" on Justia Law

These five John Doe proceedings, referred to as the “John Doe investigation,” were overseen by a single John Doe judge and organized by a single special prosecutor. The purpose of the John Doe investigation was to root out allegedly illegal campaign coordination between certain issue advocacy groups and a candidate for elective office. The special prosecutor obtained wide-ranging subpoenas and search warrants for twenty-nine organizations and individuals seeking millions of documents. The John Doe judge granted the the motions of various targets to quash the subpoenas and search warrants and ordered the return of all seized property. The Supreme Court invalidated the special prosecutor’s theory of the case and ended the unconstitutional John Doe investigation, holding that the special prosecutor employed theories of law that do not exist in order to investigate citizens who were wholly innocent of any wrongdoing. View "Schmitz v. Hon. Gregory A. Peterson" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle, hit and run resulting in death, and related crimes. After Defendant was sentenced, he filed a postconviction motion seeking resentencing by a different judge, asserting that the circuit court’s statements at sentencing supported a conclusion that the judge was biased. The court of appeals denied relief, determining that the circuit court judge’s statements at sentencing were insufficient to support a conclusion that she was biased. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to rebut the presumption that the judge acted fairly, impartially, and without prejudice. View "State v. Herrmann" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession of THC with intent to deliver following the circuit court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop. Defendant appealed, arguing that the stop was not an investigatory stop and that the officer lacked probable cause to stop Defendant’s vehicle, making the subsequent search unlawful. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of conviction. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) an officer’s reasonable suspicion that a motorist is violating or has violated a traffic law is sufficient for the officer to initiate a stop of the offending vehicle, and an officer’s objectively reasonable mistake of law may form the basis for a finding of reasonable suspicion; and (2) although the officer in this case wrongly interpreted the law in stopping Defendant for violating a traffic law, the officer’s mistake of law was objectively reasonable, and therefore, the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant’s vehicle. View "State v. Houghton" on Justia Law