Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted David Domke of repeatedly sexually assaulting his ten-year-old stepdaughter. Domke moved for postconviction relief and a new trial based on the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. The circuit court denied the motion after concluding that while Domke had shown that counsel had performed deficiently, Domke had failed to show that the deficient performance had prejudiced him. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that Domke had established cumulative prejudice from three instances of deficient performance. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the circuit court's judgment of conviction, holding (1) Domke was not entitled to a new trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel because, although counsel performed deficiently in three aspects during trial, those errors did not prejudice Domke; and (2) under the totality of the circumstances, Domke received a fair trial. View "State v. Domke" on Justia Law

In 1997, a jury found that Edwin West was a sexually violent person. West was committed under Wis. Stat. 980.08(1), which allows persons committed under chapter 980 to petition for supervised release into the community. In 2005, the legislature amended the statute, removing language that allocated the burden of proof to the State to prove that supervised release was not warranted. In 2008, West filed a motion with the circuit court to interpret whether the amended statute continued to allocate the burden on the State. The circuit court denied West's motion, finding that the amendments unambiguously placed the burden of proof with the committed individual. West appealed, arguing that the burden of proof did not rest with the committed person, and if it did, such allocation would violate due process and equal protection. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute unambiguously places the burden of proof with the committed individual, and the appropriate burden of persuasion is clear and convincing evidence; and (2) this allocation does not violate due process and equal protection. View "State v. West" on Justia Law

In 2001, Glen Nordberg was committed as a sexually violent person pursuant to Wis. Stat. 980. Subsequently, Nordberg submitted several petitions for supervised release or discharge, including a petition in 2009 from which this appeal stemmed. The circuit court denied Nordberg's petition after reading Wis. Stat. 980.08(4)(cg) as placing the burden on the committed individual to prove by clear and convincing evidence that supervised release is warranted and finding that Nordberg had not met that burden. Nordberg filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the statute does not allocate the burden of proof to any party, and if the burden were on the individual, a clear and convincing evidence standard would be too onerous. The circuit court denied the motion. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court, holding that (1) Wis. Stat. 980.08(4) unambiguously places the burden of proof on the committed individual, and policy considerations dictate that the individual bear his burden of persuasion by clear and convincing evidence; and (2) requiring an individual lawfully committed under chapter 980 to carry the burden of proof in a petition for supervised release does not violate the due process or equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions. View "State v. Nordberg" on Justia Law

In 2005, after the Town of Linwood assessed property owned by Stupar River for property tax purposes, Stupar River filed an objection with the town Board of Review, arguing that the 2005 assessment was significantly higher than its fair market value in violation of Wis. Stat. 70.32(1). The Board affirmed the assessed value. The circuit court remanded the action to the Board with instructions to reassess the subject property. The circuit court then affirmed the Board's determination. The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the circuit court. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that the assessment upheld by the Board was made according to law and was supported by a reasonable view of the evidence. View "State ex rel. Stupar River L.L.C. v. Town of Linwood Board of Review" on Justia Law

Gregg Kandutsch was convicted for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. The evidence was based in large part upon inference from a report generated by an electronic monitoring device (EMD) that Kandutsch was wearing. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, holding (1) neither the EMD itself nor the report derived from it was so unusually complex or esoteric that expert testimony was required to lay a foundation for the admission of the report into evidence, and the testimony of two Department of Corrections (DOC) agents was sufficient to provide a foundation for the report's accuracy and reliability; and (2) a computer-generated report is not hearsay when it is the result of an automated process free from human input or intervention. View "State v. Kandutsch" on Justia Law

David Balliette was convicted of, inter alia, homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle. Balliette filed a motion for postconviction relief, raising four claims, including two for ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The trial court denied all four postconviction claims, and the court of appeals affirmed. Balliette then filed a motion for a new trial, alleging ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel for counsel's failure to raise certain claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The circuit court denied the motion, holding Balliette had made merely conclusory allegations and did not provide a sufficient reason for raising the claim now rather than previously, and, therefore, an evidentiary hearing was not warranted. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, ruling that Balliette's motion alleged sufficient material facts that, if true, would warrant relief, and concluding that Balliette alleged a sufficient reason for not previously raising the claim. On review, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that Balliette was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because the allegations in his motion for a new trial did not provide sufficient material facts that, if proven, demonstrated an entitlement to the relief sought. View "State v. Balliette" on Justia Law

Respondents, Dale and Gudrun Dawson and Edward Thomas, applied to the town boards of Cedarburg and Jackson to vacate part of a jointly owned public highway, which was surrounded by land Respondents owned. At a joint meeting of the town boards, the Jackson board members voted in favor of the application to discontinue the road, but the Cedarburg members voted against it. Respondents sought a declaratory judgment that the joint action of the town board resulted in discontinuance of the road. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Respondents, and the court of appeals affirmed. On review, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, holding (1) the approval of both governing bodies is necessary to approve a joint application like the one from Respondents; (2) Respondents should have proceeded under Wis. Stat. 68.13 to seek a determination that Cedarburg's refusal to issue a highway order was not in accordance with law; and (3) the fact that the circuit court should have dismissed Respondents' request for a declaratory judgment as untimely under section 68.13 did not deprive the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to address an issue of law. View "Dawson v. Town of Jackson" on Justia Law

Covenant Healthcare, the sole member of a regional medical center that owns an outpatient clinic, constructed a building in the City of Wauwatosa to house the outpatient clinic. Covenant sought a tax exemption with the City for the clinic as property used exclusively for the purpose of a hospital under Wis. Stat. 70.11(4m)(a). The city assessor denied the exemption. After paying the assessed tax, Covenant brought an action to recover the amount of the City's allegedly unlawful assessment. The circuit court concluded that the clinic was exempt from taxation pursuant to the statute. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed. On review, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, holding (1) the outpatient clinic is used for the primary purposes of a hospital and therefore qualifies as tax-exempt property under the statute; (2) the outpatient clinic is neither a doctor's office nor a property used for commercial purposes within the meaning of the statute; and (3) no benefit inures to any member of the medical center because the term "member" under the statute does not include not-for-profit entities. View "Covenant Healthcare Sys., Inc. v. City of Wauwatosa" on Justia Law

This case arose out of an accident that occurred when a truck collided with the Casper family's minivan. The Caspers brought suit against several defendants, including the truck driver, his two employers, an employer CEO, and an employer's excess insurer. The Supreme Court granted review, affirming in part and reversing in part the decision of the court of appeals. The Court (1) affirmed the decision of the appellate court in finding the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in (a) finding excusable neglect and granting the insurer's motion to enlarge time by seven days to answer the amended complaint, and (b) denying the Caspers' motion for default judgment; (2) reversed the decision of the appellate court affirming the lower court's ruling that a liability insurance policy needs to be delivered or issued for delivery in Wisconsin in order to subject the insurer to a direct action under Wis. Stat. 632.24 and 803.04(2); and (3) affirmed that a corporate officer may be liable for non-intentional torts committed in the scope of his employment but reversed the decision of the appellate court because in this instance, the CEO's actions were too remote to provide a basis for personal liability. View "Casper v. Am. Int'l S. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In this case, the court of appeals reversed Defendant Olu Rhodes's conviction of first-degree intentional homicide and first-degree recklessly endangering safety. Defendant had argued that the circuit court violated his constitutional right to confront a witness when it cut off his cross-examination of a prosecution witness, Defendant's sister, Nari. Defendant's cross-examination sought to cast doubt on the State's theory of the motive in the case, that Rhodes had killed the victim because the victim was responsible for Nari being beaten the day before the shooting of the homicide victim. On review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court reasonably limited Defendant's cross-examination of his sister about incidents of domestic abuse against her by the victim of the homicide to avoid confusing the issues and misleading the jury. This limitation did not prevent Defendant from presenting evidence to rebut the State's theory of Defendant's motive for the crime and to make that argument in closing. Remanded. View "State v. Rhodes" on Justia Law