Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court’s decision rejecting Defendant’s motion to vacate his judgments of conviction and requesting a new trial, holding that Defendant was not entitled to a new trial.In his motion, Defendant argued that his first trial, which resulted in convictions for the sexual assault of two victims, was unfair because the State shifted the burden of proof and distorted the jury’s credibility determinations and that the jury based its verdict in part on inadmissible evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the motion, holding (1) the State’s trial commentary was not improper; and (2) there was no reasonable probability that redacting the challenged evidence would have changed the result of the trial. View "State v. Bell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for carrying a concealed and dangerous weapon, in violation of the Concealed Carry Statute, Wis. Stat. 941.23(2).In convicting Defendant, the trial court rejected Defendant’s argument that because his conduct was in compliance with the Safe Transport Statute, Wis. Stat. 167.31(2)(b), his conviction was precluded under the Concealed Carry Statute. The court of appeals affirmed, ruling that compliance with the Safe Transport Statute does not preclude conviction for a violation of the Concealed Carry Statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Concealed Carry Statute and Safe Transport Statute are not in conflict; and (2) the Concealed Carry Statute is not unconstitutionally vague. View "State v. Grandberry" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment to Plaintiffs’ underinsured motorist (UIM) carrier, Allstate Property and Casualty Co. (Allstate), holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that Plaintiffs failed to provide Allstate with timely notice of the UIM claim and that they failed to rebut the presumption that Allstate was prejudiced by the untimely notice.Specifically at issue in this case was whether the court of appeals misinterpreted the UIM policy’s “proof of claim” provision as a “notice of accident” provision. The Supreme Court held (1) the operative event triggering the notice requirement in Plaintiffs’ UIM is the tender of the tortfeasor’s underlying policy limit, not the accident itself; (2) Wis. Stat. 631.81(1) does not apply to the UIM policy provision at issue; and (3) therefore, Plaintiffs provided Allstate with timely proof of their UIM claim as required by the policy. The Court remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Shugarts v. Mohr" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Oshkosh in this action challenging the special assessment imposed by the City following the reconfiguration of a traditional traffic light intersection into a roundabout. The Court held (1) the term “special benefits” in Wisconsin’s eminent domain statute has the same meaning in Wisconsin’s special assessment statute, and the City’s admission that special benefits are non-existent in the context of an earlier eminent domain proceeding constitutes relevant evidence in a later challenge to the special assessment; and (2) the court of appeals erred in concluding that Plaintiff failed to overcome the presumption of correctness afforded the City’s special assessment and to establish sufficient genuine issues of material fact. The Court remanded the case to the circuit court for a trial. View "CED Properties, LLC v. City of Oshkosh" on Justia Law

The DNR appealed the circuit court’s decision restoring contested Wisconsin Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (WPDES) permit conditions that the DNR had rejected. The DNR selected District II as the appellate venue. A single court of appeals judge issued an order sua sponte transferring venue from District II to District IV, noting that District IV was the proper venue because it encompassed the circuit court that issued the judgment from which the DNR appealed. The DNR then petitioned the Supreme Court for a supervisory writ requiring the court of appeals to transfer venue back to District II. The Supreme Court granted the petition for a supervisory writ, holding (1)Wis. Stat. 752.21(2) gave DNR the right to select appellate venue under the circumstances of this case; (2) it was the court of appeals’ plain duty to hear the DNR’s appeal in District II; and (3) the DNR met the requirements for the issuance of a supervisory writ. View "State ex rel. Department of Natural Resources v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals, District IV" on Justia Law

The circuit court applied the proper standard of law to the facts of record when it concluded that Nationstar Mortgage LLC acted in bad faith and then awarded attorney fees to Robert Stafsholt. Further, Nationstar may collect interest on the principal amount of the loan accrued during litigation because Stafsholt would receive a windfall if he was both excused from paying interest and received his attorney fees. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) circuit courts may include attorney fees as part of an equitable remedy “in exceptional cases and for dominating reasons of justice”; and (2) the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in this case. View "Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. Stafsholt" on Justia Law

Wis. Stat. 846.165 does not require a circuit court to make a determination of a guaranty credit at the time a foreclosure sale is confirmed. Further, when an action for foreclosure against a mortgagor and an action for a money judgment on a guaranty are brought in the same proceeding, the circuit court may decide the amount of a credit to be applied to a judgment on a guaranty either at the time the sale is confirmed or at another time.Petitioner sought review of the court of appeals' decision directing that the circuit court apply a credit of $2.25 million to a money judgment entered against Petitioner as a guarantor of a loan. Petitioner argued that the court of appeals erroneously limited the credit to the amount of the winning bid at the sheriff’s sale, thus precluding the circuit court from hearing evidence of the fair value of the property after the confirmation of sale. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court properly decoupled the confirmation of sale from the determination of the guaranty credit; and (2) the stipulation in this case did not establish that the amount of the winning bid at the sheriff’s sale shall be the sole credit toward the money judgment against Petitioner. View "Horizon Bank, National Ass’n v. Marshalls Point Retreat LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court’s declaration that the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC) exceeded its authority under Wis. Stat. ch. 111 in promulgating Wis. Admin. Code chs. ERC 70 and 80 and the circuit court’s order that WERC hold certification elections for the Wisconsin Association of State Prosecutors (WASP) and the Service Employees International Union, Local 150 (SEIU). The Supreme Court reinstated WERC’s orders dismissing the Unions’ petitions for election as untimely, holding (1) WERC did not exceed its authority because it had express authority under Wis. Stat. ch. 111 to promulgate rules that require a demonstration of interest from labor organizations interested in representing collective bargaining units; and (2) WERC may decertify a current representative labor organization on September 15 or at the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, whichever occurs later, where there are no timely petitions for election filed because the statute requires WERC to conduct elections on or before December 1. View "Wisconsin Ass’n of State Prosecutors v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission" on Justia Law

At issue was at which point in time Defendant was considered “in custody” for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).The circuit court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress incriminating statements made to law enforcement officers, concluding that Defendant was not in custody at the time the statements were made. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in light of the totality of the circumstances of this case, Defendant’s confession did not transform his status to that of “in custody.” Rather, Defendant was not in custody until detectives took his cell phone, approximately ten minutes after his confession, and instructed him to remain in the interview room. Because Defendant was not in custody until this point, which was after his alleged request for counsel, his Fifth Amendment right to counsel did not attach. View "State v. Bartelt" on Justia Law

At issue was at which point in time Defendant was considered “in custody” for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).The circuit court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress incriminating statements made to law enforcement officers, concluding that Defendant was not in custody at the time the statements were made. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in light of the totality of the circumstances of this case, Defendant’s confession did not transform his status to that of “in custody.” Rather, Defendant was not in custody until detectives took his cell phone, approximately ten minutes after his confession, and instructed him to remain in the interview room. Because Defendant was not in custody until this point, which was after his alleged request for counsel, his Fifth Amendment right to counsel did not attach. View "State v. Bartelt" on Justia Law