Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's determination that Southwest Airlines and AirTran Airways (collectively, Southwest) does not qualify for the "hub facility" property tax exemption, holding that Southwest was not entitled to the hub facility exemption.The hub facility provision exempts from property taxes all property of an air carrier company if the company operated at least forty-five common carrier departing flights each weekday in the prior year from a facility at a Wisconsin airport. On appeal, Southwest argued that, under a strict but reasonable interpretation of Wis. Stat. 70.11(42)(a)2.a, it was entitled to the property tax exemption for both its 2013 and 2014 tax assessments. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Southwest did not operate forty-five departing flights on each weekday without exception, Southwest was not entitled to the hub facility exemption for either the 2013 or 2014 property tax assessment. View "Southwest Airlines Co. v. State Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court denying Defendant's motion to suppress certain firearm evidence on the grounds that the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant's vehicle, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the stop was lawful.At issue was whether the law enforcement officer in this case has a reasonable suspicion that Defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime. The court of appeals concluded that the stop was unlawful. The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed, holding that, considering the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable law enforcement officer knowing what the officer in this case knew and seeing what he saw would reasonably suspected that Defendant was engaged in a drug transaction, and therefore, the investigatory stop of Defendant's vehicle complied with the Fourth Amendment. View "State v. Genous" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment of conviction of Defendant for possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia and remanded with instructions to grant Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the seizure of Defendant was unlawful because the police officer did not have reasonable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in criminal activity.Defendant's conviction arose from a search of her vehicle. On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court erred in denying her motion to suppress because the search violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) Defendant was seized when the officer returned to her vehicle after running a records check, withheld her driver's license, and continued to question her and her passenger in order to hold her until a drug-sniff dog arrived; and (2) the seizure was unlawful because Defendant did not have a reasonable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in criminal activity at the time he seized her. View "State v. VanBeek" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the determination of the City of Milwaukee Board of Review that Petitioner's property was properly assessed at a value of $31,800, holding that the assessor properly considered the impairment of the property's value due to contamination in arriving at a valuation pursuant to Wis. Stat. 70.32(1m).On appeal, Petitioner argued that because the property was contaminated he could not sell it, and therefore, the assessed value should be zero dollars. Further, Petitioner argued that the City of Milwaukee Environmental Contamination Standards (CMECS) conflict with Wis. Stat. 70.32. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) by utilizing the income approach to value the property according to its highest and best use as a parking lot, the assessor properly considered the contained nature of the property in arriving at a valuation; and (2) this Court declines to address Petitioner's challenge to the CMECS because the assessor did not rely on the CMECS in the assessment of Petitioner's property. View "Collison v. City of Milwaukee Board of Review" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court ruling that the exclusive-remedy provision of the Wisconsin Worker's Compensation Act, Wis. Stat. 102.03(2), did not bar Petitioner's tort action against his employer's worker's compensation insurance carrier, holding that the Act provided Plaintiff's exclusive remedy for the injuries alleged in his complaint.In his tort action against Continental Indemnity Company Plaintiff alleged that Continental was negligent in failing to approve payment for a refill of his antidepressant medication that was prescribed after a workplace injury and that, as a result, he attempted suicide. Continental filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that section 102.03(2) barred Plaintiff's tort action. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the Act's exclusive remedy provision did not bar Plaintiff's action. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the allegations in Petitioner's tort action, if proven, would satisfy the conditions for worker's compensation liability, and therefore, the exclusive-remedy provision applied. View "Graef v. Continental Indemnity Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court denying summary judgment to Jacob Tetting and his insurer, concluding that Tetting, who was an occupant of a bar when he injured another person, was not an "other lawful occupant of real property" entitled to immunity.David Stroede was drinking at a bar when he punched another person. Jacob Tetting, an employee of the bar who was patronizing the bar with his family, grabbed Stroede, and when he released him, Stroede fell down some concrete stairs and suffered injuries. Stroede brought this action against Tetting, the bar, and the bar's insurer. Tetting and his homeowners insurance provider (together, Tetting) filed motions for summary judgment asserting that Tetting was entitled to immunity and did not owe a duty of care to Stroede. The circuit court decided that Tetting was not a "possessor of real property" under Wis. Stat. 895.529 and was therefore not entitled to immunity. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Tetting was an "other lawful occupant" entitled to immunity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Tetting was not an "other lawful occupant of real property" under section 895.529 and was therefore not entitled to immunity. View "Stroede v. Society Insurance" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals holding that a diminution in property value that results from changing the grade of a highway abutting the property does not qualify as "damages to the lands" under Wis. Stat. 32.18.When the Department of Transportation (DOT) changed the grade of a highway that abuts United America, LLC's property, access to United America's property became less convenient. Therefore, the property's value decreased. United America brought this action alleging that section 32.18 entitled it to damages to its lands, property, and property value brought about by the change in grade. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of United America. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plain meaning of "damages to the lands" in section 32.18 did not encompass United America's diminution in property value. View "United America, LLC v. Wisconsin Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the ruling of the circuit court concluding that Defendant's request for a judicial substitution under Wis. Stat. 801.58(1) was untimely filed, holding that Defendant's substitution request was timely.This case stemmed from proceedings to commit Defendant as a sexually violent person under Wis. Stat. ch. 980. The morning of the probable cause hearing, Defendant's counsel filed a request under section 801.58(1) to substitute the circuit court judge. The circuit court denied the request, finding it to be untimely. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's substitution request was timely because his motion to adjourn was not a "preliminary contested matter" according to the accepted legal meaning of the phrase and because the circuit court heard no other such matter before Defendant filed his request. View "State v. Matthews" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's judgment convicting Defendant of operating or going armed with a firearm while intoxicated, holding that Defendant's argument that Wis. Stat. 941.20(1)(b) was unconstitutional as applied to him was without merit.Specifically, Defendant argued that the statute violated his right to armed self-defense under the Second Amendment, as held in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) section 941.20(1)(d) is not violate the right of the Second Amendment because Defendant did not act in self-defense; and (2) the statute does not severely burden Defendant's Second Amendment right. View "State v. Christen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing in part the circuit court's determination that the price for certain property was $16.6 million and granting County Visions Cooperative fifteen days to exercise its right of first refusal at that price, holding that a circuit court may set an exercise price that exceeds the appraised value of the burdened property.The circuit court granted Country Visions specific performance of its right of first refusal to a property that Archer-Daniel-Midland Co. was attempting to sell. At issue was whether the circuit court correctly set the price at which Country Visions could exercise its right of first refusal. The court of appeals concluded that the circuit court did not err in how it determined the appropriate right of first refusal exercise price but remanded the case for a determination of whether the $16.6 million price included personal property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court properly considered the unique synergies that the property provided when it set the exercise price higher than the appraised value; but (2) remand was necessary to determine whether the $16.6 million exercise price included more than what was called for in the right of first refusal contract. View "Country Visions Cooperative v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co." on Justia Law