Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the circuit court extending Defendant's involuntary commitment, holding that the circuit court incorrectly determined that Defendant's demand for a jury trial was untimely.Defendant did not request a jury trial before the first time set for his final hearing, but the final hearing was adjourned and rescheduled. More than forty-eight hours before the rescheduled date, Defendant demanded a jury trial. At issue was whether the request was timely under Wis. Stat. 51.20(11)(a). The Supreme Court held that Defendant's jury demand was timely because (1) section 51.20(11)(a) does not limit the filing of a jury demand to only the first time that a final hearing is set; and (2) rather, when a final hearing is rescheduled, section 51.20(11)(a) allows a jury demand to be filed up until forty-eight hours prior to the rescheduled final hearing. View "Waukesha County v. E.J.W." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming in part and reversing in part the order of the circuit court denying Appellant's motion for sentence credit against his 1992 and 1999 sentences for time he spent incarcerated in Oklahoma between 2006 and 2017, holding that Appellant was not entitled to sentence credit.In his motion for sentence credit, Appellant argued (1) he was "made available" to Oklahoma and that under Wis. Stat. 973.15(5) he was entitled to credit for time served, and (2) under Wis. Stat. 304.072(5) and 973.155 he must receive credit for time he spent detained in Texas and Wisconsin from 2005 to 2006. The court of appeals concluded that sentence credit was due in the 1992 and 1999 cases for Appellant's time spent incarcerated between 2005 and 2006 and between 2006 and 2017. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) both sections 973.15(5) and 304.072(5) incorporate Wisconsin's foundational sentence-credit statute, Wis. Stat. 973.155; and (2) under section 973.155, Appellant was not entitled to credit. View "State v. Lira" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court concluded that the Honorable Scott C. Woldt, a judge for the Winnebago County circuit court, willfully violated several rules of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which constituted judicial misconduct under Wis. Stat. 757.81(4)(a), and that Judge Woldt should be suspended without pay for a period of seven days.The Supreme Court concluded that several of Judge Woldt's comments during certain judicial proceedings, combined with the "unnecessary display of his personal handgun" during a sentencing proceeding, constituted a failure to observe the "high standards of conduct" so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary would be preserved. Therefore, the Court ordered that Judge Woldt be suspended from the office of circuit judge without compensation and prohibited from exercising any of the powers or duties of a circuit judge for a period of seven days. View "Wisconsin Judicial Commission v. Honorable Scott C. Woldt" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court deciding that the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) had the explicit authority to impose and animal unit maximum condition and an off-site groundwater monitoring condition upon a Wisconsin Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (WPDES) it reissued to Kinnard Farms, Inc. for its concentrated animal feeding operation (CAFO), holding that the circuit court did not err.On review, the circuit court concluded that the DNR had the explicit authority to impose the animal unit maximum and off-site groundwater monitoring conditions on Kinnard's reissued WPDES permit pursuant to Wis. Stat. 283.31(3)-(5) and related regulations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the DNR had the explicit authority to prescribe the animal unit maximum condition and the off-site groundwater monitoring condition. View "Clean Wisconsin, Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources" on Justia Law

In this case concerning eight applications to operate high capacity groundwater wells the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court with a modification that the circuit court remand all eight well applications to the Department of Natural Resources (DNR), holding that the DNR erroneously interpreted the law in concluding that it had no authority to consider the environmental effects of the wells at issue.The eight well applications did not require a formal environmental review, but the DNR had information that the wells would negatively impact the environment. The DNR, however, approved the applications, concluding that it had no authority to consider the proposed wells' environmental effects. The circuit court vacated the DNR's approval of the wells. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that the DNR erred in interpreting Wis. Stat. 227.10(2m) as a bar to considering a proposed high capacity well's potentially adverse environmental effects for which an environmental review was not otherwise required. The Court modified the circuit court's order with instruction that it remand all eight applications to the DNR. View "Clean Wisconsin, Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit regarding whether a private school was entitled to receive public funding to transport children to its school.St. Augustine School applied for transportation benefits pursuant to Wis. Stat. 121.51 and 121.54, under which private schools are entitled to receive public funding to transport children to their schools but only one affiliated school per "religious denomination" can receive the funding in each "attendance area." The Superintendent of Public Transportation denied the application on the grounds that St. Gabriel was another school of the same religious denomination within the same attendance area. The certified question asked what information the Superintendent may consider in making a determination regarding whether two schools are affiliated with the same religious denomination. The Supreme Court answered that the Superintendent is not limited to consideration of a school's corporate documents exclusively but may also conduct a neutral and secular inquiry. View "St. Augustine School v. Taylor" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for first-degree intentional homicide, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims that the trial court erred in denying two pre-trial evidentiary orders.At issue was the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress the admission of incriminating cell phone data and the circuit court's discretionary decision to admit evidence from a Fitbit device allegedly worn by the victim's boyfriend at the time of the homicide. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) even if some constitutional defect attended either the initial download of the cell phone data or subsequent accessing of the cell phone data, there was no law enforcement misconduct that would warrant exclusion of that data; and (2) the circuit court permissibly exercised its discretion in admitting the Fitbit evidence where no expert was required and the State sufficiently authenticated the records from Fitbit. View "State v. Burch" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the order of the circuit court concluding that it had the authority to order Paul Schwab to comply with a marital settlement agreement entered into in 1992 on the grounds that Wis. Stat. 893.40 barred Kathy Siech's action, holding that the statute posed no bar to Kathy's action.In the settlement agreement, Paul promised to pay Kathy half of his pension "when and if" that benefit became available to him. Twenty-one years later, Paul received his pension, but he refused to pay Kathy her share. Kathy sought to judicially enforce their agreement by seeking a contempt order. In response, Paul asserted that Kathy's action was barred by section 893.40's twenty-year statute of repose. The circuit court concluded that it had the authority to order Paul to comply with the settlement agreement under Johnson v. Masters, 830 N.W.2d 647. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 893.40 did not bar Kathy's action because it was impossible for Kathy to enforce Paul's promise until after the statutory period of repose had run. View "Schwab v. Schwab" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court dismissing, for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff's complaint alleging malicious prosecution, holding that a withdrawal of a prior proceeding may satisfy the favorable termination element of a malicious prosecution claim.In dismissing Plaintiff's complaint, the circuit court concluded that the complaint failed to establish that the prior proceeding was terminated in Plaintiff's favor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) this Court hereby adopts the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 674, cmt. j addressing whether a withdrawal constitutes a favorable termination; and (2) whether or not the withdrawal in this case constitutes a favorable termination remains a question for the fact-finder. The Supreme Court remanded this case to the circuit court to apply the analysis set forth in this opinion. View "Monroe v. Chase" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals determining that Wisconsin's incapacitated driver provision contained within the implied consent statute, Wis. Stat. 343.305, was unconstitutional, holding that the incapacitated driver provision is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.The court of appeals determined that the incapacitated driver provision is unconstitutional but additionally determined that the application of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule allowed for the admission of blood test evidence that Defendant sought to suppress. The Supreme Court agreed with the judgment of the court of appeals, holding (1) the incapacitated driver provision is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied under the facts of this case, and the evidence resulting from Defendant's blood draw need not be suppressed. View "State v. Prado" on Justia Law