Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's order that determined that Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant-insurance company were barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion, holding that claim preclusion barred the claims of certain plaintiffs, but the Court was evenly divided as to whether claim preclusion barred the claims brought by a fourth plaintiff.This case arose from a car accident in which a mother and her three daughters were seriously injured. The father was not in the car. The accident resulted in two separate lawsuits. In the first action, the mother brought a negligence claim against the driver of the other vehicle and her insurer, State Farm. The children were also named as plaintiffs. The action settled. The second lawsuit brought by the family, including the father, alleging that the driver of the car in which they were passengers was negligent. Plaintiffs sued the driver's insurer directly. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that the action was barred by claim preclusion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court held (1) claim preclusion barred the claims brought by the mother and daughters in the second action; but (2) the court of appeals properly allowed the father's claims to proceed. View "Teske v. Wilson Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming a jury verdict convicting Defendant of armed robbery and operating a vehicle without the owner's consent and affirming the denial of Defendant's motion for postconviction relief, holding that the court of appeals properly denied Defendant's appeals.Specifically, the Court held (1) Defendant waived his right to object to the use of Wis JI-Criminal 140 by failing to object to its use at the jury instruction and verdict conference; (2) Wis JI-Criminal 140 does not unconstitutionally reduce the State's burden of proof below the reasonable doubt standard; and (3) discretionary reversal under Wis. Stat. 751.06 was not warranted under the facts of this case. View "State v. Trammell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the circuit court denying Petitioner's postconviction motion to withdraw his guilty plea, holding that the circuit court's plea colloquy was not defective under Wis. Stat. 971.08 or State v. Bangert, 389 N.W.2d 12 (Wis. 1986).Petitioner argued that the plea colloquy was defective because the circuit court failed sufficiently to explain, and he did not understand, the constitutional rights he would be waiving by entering a plea, and therefore, he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter his plea. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Petitioner failed to meet his burden to demonstrate that the plea colloquy was defective so as to entitle him to the relief requested, and this Court declines to exercise its superintending authority to require circuit courts to advise a defendant of each constitutional right being waived by pleading guilty. View "State v. Pegeese" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Hiscox Insurance Company on Leicht Transfer & Storage Company's complaint seeking coverage for its losses under a commercial crime insurance policy issued to it by Hiscox, holding that Leicht's losses were not covered under the policy.Pallet Central Enterprises, Inc. forged delivery tickets and used them to bill Leicht for the sale and delivery of pallets that Pallet Central never sold or delivered. Leicht sought coverage for its losses under the policy issued to it by Hiscox. Hiscox denied coverage. Leicht sued for breach of contract, arguing that the forged delivery tickets comprised "directions to pay" within the meaning of the "forgery or alteration" insuring agreement of the Hiscox policy. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Hiscox, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the delivery tickets did not qualify as "written...directions to pay a sum certain in money"; and (2) the policy did not provide coverage for forged documents that were not themselves "directions to pay," but which were used as proxies for such documents. View "Leicht Transfer & Storage Co. v. Pallet Central Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals summarily denying as untimely Appellant's petition for habeas corpus seeking reinstatement of his right to file a direct appeal, holding that neither the language of Wis. Stat. 809.51 nor principles of equity require a habeas petitioner to allege timeliness in the petition.Without ordering a response from the State, the court of appeals concluded that Appellant's nine-year delay in filing his petition caused prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) State ex rel. Smalley v. Morgan, 565 N.W.2d 805 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997), abrogated in part by State ex rel. Coleman v. McCaughtry, 714 N.W.2d 900 (Wis. 2006), which imposed a "prompt and speedy" pleading requirement on habeas petitioners, is overruled; (2) any equitable concerns regarding substantial delays, such as the delay in the instant case, are properly raised by the State asserting the defense of laches and establishing prejudice resulting from the delay; and (3) Appellant had a right to have his petition considered without the court of appeals imposing a non-existent timeliness requirement as a basis for denying the petition ex parte. View "State ex rel. Lopez-Quintero v. Dittmann" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the circuit court granting a petition for grandparent visitation over the objection of two fit parents, holding that the Grandparent Visitation Statute, Wis. Stat. 767.43(3), as applied to the circuit court order, is unconstitutional because Grandmother did not overcome the presumption in favor of the Parents' visitation decision with clear and convincing evidence that their decision was not in the child's best interest.Despite finding that Parents were good and fit parents, the circuit court granted Grandmother's petition for visitation. The Supreme Court vacated the order, holding (1) The Grandparent Visitation Statute must withstand strict scrutiny; (2) the statute is facially constitutional and is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest; but (3) the statute is unconstitutional as applied, and the visitation order in this case violated the constitutional rights of Parents. View "Michels v. Lyons" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Steven Tikalsky's "constructive trust" count as against Terry Stevens, holding that a constructive trust is a remedy, not a cause of action, and that the circuit court properly dismissed Terry from the case with prejudice.At issue in this case was the proper distribution of Donald and Betty Lou Tikalsky's estate. Steven sued his sister, Terry, and two other siblings to obtain part of the inheritance they received from their parents. As against Terry, Steven asserted "constructive trust" as a cause of action. The circuit court granted summary judgment against Steven on the constructive trust count and dismissed Terry from the lawsuit. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a constructive trust remained a "permissible equitable remedy" as to Terry. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) under the proper circumstances, a constructive trust may be imposed on property in the possession of one who is innocent of any inequitable conduct; but (2) the complaint in this case did not state a cause of action against Terry nor assert any other grounds upon which a constructive trust could be imposed, and therefore, Terry was properly dismissed from the case with prejudice. View "Tikalsky v. Friedman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court ordered that Racine County Circuit Court Judge Michael J. Piontek be suspended from the office of circuit judge without compensation and prohibited from exercising any of the powers or duties of a Wisconsin circuit judge, for a period of five days, holding that suspension was warranted.The Judicial Commission filed a complaint against Judge Piontek alleging that he had engaged in judicial misconduct by his actions in presiding over two different criminal matters. The Judicial Conduct Panel recommended that the Supreme Court suspend Judge Piontek between five and fifteen days. The Supreme Court found that suspension was warranted and that a five-day suspension was appropriate. View "Wisconsin Judicial Commission v. Piontek" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals dismissing J.W.K.'s appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence extending his commitment, holding that J.W.K.'s sufficiency challenge was moot.J.W.K. was originally committed in February 2016 for six months under Wis. Stat. 51.20. In July 2016, Portage County filed a petition seeking to extend J.W.K.'s commitment for twelve months. The circuit court found the statutory dangerousness standard was satisfied and extended J.W.K.'s commitment for twelve months. J.W.K. filed a notice of appeal. Thereafter, in 2017, the County filed a petition seeking another twelve-month extension of J.W.K.'s commitment, which the circuit court granted. The court of appeals dismissed J.W.K.'s appeal as moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that reversing the expired 2016 order for insufficient evidence would have no effect on subsequent recommitment orders because later orders stand on their own under the language of section 51.20. View "Portage County v. J.W.K." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's denial of the Town of Rib Mountain's action seeking a declaration that Marathon County lacked the authority to establish a rural naming or numbering system in towns, holding that Wis. Stat. 59.54(4) does not restrict a county's authority to "establish a rural naming or numbering system in towns" to only rural areas within towns.In 2016, Marathon County decided to establish a uniform naming and numbering system. The Town of Rib Mountain was one of the towns required to participate in the addressing system. The Town filed this action for declaratory relief alleging that the statute confines counties to implementing naming and numbering systems only within "rural" areas of towns. The circuit court denied relief. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the use of the word "rural" unambiguously demonstrated that the legislature intended to restrict a county's naming and numbering authority to "rural" areas. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the statutory text provides that a county may establish a rural naming or numbering system "in towns"; and (2) accordingly, Marathon County acted within its authority by enacting an ordinance to create a uniform naming and numbering system in towns throughout Marathon County. View "Town of Rib Mountain v. Marathon County" on Justia Law