Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The circuit court applied the proper standard of law to the facts of record when it concluded that Nationstar Mortgage LLC acted in bad faith and then awarded attorney fees to Robert Stafsholt. Further, Nationstar may collect interest on the principal amount of the loan accrued during litigation because Stafsholt would receive a windfall if he was both excused from paying interest and received his attorney fees. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) circuit courts may include attorney fees as part of an equitable remedy “in exceptional cases and for dominating reasons of justice”; and (2) the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in this case. View "Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. Stafsholt" on Justia Law

Wis. Stat. 846.165 does not require a circuit court to make a determination of a guaranty credit at the time a foreclosure sale is confirmed. Further, when an action for foreclosure against a mortgagor and an action for a money judgment on a guaranty are brought in the same proceeding, the circuit court may decide the amount of a credit to be applied to a judgment on a guaranty either at the time the sale is confirmed or at another time.Petitioner sought review of the court of appeals' decision directing that the circuit court apply a credit of $2.25 million to a money judgment entered against Petitioner as a guarantor of a loan. Petitioner argued that the court of appeals erroneously limited the credit to the amount of the winning bid at the sheriff’s sale, thus precluding the circuit court from hearing evidence of the fair value of the property after the confirmation of sale. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court properly decoupled the confirmation of sale from the determination of the guaranty credit; and (2) the stipulation in this case did not establish that the amount of the winning bid at the sheriff’s sale shall be the sole credit toward the money judgment against Petitioner. View "Horizon Bank, National Ass’n v. Marshalls Point Retreat LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court’s declaration that the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC) exceeded its authority under Wis. Stat. ch. 111 in promulgating Wis. Admin. Code chs. ERC 70 and 80 and the circuit court’s order that WERC hold certification elections for the Wisconsin Association of State Prosecutors (WASP) and the Service Employees International Union, Local 150 (SEIU). The Supreme Court reinstated WERC’s orders dismissing the Unions’ petitions for election as untimely, holding (1) WERC did not exceed its authority because it had express authority under Wis. Stat. ch. 111 to promulgate rules that require a demonstration of interest from labor organizations interested in representing collective bargaining units; and (2) WERC may decertify a current representative labor organization on September 15 or at the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, whichever occurs later, where there are no timely petitions for election filed because the statute requires WERC to conduct elections on or before December 1. View "Wisconsin Ass’n of State Prosecutors v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission" on Justia Law

At issue was at which point in time Defendant was considered “in custody” for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).The circuit court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress incriminating statements made to law enforcement officers, concluding that Defendant was not in custody at the time the statements were made. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in light of the totality of the circumstances of this case, Defendant’s confession did not transform his status to that of “in custody.” Rather, Defendant was not in custody until detectives took his cell phone, approximately ten minutes after his confession, and instructed him to remain in the interview room. Because Defendant was not in custody until this point, which was after his alleged request for counsel, his Fifth Amendment right to counsel did not attach. View "State v. Bartelt" on Justia Law

At issue was at which point in time Defendant was considered “in custody” for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).The circuit court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress incriminating statements made to law enforcement officers, concluding that Defendant was not in custody at the time the statements were made. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in light of the totality of the circumstances of this case, Defendant’s confession did not transform his status to that of “in custody.” Rather, Defendant was not in custody until detectives took his cell phone, approximately ten minutes after his confession, and instructed him to remain in the interview room. Because Defendant was not in custody until this point, which was after his alleged request for counsel, his Fifth Amendment right to counsel did not attach. View "State v. Bartelt" on Justia Law

The lower courts properly denied Defendant’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea he entered to one count of child enticement because the plea colloquy comported with both Wis. Stat. 971.08 and State v. Bangert, 389 N.W.2d 12 (Wis. 1986).The circuit court summarily denied Defendant’s plea withdrawal motion, finding that Defendant failed to establish a defect in the plea colloquy and that no evidentiary hearing was required. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court’s failure to tell him the legal definition of “sexual contact” at his plea hearing violated the statutory requirement that a pleading defendant must understand the nature of the charge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to establish any deficiency in his plea colloquy because sexual contact is not an element of the crime of child enticement and the record showed that Defendant understood the nature of the charge. The Supreme Court rejected the State’s request to change the Bangert requirements. View "State v. Hendricks" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Creekside Tree Service, Inc. and its insurer, Selective Insurance Company of South Carolina, after Plaintiffs’ wife and mother was killed when a tree branch cut by Creekside fell on her while she was walking on a public path through the property of Conference Point Center. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Creekside on the ground that the recreational immunity statute, Wis. Stat. 895.52, barred claims against it. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Creekside, as the entity hired by Conference Point to complete a tree-trimming project, was not protected from liability as an “agent” of Conference Point under Wis. Stat. 895.52(2)(b); and (2) Creekside was not entitled to recreational immunity as an occupier of the Conference Point property such that it was a statutory “owner” of the property at the time of the accident. View "Westmas v. Selective Insurance Co. of South Carolina" on Justia Law

At issue was whether the public interest that elections remain free from voter intimidation and coercion in this certification election was sufficient to outweigh the public interest in favor of openness of public records.The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court that granted summary judgment to Madison Teachers, Inc. (MTI) on its claim that the public records law was violated by the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC). WERC denied MTI’s requests, made at various times during the 2015 certification elections, for names of Madison Metropolitan School District employees who had voted as of those dates based on the WERC chairman’s determination that the public interest that elections remain free from voter intimidation and coercion outweighed the public interest. In reversing the circuit court, the Supreme Court held that the chairman lawfully performed the balancing test in concluding that the public interest in elections free from voter intimidation and coercion outweighed the public interest in favor of openness of public records. View "Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Scott" on Justia Law

In this appeal from Defendant’s judgments of conviction for three crimes related to his domestic violence toward his then-girlfriend, the Supreme Court held (1) the recently amended language in Wis. Stat. 904.04(2)(b)1 allows admission of other-acts evidence with greater latitude than under an analysis pursuant to State v. Sullivan, 576 N.W.2d 30 (Wis. 1998); and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Defendant’s other acts because the court applied the correct legal standard, and admission was a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach based on the facts of the record. View "State v. Dorsey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court’s judgment entered in favor of Plaintiffs regarding their asserted right to install a pier and to access the Sailor Creek Flowage directly from their shoreline property.Defendants, who owned the waterbed of the Flowage where Plaintiffs’ property met the water, appealed, arguing that the presence of navigable water over their property did not affect their right to prohibit Plaintiffs from installing a pier into or over the portion of the waterbed of the Flowage that Plaintiffs owned. The Supreme Court held (1) Plaintiffs’ private property rights are not sufficient to place a pier into or over the waterbed of the Flowage without Defendants’ permission based on the rights attendant to their shoreline property; (2) the public trust doctrine conveys no private property rights, regardless of the presence of navigable water; and (3) as long as Plaintiffs are using the flowage waters for purposes consistent with the public trust doctrine, their own property rights are sufficient to access and exit the Flowage directly from their shoreline property. View "Movrich v. Lobermeier" on Justia Law