Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's order expunging three of Defendant's convictions, holding that the circuit court erred in expunging Defendant's convictions because he failed to satisfy the Department of Correction's (DOC) "conditions of probation" for all three convictions.At issue before the Supreme Court was the correct interpretation of the phrase "conditions of probation" in Wis. Stat. 973.015(1m)(b). On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that he did not need to satisfy DOC's conditions of probation in order for the circuit court to expunge all three of his convictions. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the phrase "conditions of probation" in the statute means conditions set by both DOC and the sentencing court; and (2) section 973.015(1m)(b) does not give circuit courts discretionary authority to declare that an individual has violated "conditions of probation," including DOC-imposed conditions. View "State v. Lickes" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of ten counts of possession of child pornography, holding that Defendant could not be held to a stipulation he entered in circuit court because he entered it by relying on a procedure that was invalid.Defendant pleaded not guilty to the offense of possession of child pornography but stipulated to inculpatory facts supporting each element of the offense and explicitly agreed to a finding of guilt at a circuit court hearing at which no witness testified. The circuit court convicted Defendant and sentenced him to three years' initial confinement. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for Defendant to choose whether to enter a plea or proceed to trial, holding (1) the occurrence in the circuit court was neither a guilty plea made in the customary mode more a court trial; (2) trials based on stipulated facts and a stipulated finding of guilt are not permissible in Wisconsin; and (3) because the procedure below was invalid, Defendant could not be held to the stipulation. View "State v. Beyer" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the circuit court that reversed the Department of Administration's approval of a cooperative plan (Plan) between the Village of Kekoskee and the Town of Williamstown and remanded the matter back to the Department, holding that the Department erroneously interpreted Wis. Stat. 66.0307(2) in approving the Plan.The circuit court concluded that section 66.0307(2), the cooperative plan statute, did not permit municipalities to use cooperative plans to absorb and entire town into a village. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the Plan changed the City of Mayville's boundary line such that Mayville was required to be a party to the Plan. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Mayville had standing to seek judicial review of the Plan; (2) the Plan changed Mayville's boundary line, and therefore, section 66.0307(2) required that Mayville be a party to the Plan; and (3) because Mayville was not a party to the Plan, the Department erred in approving the Plan. View "City of Mayville v. State of Wisconsin Department of Administration" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court vacated the portions of the emergency order issued by Janel Heinrich, in her capacity as a local health officer of Public Health of Madison and Dane County, restricting or prohibiting in-person instruction in all schools in Dane County for grades 3-12, holding that those portions were unlawful and unenforceable and are hereby vacated.The disputed order was issued in an effort to decrease the spread of COVID-19. Petitioners - students - brought three cases challenging Heinrich's authority to issue the emergency order, contending that the order exceeded her statutory authority under Minn. Stat. 252.03, violated Petitioners' fundamental right to the free exercise of religioun under Wis. Const. art. I, 18, and violated parents' fundamental right to direct the upbringing and education of their children under Wis. Const. art. I, 1. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases and held (1) local health officers do not have the statutory power to close schools under section 252.03; and (2) the order infringed Petitioners' fundamental right to the free exercise of religion guaranteed in the Wisconsin Constitution. View "St. Ambrose Academy, Inc. v. Parisi" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals agreeing with the circuit court that the amended version of Wis. Stat. 48.415(2)(a)3 applied during Mother's termination of parental rights (TPR) proceedings, holding that there was no error.In 2018, the legislature amended of Wis. Stat. 48.415(2)(a)3, a portion of the continuing child in need of protection of services (CHIPS) ground for the involuntary termination of parental rights. The amendment occurred during the pendency of Mother's court proceedings involving her child, who was adjudged CHIPS in 2016. During the TPR proceedings, the parties disputed whether the 2016 version of the 2018 amended version the statute should apply to Mother's case. The circuit court ruled that the amended version applied and then allowed Mother to appeal the non-final order. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the "15 out of 22 months" timeframe, as codified in the amended version of the statute, began to run when Mother received written notice accompanying the initial 2016 CHIPS order; and (2) starting the "15 out of 22 months" timeframe in 2016 did not violate Mother's due process rights. View "Eau Claire County Department of Human Services v. S. E." on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Kemper Independence Insurance Company denying coverage to Appellant for the loss of her home, holding that Kemper was not required to provide coverage for the loss of the home after Appellant's husband intentionally set fire to it.The parties stipulated that, with the intent to deceive, the husband concealed from Kemper facts about his involvement in the fire, and Kemper relied on that concealment and fraud to its detriment. The circuit court concluded that the "concealment or fraud" condition in the insurance policy covering the home barred coverage for Appellant's claims. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the husband was an insured under the terms of the policy; (2) the policy's "concealment or fraud" condition precluded coverage for Appellant; and (3) Wis. Stat. 631.95(2)(f) did not apply. View "Kemper Independence Insurance Co. v. Islami" on Justia Law

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In this inverse condemnation complaint brought by a property owner, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the Department of Transportation (DOT), holding that the circuit court properly granted DOT's motion for judgment on the pleadings.Southport Commons, LLC filed suit against DOT, claiming inverse condemnation arising from a construction project that resulted in a change to Southport's land. DOT moved for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that Southport failed to file its notice of claim within three years of when the damage occurred, as required by Wis. Stat. 88.87(2)(c). The circuit court agreed and granted the motion. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the notice of claim period in section 88.87(2)(c) begins to run when the damage happens or takes place; and (2) Southport did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the date of damage. View "Southport Commons, LLC v. Wisconsin Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's determination that Southwest Airlines and AirTran Airways (collectively, Southwest) does not qualify for the "hub facility" property tax exemption, holding that Southwest was not entitled to the hub facility exemption.The hub facility provision exempts from property taxes all property of an air carrier company if the company operated at least forty-five common carrier departing flights each weekday in the prior year from a facility at a Wisconsin airport. On appeal, Southwest argued that, under a strict but reasonable interpretation of Wis. Stat. 70.11(42)(a)2.a, it was entitled to the property tax exemption for both its 2013 and 2014 tax assessments. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Southwest did not operate forty-five departing flights on each weekday without exception, Southwest was not entitled to the hub facility exemption for either the 2013 or 2014 property tax assessment. View "Southwest Airlines Co. v. State Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

Posted in: Tax Law
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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court denying Defendant's motion to suppress certain firearm evidence on the grounds that the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant's vehicle, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the stop was lawful.At issue was whether the law enforcement officer in this case has a reasonable suspicion that Defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime. The court of appeals concluded that the stop was unlawful. The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed, holding that, considering the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable law enforcement officer knowing what the officer in this case knew and seeing what he saw would reasonably suspected that Defendant was engaged in a drug transaction, and therefore, the investigatory stop of Defendant's vehicle complied with the Fourth Amendment. View "State v. Genous" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment of conviction of Defendant for possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia and remanded with instructions to grant Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the seizure of Defendant was unlawful because the police officer did not have reasonable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in criminal activity.Defendant's conviction arose from a search of her vehicle. On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court erred in denying her motion to suppress because the search violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) Defendant was seized when the officer returned to her vehicle after running a records check, withheld her driver's license, and continued to question her and her passenger in order to hold her until a drug-sniff dog arrived; and (2) the seizure was unlawful because Defendant did not have a reasonable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in criminal activity at the time he seized her. View "State v. VanBeek" on Justia Law