Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A state trooper pulled defendant Deandre Buchanan's vehicle over when it was traveling in excess of the posted speed limit. The trooper saw Buchanan make a movement indicating he was putting an item out of sight beneath the driver's seat and observed that Buchanan was visibly nervous. The trooper also discovered Buchanan had an arrest record for violent crimes and drug trafficking. The officer then did a protective search of Buchanan and his vehicle and discovered plant material in the car. The officer seized the item, which was marijuana. Buchanan was convicted for possessing marijuana with intent to deliver. The court of appeals affirmed. Buchanan appealed, arguing the evidence he sought to suppress in the trial court was seized in violation of the federal and state constitutional provisions barring unreasonable search and seizure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the initial protective search of Buchanan and his vehicle was valid; and (2) the piece of marijuana plant that the state trooper discovered on the car floor during the protective search was in plain view and there was probable cause to justify seizing it. Therefore there was no basis for suppressing the evidence. View "State v. Buchanan" on Justia Law

While she was present in defendant's apartment, police obtained consent from defendant Brian St. Martin's girlfriend to search the attic in defendant's apartment. Defendant, who was in police custody in a police van parked nearby, refused to consent to the search. The police proceeded to search the attic and found cocaine and currency. A warrant was subsequently obtained and after a second search police seized cell phones, currency, a scale, and documents. Defendant was later charged based on the evidence seized in the searches. Defendant pleaded guilty and was convicted. Defendant then appealed the court's order denying his motion to suppress the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the rule regarding consent to search a shared dwelling in Georgia v. Randolph, which states that a warrantless search cannot be justified when a physically present resident expressly refuses consent, does not apply where the resident remains in close physical proximity to the residence but was not physically present at the residence. Instead, the applicable rule is the one stated in United States v. Matlock, which holds that a co-tenant's consent to search is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting co-tenant. View "State v. St. Martin" on Justia Law

Wanda Brethorst submitted an uninsured motorist (UM) claim to her insurer, Allstate. Brethorst made a demand for settlement, and Allstate responded with only a partial settlement. Brethorst rejected the offer then filed suit against Allstate for bad faith. Allstate filed a motion asking that Brethorst's contract claim for UM coverage be bifurcated from her bad faith claim and that discovery on the bad faith claim be stayed until the contract claim was resolved. Brethorst opposed the motion on the grounds that she had filed only one claim, and thus no bifurcation or stay of discovery was appropriate. The circuit court agreed with Brethorst and denied Allstate's motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an insured may file a bad faith claim without also filing a breach of contract claim; and (2) Brethorst had supplied the insurer and the court with sufficient evidence of a breach of contract by the insurer to proceed with discovery on her bad faith claim. View "Brethorst v. Allstate Property & Casualty Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case involved litigation expenses under Wis. Stat. 32.28(3)(d) in a condemnation proceeding between defendant and plaintiffs, the condemnees, when defendant initiated condemnation proceedings against the condemnees under Wis. Stat. 32.06 for an easement to construct an electrical transmission line across the condemnees' property. At issue was whether litigation expenses should be awarded when an appeal was taken from a negotiated price recorded in a certificate of compensation. The court held that an owner who accepted the negotiated price under section 32.06(2a), timely appealed that price, and subsequently received an award from the county condemnation commission that exceeded the thresholds under section 32.28, should be awarded litigation expenses. The court also considered, but was not persuaded by various other arguments defendant made criticizing the circuit court's and the court's interpretation of section 32.06(a) and section 32.28(3)(d) that the condemnees in the present case should be awarded litigation expenses.

Plaintiffs filed a personal injury slip-and-fall action against defendants and defendants moved to disqualify plaintiffs' attorney. At issue was whether defendants had standing to bring a motion to disqualify plaintiffs' attorney where plaintiffs' attorney's law firm had previously represented defendants' exclusive property manager. Also at issue was whether the circuit court erred as a matter of law in applying an "appearance of impropriety" standard in deciding the motion for disqualification. The court held that defendants had standing to move to disqualify opposing counsel where defendants have shown that plaintiffs' attorney's prior representation was so connected with the current litigation that the prior representation was likely to affect the just and lawful determination of defendants' position. The court also held that the circuit court incorrectly applied the standard of law and should have determined the motion for disqualification based on an attorney's duty to a former client in SCR 20:1.9. Accordingly, the court reversed the order of the circuit court and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs, injured in an automobile accident, sought $10,000 from defendant, the driver, the amount received by plaintiffs from plaintiffs' insurer. At issue was whether the circuit court erred in denying plaintiffs a judgment of $10,000 against defendant when defendant did not pay plaintiffs' insurer $10,000, a sum that represented the insurer's subrogation claim. The court concluded that the collateral source rule did not, under the facts of the case, entitle plaintiffs to recover $10,000 when the case was indistinguishable from Paulson v. Allstate. Ins. where the Paulson court determined that the injured party's recovery from the tortfeasor was not affected by the subrogated insurer's settlement of its subrogation claim with the tortfeasor.

The driver of a vehicle, owned by the driver's girlfriend's father, in which plaintiff was a passenger, lost control of the vehicle and drove into a ditch wherein the driver and one other passenger were killed and plaintiff sustained severe injuries. The vehicle was insured by Wisconsin American Mutual Insurance Company ("Wisconsin American") through an automobile insurance policy issued to the driver's girlfriend's father. The girlfriend permitted the driver to use the vehicle as long as he went to a local grocery store. The driver, instead, picked up passengers including plaintiff, and was driving to a party when the accident occurred. At issue was whether the alleged negligent entrustment of the vehicle constituted an independent concurrent cause of plaintiff's injuries sufficient to trigger coverage under Wisconsin American's insurance policy. The court held that the alleged negligent entrustment of the vehicle did not constitute an independent concurrent cause of plaintiff's injuries sufficient to trigger coverage when no coverage existed for the alleged negligent operation of the vehicle. Therefore, there was no coverage for plaintiff's negligent entrustment claim and Wisconsin American was entitled to summary judgment. The court also held that its holding was dispositive of the case and did not need to reach the issue of whether plaintiff's negligent entrustment claim was barred by claim or issue preclusion.

Defendant, 14-years-old at the time of the offense, was convicted of first-degree intentional homicide and physical abuse of a child for the death of a 13-year-old. At issue was whether defendant's sentence of life imprisonment without parole was cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 6 of the Wisconsin Constitution and, in the alternative, whether defendant's sentence should be modified. The court affirmed the sentence, applying a two-step approach employed by the United States Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida, and held that defendant failed to demonstrate that there was a national consensus against sentencing 14-year-olds to life imprisonment without parole when the crime was intentional homicide and that, in the exercise of its own independent judgment, the punishment was not categorically unconstitutional. The court also held that defendant's sentence was not unduly harsh or excessive; that defendant had not demonstrated clear and convincing evidence that the scientific research on adolescent brain development to which he referred constituted a "new factor;" and that defendant had not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the circuit court actually relied on the religious beliefs of the victim's family when imposing defendant's sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's sentence of life imprisonment without parole.

In a termination of a parental rights proceeding, the court of appeals certified questions to the court to resolve the ambiguities and uncertainties regarding the use of Wis. Stat. 48.415 as a ground to terminate parental rights. The court concluded that section 48.415 prescribed a totality of the circumstances test. The court also concluded that the circuit court did not err when it denied the father's motion, in this case, for a directed verdict and that he waived his argument that the jury instruction was improper. Accordingly, the court held that the father's parental rights were lawfully terminated and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.

Plaintiff filed an appeal and complaint against defendant where defendant claimed outstanding special assessments that were due and payable in full upon the sale of plaintiff's property. At issue was whether Wis. Stat. 66.0703(12)(a)'s 90-day appeal period applied where the special assessments were contingent, were levied after construction of the improvements were completed, or in the alternative, were fraudulent. Also at issue was whether Wis. Stat. 893.72 permitted plaintiff's appeal irrespective of the 90-day period of appeal in section 66.0703(12)(a). The court held that the circuit court properly dismissed the action where plaintiff's appeal and complaint were governed by the 90-day period in section 66.0703(12)(a) and that section 893.72 was inapplicable to the case and where it was undisputed that plaintiff filed its notice of appeal and complaint years after the 90-day period had passed.