Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a defendant who fell asleep in a McDonald's drive-thru lane. An employee woke him up and called the police. The responding officer observed the defendant driving normally and without any signs of impairment. However, the officer decided to pull the defendant over due to the report of him falling asleep. The defendant explained that he was tired from a 24-hour shift. Despite not observing any signs of impairment, the officer prolonged the stop to investigate further. The officer eventually ordered the defendant out of his truck, at which point the defendant showed signs of intoxication, leading to his arrest and charges.The defendant moved to suppress the evidence discovered during the stop. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the stop and further investigation were justified as a permissible "community caretaking function." The court of appeals agreed with the lower court's decision.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that the traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion. Furthermore, even if the traffic stop was permissible as a community caretaking activity, the court held that the stop was unreasonably prolonged when it transformed into an unjustified criminal investigation. The court stated that the scope of caretaking stops should be guided and limited by the justification for the stop. This means that, absent another permissible reason to detain someone, the detention must end when the original community caretaking justification is resolved. The court remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions to vacate the judgment of conviction and grant the motion to suppress. View "State v. Wiskowski" on Justia Law

The case involves a non-marital couple, A.M.B. and T.G., who sought to adopt A.M.B.'s biological child, M.M.C. T.G. had been a father figure to M.M.C. for over a decade and had assumed various parental duties. The parental rights of M.M.C.'s biological father had been terminated. Despite a positive Home Study Report recommending the adoption, the Circuit Court for Ashland County denied the adoption petition. The court cited Wisconsin's adoption statutes, which only allow a non-marital partner to adopt their partner's child if they are married to the child's parent. A.M.B. and T.G. appealed, arguing that the statutes violated their equal protection rights.The Circuit Court for Ashland County denied the adoption petition, citing Wisconsin's adoption statutes. The statutes only allow a non-marital partner to adopt their partner's child if they are married to the child's parent. The court referenced a previous case, Georgina G. v. Terry M., which held that an adoption by a third party who is not the spouse of the parent is not permissible. A.M.B. and T.G. appealed the decision, arguing that the statutes violated their equal protection rights.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the adoption statutes did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found that the statutes did not restrict a fundamental right or regulate a protected class. The court concluded that the state had a legitimate interest in promoting stability for adoptive children through marital families, which provided a rational basis for the legislative limits on eligibility to adopt a child. View "A. M. B. v. Circuit Court for Ashland County" on Justia Law

The case involves Erik A. Andrade, a former Milwaukee Police Officer, who was terminated for a series of posts and comments he made on Facebook. The posts attracted significant local and national attention following a civil rights lawsuit that brought them to light. The Milwaukee Police Department conducted an internal investigation into the posts, informed Andrade of the policies he potentially violated, and scheduled an interview. Following the internal investigation, the Department formally charged Andrade with violating two policies, both citing Andrade's posts as the basis for the violations. The Chief of Police, Alfonso Morales, determined his guilt and imposed the appropriate punishment. The Chief had internal affairs reach out to the Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office, which explained that Andrade's posts would diminish his credibility in court so severely that they would no longer use him as a witness. Given the critical importance of testifying in police work, this fact convinced the Chief that termination was appropriate.The Chief's decision was reviewed by the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners. After a full evidentiary trial, the Board issued a detailed decision determining that Andrade was guilty of the violations and the punishments he received were appropriate. Andrade then filed two actions in the circuit court. The first was a statutory appeal focused on whether there was just cause to sustain the charges. The second was a petition for a writ of certiorari alleging that the Board committed legal and jurisdictional errors. The circuit court upheld the Board's decision, Andrade appealed on his certiorari petition, and the court of appeals affirmed.Before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, Andrade challenged his termination on procedural grounds. He contended that it fell short of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee. He argued that due process required the Department to explain why Chief Morales terminated him instead of imposing a lesser form of discipline. As such, the Department should have told him that Chief Morales made his decision based on the DA's determination that they would no longer use Andrade as a witness. Andrade insisted that the Department's failure to tell him this prior to termination means he was not given an explanation of the evidence supporting his termination in violation of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin disagreed with Andrade's claim and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. View "Andrade v. City of Milwaukee Board of Fire and Police Commissioners" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the defendant, Antonio S. Davis, who was charged with misdemeanor battery and disorderly conduct. Davis had applied for representation from the State Public Defender (SPD) and while his application was still being processed, he was arraigned. Consequently, Davis pleaded not guilty and further proceedings were scheduled. It was not until 65 days later that the SPD appointed counsel for Davis. Six days after counsel was appointed, Davis filed a request for substitution of judge, which was denied by the Circuit Court for Dane County as untimely.Davis then filed a petition for supervisory writ, arguing that the Circuit Court had a plain duty to treat his request for substitution of judge as timely. The Court of Appeals denied his petition and the case was brought before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin for review. The Supreme Court needed to decide whether Davis had forfeited the issues he brought forth and whether he was entitled to a supervisory writ directing the lower court to treat his request for substitution of judge as timely.The Supreme Court concluded that even if Davis had forfeited the issues, they would exercise discretion to address them to clarify the procedure for appealing a denial of a request for substitution of judge as untimely. However, the court found that Davis was not entitled to a supervisory writ, asserting that the lower court did not have a plain duty to treat Davis's request as timely under Wisconsin Statute § 971.20(4), Dane County Local Rule 208, a government-created obstacle exception, or a theory of equitable tolling. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Davis v. Circuit Court for Dane County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin was asked to review a decision by the state's Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) and determine whether Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. (CCB) and its four sub-entities were operated primarily for religious purposes, and thus exempt from making contributions to Wisconsin's unemployment insurance system. The Court decided that in determining whether an organization is "operated primarily for religious purposes" according to Wisconsin Statute § 108.02(15)(h)2, both the motivations and activities of the organization must be examined.Reviewing the facts of the case, the court determined that while CCB and its sub-entities professed to have a religious motivation, their activities were primarily charitable and secular. The services provided by the sub-entities, which included job training, placement, and coaching, along with services related to daily living, could be provided by organizations of either religious or secular motivations, and thus were not "primarily" religious in nature.The court also rejected CCB's argument that this interpretation of the statute violated the First Amendment, as it did not interfere with the church's internal governance nor examine religious dogma. Instead, it was a neutral and secular inquiry based on objective criteria. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. View "Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. State of Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Commission" on Justia Law

A group of voters and officials in Wisconsin brought a case before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, arguing that the state's current legislative districts were not contiguous and therefore violated the state constitution. The respondents countered that the districts were contiguous, as they included separate, detached territories known as "municipal islands." The court ruled in favor of the petitioners, holding that the current legislative districts did not meet the contiguity requirements of the state constitution. The court explained that "contiguous territory" means territory that is physically touching, and the current districts, which include separate, detached parts, do not meet this requirement. The court also rejected the respondents' defenses of lack of standing, laches, issue preclusion, claim preclusion, and judicial estoppel. As a remedy, the court enjoined the Wisconsin Elections Commission from using the current legislative maps in future elections and urged the legislature to pass legislation creating new maps that satisfy all legal requirements. The court also set forth a process for adopting new state legislative districts if the legislature fails to enact new maps. View "Clarke v. Wisconsin Elections Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court affirming the decision of the State Claims Board awarding Appellant $25,000 in compensation after finding Appellant was innocent of a crime for which he was imprisoned, holding that Wis. Stat. 775.05(4) does not compel the Board to make a finding regarding adequacy.Appellant pled no contest to first-degree intentional homicide and spent approximately twenty-six years in prison. After his second guilty plea was vacated Appellant petitioned the State Claims Board for compensation, seeking more than $5.7 million. The Board awarded the maximum under Wis. Stat. 775.05(4). Appellant sought judicial review, arguing that the Board should have made a finding regarding the adequacy of the amount awarded. The circuit court affirmed, but the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals grafted onto the statute a process the legislature did not sanction. View "Sanders v. State of Wis. Claims Bd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Father's motion to withdraw his plea of no contest to one of two grounds alleged in the State's petition to terminate Father's parental rights to his daughter, holding that Father knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently pled no contest.In its termination petition under Wis. Stat. 48.415 the State claimed both that Father's daughter remained a child in continuing need of protection or services (CHIPS) and that Father failed to assume parental responsibility for his daughter. Father pled no contest to the continuing CHIPS ground. Thereafter, Father filed a motion for plea withdrawal. The circuit court denied the motion, but the court of appeals reversed on the grounds that the State lacked evidence establishing the validity of the plea. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Father knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently pled no contest to the continuing CHIPS ground for terminating his parental rights; and (2) therefore, the court of appeals erred in permitting Father to withdraw his plea. View "State v. A.G." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the case against him with prejudice after a mistrial was declared, holding that retrial would not violate Defendant's right against double jeopardy.Defendant was tried on one count of trafficking of a child. During trial, the trial court declared a mistrial on the basis that certain evidence was improperly admitted. Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that retrial would violate his right under the Fifth Amendment, as incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, to be free against double jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court exercised sound discretion in ordering a mistrial based on manifest necessity and that retrial will not violate Defendant's Fifth Amendment right against double jeopardy. View "State v. Green" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's demand for a jury trial before Walworth County extended his involuntary commitment for twelve additional months, holding that Waukesha County v. E.J.W., 966 N.W.2d 590 (Wis. 2021), applied retroactively to Appellant's case and that the denial of Appellant's jury demand was erroneous.Following a mental health crisis, Appellant was involuntarily committed and forcibly medicated for six months. Walworth County later sought to extend Appellant's commitment for twelve months. Appellant filed a jury demand at least forty-eight hours prior to his rescheduled final hearing date, but the circuit court denied the jury demand as untimely. Thereafter, the Supreme Court decided E.J.W., which held that a jury demand is timely filed if it is filed at least forty-eight hours before a rescheduled final hearing. Appellant appealed, arguing that E.J.W. applied retroactively. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) E.J.W. applies retroactively; and (2) under the circumstances of this case, the proper remedy for the circuit court's denial of Appellant's jury demand was not remand but reversal. View "Walworth County v. M.R.M." on Justia Law