Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that Brown County's sales and use tax ordinance was consistent with Wis. Stat. 77.70 and therefore lawful and that there was no error in the proceedings below.Brown County Taxpayers Association (BCTA) argued that Brown County's sales and use tax was invalid because it did not dollar-for-dollar directly reduce the County's property tax levy, in violation of section 77.70, but instead was impermissibly used to fund new capital projects. The circuit court granted Brown County's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) nothing in section 77.70 requires the dollar-for-dollar offset sought by BCTA; and (2) because the Brown County sales and use tax ordinance does, in fact, directly reduce the property tax levy, the ordinance is permissible. View "Brown County v. Brown County Taxpayers Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court adopted proposed remedial state senate and state assembly maps submitted by Governor Tony Evers in response to the Court's call for proposed maps for the set of districts where new district boundaries were required due to this Court's holding that maps enacted into law in 2011 were unconstitutional, holding that Governor Evers' maps satisfied all requirements.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) as to the proposed congressional maps, Governor Evers' proposed congressional map most complied with this Court's least-change directive, the federal Constitution, and all other applicable laws; and (2) as to the proposed State legislative maps, the Governor's proposed senate and assembly maps produced less overall change than other submissions, and the Governor's proposals satisfied the requirements of the state and federal constitutions. View "Johnson v. Wisconsin Elections Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals that applied the doctrine of forfeiture as the basis for its reversal of the circuit court's vacatur of Loren Imhoff Homebuilder, Inc.'s arbitral award under Wis. Stat. 788.10(1), holding that remand was required.This case arose from a construction contract that Imhoff entered into with Homeowners for a remodeling project on Homeowners' home. Homeowners later asserted that Imhoff breach the construction contract. The parties proceeded to arbitration. Imhoff brought a motion to confirm the arbitral award. Homeowners moved to vacate the award based partly on the arbitrator's sleeping during arbitration, which Homeowners alleged was both misbehavior that resulted in prejudice and indicative of a flawed process. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Homeowners did not forfeit their objection to the arbitrator's sleeping; and (2) because this Court is divided on whether the arbitration award should be vacated pursuant to Wis. Stat. 788.10, remand was required for consideration of section 788.10 issues. View "Loren Imhoff Homebuilder, Inc. v. Taylor" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of the Wisconsin Energy Corporation (WEC) in this action brought by Claudia Bauer seeking the removal of a natural-gas line installed beneath her property over forty years ago, holding that Bauer's claims against the WEC were properly dismissed.The natural-gas line was first installed with the permission of the property's then-owner, Virginia Garside. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether Garside's grant of permission ripened into a prescriptive right under Wis. Stat. 893.28(2), allowing the public utility to continue using the line over Bauer's protests. The Supreme Court held (1) the WEC met the required continuous use for ten years prior to Bauer's purchase of the property; (2) section 893.28(2) abrogated the claim-of-right requirement when it removed the adversity requirement; and (3) under section 893.28(2), the WEC's prescriptive right to continue using the gas line vested prior to Bauer's purchase of the property. View "Bauer v. Wisconsin Energy Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the circuit court and court of appeals ordering two not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect (NGI) commitment periods to run consecutively, holding that circuit court properly exercised its authority to impose consecutive NGI commitment periods.In two separate cases, Defendant pleaded guilty to bail jumping and phone harassment. The circuit court accepted Defendant's pleas in both cases at the same hearing. The parties all agreed that Defendant was NGI for all of his offenses. The circuit court ordered a two-year term of commitment for one case and a three-year term of commitment for the second case to run consecutively. Defendant appealed, arguing that the commitment orders must run concurrently. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Wis. Stat. 971.17 provides circuit courts with the statutory authority to impose consecutive periods of NGI commitment. View "State v. Yakich" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and instead granting summary judgment in favor of Elliot Brey, holding that Wis. Stat. 632.32(2)(d) does not bar an insurer from requiring that an insured sustain bodily injury or death in order to trigger underinsured (UIM) coverage under an automobile liability insurance policy.The circuit court determined (1) the State Farm automobile liability insurance policy issued to Brey's mother and her husband did not provide uninsured motorist (UIM) coverage to Brey for the death of his father in an automobile accident because Brey was an insured under the policy but his father was not; and (2) Brey could not recover under the policy because he did not sustain bodily injury. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that sections 632.32(1) and (2)(d) bar an insurer from limiting UIM coverage to only those insureds who sustain bodily injury or death. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 632.32(2)(d) does not require insurers to extend UIM coverage to an insured for bodily injury or death suffered by a person who was not insured under the policy. View "Brey v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Respondents and enjoining Petitioners from issuing payments under two contracts for legal services, holding that the circuit court incorrectly applied the standard for granting a stay of an injunction pending appeal.On behalf of the legislature, Petitioners entered into contracts for attorney services regarding the decennial redistricting process and resulting litigation. The circuit court declared the contracts void ab initio and enjoined their enforcement. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Petitioners, holding that the circuit court's decision to enjoin enforcement of the contracts was improper. The Court further clarified the standard for granting a stay of an injunction pending appeal, which the circuit court incorrectly applied. View "Waity v. Lemahieu" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentence for his second-degree intentional homicide conviction, holding that Defendant failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the circuit court relied on an improper sentencing factor in mentioning Defendant's lawful gun ownership and conceal-carry (CCW) permit.Defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree intentional homicide. After a sentencing hearing, the circuit court sentenced Defendant to fourteen years of initial confinement followed by six years of extended supervision. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the court's statements at sentencing demonstrated that Defendant was not being punished for exercising his Second Amendment rights but, rather, for his belief that he could unlawfully and lethally shoot an unarmed individual. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the record did not indicate that Defendant received a longer sentence because he purchased a gun or applied for a CCW permit or that those activities formed the basis for Defendant's sentence. View "State v. Dodson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Department of Workforce Development rejecting Eden Senior Care's application to succeed the unemployment insurance account of Friendly Village Nursing and Rehab's previous owner, holding that Eden failed to demonstrate excusable neglect for the untimely filing of its application.After purchasing Friendly Village, Eden untimely filed its successorship application. The Labor and Industry Review Commission concluded that the record was insufficient to establish that Eden's application was late because of excusable neglect. Eden appealed, arguing that the Commission erred in failing to consider whether the interests-of-justice factors supported a finding of excusable neglect. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission applied the correct legal standard; and (2) there was no basis on which to excuse Eden's neglect in filing its successorship application after the statutory deadline. View "Friendly Village Nursing and Rehab, LLC v. State, Department of Workforce Development" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this petition for review of a decision of the court of appeals affirming a circuit court order that certified a class and appointed Timothy Rave as class representative, holding that this case was moot.In the underlying action, Rave alleged that SVA Healthcare Services, LLC (SVA), a medical records vendor, improperly charged him and others similarly situated a fee for copies of medical records that exceeded the fee restrictions set forth in Wis. Stat. 146.83(3f)(b). At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the circuit court erred in granting Rave's motion for class certification. In Townsend v. ChartSwap, LL, 967 N.W.2d 21 (Wis. 2021), the Supreme Court held that fee restrictions in section 146.83(3f)(b) apply only to "health care providers" as that term is defined in Wis. Stat. 146.81(1). Following the issuance of Townsend, Rave filed a motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court granted the motion, holding that Townsend rendered this matter moot because no evidence showed that SVA met the definition of a health care provider in section 146.81(1). View "Rave v. SVA Healthcare Services, LLC" on Justia Law