Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court vacating Defendant's 2005 conviction by the Mid-Moraine Municipal Court of operating while intoxicated (OWI) in violation of a City of Cedarburg ordinance, holding that the municipal court had power to adjudicate the allegation that Defendant operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated in violation of a municipal ordinance.When Defendant was again charged with OWI in 2016, Defendant collaterally attacked his 2005 conviction by proving that he had a 2003 OWI conviction in Florida. Defendant argued that, therefore, his 2005 OWI conviction was factually a second offense and outside of the municipal court's limited subject matter jurisdiction. The circuit court reversed, concluding that the 2005 judgment was void for lack of municipal court subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the 2005 municipal citations invoked the municipal court's subject matter jurisdiction, which was granted by Wis. Const. art. VII, 14; and (2) even if Wisconsin's statutory progressive OWI penalties were not followed in 2005, the municipal court would have lacked competence, not subject matter jurisdiction. View "City of Cedarburg v. Hansen" on Justia Law

In this review of the court of appeals' decision affirming the circuit court's orders for involuntary commitment and involuntary medication and treatment of D.K. the Supreme Court held that there was clear and convincing evidence at a final hearing that D.K. was dangerous as defined under Wis. Stat. 51.20(1)(a)2.b.D.K. argued that he should not have been committed because Winnebago County failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was dangerous. The circuit court concluded that the County met its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that D.K. was mentally ill and dangerous. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the circuit court's dangerousness determination was supported by the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) D.K.'s commitment was not a moot issue because it still subjected him to a firearms ban; and (2) there was clear and convincing evidence that D.K. was dangerous as defined under section 51.20(1)(a)2.b. View "Marathon County v. D. K." on Justia Law

In this case involving a stolen 1938 Talbot Lago automobile the Supreme Court held that a true owner can maintain a replevin action for wrongful detention against a subsequent purchaser of converted property and that a cause of action for replevin based on wrongful detention accrues when the subsequent purchaser obtains the property.In 2001, the Talbot Lago disappeared from a Milwaukee business. In 2015, TL90108, LLC (TL) purchased the vehicle in Europe. In 2018, TL attempted to obtain title in Illinois. When a hit on a stolen vehicle report was triggered, Plaintiffs, who claimed to be the rightful owners, demanded the vehicle's return. TL refused, and Plaintiffs brought an action in replevin. The circuit court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the claim was barred by the six-year statutes of repose in Wis. Stat. 893.35 and 893.51(1). The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the wrongful detention claim was triggered when Plaintiffs demanded a return of the vehicle, thus restarting the six-year repose clock. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the replevin action based on TL's alleged wrongful detention of the Talbot Lago accrued when TL obtained - and wrongfully detained - the vehicle, and therefore, Plaintiffs' cause of action for replevin was not barred by the applicable statutes of repose. View "Mueller v. TL90108, LLC" on Justia Law

In this judicial disciplinary proceeding, the Supreme Court adopted a Judicial Conduct Panel's findings of fact, agreed that those facts demonstrated that Honorable Kenneth W. Gorski, a part-time commissioner for the Wood County circuit court, committed judicial misconduct, and publicly reprimanded Commissioner Gorski for that misconduct.After adopting the panel's findings of fact the Supreme Court agreed with the panel's conclusion that those factual findings demonstrated that Commissioner Gorski willfully violated specified provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct, thereby committing judicial misconduct. The Court then held that a sanction was necessary to impress upon Commissioner Gorski the damage that such conduct does to the judicial system and the rule of law and ordered that Commissioner Gorski be publicly reprimanded for judicial misconduct. View "Wisconsin Judicial Commission v. Gorski" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to Veritas Steel, LLC on Lunda Construction Company's successor liability claim, holding that neither the de facto merger nor the mere continuation exceptions to the rule against successor liability applied in this case to impose successor liability on Veritas, and Lunda forfeited its argument that the fraudulent transaction exception applied.Lunda alleged that Veritas and third-party defendants took unfair advantage of DPM Bridge LLC's loan defaults with the intent to gain ownership of PDM's steel fabrication business. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Veritas on the successor liability claim. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Lunda did not establish a genuine issue of material fact as to identity of ownership between Veritas and PDM, it could not satisfy the de facto merger or mere continuation exceptions to the rule against successor liability; and (2) by not raising the fraudulent transaction exception before the court of appeals, Lunda forfeited its claim for successor liability based on that exception. View "Veritas Steel, LLC v. Lunda Construction Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's order denying Defendant's postconviction motion for resentencing, holding that Defendant did not forfeit his ability to challenge inaccurate information raised by the State at his sentencing but that the circuit court's reliance on the inaccurate information was harmless error.In his postconviction motion, Defendant argued for the first time that the circuit court violated his due process rights when it relied on inaccurate information at sentencing. The postconviction court concluded that the State introduced inaccurate information at the sentencing hearing, that the circuit court actually relied on the inaccurate information, but that the error was harmless. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Defendant forfeited his claim because he failed to object at the sentencing hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, albeit on different grounds, holding (1) the forfeiture rule does not apply to previously unknown, inaccurate information first raised by the State at sentencing; and (2) the circuit court's error in relying on the inaccurate information at sentencing was harmless. View "State v. Coffee" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's dismissal of Chris Hinrichs and Autovation Limited's (collectively, Hinrichs) common law misrepresentation claims against the DOW Chemical Company and reversing the circuit court's dismissal of Hinrichs' statutory claim under Wis. Stat. 100.18, holding that the court of appeals did not err.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that, with regard to Hinrichs' common law claims, neither the "fraud in the inducement" exception nor the "other property exception" to the economic loss doctrine applied to allow Hinrichs' common law claims to go forward. With regard to Hinrichs' statutory claims the Court held (1) the economic loss doctrine does not serve as a bar to claims made under section 100.18; (2) because one person can be "the public" for purposes of section 100.18(1), the court of appeals did not err in determining that dismissal for failure to meet "the public" factor of the section 100.18 claim was in error; and (3) the heightened pleading standard for claims of fraud does not apply to claims made under section 100.18 and that Hinrichs' complaint stated a claim under the general pleading standard. View "Hinrichs v. DOW Chemical Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals imposing laches and denying Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that this Court will not revisit its ruling that the State may assert laches as a defense to a habeas petition and that the State established unreasonable delay and prejudice.In 2007, Defendant was convicted of reckless homicide. By 2010 or 2011, Defendant knew that his counsel failed to file a notice of intent to pursue post conviction relief as promised, causing Defendant to lose his direct appeal rights. In 2017, Defendant filed his habeas petition asserting ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to appeal. The State pled laches. The court of appeals imposed laches and denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that State properly asserted laches and that the court of appeals did not erroneously exercise its discretion by applying laches and barring relief. View "Wren v. Richardson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held in this case that Wisconsin law required an administrative agency to promulgate a rule containing a new statutory interpretation that prohibited the owner of a roadside sign from remedying a modification that caused the sign to lose its legal, nonconforming status before applying it against the sign owner.The sign owner here applied for a permit to remove vegetation that partially obscured the sign from view. At the time he filed the application nothing suggested that the sign failed to comply with applicable laws that existed at the time the permit issued. However, the interpretation of Wis. Stat. 84.30 changed so that the sign was no longer allowed where it was located. The Wisconsin Department of Transportation denied the application and ordered the sign owner to remove the sign. The Division of Hearings and Appeals upheld the determination. The circuit court and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Wis. Stat. 227.10(1) required the Department to engage in formal rulemaking when it adopted its new interpretation of Wis. Stat. 84.30(11). View "Lamar Central Outdoor, LLC v. Division of Hearings & Appeals" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's order vacating Defendant's 1996 judgment of conviction for two counts of first-degree intentional homicide, party to a crime, and granting Defendant's postconviction motion for a new trial, holding that prejudice cannot be presumed when the entire trial transcript is unavailable.Under State v. Perry and State v. DeLeon, when a transcript is incomplete, a defendant is entitled to a new trial after making a facially valid claim of arguably prejudicial error. In making its ruling in this case the circuit court concluded that a new trial was necessary because there was no available transcript of Defendant's 1996 jury trial. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that Defendant was not entitled to a new trial because he did not meet his burden to assert a facially valid claim of error. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Perry/DeLeon procedure applies whether all or a portion of a transcript is unavailable; and (2) no exception to the Perry/DeLeon procedure was available to Defendant because the transcript was unavailable due to Defendant's own delay. View "State v. Pope" on Justia Law