Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Plaintiffs' medical malpractice action, holding that the circuit court did not err in instructing the jury on the "alternative methods" paragraph of Wis JI-Civil 1023.London Barney was born with severe and permanent neurologic injuries. London and his mother, Raquel Barney, filed a medical malpractice action alleging that Dr. Julie Mickelson was negligent for failing accurately to trace London's fetal heart rate during Raquel's labor. The jury found that Dr. Mickelson was not negligent in her care and treatment of the plaintiffs. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the alternative methods instruction given to the jury likely misled the jury. This instruction generally informed the jury that Defendant was not negligent if she used reasonable care, skill and judgment in administering any one of the recognized reasonable treatment methods for monitoring London's heart rate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, based on all of the expert testimony introduced at trial, the jury was properly given the alternative methods instruction. View "Barney v. Mickelson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's order extending Petitioner's involuntary commitment, holding that the evidence introduced at the recommitment hearing was insufficient to support a conclusion that Petitioner was "dangerous" pursuant to either Wis. Stat. 51.20(1)(a)2.c. or 2.d. and 51.20(1)(am).On appeal, Petitioner argued that Langlade County did not present sufficient evidence of his dangerousness to sustain an extension of his involuntary commitment. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) going forward, circuit courts in recommitment proceedings are required to make specific factual findings with reference to the subdivision paragraph of section 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the recommitment is based; and (2) the evidence in this case was insufficient to support the conclusion that Petitioner was "dangerous" under the relevant statutes. View "Langlade County v. D.J.W." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals reversing an order of the circuit court that granted sentence credit to Defendant, holding that the court of appeals correctly found that Defendant was not entitled to sentence credit but erred by advancing the commencement of Defendant's terms of extended supervision for Defendant's 2007 and 2008 cases.Specifically, the Court held (1) Defendant was not entitled to sentence credit under Wis. Stat. 973.155(1)(a) because the days he spent in custody for which he sought sentence credit were not in connection with the courses of conduct for which those sentences were imposed; and (2) the court of appeals erred by advancing the commencement of Defendant's terms of extended supervision for his 2007 and 2008 cases to the date they would have begun but for Defendant's confinement for unrelated convictions that were later set aside, holding that whether to employ advancement is a public policy decision best left to the legislature. View "State v. Harrison" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals applying a constructive trust to proceeds Lynnea Landsee-Pulkkila collected from a life insurance policy maintained by her late husband, James Pulkkila, holding that the court of appeals erred in imposing a constructive trust absent findings of fact that would support such an imposition.In 2009, James and Joan Pulkkila divorced. In their marital settlement agreement (MSA) that was incorporated into the judgment of divorce James and Joan were required to maintain life insurance with their children as beneficiaries. In 2013, James and Lynnea were married. The following year, James submitted a beneficiary name change asking that Lynnea be made the sole beneficiary of the life insurance policy. After Lynnea was paid the proceeds of the policy, Joan asserted that James breached the MSA agreement and that a constructive trust should be placed on the proceeds. The circuit court denied Joan's motion for a constructive trust. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that equity required the imposition of a constructive trust. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erroneously exercised its discretion because it determined that a constructive trust was appropriate in the absence of an evidentiary hearing and resulting relevant factual findings. View "Pulkkila v. Pulkkila" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Wis. Stat. 51.61(1)(g), which permits the involuntary medication of an incompetent but non-dangerous inmate, is facially unconstitutional for any inmate who is involuntarily committed based on determinations that he was mentally ill and in need of treatment when the inmate is involuntarily medicated based merely on a determination that the inmate is incompetent to refuse medication.At issue before the Supreme Court was the circuit court's order of extension of commitment, order for involuntary medication and treatment, and order denying C.S.'s postcommitment motion. C.S., who suffered from schizophrenia, was committed while he was an inmate. Because he was determined incompetent to refuse medication pursuant to section 51.61(1)(g) he was the subject of multiple involuntary medication court orders. C.S. was committed not based upon a determination of dangerousness but, rather, on determinations that he was mentally ill and in need of treatment. C.S. argued that section 51.61(1)(g)(3 is unconstitutional when it permits the involuntary medication of any inmate committed under Wis. Stat. 51.20(1)(ar) without a determination that the inmate is dangerous. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that incompetence to refuse medication alone is not an essential or overriding State interest and cannot justify involuntary medication. View "Winnebago County v. C.S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court concluding that Employees' time spent "donning and doffing" personal protective equipment was compensable, holding that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it summarily dismissed Employer's equitable defenses.Employees filed suit seeking unpaid wages for time spent at the start and end of their shifts donning and doffing personal protective equipment. The circuit court denied Employer's motion for summary judgment, concluding (1) the donning and doffing time was compensable; (2) Employees could not modify or eliminate compensation for donning and doffing through collective bargaining; (3) the time was not rendered non-compensable by the de minimis doctrine; and (4) Employer's four equitable defenses did not preclude Employees' recovery of damages. The Supreme Court affirmed with one exception, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion when it dismissed Employer's equitable defenses on the basis of Wis. Stat. 109.03(5). View "Piper v. Jones Dairy Farm" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court concluding that Fryed Audio, LLC was entitled to recreational immunity from Plaintiff's tort action, holding that Fryed Audio was entitled to immunity pursuant to Wis. Stat. 895.52(2).Fryed Audio was a member of Rhythm Method, LLC, with whom the Lions Club of Cudahy Wisconsin, Inc. contracted to provide music for its festival. At the event. Plaintiff allegedly tripped on an electronic cord that Steven Fry, the sole member of Fryed Audio, laid. Plaintiff sued Fryed Audio for negligence. Fryed Audio moved for summary judgment under Wis. Stat. 895.52(2), which provides that agents of owners have immunity from claims by those who enter property of a statutory owner to engage in recreational activity. The circuit court granted the motion. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the Lions Club lacked the right to control Fryed Audio. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) there were no issues of material fact as to the Lions Club's right to control Fryed Audio in regard to laying the cords, and Fryed Audio was an agent of the Lions Club; and (2) the Lions Club was a statutory owner, and therefore, Fryed Audio was entitled to immunity. View "Lang v. Lions Club of Cudahy Wisconsin, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals rejecting Defendant's assertion that his second criminal prosecution violated the constitutional proscription of double jeopardy, holding that the State's second prosecution of Defendant for sexual assault did not violate the double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment or Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution.A jury acquitted Defendant of the charge of repeated sexual assault of a child for engaging in sexual intercourse with the victim, M.T., in "late summer to early fall of 2012." Thereafter, paternity tests revealed that Defendant was the father of M.T.'s child. The State subsequently charged Defendant with sexual assault of a child under sixteen years of age occurring "on or about October 19, 2012," the date it was determined the child was conceived. Defendant was convicted. Defendant moved for postconviction relief, asserting that his second prosecution violated the constitutional proscription of double jeopardy. The circuit court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the two cases against Defendant did not involve the "same offense" under the Double Jeopardy Clause. View "State v. Schultz" on Justia Law

In this case involving the Town of Perry's alleged failure to construct a proper road as promised when exercising its power of eminent domain the Supreme Court held that Wis. Stat. 82.50(1) does not impose obligations on the Town that are susceptible to a declaration of rights, nor does it create a private cause of action by which Plaintiff can recover damages under the circumstances.The Town acquired a portion of property belonging to Plaintiff. In exercising it power of eminent domain, the Town committed itself to building a replacement road over part of the acquired property. The Town later brought this action alleging that the Town failed to build the road to the standards required by either the condemnation petition or Wis. Stat. 82.50(1). The circuit court concluded that claim preclusion barred Plaintiff's claim. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court revered, holding (1) neither the right-to-take case nor the just compensation case barred Plaintiff's claims; and (2) section 82.50(1) does not impose road-building obligations on the Town that are susceptible to a declaration of rights, nor does it create a private cause of action by which Plaintiff can recover damages for the Town's failure to improve the road. View "DSG Evergreen Family Limited Partnership v. Town of Perry" on Justia Law

In this criminal case, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals, holding that venue in Fond du Lac County was proper but that two of the charges on which the jury convicted Defendant were multiplicitous.Defendant was transported to the Fond du Lac County jail to face criminal charges unrelated to this case. During the booking process, a cache of narcotics and prescription medications was discovered in Defendant's boot. This case was then brought in the Fond du Lac County circuit court. A jury found Defendant guilty of multiple drug-related charges. Defendant filed a postconviction motion claiming that venue was improper in Fond du Lac County because he did not possess the drugs when the deputy discovered them where his arrest in Kenosha County terminated his ability to possess contraband on his person. Defendant also argued that two charges for possessing oxycodone were multiplicitous. The postconviction court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court held (1) Defendant did not lose possession of the drugs in his boot upon his arrest, and because he still possessed the drugs in Fond du Lac County, venue there was proper; and (2) the two charges at issue were multiplicitous. View "State v. Brantner" on Justia Law