Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Minors John Doe 56 and John Doe 57 and their parents filed suit against Dr. Van de Loo and related entities, claiming medical malpractice. Specifically, the Does alleged that they were sexually assaulted during a medical examination. The circuit court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Does’ allegations could constitute an actionable medical malpractice claim; and (2) the statute of limitations barred the Does’ medical malpractice claims, as the claims accrued on the date Dr. Van de Loo last physically touched the Does during their genital examinations, rather than when the Does learned that Dr. Van de Loo’s genital examination may, in fact, have constituted a criminal act. View "John Doe 56 v. Mayo Clinic Health System - Eau Claire Clinic, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1997, James Vandenberg and three other individuals (collectively, the intervenors) acquired real estate as tenants-in-common. During the time they owned the property, James accumulated personal debts resulting in encumbrances being filed against the property. In 2011, James and the intervenors contracted to sell their property to Van De Hey Real Estate, LLC on land contract. Prince Corporation subsequently filed a garnishment summons and complaint seeking to garnish Van De Hey’s final payment as partial satisfaction of its judgment against James. The intervenors intervened in the action. The circuit court entitled Prince to garnish 1/4 of the full contract price. The intervenors then impleaded the Department of Revenue (DOR) as an interested party and moved for partition. The circuit court entered an order holding that the Department of Revenue (DOR), rather than Prince, was entitled to garnish 1/4 of the land contract proceeds due to the DOR’s superior tax warrants. The court also denied the interveners’ request to partition the real estate. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the DOR was entitled to garnish from the final land contract payment the amount that James could require be paid to him from that payment; and (2) the circuit court did not err in refusing to partition the property. Remanded. View "Prince Corp. v. Vandenberg" on Justia Law

Defendant and the State entered into a plea agreement under which Defendant would plead no contest to certain counts brought against him, while other counts would be dismissed and read into the record for purposes of sentencing and recitation. At a plea hearing, the court concluded that Defendant’s pleas were made in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary fashion and ordered judgments of guilt. Defendant was then sentenced. Defendant later filed a motion for postconviction relief seeking to withdraw his no contest pleas. Specifically, Defendant claimed that his pleas were unknowing because he did not understand the effect the read-in charge could have at sentencing. The postconviction court denied Defendant’s motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the postconviction court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing before it determined whether Defendant had entered his pleas in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary fashion; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his postconviction motion to withdraw his plea because he was correctly informed of and understood the effect of the read-in charges at sentencing. View "State v. Sulla" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Wisconsin Supreme Court's review was whether the Circuit Court erred when it granted the State's motion to join intimidation charges involving two victims, a mother and her daughter, with already-pending sexual assault charges where the daughter was the victim. The circuit court held that joinder was proper under Wis. Stat. 971.12(1)(2009-10); the court of appeals reversed in an unpublished per curiam opinion. After review, the Supreme Court held that joinder was proper because the charges joined were "2 or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan," the charges were "connected together," and the charges constituted parts of a "common scheme or plan." The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the jury's verdicts finding Luis Salinas guilty of: (1) repeated sexual assault of a child; (2) second-degree sexual assault; (3) second-degree sexual assault of a child under the age of 16; (4) intimidation of witness, M.S.; and (5) intimidation of witness, V.G. View "Wisconsin v. Salinas" on Justia Law

The charges of first-degree sexual assault against defendant-appellant Stephen LeMere arose out of events that occurred after a gathering in the Eau Claire on Friday evening, May 13, 2011, at the home of J.C. and his wife, A.C. LeMere was then 24. Also present that evening was C.R.C., J.C.'s 12-year-old sister. During the gathering, LeMere and another visitor drank the majority of two 30 packs of beer, in addition to other alcohol in the house. LeMere also took a narcotic pain killer. Although his memory of the evening became "fuzzy," LeMere recalled playing drinking games throughout the night. Early the next morning, LeMere sent text messages to C.R.C., and when she refused to have sex with her, he placed her in a choke hold, put a knife to her throat, fondled her, and threatened to kill her if she told anyone about what happened. C.R.C. did tell someone about it, and charges were later filed against him. In "Padilla v. Kentucky," (559 U.S. 356 (2010)), the federal Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires defense counsel to inform a client whether his plea to a criminal charge carries a risk of deportation. Here, the Wisconsin Supreme Court assessed "Padilla" in a different context: did the Sixth Amendment require defense counsel to inform a client about the possibility of civil commitment, under Wis. Stat. ch. 980, when the client entered a plea to a sexually violent offense? LeMere wanted to withdraw his plea, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for not informing him of the possibility of civil commitment following the confinement portion of his sentence under Chapter 980. The Wisconsin Court concluded that counsel's performance was not deficient in this case, and affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. View "Wisconsin v. LeMere" on Justia Law

The circuit court dismissed an action brought by Vilas County District Attorney Albert Moustakis who sought to restrain the Wisconsin Department of Justice from releasing records pertaining to Moustakis in response to a public records request by The Lakeland Times, a newspaper located in Minocqua. The request sought records of any "complaints or investigations regarding Vilas County District Attorney Al Moustakis" and records "regarding any investigation of [Moustakis's] conduct or handling of cases while district attorney." The request also sought "information related to complaints and investigations regarding Mr. Moustakis that were completed or ended without any action taken against him[,]" as well as "any communications between Mr. Moustakis and [Department of Justice] since he took office in 1995." The court of appeals affirmed the order of the circuit court. Finding no error in the circuit or appellate courts' decisions, the Supreme Court also affirmed. View "Moustakis v. Wisconsin Department of Justice" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was 2011 Wisconsin Act 21 (Act 21), which, among other things, amended portions of Wis. Stat. ch. 227, which governs the procedures for administrative rule making and allows the Governor and the Secretary of Administration (Secretary) permanently to halt the rulemaking process. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that Act 21 is unconstitutional as applied to the Superintendent of Public Instruction (SPI) and the Department of Public Instruction (DPI). The circuit court permanently enjoined the Governor and Secretary from proceeding under Act with respect to the SPI, concluding that Act 21 is unconstitutional as applied to the SPI because it gives superior authority over public instruction to officers who are not subordinate to the SPI. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Act 21 unconstitutionally vests the Governor and Secretary with the supervision of public instruction in violation of Wis. Const. art. X, 1 because it does not allow the SPI and DPI to proceed with their duties of supervision without the Governor’s, and in some circumstances, the Secretary’s approval. View "Coyne v. Walker" on Justia Law

St. Croix County petitioned to terminated Mother’s parental rights to her Son, alleging that Son was a child in continuing need of protection or services (CHIPS) and that Mother failed to assume parental responsibility. The circuit court terminated Mother’s parental rights to Son. Citing Waukesha County v. Steven H., the court of appeals reversed, ruling that because the last order Mother received did not contain written notice warning her about termination, the County failed to establish the notice element required under Wis. Stat. 48.415(2)(a)(1). The Supreme Court reversed after clarifying Steven H., holding that the notice Mother received satisfied the statutory notice requirement in a termination of parental rights action based on continuing CHIPS, and the evidence was sufficient to support the remaining elements of continuing CHIPS set forth in Wis. Stat. 48.415(2). View "St. Croix County Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Michael D." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sustained personal injury and property damage in a car accident with Defendant, a State employee. Plaintiff delivered notice of claim to the attorney general by personal service and then instituted a negligence action against Defendant. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Sorenson did not strictly comply with Wis. Stat. 893.82, which requires service of notice of claim on the attorney general by certified mail. The circuit court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that service was proper. The court of appeals reversed, holding that delivering notice by personal service does not comply with the plain language of section 893.82(5). View "Sorenson v. Batchelder" on Justia Law

Abbey Springs Condominium Association, Inc. and Abbey Springs, Inc. (collectively, Abbey Springs) have a policy forbidding both current and subsequent unit owners from utilizing recreational facilities until unpaid condominium assessments are paid in full. Following a foreclosure action and sheriff’s sale of the property to Walworth State Bank, the Bank paid the former owner’s outstanding assessment under protest. The Bank filed suit against Abbey Springs, asserting that the policy violates Wisconsin law by impermissibly reviving a lien on the condominium units that was eliminated by the foreclosure action. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the condominium policy effectively revived the lien against the property that the foreclosure judgment entered against Abbey Springs and the former unit owners had extinguished, and therefore, the policy violates well-established foreclosure law and the foreclosure judgment entered in the underlying foreclosure action. Remanded. View "Walworth State Bank v. Abbey Springs Condo. Ass’n" on Justia Law