Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

by
Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy of violating RICO. Approximately seven years later, Defendant was arrested for possession of cocaine in violation of Wis. Stat. 961.41(3g)(c). Defendant’s prior RICO conviction was listed as a prior conviction to enhance the penalty for cocaine possession conviction. The circuit court found Defendant guilty of violating section 961.41(3g)(c). Under the enhancement, Defendant’s cocaine possession constituted a felony. The court also convicted Defendant of felony bail jumping. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court improperly enhanced the penalty for conviction of cocaine possession due to his prior RICO conspiracy conviction. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s prior RICO conviction enhanced the penalty for cocaine possession under section 961.41(3g)(c) to a second offense as a Class I felony; and (2) Defendant’s bail-jumping offense was properly a felony conviction. View "State v. Guarnero" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
Ash Park, LLC entered into a one-party listing contract with Re/Max Select, LLC providing that Ash Park shall pay a broker’s commission to Re/Max if Ash Park enters into an “enforceable contract” for the sale of a parcel of vacant land. Ash Park entered into a contract for the sale of the land with Alexander & Bishop, LLC, but Alexander & Bishop later breached the purchase contract, and the sale of the land was never consummated. The circuit court declared that Ash Park owed no broker’s commission to Re/Max and ordered Re/Max’s broker lien discharged from the property. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the purchase contract between Ash Park and Alexander & Bishop constituted an “enforceable contract” within the meaning of the listing contract between Ash Park and Re/Max, and therefore, Re/Max was entitled to a broker’s commission even though Alexander & Bishop breached the purchase contract and the sale was never consummated. View "Ash Park, LLC v. Alexander & Bishop, Ltd." on Justia Law

by
Defendant was charged with two counts of intentional homicide for the murders of his parents. Defendant pleaded not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. The circuit court found that Defendant had not met his burden of proving that he was not mentally responsible for the murders. The court convicted and sentenced Defendant to consecutive life sentences. The court of appeals granted Defendant a new trial under Wis. Stat. 752.35, concluding that Defendant met his burden of proving by the greater weight of the credible evidence that he was not mentally responsible for the murders. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of a new trial, holding (1) because the circuit court’s finding that Defendant did not meet his burden of showing by the greater weight of the credible evidence that he was not mentally responsible for the crimes was not clearly erroneous, the court of appeals abused its discretion in disturbing the factual findings of the circuit court concerning the burden of proof; and (2) the court of appeals therefore abused its discretion in concluding that a new trial in the interest of justice was warranted. View "State v. Kucharski" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
Petitioner was charged with and convicted of seven misdemeanors and one felony. Prior to serving his sentences, defendant was in custody in 1998, 1999, and 2001, Upon his conviction, Petitioner was given some sentence credit for these periods of custody, but he accumulated more sentence credit than the court awarded. After Petitioner’s parole from the felony sentence was revoked, Petitioner requested sentence credit. The circuit court denied Petitioner’s motion for sentence credit. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) forty-two of the 105 days of custody prior to Defendant’s 2001 incarceration should have been applied to his term of reincarceration for the felony conviction; and (2) when a convicted defendant’s parole is revoked, the parolee’s indeterminate sentence that was issued by the circuit court resumes running so that it is available to accept sentence credit. View "State v. Obriecht" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
Plaintiff was driving a passenger automobile when he collided with a semi-trailer truck operated by Defendant. A jury found Defendant sixty-five percent causally negligent and Plaintiff thirty-five percent causally negligent. The jury assessed damages at more than $1 million for Plaintiff and $63,366 for Plaintiff’s wife. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in giving a truck driver negligence instruction on the standard of care applicable to Defendant because the instruction imposed a heightened standard of care on Defendant. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that any error in the challenged jury instruction was not prejudicial. The Supreme Court affirmed, albeit on different grounds, holding that the truck driver negligence instruction did not misstate the law and was not misleading. View "Dakter v. Cavallino" on Justia Law

Posted in: Injury Law
by
Plaintiffs, referred to collectively as the Wisconsin Realtors Association (WRA), filed a complaint against Defendant, the Public Service Commission of Wisconsin (Commission), arguing that Wis. Admin. Code ch. PSC 128 - titled “Wind Energy Systems” - is invalid because it was promulgated by the Commission without compliance with statutory rule-making procedures. The specific issue presented in this case was whether, under Wis. Stat. 227.115(2), the Department of Commerce was required as a matter of law to prepare a housing impact report before Wis. Admin. Code ch. PSC 128 was submitted to the Legislative Council staff for review. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the Commission, concluding that Wis. Admin. Code ch. PSC 128 was duly promulgated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) WRA did not demonstrate that a housing impact report was required as a matter of law for Wis. Admin. Code ch. PSC 128; and (2) invalidating Wis. Admin. Code ch. PSC 128 under the circumstances would infringe on the role of the legislature, which the Court declined to do. View "Wis. Realtors Ass’n v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Wis." on Justia Law

by
In 2006, Plaintiffs, former employees and the estates and beneficiaries of former employees at an Eau Claire tire manufacturing plant, filed suit against multiple defendants alleging that the initial plaintiffs were exposed to benzene during their employment at the tire manufacturing facility, causing injury and, in some cases, death. In 2012, the circuit court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that Plaintiffs’ claims had accrued at death and were therefore barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that their claims did not accrue until they had reason to believe that Defendants were responsible for the injuries giving rise to their claims. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the discovery rule permits the accrual of both survival claims and wrongful death claims after the date of the decedent’s death; and (2) under the circumstances of this case, the applicable statute of limitations began to run when the survival claims and wrongful death claims were discovered provided that Plaintiffs would be able to show that they exercised reasonable diligence in investigating and discovering their claims. Remanded. View "Christ v. Exxon Mobil Corp." on Justia Law

Posted in: Injury Law
by
The Journal Times of Racine and its editor (collectively, the Newspaper) commenced this mandamus action under Wis. Stat. 19.37(1)(a) after the City of Racine Board of Police and Fire Commissioners (Commission) denied the Newspaper’s request seeking information pertaining to a special meeting that the Commission held in closed session. The Commission subsequently provided the Newspaper the information it had requested. The circuit court granted the Commission’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the Newspaper’s record request had become moot. The court of appeals reversed and remanded solely for a determination of whether the Newspaper was entitled to attorney fees and costs. The Newspaper appealed, arguing that the court of appeals erred in remanding the matter where the award should instead by made as a matter of law. The Commission also appealed, arguing that the Newspaper did not prevail in its lawsuit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Newspaper did not prevail in substantial part in the action and was therefore not entitled to its requested relief. View "Journal Times v. City of Racine Bd. of Police & Fire Comm’rs" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court took this opportunity to clarify the law on waiver of the right to counsel after a defendant has been charged with a crime. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of delivering heroin, second or subsequent offense, as a repeater and as party to a crime. Defendant appealed, arguing that statements he made to investigators while he was incarcerated and after his initial appearance should have been suppressed in accordance with State v. Dagnall. Before the interview, Defendant waived his Miranda rights and did not ask for counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Montejo v. Louisiana effectively overruled Dagnall by establishing that a waiver of Miranda rights is sufficient to waive the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and such a waiver is not presumed invalid simply because the defendant is already represented by counsel; and (2) Wis. Const. art. I, 7 does not provide greater protections than the Sixth Amendment of the federal Constitution in the context of a waiver of the right to have counsel present during questioning. View "State v. Delebreau" on Justia Law

by
After the circuit court denied his motion to suppress certain statements he made during police questioning, Defendant pled guilty to second-degree reckless homicide as party to a crime. Defendant was fifteen years old at the time of the crime. Defendant requested that he be allowed to withdraw his plea, arguing that his confession to police was involuntary and, alternatively, that the incriminating statements he made that were not recorded during his custodial interrogation as a juvenile were inadmissible. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s rulings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s statements were voluntary; and (2) the police violated Wis. Stat. 938.195 by turning off the device recording Defendant’s interrogation during questioning, but the error in not suppressing some of Defendant’s statements was harmless. View "State v. Moore" on Justia Law