Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this forfeiture action, the State alleged that Defendant Basil Ryan unlawfully placed and maintained a sunken barge on the bed of the Menomonee River in violation of Wis. Stat. Ann. chapter 30. The circuit court concluded that the doctrine of judicial estoppel precluded Ryan from asserting that he did not own the barge, and it granted summary judgment in favor of the State. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erroneously invoked the doctrine of judicial estoppel, as two essential elements of the doctrine were not satisfied; and (2) summary judgment is not permitted in forfeiture actions for violations of chapter 30. Remanded. View "State v. Ryan" on Justia Law

An accountant and the company he owned (collectively, MBS), filed suit against Defendants, telecommunications companies, asserting claims for damages under Wis. Stat. 100.207 and other statutes, arguing that Defendants' telephone bills contained unauthorized charges. The circuit court dismissed MBS's claims for relief, determining that although the complaint properly alleged violations of section 100.207, the voluntary payment doctrine barred any entitlement to monetary relief. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the Supreme Court had not decided whether the legislature intended the voluntary payment doctrine to be a viable defense against any cause of action created by a statute; and (2) under the circumstances, the conflict between the manifest purpose of section 100.207 and the common law defense left no doubt that the legislature intended that the common law defense should not be applied to bar claims under the statute. Remanded. View "MBS-Certified Pub. Accountants, LLC v. Wis. Bell Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant Carl Dowdy was found guilty of second degree sexual assault. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to fifteen years imprisonment and then stayed the sentence in favor of a ten-year period of probation. Seven years later, Defendant petitioned the circuit court to reduce the length of his probation from ten years to seven years. The court granted the petition and thereby discharged Defendant from probation, finding (1) Wis. Stat. 973.09(3)(a) authorized the court to reduce the length of probation, and (2) there was cause for reducing the length of Defendant's probation. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the circuit court lacked authority to reduce the length of Defendant's probation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Wis. Stat. 973.09(3)(a) does not grant a circuit court authority to reduce the length of probation; and (2) accordingly, the circuit court in this case erred as a matter of law when it relied upon section 973.09(3)(a) to reduce the length of Defendant's probation. View "State v. Dowdy" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, several residents of the Town of Cooks Valley, brought a declaratory judgment action against the Town to declare the Town's nonmetallic mining ordinance invalid because the ordinance did not have county board approval. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. At issue on appeal was whether the mining ordinance was a zoning ordinance. If the ordinance was not a zoning ordinance, county board approval was not required. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court, holding that, even though the ordinance at issue had some similarities to traditional zoning ordinances, it was not to be classified as a zoning ordinance. Rather, it was a non-zoning ordinance adopted under the Town's police power. View "Zwiefelhofer v. Town of Cooks Valley" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of battery to a law enforcement officer and disorderly conduct. Although the circuit court judge's daughter-in-law was not a member of the jury, she was in the pool of potential jurors, and Defendant used a peremptory challenge to remove the judge's daughter-in-law from the jury. The circuit court denied defendant's motion for a new trial, noting that neither party moved to strike the daughter-in-law for cause and neither the State nor Defendant suggested that the daughter-in-law was not a suitable juror. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of conviction and the order denying post-conviction relief, holding that presiding judges must sua sponte remove their immediate family members from the panel of potential jurors. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Defendant exercised a peremptory strike to remove the judge's daughter-in-law from the jury, and because Defendant did not claim the jury was unfair or partial, a new trial was not required under the circumstances. View "State v. Sellhausen" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Daniel Hanson was found guilty of fleeing a traffic officer, a felony under Wis. Stat. 346.04(3). The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court properly instructed the jury on the requirements of section 346.04(3); (2) there does not exist a subjective, good-faith exception to the fleeing law, and Hanson's opportunity to demonstrate any justification for his behavior was through his self-defense claim, which the jury considered and rejected; (3) the circuit court was correct to exclude testimony about the traffic officer's alleged confrontational character because the officer was not a "victim" for purposes of admitting character evidence under Wis. Stat. 904.04(1)(b); and (4) neither the Constitution nor the interests of justice warranted a new trial, as no constitutional infirmities were raised on appeal and the real controversy was tried. View "State v. Hanson" on Justia Law

Todd Olson filed suit against Robert Farrar, alleging he was liable for property damage to Olson's trailer home and vehicle. Farrar's insurer, Mt. Morris Mutual Insurance Company, sought a declaration that it had neither a duty to defend nor a duty to indemnify Farrar under the terms of its insurance policy. The circuit court granted a declaratory and summary judgment in favor of Mt. Morris. The court of appeals reversed. Mt. Morris appealed, arguing that it had no duty to defend or indemnify because of certain coverage exclusions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the policy provisions at issue were ambiguous; therefore, the Court construed them in favor of coverage. Remanded. View "Olson v. Farrar" on Justia Law

Jason Goss was pulled over for a traffic stop, after which the officer discovered that Goss had a revoked license and, due to four prior drunk driving convictions, was subject to a .02 prohibited alcohol content (PAC) standard. While arresting Goss for the license offense, the officer noticed the odor of alcohol and asked Goss to provide a breath sample for a preliminary breath test (PBT). Goss was subsequently convicted for fifth offense drunk driving. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the officer's request for a PBT sample was made in violation of Wis. Stat. 343.303, which states that such requests may be made only where there is probable cause to believe the driver is operating a vehicle in violation of one of the statutes related to drunk driving. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under these circumstances, where Goss was known to be subject to a .02 PAC standard, the officer knew it would take very little alcohol for Goss to exceed that limit, and the officer smelled alcohol on Goss, there was probable cause to request a PBT breath sample. View "State v. Goss" on Justia Law

Pursuant to its power of eminent domain, the Wisconsin DOT acquired the property of 260 North 12th Street, LLC and Basil Ryan (collectively, Ryan). A jury awarded Ryan $2,001,725 as just compensation. Over Ryan's objection, the jury was presented evidence concerning the environmental contamination of Ryan's property and the cost to remediate it. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) evidence of environmental contamination and of remediation costs are admissible in condemnation proceedings subject to the circuit court's discretion; (2) the circuit court appropriately exercised its discretion when it admitted at trial testimony by the DOT's appraiser over Ryan's objection that the testimony was speculative; (3) the circuit court did not err when it excluded Ryan's expert witness as a result of Ryan's failure to timely disclose the witnesses in accordance with the court's scheduling order; and (4) the circuit court appropriately exercised its discretion when it rejected Ryan's proposed jury instructions in favor of the standard jury instruction on fair market value in the case of a total taking. View "260 North 12th St., LLC v. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

While representing a criminal defendant on appeal, the Office of the State Public Defender was sanctioned by the court of appeals in a footnote after the court found that the appendix to the assistant state public defender's brief was deficient and the attorney's certification of the appendix was false in violation of Wis. Stat. 809.19(2)(a). The Public Defender objected to the summary procedure used by the court of appeals in finding a violation of Rule 809.19(2)(a) without giving notice to counsel and without giving counsel an opportunity to be heard in writing. On review, the Supreme Court suggested that hereafter when the court of appeals considers imposing a sanction in such a situation, an order to show cause should be issued directing counsel to explain why a violation of Rule 809.12(2)(a) and (b) should not be found and why the attorney should not pay a stated amount of money to the clerk of the court as a sanction. Remanded with instructions to modify the footnote. View "State v. Nielsen" on Justia Law