Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this original action brought by Plaintiffs, two licensed teachers and two school board members, against the Superintendent of Public Instruction (SPI) and the Department of Public Instruction (DPI) arguing that, prior to drafting or promulgating an administrative rule, the SPI and DPI must receive written approval from the governor as required by statute, holding that the gubernatorial approval requirement for rulemaking is constitutional as applied to the SPI and DPI.The SPI and DPI argued that the statutory requirement of gubernatorial approval was unconstitutional as applied because, pursuant to Wis. Const. art. X, 1, no other officer may be placed in a position equal or superior to that of the SPI with regard to the supervision of public instruction. The Supreme Court held that it was of no constitutional concern that the governor is given equal or greater legislative authority than the SPI in rulemaking because when the SPI, through the DPI, promulgates rules, it is exercising legislative power that comes not from the constitution from from the legislature. View "Koschkee v. Taylor" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the circuit court declaring the Wisconsin Legislature's December 2018 extraordinary session unconstitutional, enjoining enforcement of all legislation passed during the session, and vacating eighty-two appointments during the session, holding that extraordinary sessions do not violate the Wisconsin Constitution.The League of Women Voters of Wisconsin brought this suit arguing that the extraordinary session was unconstitutional. The circuit court agreed and issued a temporary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the three Acts passed during the session and vacating all eighty-two appointments. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's order, holding that the extraordinary session was constitutional and that the circuit court invaded the province of the Legislature in declaring the session unconstitutional, enjoining enforcement of the Acts, and vacating the 82 appointments. The Court remanded the matter to the circuit court with directions to dismiss the League's complaint. View "League of Women Voters of Wisconsin v. Evers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, holding that the disciplining of Defendant's attorney for professional misconduct that included his handling of Defendant's defense did not prove that counsel had provided ineffective assistance.Defendant pleaded guilty to a single count of armed robbery as a party to a crime. Before sentencing, Defendant asked to withdraw his plea due to ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court denied the motion. While Defendant's appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided a disciplinary case brought against Defendant's counsel and disciplined the attorney for professional misconduct. On appeal, Defendant argued that his attorney's discipline for his misconduct in handling Defendant's defense is proof to establish the deficiency of his counsel. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the record did not demonstrate that the professional misconduct of Defendant's attorney prevented Defendant from receiving effective assistance of counsel, and therefore, the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in denying Defendant's motion. View "State v. Cooper" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's grant of summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims against the Village of Stetsonville for negligence and private nuisance after wastewater backed up into Plaintiff's basement, holding that the Village was immune from suit for negligence and that, as to Plaintiff's private nuisance claim, no genuine issue of material fact existed as to causation.Specifically, the Court held (1) the court of appeals did not err in determining that the Village was immune from suit for negligence pursuant to Wis. Stat. 893.80(4); and (2) under the facts of this case, the court of appeals did not err in affirming the grant of summary judgment on the private nuisance claim on the grounds that Plaintiff did not present expert testimony with regard to causation. View "Pinter v. Village of Stetsonville" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court granting summary judgment dismissing Rural Mutual Insurance Company's subrogation claims pursuant to a subrogation waiver, holding that the subrogation waiver was valid and enforceable.Rural Mutual brought this action against Lester Buildings, LLC, Phoenix Insurance Company, Van Wyks, Inc., and West Bend Mutual Insurance Company after a barn collapsed due to strong winds and Rural Mutual paid more than $650,000 to the barn owner, Jim Herman, Inc. (Herman). The circuit court concluded that the claims were barred pursuant to a subrogation waiver contained in Lester Buildings' contract with Herman, Rural Mutual's insured, and further concluded that Wis. Stat. 895.447 did not void that subrogation waiver. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 895.447 did not void the subrogation waiver in the contract because the waiver did not limit or eliminate tort liability; and (2) the subrogation waiver was not an unenforceable exculpatory contract contrary to public policy. View "Rural Mutual Insurance Co. v. Lester Buildings, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals denying Defendant's petition for a supervisory writ in which Defendant argued that an automatic stay in his case began upon the circuit court's entry of a involuntary medication order rather than upon filing a notice of appeal but vacated the circuit court's order for involuntary medication, holding that the order was constitutionally insufficient.The circuit court ordered Defendant to be involuntarily medicated to restore his competency to stand trial on a felony charge. After the Supreme Court released its decision in State v. Scott, 914 N.W.2d 141 (Wis. 2018), subjecting involuntary medication orders to an automatic stay pending appeal, the circuit court stayed its involuntary medication order. Defendant petitioned the court of appeals for a supervisory writ and challenged the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. 971.14 based on its incompatibility with Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). The Supreme Court held (1) the court of appeals did not err in denying Defendant's petition for a supervisory writ; and (2) the standard for ordering involuntary medication set forth in section 971.14(3)(dm) and (4)(b) is unconstitutional to the extent it requires circuit courts to order involuntary medication based on a standard that does not comport with Sell. View "State v. Fitzgerald" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals granting Waukesha County's motion to dismiss the appeal brought by Ms. L. challenging the circuit court's judgment extending Ms. L's commitment, holding that all three issues brought by Ms. L. on appeal were moot but that the Court would address two of those three issues.Specifically, the Court held (1) the circuit court still had personal jurisdiction over Ms. L. when it conducted the extension hearing and entered the extension order, and the County's notice did not fail any due process requirements; (2) the circuit court properly entered default against Ms. L. for failing to appear at an extension hearing; and (3) Ms. L.'s issue that there was insufficient evidence to support the circuit court's entry of the extension order was moot. View "Waukesha County v. S.L.L." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals affirming an order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant, a medical doctor, on Plaintiffs' claim that Defendant negligently failed diagnose Plaintiff with cancer and violated Plaintiff's right to informed consent, holding that Wisconsin's borrowing statute did not apply to Plaintiffs' negligence claim.In his motion for summary judgment Defendant argued that Plaintiffs' claims were foreign causes of action pursuant to the borrowing statute, Wis. Stat. 893.07, and therefore, Michigan's statute of limitations applied to Plaintiffs' claims rendering their claims untimely. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The court of appeals affirmed, applying the Michigan statute of limitations to both of Plaintiffs' claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) because Plaintiff's place of first injury was unknowable, Wisconsin's borrowing statute did not apply; and (2) Plaintiffs' informed consent claim was "foreign" for purposes of Wisconsin's borrowing statute, and therefore, that claim was untimely. View "Paynter v. ProAssurance Wisconsin Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a question certified to it from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, holding that Wis. Stat. 943.10(1m)(a)-(f) identifies alternative means of committing one element of the crime of burglary under section 943.10(1m), and therefore, a unanimous finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to a locational alternative in subsections (a)-(f) is not necessary to convict.Defendants pleaded guilty to violations of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and, based on their previous Wisconsin burglary convictions, were classified as armed career criminals and sentenced to a mandatory minimum of fifteen years' imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). Before the Seventh Circuit, Defendants asserted that because the locational alternatives in section 943.10(1m)(a)-(f) provide alternative means of committing one element of the crime of burglary, the Wisconsin burglary statute was too broad to fall within the definition of burglary as a predicate violent felony under the ACCA. The Seventh Circuit then certified a question of Wisconsin state law to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered that the legislature intended that section 943.10(1m)(a)-(f) set forth alternative means of committing one element of burglary and not elements of distinct crimes and remanded the cause to the Seventh Circuit. View "United States v. Franklin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's denial of Appellant's postconviction motion, holding that, as a matter of first impression, Miranda warnings are not required at John Doe proceedings.Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was not violated because his John Doe testimony regarding the statement of his estranged wife to police was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted; (2) Appellant's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of his John Doe testimony because he was not read all of the Miranda warnings failed because the law was unsettled as to whether Miranda warnings were required at the John Doe proceedings; and (3) Miranda warnings are not required at John Doe proceedings. View "State v. Hanson" on Justia Law