Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted and sentenced under 2009 Wis. Act 28, which allowed inmates the opportunity to earn “positive adjustment time,” by which inmates could obtain early release from prison. 2011 Wis. Act 38 retroactively repealed positive adjustment time. Singh filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the new legislation violated the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions because it delayed inmates’ release from prison by up to ninety days. The circuit court dismissed the petition. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the retroactive application of 2011 Wis. Act 38 was an ex post facto violation. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the retroactive repeal of positive adjustment time is an ex post facto violation, and (2) 2011 Wis. Act 38 violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws because it results in a longer period of incarceration and, consequently, makes the punishment for an offense more burdensome after it was committed. View "State ex rel. Singh v. Kemper" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to attempting to flee a traffic officer and operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent. Defendant’s presentence investigation report included an attached COMPAS risk assessment, an evidence-based risk assessment tool that provides decisional support for the Department of Corrections when managing offenders. The circuit court referenced the COMPAS risk score along with other sentencing factors in ruling out probation for Defendant. Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief requesting a new sentencing hearing, arguing that the circuit court’s consideration of a COMPAS risk assessment at sentencing violated his right to due process.The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) if used properly, a circuit court’s consideration of a COMPAS risk assessment at sentencing does not violate a defendant’s right to due process; (2) the circuit court’s use of the COMPAS risk scores in this case was not an abuse of discretion; and (3) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in considering read-in charges in the plea agreement. View "State v. Loomis" on Justia Law

This case required the Supreme Court to reexamine State v. Shiffra, modified by State v. Green, (hereinafter Shiffra/Green), under which a defendant can acquire a complainant’s privileged mental health treatment records via a motion for in camera review if the defendant demonstrates “a reasonable likelihood that the records contain relevant information necessary to a determination of guilt or innocence….” Here the complainant alleged that Defendant sexually assaulted her as a child. Defendant filed a pretrial motion pursuant to Shiffra/Green, seeking an in camera inspection of the complainant’s privileged mental health treatment records. The circuit court granted the motion. Further, the court informed the complainant that if she refused to turn over the records, her testimony would be barred at trial. The complainant refused to give up her mental health treatment records, and the circuit court barred her from testifying at trial. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court overruled Shiffra/Green and its progeny, holding that Shiffra/Green improperly relied on Pennsylvania v. Ritchie when it invented a right to access privileged information via a motion for in camera review and cannot be grounded in any other legal basis. View "State v. Lynch" on Justia Law

This case was one of several cases involving litigation between Lands’ End and the City of Dodgeville challenging the City’s property tax assessment of Lands’ End’s headquarters. In 2009, Lands’ End made an offer of settlement, which the City rejected. Eventually, the court of appeals remanded the matter to the circuit court with directions to enter judgment in favor of Lands’ End in the amount of $724,292 plus statutory interest. At issue on remand was whether Lands’ End was entitled to interest at the statutory rate of interest in effect when the offer of settlement was made under Wis. Stat. 807.01(4) or at the statutory rate of interest in effect when Lands’ End recovered the judgment under the amended version of the statute. The circuit court awarded interest at “1 percent plus the prime rate,” the rate in the amended version of the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Lands’ End did not have a vested right in the twelve percent interest rate in effect in section 807.01(4) at the time Lands’ End made its offer of settlement; and (2) awarding interest under the amended version of the statute did not violate the Due Process or Equal Protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions. View "Lands' End, Inc. v. City of Dodgeville" on Justia Law

In 1990, Defendant was convicted in Minnesota of a first-offense operating while intoxicated (OWI). In 1992, the Eau Claire County Circuit Court entered a civil forfeiture judgment against Defendant for another first-offense OWI. In 2014, Defendant filed a motion to reopen and vacate her 1992 first-offense OWI civil forfeiture judgment because it was a second OWI offense improperly charged as a first offense, thus implicating subject matter jurisdiction. The circuit court voided Defendant’s 1992 Eau Claire County conviction on subject matter jurisdiction grounds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant forfeited her right to challenge her 1992 first-offense OWI judgment by failing to timely raise it; and (2) therefore, the circuit court erred when it granted Defendant’s motion to reopen and vacate her 1992 first-offense OWI civil forfeiture judgment. View "City of Eau Claire v. Booth" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded no contest to first-degree recklessly endangering safety as domestic abuse. In the plea colloquy accepting Defendant’s plea, the circuit court misstated the potential punishment if Defendant were convicted. Defendant later filed a motion to withdraw his plea. The circuit court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the cause with instructions to grant Defendant’s motion. In so doing, the court relied on the remedy set forth in State v. Bangert for cases where a circuit court fails to comply with Wis. Stat. 971.08(1) or other mandatory duties at a plea colloquy and the defendant does not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter his plea. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the circuit court’s defect could be remedied by reducing the sentence to the punishment Defendant was informed and believed he could receive or whether Defendant must be allowed to withdraw his plea. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of the present case, Bangert and State v. Brown governed, and Defendant was entitled to withdraw his plea. Remanded with instructions to grant Defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea. View "State v. Finley" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded no contest to homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle and operating without a license, causing death. The convictions arose after Defendant killed an individual while he was driving under the influence of alcohol in the wrong direction on a freeway. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to fifteen years of initial confinement followed by seven years of extended supervision. Defendant filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing, inter alia, that the sentencing court improperly considered his immigration status at sentencing. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court’s comments at sentencing did not deny Defendant due process in the form of reliance on an improper sentencing factor. View "State v. Gayton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the insured of Dairyland, sustained bodily injury and property damage while operating his motorcycle. After paying plaintiff all proceeds to which he was entitled under the Dairyland policy, and after plaintiff had settled with the tortfeasor's insurer, Dairyland sought and obtained subrogation from the tortfeasor's insurer for the property damages that it previously paid to plaintiff. Plaintiff then demanded Dairyland pay him the funds it obtained on its subrogation claim. When Dairyland refused, plaintiff filed suit for breach of contract and bad faith. The court concluded that the made whole doctrine does not apply to preclude Dairyland from retaining the funds it received from its subrogation claim because the equities favor Dairyland: (1) Dairyland fully paid plaintiff all he bargained for under his Dairyland policy, which included the policy's limits for bodily injury and 100% of plaintiff's property damage; (2) plaintiff had priority in settling with the tortfeasor's insurer; and (3) if Dairyland had not proceeded on its subrogation claim, plaintiff would have had no access to additional funds from the tortfeasor's insurer. The court also concluded that Dairyland did not act in bad faith. Accordingly, the court reversed the court of appeals decision in all respects. View "Dufour v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Wis. Act 76 substantially changed the circumstances under which the Department of Children and Families (DCF) may license and certify childcare providers in Wisconsin. One provision in the new law, Wis. Stat. 48.685(5)(br)5., "imposes a lifetime ban on licensure" and certification for persons who have been convicted of specific crimes. After plaintiff's license was revoked based upon a 1986 conviction for misdemeanor welfare fraud, she filed suit challenging the statute. Both the Dane Circuit Court and the court of appeals rejected plaintiff's challenges. The court concluded that the statute rationally advances the legislature's fraud reduction objective in a manner that outweighs any interest that plaintiff might have in eligibility to receive payments through Wisconsin Shares. Because the court concluded that the statute denies plaintiff neither due process nor equal protection of the law, the court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. View "Blake v. Jossart" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first-degree intentional homicide. Defendant moved to suppress her incriminating statements made during a six-hour interrogation conducted without a Miranda warning and evidence of the search of her house conducted after the interrogation. The circuit court suppressed Defendant’s statements and the physical evidence obtained from her house, which the court concluded was fruit of the poisonous tree. The court of appeals reversed in part, concluding that the officers searching Defendant’s house would have discovered the incriminating physical evidence during their search conducted pursuant to a search warrant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) application of the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule does not require that the State prove the absence of bad faith by the officers who intentionally engaged in the misconduct that provides the basis for exclusion; and (2) the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that officers inevitably would have discovered the physical evidence at issue. Remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Jackson" on Justia Law