Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that Wis. Stat. 51.61(1)(g), which permits the involuntary medication of an incompetent but non-dangerous inmate, is facially unconstitutional for any inmate who is involuntarily committed based on determinations that he was mentally ill and in need of treatment when the inmate is involuntarily medicated based merely on a determination that the inmate is incompetent to refuse medication.At issue before the Supreme Court was the circuit court's order of extension of commitment, order for involuntary medication and treatment, and order denying C.S.'s postcommitment motion. C.S., who suffered from schizophrenia, was committed while he was an inmate. Because he was determined incompetent to refuse medication pursuant to section 51.61(1)(g) he was the subject of multiple involuntary medication court orders. C.S. was committed not based upon a determination of dangerousness but, rather, on determinations that he was mentally ill and in need of treatment. C.S. argued that section 51.61(1)(g)(3 is unconstitutional when it permits the involuntary medication of any inmate committed under Wis. Stat. 51.20(1)(ar) without a determination that the inmate is dangerous. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that incompetence to refuse medication alone is not an essential or overriding State interest and cannot justify involuntary medication. View "Winnebago County v. C.S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court concluding that Employees' time spent "donning and doffing" personal protective equipment was compensable, holding that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it summarily dismissed Employer's equitable defenses.Employees filed suit seeking unpaid wages for time spent at the start and end of their shifts donning and doffing personal protective equipment. The circuit court denied Employer's motion for summary judgment, concluding (1) the donning and doffing time was compensable; (2) Employees could not modify or eliminate compensation for donning and doffing through collective bargaining; (3) the time was not rendered non-compensable by the de minimis doctrine; and (4) Employer's four equitable defenses did not preclude Employees' recovery of damages. The Supreme Court affirmed with one exception, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion when it dismissed Employer's equitable defenses on the basis of Wis. Stat. 109.03(5). View "Piper v. Jones Dairy Farm" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court concluding that Fryed Audio, LLC was entitled to recreational immunity from Plaintiff's tort action, holding that Fryed Audio was entitled to immunity pursuant to Wis. Stat. 895.52(2).Fryed Audio was a member of Rhythm Method, LLC, with whom the Lions Club of Cudahy Wisconsin, Inc. contracted to provide music for its festival. At the event. Plaintiff allegedly tripped on an electronic cord that Steven Fry, the sole member of Fryed Audio, laid. Plaintiff sued Fryed Audio for negligence. Fryed Audio moved for summary judgment under Wis. Stat. 895.52(2), which provides that agents of owners have immunity from claims by those who enter property of a statutory owner to engage in recreational activity. The circuit court granted the motion. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the Lions Club lacked the right to control Fryed Audio. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) there were no issues of material fact as to the Lions Club's right to control Fryed Audio in regard to laying the cords, and Fryed Audio was an agent of the Lions Club; and (2) the Lions Club was a statutory owner, and therefore, Fryed Audio was entitled to immunity. View "Lang v. Lions Club of Cudahy Wisconsin, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals rejecting Defendant's assertion that his second criminal prosecution violated the constitutional proscription of double jeopardy, holding that the State's second prosecution of Defendant for sexual assault did not violate the double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment or Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution.A jury acquitted Defendant of the charge of repeated sexual assault of a child for engaging in sexual intercourse with the victim, M.T., in "late summer to early fall of 2012." Thereafter, paternity tests revealed that Defendant was the father of M.T.'s child. The State subsequently charged Defendant with sexual assault of a child under sixteen years of age occurring "on or about October 19, 2012," the date it was determined the child was conceived. Defendant was convicted. Defendant moved for postconviction relief, asserting that his second prosecution violated the constitutional proscription of double jeopardy. The circuit court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the two cases against Defendant did not involve the "same offense" under the Double Jeopardy Clause. View "State v. Schultz" on Justia Law

In this case involving the Town of Perry's alleged failure to construct a proper road as promised when exercising its power of eminent domain the Supreme Court held that Wis. Stat. 82.50(1) does not impose obligations on the Town that are susceptible to a declaration of rights, nor does it create a private cause of action by which Plaintiff can recover damages under the circumstances.The Town acquired a portion of property belonging to Plaintiff. In exercising it power of eminent domain, the Town committed itself to building a replacement road over part of the acquired property. The Town later brought this action alleging that the Town failed to build the road to the standards required by either the condemnation petition or Wis. Stat. 82.50(1). The circuit court concluded that claim preclusion barred Plaintiff's claim. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court revered, holding (1) neither the right-to-take case nor the just compensation case barred Plaintiff's claims; and (2) section 82.50(1) does not impose road-building obligations on the Town that are susceptible to a declaration of rights, nor does it create a private cause of action by which Plaintiff can recover damages for the Town's failure to improve the road. View "DSG Evergreen Family Limited Partnership v. Town of Perry" on Justia Law

In this criminal case, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals, holding that venue in Fond du Lac County was proper but that two of the charges on which the jury convicted Defendant were multiplicitous.Defendant was transported to the Fond du Lac County jail to face criminal charges unrelated to this case. During the booking process, a cache of narcotics and prescription medications was discovered in Defendant's boot. This case was then brought in the Fond du Lac County circuit court. A jury found Defendant guilty of multiple drug-related charges. Defendant filed a postconviction motion claiming that venue was improper in Fond du Lac County because he did not possess the drugs when the deputy discovered them where his arrest in Kenosha County terminated his ability to possess contraband on his person. Defendant also argued that two charges for possessing oxycodone were multiplicitous. The postconviction court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court held (1) Defendant did not lose possession of the drugs in his boot upon his arrest, and because he still possessed the drugs in Fond du Lac County, venue there was proper; and (2) the two charges at issue were multiplicitous. View "State v. Brantner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming a $4,800 fine imposed by the circuit court upon sentencing Defendant for third-offense OWI, holding that the court of appeals erred in interpreting the penalty enhancers in Wisconsin's OWI statutes.Defendant faced two penalty enhancers. At issue was how the penalty enhancers' provisions requiring "doubling" and "quadrupling" of the fine for a third-offense OWI should be determined when multiple penalty enhancers apply. The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals erred in affirming the $4,800 fine imposed by the circuit court, holding that, under the correct interpretation of the statutes, Defendant's two fines totaled $3,600, not $4,800. View "State v. Neill" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court concluding that an annexation of 247 acres of land to the City of Sheboygan satisfied the statutory contingency requirement, the rule of reason, and the procedural requirements of Wis. Stat. 66.0217, holding that the circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion.This appeal concerned J. Kohler Company's plan to convert 247 acres of land located in the Town of Wilson into a golf course. Kohler petitioned for annexation to the City of Sheboygan, determining that the golf course would not be developed if the land remained in the boundaries of the Town. In response, the Town filed this declaratory judgment action challenging the annexation. The circuit court dismissed the action in full. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the annexation met the statutory contiguity requirement in Wis. Stat. 66.0217(3); (2) the annexation satisfied the rule of reason; and (3) the petition complied with the signature and certification requirements set forth in Wis. Stat. 66.0218(3) and (5)(a). View "Town of Wilson v. City of Sheboygan" on Justia Law

In this insurance coverage duty-to-defend dispute the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's judgment denying the motion for attorney fees filed by the Germantown School District Board of Education and Germantown School District (collectively, the School District), holding that the School District's insurers (Insurer) did not breach the duty to defend the School District in a lawsuit brought by retired employees.In seeking attorney fees, the School Board argued that its Insurer should pay all of the attorney fees incurred by the School District in the underlying lawsuit as a remedy for its breach of the duty to defend the School District. The Supreme Court held (1) the Insurer's initial denial of the School District's tendered claim did not breach its duty to defend when the Insurer followed a judicially preferred method for determining coverage; (2) a delay in payment of liability attorney fees alone does not mean an insurer breached its duty to defend; and (3) the four-corners rule applies in determining whether a duty to defend exists but does not preclude a court's consideration of certain factors in assessing whether an insurer breached its duty to defend. View "Choinsky v. Germantown School District Board of Education" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court modified the decision of the court of appeals affirming Appellant's judgment of conviction and the denial of her motion for postconviction relief and affirmed as modified, holding that Appellant appropriately raised her challenge to the circuit court's use of previously unknown information during sentencing and that there was no due process violation in this case.On appeal, Appellant claimed, among other things, that the circuit court denied her due process at sentencing by failing to provide her with notice that it would consider previously unknown information first raised by the court at sentencing. The State responded that Appellant forfeited her direct challenge to the previously unknown information considered at sentencing because she failed to object at the sentencing hearing. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) where previously unknown information is raised by the circuit court at a sentencing hearing a defendant does not forfeit a direct challenge to the use of the information by failing to object at the hearing; and (2) Appellant's due process rights were not violated by the circuit court's use of the previously unknown information. View "State v. Counihan" on Justia Law