Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that rezoning by amending a local government's zoning ordinance is legislative in character, and therefore, due process did not require an impartial decision-maker.Trustee Jan Miller (Trustee Miller), who served on the Village Board of Lyndon Station, cast the deciding vote in favor of an application filed by her daughter and son-in-law to amend the Village's zoning ordinance to rezone their residential property for commercial development. Thomas Miller (Miller), a local business owner, sought certiorari review of the Village's Zoning Board Appeals' decision upholding the Board's vote to amend the zoning ordinance. The circuit court reversed, concluding that Trustee Miller was not a fair and impartial decision-maker, and therefore, her participation in the vote violated due process. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Village Board's action was legislative in nature, and therefore, Miller was not entitled to an impartial decision-maker. View "Miller v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Village of Lyndon Station" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court in this legal malpractice case, holding that there was no error.A media company entered into a purportedly tax-friendly sale with the assistance of a tax law firm, an accounting firm, and Murphy Desmond. After the deal closed and the shareholders had received their payout, the IRS levied various taxes and penalties against the shareholders. Several shareholders brought suit. Terry and Sandy Shockley intervened and filed a complaint against all three entities. The Shockleys subsequently settled with two entities, leaving them with a legal malpractice claim against Murphy Desmond. The jury found Murphy Desmond negligent in part, but the circuit court concluded that it was entitled to indemnification from the entities who settled, leaving the Shockleys with no further recovery. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in accord with Fleming v. Thresherman's Mutual Insurance Co., 388 N.W.2d 908 (Wis. 1986), Murphy Desmond owed no damages to the Shockleys. View "Allsop Venture Partners III v. Murphy Desmond SC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not err by ordering Defendant in this case to register as a sex offender for fifteen years rather than until his death and did not err in finding Defendant ineligible to participate in the earned release program (ERP).Defendant pled guilty to five counts of possession of child pornography. As part of Defendant's sentence the circuit court ordered him to comply with sex offender registration requirements for fifteen years and found him ineligible to participate in the ERP. The State requested that the circuit court amend the judgment of conviction (JOC) to reflect that Defendant was required to register for life. The circuit court denied the motion. Defendant also moved to amend the JOC on the grounds that it was error not to allow him to participate in the ERP. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of both requests to amend the JOC, holding that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion. View "State v. Rector" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court dismissing Femala Fleming's action against Amateur Athletic Union of the United States, Inc. (AAU) as untimely under Wis. Stat. 893.54, holding that Fleming's negligence claim against AAU was not timely filed.Fleming argued that she timely filed her negligence action because the governing statute of limitations was Wis. Stat. 893.587. Specifically, Fleming argued that because she alleged AAU negligently hired, retained, and supervised the man who sexually assaulted her, section 893.587 governed her claim where her injury was "caused by an act that would constitute a violation of" an offense enumerated in chapter 948. The Supreme Court held (1) section 893.587 did not provide the governing statute of limitations for Fleming's negligence claim because Fleming did not allege that AAU committed an enumerated injury-causing act; (2) the governing time limit was the three-year statute of limitations under section 893.54, as extended by Wis. Stat. 893.16; and (3) therefore, the circuit court correctly granted AAU's motion to dismiss. View "Fleming v. Amateur Athletic Union of United States, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the challenges to the victim's rights amendment termed "Marsy's Law" that was brought by Wisconsin Justice Initiative, Inc. and several citizens (WJI) failed and that the amendment was validly ratified and properly part of the Wisconsin Constitution.In April 2020, the people of Wisconsin ratified Marsy's Law. In this action, WJI argued that the ballot question for Marsy's Law that was submitted to Wisconsin voters violated Wis. Const. art. XII, 1 because it misled voters by neglecting the amendment's impact on the rights of criminal defendants. The circuit court granted declaratory judgment for WJI, concluding that the ballot question failed to meet requirements as to content and form. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Mary's Law was validly submitted to and ratified by voters, as required by the constitution. View "Wis. Justice Initiative, Inc. v. Wis. Elections Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court overruled State v. Shiffra, 499 N.W.2d 719 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993), which created a process by which a criminal defendant could obtain a limited review by way of in camera review by the court of a victim's privately-held, otherwise privileged health records, holding that Shiffra is unsound in principle and unworkable in practice and has been undermined by developments in the law.Defendant was charged with sexually assaulting his son, T.A.J., and his daughter. Citing Shiffra, Defendant sought in camera review of T.A.J.'s mental health and counseling records. T.A.J. opposed the motion, but the circuit court concluded that he lacked standing. On interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals reversed, concluding that Marsy's Law gave crime victims such as T.A.J. standing to oppose Shiffra motions. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions to deny Defendant's motion for in camera review, holding that Shiffra was wrongly decided and is overruled. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's issuance of an injunction compelling Aurora Health Care, Inc. to administer Ivermectin to Petitioner's uncle (Patient), holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in issuing the injunction without analyzing Petitioner's reasonable probability of success on the merits.Patient was in Aurora's care when he tested positive for COVID-19. Petitioner, who held health care power of attorney for Patient, received a prescription for Ivermectin from a retired OB/GYN, but Aurora declined to effect the prescription. Thereafter, Petitioner bright a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The circuit court issued an order compelling Aurora immediately to enforce the prescription and administer Ivermectin to Patient. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by issuing the temporary injunction without referencing any basis demonstrating that Petitioner had a reasonable probability of success on the merits of "some type of legal claim." View "Gahl v. Aurora Health Care, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the arbitrator concluding that the Green Bay Police Department had cause to discipline Andrew Weiss for violating several policies of the Green Bay Police Department and demoted him from his position as a detective to a patrol officer, holding that the arbitrator did not exceed his powers.After an investigation, the Department issued a formal complaint alleging that Weiss violated four Department policies. The Department later issued its disciplinary action determining that Weiss violated several policies and demoting him to a position as a patrol officer. After Weiss's grievance was denied he sought arbitration. The arbitrator concluded that the discipline was warranted and did not violate Weiss's due process rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law when he determined that Weiss was afforded the process he was due under law. View "Green Bay Professional Police Ass'n v. City of Green Bay" on Justia Law

In this lawsuit stemming from the Wisconsin Department of Transportation's (DOT's) closure of a driveway connecting DEKK Property Development, LLC's property to State Trunk Highway (STH) 50, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the order of the circuit court granting DEKK motion for summary judgment, holding that summary judgment should be granted in DOT's favor.DEKK filed an action under Wis. Stat. 32.05(5) challenging DOT's right to remove DEKK's rights of access to STH 50. The circuit court granted summary judgment for DEKK, reasoning that DEKK had "some sort of right of access" to the driveway, entitling it to compensation from the closure. The court of appeals reversed and held for DOT on the merits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that DEKK was not permitted to recover damages for the driveway closure under section 32.05(5) because the access rights allegedly lost by DEKK were distinct from the taking described in DOT's jurisdictional offer. View "DEKK Property Development, LLC v. Wisconsin Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the circuit court granting declaratory judgment for Acuity, a mutual insurance company, in this insurance dispute arising from a fatal automobile accident, holding that the court of appeals did not err.When Douglas Curley lost control of his vehicle and crossed the center line he hit another vehicle, killing Michael Shimeta and seriously injuring Terry Scherr. After Curley's insurer paid Shimeta's estate and Scherr $250,000 each both parties sought additional recovery under a policy that Acuity had issued to Shimeta before the accident. At issue was whether Acuity's underinsured motorist coverage entitled Shimeta's estate and Scherr to an additional $250,000 each from Acuity or whether the payments the parties received from Curley's insurer reduced their recovery to $0. The Supreme Court held that Acuity owed Shimeta's estate and Scherr $250,000 each, thus affirming the court of appeals. View "ACUITY v. Estate of Michael Shimeta" on Justia Law