Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that the law on testimonial hearsay has not changed in the last fourteen years to such a degree that, at Defendant's new trial, the circuit court was no longer bound by the Supreme Court's decision on appeal in State v. Jensen (Jensen I), 727 N.W.2d 518 (Wis. 2007).Before Defendant's criminal trial for killing his wife, Julie, the Supreme Court held that certain hearsay statements made by Julie were testimonial and that the statements were inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause. Defendant was convicted. In subsequent federal habeas corpus litigation, the federal court held that it was not harmless error to admit Julie's testimonial statements and ordered Defendant's conviction vacated. The State then initiated new proceedings against Defendant. Defendant filed a motion to exclude Julie's statements, per Jensen I. The circuit court denied the motion, explaining that, under the law today, Julie's statements were not testimonial. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that the circuit court was bound by Jensen I. View "State v. Jensen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to the Department of Revenue and determining that Applegate-Bader Farm, LLC did not raise a claim that triggered judicial review, holding that Applegate met its threshold burden to show that there was an environmental injury.Applegate challenged the Department's decision not to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) under the Wisconsin Environmental Police Act (WEPA) when it promulgated the administrative rule set out in Wis. Admin. Code Tax 18.05(1)(d). The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's dismissal, holding that Applegate had not raised a bona fide claim because it alleged only indirect environmental effects. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) administrative agencies must consider indirect, along with direct, environmental effects of their proposed rules when deciding whether to prepare an EIS; and (2) the Department failed to comply with WEPA. View "Applegate-Bader Farm, LLC v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the court of appeals denying the State's petition for leave to file an interlocutory appeal of an order of the circuit court granting Defendant's discovery request, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting the request.In 2016, the State filed a petition seeking to commit Defendant was a sexually violent person. The circuit court found probable cause to believe that Defendant was a sexually violent person and bound him over for trial. Thereafter, Defendant moved the circuit court to order the Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC) to disclose its database so he could have an expert analyze the Wisconsin-specific base rate. Defendant asserted that the DOC's Wisconsin-specific data provided a more relevant basis upon which to calculate his risk of engaging in future acts of sexual violence and that the database was discoverable. The circuit court ordered the DOC to transmit the full, unredacted database to Defendant. The court of appeals denied the State's petition for leave to appeal the non-final order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court permissibly ordered the disclosure of the DOC database. View "State v. Jendusa" on Justia Law

In this case disputing the ownership of a pair of red bib overalls with a handkerchief hanging out the back pocket and the ownership of the names "Bibs Resort" and "Bibs" the Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment in favor of Ted and Carolyn Ritter and Bibs Resort Condominium, Inc. (the Association), holding that the circuit court did not apply the well-settled principles surrounding trademarks and trade names.Tony and Arlyce Farrow claimed they assumed ownership of the Bibs Resort marks when they purchased the Ritters' resort management business and that the Ritters subsequently infringed on those marks. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Ritters and the Association. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, as a matter of law, the Farrows became the exclusive owner of the Bibs Resort marks when they purchased the resort management business from the Ritters. View "Ritter v. Farrow" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's judgment of conviction and order denying Defendant's postconviction motion, holding that Defendant's counsel never conceded Defendant's guilt during closing arguments.A jury found Defendant guilty of second-degree reckless homicide with a dangerous weapon, as a party to a crime, and possession of a firearm by a person adjudicated delinquent for a felony. After Defendant was convicted, the United States Supreme Court decided McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018). Seeking to apply McCoy to his case, Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief, arguing that trial counsel conceded his guilt during closing arguments. The circuit court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's McCoy argument failed because defense counsel did not concede Defendant's guilt during closing arguments. View "State v. Chambers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's judgment of conviction for eighth offense operating while intoxicated (OWI), holding that it was more likely than not that Defendant had a 1990 California OWI conviction, and therefore, the State met its burden of proof.The court of appeals remanded Defendant's conviction for resentencing as a seventh offense, determining that the State did not prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of Defendant's 1990 California OWI conviction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the documentary evidence in the record was sufficient to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, Defendant's 1990 California OWI conviction. View "State v. Loayza" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order extending K.E.K.'s involuntary commitment pursuant to Wis. Stat. 51.20(13)(g)3., holding that Wis. Stat. 51.20(1)(am), the statute upon which Waupaca County relied on to prove K.E.K.'s dangerous, is facially constitutional and that K.E.K.'s as-applied constitutional challenges failed.K.E.K. challenged the commitment extension on appeal, arguing that section 51.20(1)(am) was both facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied because it does not require a sufficient showing of current dangerousness, as exhibited by recent acts of dangerousness. The court of appeals denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute is facially constitutional and that K.E.K.'s as-applied constitutional challenges, which the Court noted were disguised sufficiency of the evidence challenges, also failed. View "Waupaca County v. K.E.K." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's order for judgment in favor of Mohns, Inc. and the award of compensatory damages for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, as well as punitive damages, holding that the damages award must be set aside.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court properly exercised its discretion when it imposed judgment on liability as a sanction for the discovery violations of BMO Harris Bank National Association; (2) the damages award for unjust enrichment was in error because the law does not permit recovery of damages for both breach of contract and unjust enrichment arising from the same conduct; and (3) because punitive damages are recoverable only in tort the punitive damages award must be set aside because it was based upon an award of damages for the contract claims. The Court remanded the matter to the circuit court to modify the order for judgment. View "Mohns Inc. v. BMO Harris Bank National Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded this case to the circuit court with directions to deny Defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that Defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), when he was interviewed by a police officer.Defendant was an inmate in jail when he returned a call from an officer regarding an incident at Defendant's prior correctional institution. During the call, during which no Miranda warnings were given, Defendant admitted to the officer that he took and destroyed an inmate's missing property. The circuit court granted Defendant's motion to suppress, concluding that it was bound to apply the per se rule set forth in State v. Armstrong, 588 N.W.2d 606 (Wis. 1999), that incarcerated individuals are in custody for Miranda purposes. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the per se rule adopted in Armstrong was effectively overruled by the United States Supreme Court in Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499 (2012). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the decision in Howes functionally overruled Armstrong's per se rule; and (2) Defendant's circumstances did not satisfy the standard requirements for custody under Miranda's framework. View "State v. Halverson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's order upholding the Town of Newbold's denial of Petitioner's attempt to subdivide his property, holding that the Town ordinance precluding the subdivision was a permissible exercise of the Town's subdivision authority pursuant to Wis. Stat. 236.45.The Town denied Petitioner's proposed subdivision because the two resulting lots would not meet the Town's applicable minimum shoreline frontage requirement, as set forth in the Town ordinance. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the minimum shoreline frontage requirement was unenforceable because it was a shoreline zoning regulation that the Town did not have the authority to enact. The Supreme Court rejected the argument, holding that the ordinance was a permissible exercise of the Town's subdivision authority, and therefore, the Town proceeded on a correct theory of law when it denied Petitioner's request to subdivide his property. View "Anderson v. Town of Newbold" on Justia Law