Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

John Steffens, a beneficiary under an ERISA plan provided by BlueCross, required surgery after an automobile accident. BlueCross paid for a significant portion of Steffens' medical expenses as it was required to do under the Plan. Steffens then sued the other individual in the accident, naming BlueCross as a defendant. Steffens asked for a judgment against BlueCross foreclosing any claim it may have had for subrogation. BlueCross filed a counterclaim against Steffens, alleging it had paid $67,477 on behalf of Stevens and that under the Plan, Steffens was obligated to reimburse BlueCross. The circuit court ordered Steffens to reimburse BlueCross $64,751 plus attorney fees. The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's order and remanded, holding that BlueCross must prove that the surgery-necessitating injuries were related to the accident. The Supreme Court granted review and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that it was not arbitrary and capricious for the Plan administrator to interpret the Plan and conclude that BlueCross was entitled to reimbursement because the expenses that BlueCross paid arose from an accident for which a third party may have been liable. View "Steffens v. BlueCross BlueShield" on Justia Law

Defendant Esteban Gonzales was convicted of exposing a child to harmful material. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction. At issue on appeal was whether Defendant had shown there was a reasonable likelihood that a jury instruction misled the jury into believing that the State did not need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted knowingly. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) that the jury was not instructed that it had to determine whether Defendant had knowingly exhibited the harmful material to the child, as distinguished from accidentally or unknowingly exhibiting harmful material to the child; and (2) Defendant established a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instruction in a way that relieved the State of its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore applied the instruction in an unconstitutional manner. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, David Funk was found guilty of two counts of sexual assault. The circuit court vacated the jury verdict and ordered a new trial based on its post-trial discovery that one juror had not revealed during voir dire that she had been a victim of two prior incidents of sexual assault, finding that these experiences made the juror biased against Funk and deprived him of his constitutional right to an impartial jury. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the guilty verdict and judgment of conviction, concluding (1) the circuit court's finding that the juror was subjectively biased against Funk was unsupported by facts of record and was clearly erroneous; and (2) the circuit court's conclusion that the juror was objectively biased was erroneous because the facts necessary to ground a court's reasonable legal conclusion that a reasonable person in the juror's position could not be impartial were not developed in this case. View "State v. Funk" on Justia Law

Olsen's Mill, a grain elevator, and BNP Paribas, the elevator's largest creditor, entered into a voluntary assignment agreement for the benefit of creditors under Wis. Stat. 128 after Olsen's Mill defaulted on its obligations to Paribas. The circuit court approved of the assignment and ordered the sale of certain assets free and clear of Paribas's security interest without its consent. The court of appeals affirmed the order. On review, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding (1) the circuit court erred by ordering the sale of Paribas's collateral free and clear of Paribas's security interest without its consent; and (2) the court contravened the statute by approving an offer that circumvented the order of distribution mandated by Ws. Stat. 128.17(1). Remanded for a determination of what remedy was available under the circumstances. View "BNP Paribas v. Olsen's Mill, Inc." on Justia Law

In the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) issued a permit to the village of East Troy to construct a municipal well. Lake Beulah Management District (LBMD) sought a declaratory action in circuit court seeking to enforce its ordinance, which purports to regulate and require permits for certain wells that withdraw water from the area around Lake Beulah. The village moved for summary judgment, asserting that the ordinance was invalid as preempted by state law. The circuit court granted the village's motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ordinance was preempted by state law. The ordinance was invalid because it conflicted with, defeated the purpose of, and violated the spirit of the legislature's delegation of authority to the DNR to regulate high capacity wells. View "Lake Beulah Mgmt. Dist. v. Village of East Troy" on Justia Law

After the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) issued a permit to the village of East Troy to construct a municipal well, two conservancies challenged the DNR's decision to issue the permit without considering the well's potential impact on nearby Lake Beulah. The circuit court denied the petition for review, concluding that the DNR did not violate its obligations by issuing the permit because there was no evidence that the well would harm Lake Beulah. On appeal, the court of appeals held that (1) the DNR has the duty to consider the environmental impact of a proposed high capacity well if presented with sufficient scientific evidence suggesting potential harm to waters of the state, and (2) the DNR was presented with such evidence in this case. Therefore, the court remanded the case to the circuit court with directions to remand to the DNR. The Supreme Court affirmed the first part of the appellate court decision but reversed the second part, holding that, based on the record, the DNR was not presented with sufficient concrete, scientific evidence of the well's potential harm to waters of the state. Thus, the Court affirmed the DNR's decision to issue the permit. View "Lake Beulah Management District v. DNR" on Justia Law

Appellants David, Joyce, and Alan Affeldt objected to the county's removal of trees and fences along their farm property on a county highway. Appellants sought a judgment declaring that the trees and fences were not within the county's four rod right-of-way and enjoining their removal. The circuit court granted the county's motion for summary judgment, finding that appellants failed to set forth sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption under Wis. Stat. 82.31(1) that the county highway was laid out four rods wide. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed, but on the grounds that it was an undisputed fact that the highway was a recorded, laid out highway and hence had a four rod right-of-way as a matter of law. On review, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that appellants set forth sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning the width of the county highway and whether the highway was laid out or instead was created by user. View "Affeldt v. Green Lake County" on Justia Law

David Rasmussen filed a class-action complaint against several automobile companies, including Nissan Japan and its wholly owned subsidiary, Nissan North America. The complaint alleged that the automobile company defendants violated Wisconsin's antitrust and conspiracy laws. The circuit court dismissed Nissan Japan from the lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court of appeals affirmed the order of dismissal. At issue was whether Wisconsin's long-arm statute granting personal jurisdiction over individuals engaged in substantial and not isolated activities within Wisconsin subjected Nissan Japan to personal jurisdiction in Wisconsin. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statutory prerequisites for general personal jurisdiction were not met because (1) the activities of the subsidiary corporation, Nissan North America, were insufficient to subject its nonresident parent corporation, Nissan Japan, to general personal jurisdiction, and (2) Rasmussen did not meet his burden to show that the corporate separateness of Nissan Japan and Nissan North America should be disregarded such that the activities of Nissan North America in Wisconsin should be imputed to Nissan Japan. View "Rasmussen v. General Motors Corp." on Justia Law

In 1995, David Bushard and Steven Reisman formed a partnership called PressEnter. After Bushard dissolved the partnership in 1999 he withdrew from its day-to-day operations. Reisman continued to run day-to-day operations and to direct PressEnter to pay partnership distributions to both partners. In 2004, Reisman started taking a salary. In 2007, Bushard filed a complaint against Reisman and PressEnter, alleging breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment and demanding a money judgment, including the amount of Reisman's salary. Reisman counterclaimed with two counts of unjust enrichment, damage to business reputation, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court concluded that the dissolution of PressEnter resulted in a wind-up, ordered the equal distribution of PressEnter's profits to both partners, and granted summary judgment in favor of Bushard. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the distribution of PressEnter's profits and losses was governed by Wis. Stat. 178.15, and Reisman's equitable arguments were insufficient to overcome the plain language of the statute; and (2) because there was no genuine dispute of material fact, the circuit court appropriately ordered summary judgment in favor of Bushard. View "Bushard v. Reisman" on Justia Law

Defendant Charles Lamar pleaded guilty and was sentenced for aggravated battery and misdemeanor bail jumping, both as a habitual offender, for severely beating his girlfriend. One year later, Lamar filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the aggravated battery as a habitual offender charge. The circuit court granted Lamar's motion, and the sentence was vacated. Lamar subsequently pleaded guilty to aggravated battery and a second misdemeanor bail jumping charge. The circuit court resentenced Lamar. Lamar petitioned the circuit court for an order granting additional sentence credit for the days in confinement he previously served pursuant to Wis. Stat. 973.04. The circuit court denied Lamar's motion, ruling that the sentence credit should not be granted for two sentences being served consecutively to each other. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that (1) under State v. Boettcher, Lamar was not entitled to additional sentence credit, and (2) Lamar was not entitled to additional sentence credit by virtue of the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. View "State v. Lamar" on Justia Law