Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Employer and Employee settled a suit Employee brought against Employer, Employer's Insurer paid the policy's maximum of $2 million pursuant to an oral funding agreement. Insurer then filed an action against Employer, seeking a declaration that its policies provided no coverage for Employee's claim and reimbursement of the $2 million. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Employer on March 26, but the parties agreed to delay entry of a final judgment. On July 8, the circuit court entered a final judgment. Insurer appealed on August 12. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely, concluding that the circuit court's March 26 decision and order was the final order for purposes of appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Insurer's appeal was timely because although the March 26 order arguably disposed of the entire matter in litigation between the parties, it did not unambiguously do so, and therefore, the July 8 judgment was final for purposes of appeal; (2) the funding agreement was an enforceable contract; (3) under these circumstances, an insurer cannot recover payments based on an unjust enrichment theory; and (4) Insurer's asserted mistake of fact did not provide grounds for voiding the contract. View "Admiral Ins. Co. v. Paper Converting Machine Co." on Justia Law

Crown Castle USA, Inc. commenced an action against Orion Construction Group, LLC in Pennsylvania seeking monetary damages to satisfy an account receivable. The court entered default judgment against Orion Construction, and Crown Castle filed its foreign judgment in the office of the clerk of court of Outagamie County. The county court commissioner ordered Orion Logistics, LLC, a non-judgment debtor third party, to testify at a supplemental proceeding. The court of appeals affirmed the order. At issue on appeal was whether Orion Logistics could be compelled to testify at the supplemental proceeding under Wis. Stat. 816.06 when it was not a judgment debtor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 816.06 does not grant a judgment creditor the right to compel a non-judgment debtor third party to testify at supplemental proceedings. View "Crown Castle USA, Inc. v. Orion Logistics, LLC" on Justia Law

Employee was employed by Employer as a driver. Due to lack of work, Employee was laid off indefinitely. Three months later, Employer recalled Employee. Employee was required to submit to a pre-employment drug test, to which he tested positive. Subsequently, Employer discharged Employee. The Labor and Industry Review Commission determined that Employee was eligible for unemployment benefits after rejecting Employer's argument that Employee was discharged for misconduct connected with his work under Wis. Stat. 108.04(5). The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted review but dismissed it as improvidently granted, concluding that a decision by the Court in the instant case would not develop or clarify the law, as a Wis. Stat. 108.04(8)(b), enacted while the case was proceeding, clarified that an employee is ineligible for benefits if the employer withdraws or fails to extend an offer of work due to a positive test result for illegal drugs. View "Michael J. Waldvogel Trucking, LLC v. State Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n" on Justia Law

Petitioners asked the Supreme Court to take jurisdiction of an original action challenging rules adopted by the Government Accountability Board (GAB). Before the Court accepted the original action, four justices voted to enjoin the GAB from enforcing the rules Petitioners were challenging. The Court then accepted the original action, leaving the injunction in place. The participating justices then unanimously agreed that the order enjoining Respondents from enforcing the rules should be vacated. However, the court was equally divided on the rationale: half of the justices would conclude that the GAB had the authority to promulgate the amendments, and half of the justices would dismiss the action on the ground that an original action was improvidently granted. The action was subsequently dismissed, and the order enjoining Respondents from enforcing the rules was vacated. View "Wis. Prosperity Network v. Myse" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this action consisted of Heritage Farms and several other landowners whose properties were damaged as a result of a forest fire. A jury determined the fire was negligently caused by Jeffrey Knaack. Post-verdict, Plaintiffs moved for judgment against Knaack, the campground, and their respective insurers (Defendants) for double damages and attorney fees and costs under Wis. Stat. 26.21(1). The circuit court awarded Heritage Farms its attorney fees and costs but declined to double Heritage Farms' damages. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) pursuant to section 26.21(1), if it is determined that the owner's property was injured or destroyed by a forest fire that occurred through willfulness, malice, or negligence, the property owner is entitled to double damages; (2) because the jury determined Heritage Farms' property was damaged by a forest fire caused by Knaack's negligence, Heritage Farms was entitled to double damages; (3) pursuant to Wis. Stat. 841.04(4), Heritage Farms was entitled to twelve percent interest on its double damages award from the date of the jury's verdict and to twelve percent interest on its award of attorney fees and costs from the date of that award; and (4) section 814.04(4) was constitutional. View "Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The circuit court found William Dinkins guilty of knowingly failing to comply with the sex offender registration statute, which required Dinkins to provide the address at which he would be residing ten days prior to his release from prison. The court found that Dinkins attempted to comply with the statute but was unable to find housing for himself prior to his release. The court of appeals reversed. The State appealed, contending that homelessness was not a defense to failing to comply with the registration requirements and that Dinkins could have complied with the statute by listing a park bench or other on-the-street location as the place he would be residing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a registrant cannot be convicted of violating the statute for failing to report the address at which he will be residing when he is unable to provide this information. View "State v. Dinkins" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted at a bench trial of misdemeanor retail theft in the circuit court. On appeal, the court of appeals (1) affirmed the conviction; (2) denied Defendant's request to remand the cause to determine whether Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial; and (3) concluded that Defendant could raise the issue of postconviction counsel's ineffective assistance of counsel in a Wis. Stat. 974.06 motion. The court did not remand the matter. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred as a matter of law in ruling that Defendant had an avenue of relief through section 974.06, and the court's error deprived Defendant of any opportunity for review of an on-its-face deficient jury trial waiver colloquy or the clear error by postconviction counsel in filing a defective postconviction motion. Remanded to reinstate Defendant's direct appeal rights and to remand the matter to the circuit court to allow counsel to file a new or amended motion for postconviction relief. View "State v. Sutton" on Justia Law

This case required the Supreme Court to answer a threshold question concerning whether an appeal in this insurance company rehabilitation case could go forward. The court of appeals granted the motion of the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance to dismiss the appeal by the United States. The Commissioner had argued that the appeal should be dismissed either on the grounds that the notice of appeal was fundamentally defective such that the court of appeals had no jurisdiction or on the grounds that the United States had waived its right to appeal issues by failing to appear in the circuit court. The court of appeals concluded that the notice of appeal did not include a signature of an "attorney of record" as Wis. Stat. 802.05 required and dismissed on jurisdictional grounds without deciding the waiver issue. The Supreme Court affirmed on the basis of waiver, holding that the U.S.'s failure to litigate any issues involved in the circuit court precluded the U.S. from pursuing relief in the court of appeals. View "Nickel v. United States" on Justia Law

Insured, who was injured, submitted a claim to Insurer under her underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage after exhausting the policy limits of the underinsured motorist. An arbitration panel concluded that the court of appeals decision in Heritage Mutual v. Graser precluded Insured from recovering under her UIM coverage the value of medical expenses that were written off by her medical provider. The circuit court modified the arbitration award to include the reasonable value of the written-off medical expenses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the arbitration panel's decision in this case was properly modified by the circuit court because the arbitrators exceeded their authority by failing to fully review the Court's decisions on the collateral source rule and the law of damages. The Court overruled Graser to the extent that it held that the collateral source rule had no application in cases involving UIM coverage, because according to precedent, an injured party is entitled to recover the reasonable value of medical services, which, under the operation of the collateral source rule, includes written-off medical expenses. View "Orlowski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Joel and Evelyn Hirschhorn filed suit against their homeowners insurer, Auto-Owners Insurance Company, for breach of contract and bad faith, claiming that Auto-Owners was liable for the total loss of their vacation home. The Hirschhorns alleged that their vacation home became uninhabitable and unsaleable as a result of the accumulation of bat guano between the home's siding and walls. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Auto-Owners, concluding that Auto-Owners' insurance policy's pollution exclusion clause excluded coverage for the Hirschhorns' loss. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the pollution exclusion clause was ambiguous and therefore must be construed in favor of coverage. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court properly dismissed the Hirschhorns' complaint against Auto-Owners, as the pollution exclusion clause excluded coverage for the loss of the Hirschhorns' home that allegedly resulted from the accumulation of bat guano. View "Hirschhorn v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co." on Justia Law