Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ decision affirming the circuit court’s dismissal of Koss Corporation’s claim that Park Bank acted in bad faith in processing transactions initiated by Sujata Sachdeva and affirmed the dismissal of Park Bank’s third-party claims, holding that Park Bank was not liable to Koss Corporation.The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Park Bank on Koss Corporation’ Uniform Fiduciaries Act (UFA) claim. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Wis. Stat. 112.01(1)(c) describes the term “good faith” as honest bank acts, even when negligently done, and “bad faith” pursuant to section 112.01(9), an intentional tort, may be shown by acts evidencing bank dishonesty; and (2) Koss Corporation failed to offer evidence of bank dishonesty on the part of Park Bank, and therefore, Park Bank was not liable for the intentional tort of bad faith. View "Koss Corp. v. Park Bank" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment to Steadfast Insurance Company giving Steadfast the right to recover from Greenwich Insurance Company, holding, among other things, that Greenwich breached its duty to defend.Steadfast’s right to recover from Greenwich was based on the two insurer’s relationships with Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District (MMSD), which was sued for alleged negligent maintenance and operation of Milwaukee’s sewerage system. After MMSD tendered its defense to the insurers, Steadfast accepted the tender but Greenwich did not. Steadfast then sued Greenwich to recover the defense costs it paid to MMSD. The Supreme Court held (1) both Greenwich and Steadfast were primary and successive insurers in regard to MMSD; (2) Greenwich breached its contractual duty to defend MMSD; (3) Steadfast had a contractual duty to defend MMSD that was not abrogated by Greenwich’s breach of its contractual duty to defend MMSD, and therefore, defense costs are allocated between Steadfast and Greenwich; and (4) Steadfast is entitled to recover attorney fees from Greenwich. View "Steadfast Insurance Co. v. Greenwich Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court’s order dismissing Petitioner’s complaint against the Village of Sister Bay alleging that some summer concerts held in a public park were a public and private nuisance, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in failing to view each concert as a new nuisance prompting a new notice of injury period; but (2) Petitioner’s written notice of injury was not timely filed.On appeal, Petitioner asserted that it should not be barred from bringing future nuisance actions against the Village because it failed to complain within 120 days as required by Wis. Stat. 898.80(1d)(a) about a noise nuisance from the date the first concert was held in 2014. The Supreme Court held (1) contrary to the decision of the court of appeals, each concert alleged to be a nuisance constitutes a separate event for purposes of filing a written notice of injury; but (2) Petitioner’s written notice of injury, which was not served within 120 days after the date of the last concert alleged to be a nuisance, was not timely filed. View "Yacht Club at Sister Bay Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Village of Sister Bay" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) did not have the authority to unilaterally amend the pier permit of Philip and Terrie Myers.After the Myers were granted a permit by the DNR and built a pier at their waterfront property. Later, the DNR issued a formal permit amendment requiring the Myers to significantly change their pier. The Myers declined to comply with the permit amendment and filed a petition for judicial review. The circuit court denied the petition, concluding that the DNR had the authority to amend the pier permit. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the DNA lacked authority to amend the Myers’ permit. View "Myers v. Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court’s denial of summary judgment to the City of New Berlin and the New Berlin Parks and Recreation Department (collectively, New Berlin) on this negligence action, holding that the known danger exception to governmental immunity applied in this case.Eight-year-old Lily Engelhardt drowned in a swimming pool at an aquatic center in a field trip organized and run by the New Berlin Parks and Recreation Department. While the “playground coordinator” was informed the Lily could not swim, Lily drowned while staff were changing in the locker rooms. After Lily’s parents filed suit, New Berlin moved for summary judgment, asserting that it was immune from suit pursuant to the governmental immunity statute, Wis. Stat. 893.80(4). The circuit court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed and granted New Berlin’s motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the danger to which Lily was exposed at the pool was compelling and self-evident, and therefore, the staff had a ministerial duty to give Lily a swim test before allowing her near the pool; and (2) because the staff did not perform this ministerial duty, New Berlin was not entitled to the defense of governmental immunity. View "Engelhardt v. City of New Berlin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court’s restitution order of $8,487.41 against Defendant for losses caused by his burglary of a residence, holding that the circuit court did not err in calculating the amount of restitution.On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court erred in alleging prior burglaries of the victim’s home in violation of Wis. Stat. 973.20. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) there was no evidence presented at the restitution hearing to support a finding that the victim’s missing property was stolen on any other date than the date of the burglary considered at sentencing; and (2) the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that the victim met her burden in proving the amount of loss resulting from the crime considered at sentencing and in ordering restitution at $8,487.41. View "State v. Wiskerchen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the conclusion of the circuit court that Appellants’ one-acre parcel of property met the statutory requirements for the transfer of a cemetery to the Town of Forest, holding that Appellants failed to prove that the parcel was a cemetery, and therefore, the parcel was not subject to the transfer mechanism set forth in Wis. Stat. 157.115(1)(c).Appellants filed a petition asserting that their one-acre parcel was a cemetery where they believed their relatives were buried, that the parcel was neglected or abandoned, and that the Town should manage the parcel as a town cemetery pursuant to section 157.115(1)(c). The circuit court agreed and granted the petition. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the parcel was not a cemetery, and therefore, the section 157.115(1)(c) cemetery transfer mechanism was not applicable. View "DeWitt v. Ferries" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court’s judgment of conviction of Defendant for operating while intoxicated (OWI) as a second offense, holding, among other things, that a prior expunged OWI conviction must be counted as a prior conviction under Wis. Stat. 343.307(1) when determining the penalty for OWI-related offenses.In 2011, Defendant was convicted of injuring another person by operation of a vehicle while intoxicated. The circuit court later ordered expunction of Defendant’s 2011 conviction. In 2016, Defendant was charged with one count of OWI as a second offense. The State relied on Defendant’s expunged 2011 conviction as the prior predicate offense under section 343.307(1) in order to charge him with second offenses. After Defendant was convicted, he appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a prior expunged OWI conviction constitutes a prior conviction under section 343.307(1); and (2) the State must prove a prior OWI conviction in a second offense OWI-related offense by a preponderance of the evidence. View "State v. Braunschweig" on Justia Law

At issue was the circuit court’s role in determining the proper forum of dispute resolution when a subsequent contract, if enforceable, does not contain an arbitration clause that is present in an initial contract.The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the non-final order of the circuit court denying a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the initial agreement in this case, as well as the circuit court’s granting of a motion for declaratory judgment that the subsequent agreement was a valid contract, holding that, if valid, the subsequent agreement released certain parties from the agreement to arbitrate contained in the initial agreement, and the cause must be remanded to determine whether the subsequent agreement was a valid contract.The circuit court concluded that even though the initial agreement required arbitration, it was superseded by the subsequent agreement, which did not require the parties to submit to arbitration. The court of appeals concluded that arbitration was required pursuant to the initial agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the determination of arbitrability must be decided by the circuit court rather than an arbitrator and that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the subsequent agreement was a valid contract. View "Midwest Neurosciences Associates, LLC v. Great Lakes Neurosurgical Associates, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress and remanded the cause to the circuit court with instructions to suppress the challenged evidence and vacate Defendant’s convictions, holding that the searches at issue violated the United States and Wisconsin constitutions.Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and bail jumping. In the circuit court, Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the law enforcement officer’s warrantless entry into her apartment was not justified under any of the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, and therefore, the evidence obtained during the searches of her apartment and person should be suppressed. The circuit court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that the officer had consent to enter Defendant’s apartment and that exigent circumstances justified the officer’s pushing open the apartment door. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the officer did not have consent to enter Defendant’s apartment; and (2) exigent circumstances did not justify the officer’s opening Defendant’s apartment door. View "State v. Reed" on Justia Law