Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Labor & Employment Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the arbitrator concluding that the Green Bay Police Department had cause to discipline Andrew Weiss for violating several policies of the Green Bay Police Department and demoted him from his position as a detective to a patrol officer, holding that the arbitrator did not exceed his powers.After an investigation, the Department issued a formal complaint alleging that Weiss violated four Department policies. The Department later issued its disciplinary action determining that Weiss violated several policies and demoting him to a position as a patrol officer. After Weiss's grievance was denied he sought arbitration. The arbitrator concluded that the discipline was warranted and did not violate Weiss's due process rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law when he determined that Weiss was afforded the process he was due under law. View "Green Bay Professional Police Ass'n v. City of Green Bay" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the trial court granting judgment to the Estate of Daniel Keith Huck in this insurance dispute, holding that there was no error.Huck was killed by a motorist while he performed his job duties for the Village of Mount Pleasant. The Estate first received worker's compensation from Huck's employer's worker's compensation insurer (WC insurer) and then a settlement from the tortfeasor's insurer. By receiving the settlement from the tortfeasor the Estate was statutorily obligated to reimburse the WC insurer from the settlement. The Estate did as required and reimbursed the WC insurer $9,718.73 (the disputed amount). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Secura Supreme Insurance Company, from whom Huck had purchased an automobile insurance policy, was not statutorily authorized to reduce its liability limits by the total worker's compensation and tortfeasor settlement payments the Estate initially received but was obligated in part to reimburse. View "Secura Supreme Insurance Co. v. Estate of Huck" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing in part the circuit court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of the Milwaukee Police Supervisors Organization (MPSO) and Milwaukee Professional Firefighters' Association Local 215 (Local 215) in this challenge to a shift in policy by the Milwaukee Employees' Retirement System (MERS), holding that the circuit court properly granted Local 215's motion for summary judgment.Under the Milwaukee City Charter, MERS must pay an eligible beneficiary for duty disability retirement (DDR) a percentage of the "current annual salary for such position which he held at the time of such injury." At issue in this case was the meaning of "current annual salary." In reversing the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to Local 215, the court of appeals concluded that DDR recipients cannot receive a pension offset payment. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the charter, read alongside the relevant collective bargaining agreement, requires MERS to include a 5.8 percent pension offset payment in the "current annual salary" used to calculate DDR benefits for beneficiaries hired before October 3, 2011. View "Milwaukee Police Supervisors Organization v. City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court ruled that Cree, Inc. did not unlawfully discriminate against Derrick Palmer based on his conviction record by rescinding its job offer, holding that Cree sufficiently established that the circumstances surrounding Palmer's prior convictions for domestic violence substantially related to the circumstances of the offered position.In 2013, Palmer was convicted for committing eight crimes of domestic violence against his live-in girlfriend. Palmer later applied to work for Cree as an Applications Specialist. Cree offered Palmer the job subject to a background check, which revealed Palmer's 2013 convictions. Cree then rescinded its offer of employment. Palmer subsequently filed a discrimination complaint. The Labor and Industry Review Commission concluded that the domestic crimes at issue did not substantially related to the Applications Specialist job, and therefore, Cree discriminated against Palmer when it rescinded its job offer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Cree met its burden to establish a substantial relationship between the circumstances of Palmer's convicted offenses and the circumstances of the Applications Specialist position; and (2) therefore, Cree did not unlawfully discriminate against Palmer based on his conviction record. View "Cree, Inc. v. Labor & Industry Review Commission" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Department of Workforce Development rejecting Eden Senior Care's application to succeed the unemployment insurance account of Friendly Village Nursing and Rehab's previous owner, holding that Eden failed to demonstrate excusable neglect for the untimely filing of its application.After purchasing Friendly Village, Eden untimely filed its successorship application. The Labor and Industry Review Commission concluded that the record was insufficient to establish that Eden's application was late because of excusable neglect. Eden appealed, arguing that the Commission erred in failing to consider whether the interests-of-justice factors supported a finding of excusable neglect. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission applied the correct legal standard; and (2) there was no basis on which to excuse Eden's neglect in filing its successorship application after the statutory deadline. View "Friendly Village Nursing and Rehab, LLC v. State, Department of Workforce Development" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court ruling that the exclusive-remedy provision of the Wisconsin Worker's Compensation Act, Wis. Stat. 102.03(2), did not bar Petitioner's tort action against his employer's worker's compensation insurance carrier, holding that the Act provided Plaintiff's exclusive remedy for the injuries alleged in his complaint.In his tort action against Continental Indemnity Company Plaintiff alleged that Continental was negligent in failing to approve payment for a refill of his antidepressant medication that was prescribed after a workplace injury and that, as a result, he attempted suicide. Continental filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that section 102.03(2) barred Plaintiff's tort action. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the Act's exclusive remedy provision did not bar Plaintiff's action. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the allegations in Petitioner's tort action, if proven, would satisfy the conditions for worker's compensation liability, and therefore, the exclusive-remedy provision applied. View "Graef v. Continental Indemnity Co." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court concluding that Employees' time spent "donning and doffing" personal protective equipment was compensable, holding that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it summarily dismissed Employer's equitable defenses.Employees filed suit seeking unpaid wages for time spent at the start and end of their shifts donning and doffing personal protective equipment. The circuit court denied Employer's motion for summary judgment, concluding (1) the donning and doffing time was compensable; (2) Employees could not modify or eliminate compensation for donning and doffing through collective bargaining; (3) the time was not rendered non-compensable by the de minimis doctrine; and (4) Employer's four equitable defenses did not preclude Employees' recovery of damages. The Supreme Court affirmed with one exception, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion when it dismissed Employer's equitable defenses on the basis of Wis. Stat. 109.03(5). View "Piper v. Jones Dairy Farm" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court granting Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ complaint claiming entitlement to unpaid wages based on his commute time in a company van, holding that commute time in a company-provided vehicle is not compensable under Wisconsin law.Field service technicians employed by Defendant traveled to customers’ locations in Defendant’s vans and had the choice of commuting between work and home in either their personal vehicles or the company’s vans. Defendant did not provide compensation time for technicians’ travel time between home and work, leading Plaintiffs to file this lawsuit. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The court of appeals reversed, holding that genuine issues of material facts existed as to whether Wisconsin’s statutes and regulations require payment for commuting time in a company-provided vehicle. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that travel is not compensable where an employee drives a company-provided vehicle between home and a jobsite. View "Kieninger v. Crown Equipment Corp." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court interpreted Milwaukee County General Ordinance 201.24(4.1) to mean that employees not covered by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) were entitled to the benefit of the “Rule of 75” if they were hired prior to January 1, 2006, and that, on September 29, 2011, the operative date of the County’s amended ordinance, members of Milwaukee District Council 48 of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (DC-48) were not covered by the terms of a CBA because the last CBA had expired.At issue were pension benefits, known as the Rule of 75, to certain DC-48 members. The County enacted an ordinance granting Rule of 75 benefits to all employees “not covered by the terms of a [CBA]” as long as those employees were hired before 2006. DC-48 sought a declaratory judgment that its members were not covered by the terms of a CBA and that all members hired prior to January 1, 2006 were eligible for the Rule of 75. The circuit court concluded that DC-48 members were not covered by the terms of a CBA on September 29, 2011. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, pursuant to an active CBA, the members of DC-48 were not “covered by the terms” of a CBA on September 29, 2011. View "Milwaukee District Council 48 v. Milwaukee County" on Justia Law

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The City of Milwaukee’s 2013 amendment to its charter ordinance that reduced the right of each individual employee-member of the Employee Retirement System (ERS) to vote for three employees of his or her choice to serve on the ERS Annuity and Pension Board, modified the “other rights” of employee-members of the ERS who were members prior to the amendment and, therefore, was contrary to state law.In 1947, the State granted all first class cities the opportunity to manage the ERS pursuant to the exercise of home rule powers but also protected individual rights of those persons who were members of an ERS by precluding amendment that modified “the annuities, benefits, or other rights of any persons who are members of the system prior to the effective date of such amendment.” Laws of 1947, chapter 441, section 31(1). After the City amended its charter in 2013, Plaintiffs challenged the amendment, arguing that it violated state law. The Supreme Court agreed and restored the right of employee-members to vote for three employees of their choice to serve as employee-members of the Board. View "Milwaukee Police Ass’n v. City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law