Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The University of Wisconsin Hospitals and Clinics Authority (the Authority) was created by the legislature in 1995 and was initially required to engage in collective bargaining under the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act (Peace Act). However, in 2011, Act 10 was signed into law, which removed the Authority from the Peace Act and eliminated its obligation to engage in collective bargaining.After Act 10, the Authority ceased collective bargaining with its employees. In recent years, employees requested the Authority to recognize the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) as their collective bargaining agent, which the Authority declined. This led to a Memorandum of Understanding between SEIU and the Authority, and they petitioned the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC) to determine if the Authority was still required to engage in collective bargaining under the Peace Act. WERC concluded that the Authority was no longer required to engage in collective bargaining, citing Act 10's amendments. SEIU sought review in the circuit court, which affirmed WERC's decision. SEIU then appealed, and the Authority filed a petition to bypass the court of appeals, which was granted.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the Authority is no longer required to engage in collective bargaining under the Peace Act. The court examined the statutory language and history, concluding that Act 10 ended the collective bargaining requirements for the Authority. The decision of WERC and the circuit court was affirmed. View "Service Employees International Union Healthcare Wisconsin v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the Wisconsin State Legislature and the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction (DPI) regarding the governor's partial veto power and the allocation of funds for literacy programs. The legislature argued that the governor exceeded his constitutional authority by partially vetoing a bill that was not an appropriation bill. DPI and the governor contended that the legislature's Joint Committee on Finance (JCF) improperly withheld funds appropriated for DPI's literacy programs.The Dane County Circuit Court granted summary judgment in part for each party. The court concluded that the governor did not exceed his constitutional boundaries in partially vetoing the bill and that JCF did not improperly withhold funds from DPI. The court reasoned that the bill in question was an appropriation bill and that the governor's partial veto was valid. However, the court also held that DPI was not entitled to the funds appropriated to JCF.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the governor breached his constitutional boundaries because the bill he partially vetoed was not an appropriation bill. The court reaffirmed the "four corners rule," which requires that an appropriation bill must set aside public funds for a public purpose within its text. The court concluded that the bill in question did not meet this requirement and, therefore, was not subject to the governor's partial veto authority. The court also held that JCF did not improperly withhold funds from DPI, as the funds were lawfully appropriated to JCF. Consequently, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the circuit court's summary judgment order. View "Wisconsin State Legislature v. Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction" on Justia Law

The case involves the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and its application of the Spills Law, which mandates that parties responsible for hazardous substance discharges must notify the DNR and take necessary actions to mitigate environmental harm. The central issue is whether the DNR must promulgate rules identifying specific substances, including PFAS, as hazardous before enforcing the Spills Law.The Waukesha County Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce, Inc. (WMC) and Leather Rich, Inc., holding that the DNR's policies on emerging contaminants like PFAS were invalid unpromulgated rules. The court of appeals affirmed this decision.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that the DNR's statements regarding PFAS and other emerging contaminants as hazardous substances were guidance documents, not rules, and thus did not require rulemaking. The Court also determined that the DNR's interim decision to offer only partial liability exemptions in the Voluntary Party Remediation and Exemption from Liability program was a guidance document. Additionally, the Court found that the DNR's communications did not impose a reporting threshold for PFAS discharges.The Supreme Court concluded that the DNR has broad but explicit authority under the Spills Law to enforce reporting thresholds for hazardous substances without promulgating specific rules. Therefore, the DNR's actions were within its statutory authority, and the decision of the court of appeals was reversed, with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the DNR. View "Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources" on Justia Law

Two corrections officers, Nicole McDaniel and Matthew Davis, filed a class-action lawsuit against the Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC), seeking compensation for time spent in correctional facilities before and after their shifts. They argued that these pre- and post-shift activities, such as passing through security and obtaining equipment, are integral to their principal activities and should be compensable under Wisconsin regulations. The DOC employs approximately 5,000 corrections officers across 37 prisons, all of whom are required to complete these activities, though the specifics and duration may vary.The Milwaukee County Circuit Court certified the class, finding that the plaintiffs made a plausible argument for compensation and met the statutory requirements for class certification, including commonality, typicality, predominance, and superiority. However, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the decision, arguing that the class would lose on the merits because the pre- and post-shift activities were not compensable, thus failing the commonality and typicality requirements.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and clarified that a court should not consider the merits of the underlying claim when assessing class-certification requirements. The court determined that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in certifying the class. The Supreme Court held that the common question of whether the pre- and post-shift activities are compensable predominates over individual issues and that a class action is a superior method for resolving the controversy. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "McDaniel v. Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The case involves a constitutional challenge to a Wisconsin law that prohibits the Department of Justice (DOJ) from settling most civil cases without the approval of the Joint Finance Committee (JFC). The Attorney General, DOJ, and the Governor argue that this law is unconstitutional as applied to two specific categories of cases: civil enforcement actions and cases brought by DOJ at the request of executive branch agencies. They contend that litigation in these categories constitutes core executive power, and thus, the Legislature cannot interfere.The Dane County Circuit Court agreed with the plaintiffs and granted summary judgment in their favor. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, concluding that the power to settle these types of cases is a shared power between the executive and legislative branches, and legislative approval does not unduly burden executive powers.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that settling these two categories of cases falls within the core powers of the executive branch. The court found that the Legislature has not identified any constitutional role for itself in these categories of cases. Therefore, the statutory requirement for JFC approval prior to settling these cases violates the Wisconsin Constitution’s separation of powers. The court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the circuit court’s decision granting summary judgment to the DOJ. View "Kaul v. Wisconsin State Legislature" on Justia Law

Lauren, a thirteen-year-old girl, alleged that her father, Jobert Molde, sexually assaulted her between January 2011 and January 2012. These allegations surfaced in 2017 after Lauren attempted suicide. Molde was charged with first-degree sexual assault of a child under twelve and incest with a child. The key evidence against Molde included Lauren's in-court testimony and a recording of her forensic interview.The Dunn County Circuit Court allowed a nurse practitioner to testify as an expert, but she was unavailable, so Dr. Alice Swenson, a licensed child abuse pediatrician, testified instead. Dr. Swenson supervised Lauren's forensic interview but did not personally evaluate her. During the trial, a juror asked Dr. Swenson about the frequency of false sexual abuse disclosures, to which she responded that false disclosures are extraordinarily rare, around one percent. Molde's counsel did not object to this testimony. The jury found Molde guilty on both counts. Molde then moved for postconviction relief, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for not objecting to Dr. Swenson's testimony. The circuit court denied the motion.The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that Dr. Swenson's testimony constituted impermissible vouching and that Molde's attorney was ineffective for not objecting. The state petitioned for review, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court granted it.The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that Dr. Swenson's statistical testimony did not violate the Haseltine rule, which prohibits witnesses from vouching for another witness's credibility. The court held that statistical evidence alone about the prevalence of false reporting does not constitute impermissible vouching. Since Dr. Swenson did not opine on Lauren's truthfulness, Molde's counsel was not deficient for failing to object. Therefore, Molde's ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed, and the court reversed the decision of the court of appeals. View "State v. Molde" on Justia Law

Following a high-speed chase, Kordell L. Grady was charged with multiple criminal offenses. He accepted a plea deal, pleading no contest to three charges. The dispute arose over whether Grady's due process rights were violated during a restitution hearing, where he was ordered to pay for damages caused to a law enforcement vehicle during the chase. Grady's counsel argued he lacked the ability to pay, and Grady, attending via Zoom, interrupted the proceedings. The court allowed him to speak with his attorney but warned that the conversation could be heard by everyone in the courtroom. Grady's statements undermined his counsel's argument, and the court ordered him to pay the full restitution amount.Grady filed a motion for postconviction relief, arguing that his due process rights were violated because he could not consult confidentially with his counsel, and that the Assistant District Attorney improperly used his statements. The circuit court rejected these arguments, finding that Grady did not intend for his conversation to be confidential. The court of appeals summarily affirmed the circuit court's decision.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and deferred to the circuit court's factual finding that Grady did not intend for his conversation with his counsel to be confidential. The Supreme Court held that Grady's due process rights were not violated, as he did not seek a confidential conversation. Consequently, his conversation was not privileged under Wisconsin Statute § 905.03(2). The decision of the court of appeals was affirmed. View "State v. Grady" on Justia Law

H.C. appealed an order terminating her parental rights, arguing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and public policy require the State to prove by clear and convincing evidence, or at least a preponderance of the evidence, that termination is in the best interests of the child. H.C.'s son, John, has significant medical and developmental needs, which H.C. failed to address. John was taken into custody at age two after numerous incidents of abuse and neglect. H.C. struggled with addiction, mental health issues, and was often absent from her group home. The State filed a petition to terminate H.C.'s parental rights, citing continuing CHIPS and failure to assume parental responsibility.The Milwaukee County Circuit Court found H.C. unfit and determined that terminating her parental rights was in John's best interests. The court of appeals affirmed, stating that the circuit court did not err in its discretion. However, the court of appeals also asserted that due process requires the child's best interests to be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, with the burden of proof shared by all parties.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the best interests of the child during the dispositional phase of a TPR proceeding constitute a discretionary determination by the circuit court, with no burden of proof placed on any party. The court concluded that neither the Due Process Clause nor applicable statutory law imposes a burden of proof during the dispositional phase. The court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, agreeing that the circuit court committed no error in terminating H.C.'s parental rights but rejected the court of appeals' due process analysis. View "State v. H. C." on Justia Law

Melissa Hubbard sought medical treatment from Dr. Carol Neuman for reproductive health issues and was diagnosed with severe endometriosis. Dr. Neuman advised Hubbard to consider removing her left fallopian tube and ovary, but Hubbard did not consent. Dr. Neuman then referred Hubbard to Dr. Michael McGauley for colon surgery. Hubbard alleges that Dr. Neuman and Dr. McGauley planned the surgery without her knowledge, including a recommendation by Dr. Neuman to remove Hubbard’s ovaries, which Dr. McGauley ultimately did during the surgery.The Rock County Circuit Court denied Dr. Neuman’s motion to dismiss Hubbard’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Dr. Neuman argued that she was not the physician who removed Hubbard’s ovaries and thus not liable under Wisconsin’s informed consent statute, WIS. STAT. § 448.30. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s decision, concluding that Hubbard’s allegations were sufficient to claim that Dr. Neuman was a “physician who treats a patient” under the statute.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that Hubbard’s complaint sufficiently alleged that Dr. Neuman was involved in the treatment process, even though she did not perform the surgery herself. The court emphasized that when examining the sufficiency of a complaint, all facts and reasonable inferences must be accepted as true. The court concluded that Hubbard’s allegations, if true, could entitle her to relief under the informed consent statute, thus Dr. Neuman’s motion to dismiss was properly denied. View "Hubbard v. Neuman" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to Governor Tony Evers' use of his partial veto authority under the Wisconsin Constitution. The dispute centers on the 2023-25 biennial budget bill, where the governor used his partial veto power to extend an education revenue limit increase from two fiscal years to 402 fiscal years by striking certain words and digits from the bill.The petitioners did not ask the court to overrule existing precedent but instead brought two novel challenges. They argued that the governor's partial vetoes violated Article V, Section 10(1)(b) of the Wisconsin Constitution because extending a duration from two years to 402 years is not a "part" of two years. They also contended that the vetoes violated Section 10(1)(c) because it prohibits the governor from striking digits to create new numbers.The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected both arguments. The court found that the first argument improperly relied on the holding in Citizens Utility Board v. Klauser, which was limited to the specific circumstance of write-in vetoes, not applicable here. The second argument failed because Section 10(1)(c) does not prohibit the governor from striking digits to create new numbers. The court concluded that the 2023 partial vetoes did not violate the constitution and denied the petitioners' requested relief.The court also highlighted potential legislative options to address the governor's partial veto power, including future budget bills, constitutional amendments, and legislative drafting strategies. The court upheld the partial vetoes as consistent with the Wisconsin Constitution. View "LeMieux v. Evers" on Justia Law