Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals rejecting Defendant's assertion that his second criminal prosecution violated the constitutional proscription of double jeopardy, holding that the State's second prosecution of Defendant for sexual assault did not violate the double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment or Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution.A jury acquitted Defendant of the charge of repeated sexual assault of a child for engaging in sexual intercourse with the victim, M.T., in "late summer to early fall of 2012." Thereafter, paternity tests revealed that Defendant was the father of M.T.'s child. The State subsequently charged Defendant with sexual assault of a child under sixteen years of age occurring "on or about October 19, 2012," the date it was determined the child was conceived. Defendant was convicted. Defendant moved for postconviction relief, asserting that his second prosecution violated the constitutional proscription of double jeopardy. The circuit court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the two cases against Defendant did not involve the "same offense" under the Double Jeopardy Clause. View "State v. Schultz" on Justia Law

In this case involving the Town of Perry's alleged failure to construct a proper road as promised when exercising its power of eminent domain the Supreme Court held that Wis. Stat. 82.50(1) does not impose obligations on the Town that are susceptible to a declaration of rights, nor does it create a private cause of action by which Plaintiff can recover damages under the circumstances.The Town acquired a portion of property belonging to Plaintiff. In exercising it power of eminent domain, the Town committed itself to building a replacement road over part of the acquired property. The Town later brought this action alleging that the Town failed to build the road to the standards required by either the condemnation petition or Wis. Stat. 82.50(1). The circuit court concluded that claim preclusion barred Plaintiff's claim. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court revered, holding (1) neither the right-to-take case nor the just compensation case barred Plaintiff's claims; and (2) section 82.50(1) does not impose road-building obligations on the Town that are susceptible to a declaration of rights, nor does it create a private cause of action by which Plaintiff can recover damages for the Town's failure to improve the road. View "DSG Evergreen Family Limited Partnership v. Town of Perry" on Justia Law

In this criminal case, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals, holding that venue in Fond du Lac County was proper but that two of the charges on which the jury convicted Defendant were multiplicitous.Defendant was transported to the Fond du Lac County jail to face criminal charges unrelated to this case. During the booking process, a cache of narcotics and prescription medications was discovered in Defendant's boot. This case was then brought in the Fond du Lac County circuit court. A jury found Defendant guilty of multiple drug-related charges. Defendant filed a postconviction motion claiming that venue was improper in Fond du Lac County because he did not possess the drugs when the deputy discovered them where his arrest in Kenosha County terminated his ability to possess contraband on his person. Defendant also argued that two charges for possessing oxycodone were multiplicitous. The postconviction court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court held (1) Defendant did not lose possession of the drugs in his boot upon his arrest, and because he still possessed the drugs in Fond du Lac County, venue there was proper; and (2) the two charges at issue were multiplicitous. View "State v. Brantner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming a $4,800 fine imposed by the circuit court upon sentencing Defendant for third-offense OWI, holding that the court of appeals erred in interpreting the penalty enhancers in Wisconsin's OWI statutes.Defendant faced two penalty enhancers. At issue was how the penalty enhancers' provisions requiring "doubling" and "quadrupling" of the fine for a third-offense OWI should be determined when multiple penalty enhancers apply. The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals erred in affirming the $4,800 fine imposed by the circuit court, holding that, under the correct interpretation of the statutes, Defendant's two fines totaled $3,600, not $4,800. View "State v. Neill" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court concluding that an annexation of 247 acres of land to the City of Sheboygan satisfied the statutory contingency requirement, the rule of reason, and the procedural requirements of Wis. Stat. 66.0217, holding that the circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion.This appeal concerned J. Kohler Company's plan to convert 247 acres of land located in the Town of Wilson into a golf course. Kohler petitioned for annexation to the City of Sheboygan, determining that the golf course would not be developed if the land remained in the boundaries of the Town. In response, the Town filed this declaratory judgment action challenging the annexation. The circuit court dismissed the action in full. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the annexation met the statutory contiguity requirement in Wis. Stat. 66.0217(3); (2) the annexation satisfied the rule of reason; and (3) the petition complied with the signature and certification requirements set forth in Wis. Stat. 66.0218(3) and (5)(a). View "Town of Wilson v. City of Sheboygan" on Justia Law

In this insurance coverage duty-to-defend dispute the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's judgment denying the motion for attorney fees filed by the Germantown School District Board of Education and Germantown School District (collectively, the School District), holding that the School District's insurers (Insurer) did not breach the duty to defend the School District in a lawsuit brought by retired employees.In seeking attorney fees, the School Board argued that its Insurer should pay all of the attorney fees incurred by the School District in the underlying lawsuit as a remedy for its breach of the duty to defend the School District. The Supreme Court held (1) the Insurer's initial denial of the School District's tendered claim did not breach its duty to defend when the Insurer followed a judicially preferred method for determining coverage; (2) a delay in payment of liability attorney fees alone does not mean an insurer breached its duty to defend; and (3) the four-corners rule applies in determining whether a duty to defend exists but does not preclude a court's consideration of certain factors in assessing whether an insurer breached its duty to defend. View "Choinsky v. Germantown School District Board of Education" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court modified the decision of the court of appeals affirming Appellant's judgment of conviction and the denial of her motion for postconviction relief and affirmed as modified, holding that Appellant appropriately raised her challenge to the circuit court's use of previously unknown information during sentencing and that there was no due process violation in this case.On appeal, Appellant claimed, among other things, that the circuit court denied her due process at sentencing by failing to provide her with notice that it would consider previously unknown information first raised by the court at sentencing. The State responded that Appellant forfeited her direct challenge to the previously unknown information considered at sentencing because she failed to object at the sentencing hearing. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) where previously unknown information is raised by the circuit court at a sentencing hearing a defendant does not forfeit a direct challenge to the use of the information by failing to object at the hearing; and (2) Appellant's due process rights were not violated by the circuit court's use of the previously unknown information. View "State v. Counihan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court vacating Defendant's 2005 conviction by the Mid-Moraine Municipal Court of operating while intoxicated (OWI) in violation of a City of Cedarburg ordinance, holding that the municipal court had power to adjudicate the allegation that Defendant operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated in violation of a municipal ordinance.When Defendant was again charged with OWI in 2016, Defendant collaterally attacked his 2005 conviction by proving that he had a 2003 OWI conviction in Florida. Defendant argued that, therefore, his 2005 OWI conviction was factually a second offense and outside of the municipal court's limited subject matter jurisdiction. The circuit court reversed, concluding that the 2005 judgment was void for lack of municipal court subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the 2005 municipal citations invoked the municipal court's subject matter jurisdiction, which was granted by Wis. Const. art. VII, 14; and (2) even if Wisconsin's statutory progressive OWI penalties were not followed in 2005, the municipal court would have lacked competence, not subject matter jurisdiction. View "City of Cedarburg v. Hansen" on Justia Law

In this review of the court of appeals' decision affirming the circuit court's orders for involuntary commitment and involuntary medication and treatment of D.K. the Supreme Court held that there was clear and convincing evidence at a final hearing that D.K. was dangerous as defined under Wis. Stat. 51.20(1)(a)2.b.D.K. argued that he should not have been committed because Winnebago County failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was dangerous. The circuit court concluded that the County met its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that D.K. was mentally ill and dangerous. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the circuit court's dangerousness determination was supported by the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) D.K.'s commitment was not a moot issue because it still subjected him to a firearms ban; and (2) there was clear and convincing evidence that D.K. was dangerous as defined under section 51.20(1)(a)2.b. View "Marathon County v. D. K." on Justia Law

In this case involving a stolen 1938 Talbot Lago automobile the Supreme Court held that a true owner can maintain a replevin action for wrongful detention against a subsequent purchaser of converted property and that a cause of action for replevin based on wrongful detention accrues when the subsequent purchaser obtains the property.In 2001, the Talbot Lago disappeared from a Milwaukee business. In 2015, TL90108, LLC (TL) purchased the vehicle in Europe. In 2018, TL attempted to obtain title in Illinois. When a hit on a stolen vehicle report was triggered, Plaintiffs, who claimed to be the rightful owners, demanded the vehicle's return. TL refused, and Plaintiffs brought an action in replevin. The circuit court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the claim was barred by the six-year statutes of repose in Wis. Stat. 893.35 and 893.51(1). The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the wrongful detention claim was triggered when Plaintiffs demanded a return of the vehicle, thus restarting the six-year repose clock. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the replevin action based on TL's alleged wrongful detention of the Talbot Lago accrued when TL obtained - and wrongfully detained - the vehicle, and therefore, Plaintiffs' cause of action for replevin was not barred by the applicable statutes of repose. View "Mueller v. TL90108, LLC" on Justia Law