Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The University of Wisconsin Hospitals and Clinics Authority (the Authority) was created by the legislature in 1995 and was initially required to engage in collective bargaining under the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act (Peace Act). However, in 2011, Act 10 was signed into law, which removed the Authority from the Peace Act and eliminated its obligation to engage in collective bargaining.After Act 10, the Authority ceased collective bargaining with its employees. In recent years, employees requested the Authority to recognize the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) as their collective bargaining agent, which the Authority declined. This led to a Memorandum of Understanding between SEIU and the Authority, and they petitioned the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC) to determine if the Authority was still required to engage in collective bargaining under the Peace Act. WERC concluded that the Authority was no longer required to engage in collective bargaining, citing Act 10's amendments. SEIU sought review in the circuit court, which affirmed WERC's decision. SEIU then appealed, and the Authority filed a petition to bypass the court of appeals, which was granted.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the Authority is no longer required to engage in collective bargaining under the Peace Act. The court examined the statutory language and history, concluding that Act 10 ended the collective bargaining requirements for the Authority. The decision of WERC and the circuit court was affirmed. View "Service Employees International Union Healthcare Wisconsin v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission" on Justia Law

Two corrections officers, Nicole McDaniel and Matthew Davis, filed a class-action lawsuit against the Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC), seeking compensation for time spent in correctional facilities before and after their shifts. They argued that these pre- and post-shift activities, such as passing through security and obtaining equipment, are integral to their principal activities and should be compensable under Wisconsin regulations. The DOC employs approximately 5,000 corrections officers across 37 prisons, all of whom are required to complete these activities, though the specifics and duration may vary.The Milwaukee County Circuit Court certified the class, finding that the plaintiffs made a plausible argument for compensation and met the statutory requirements for class certification, including commonality, typicality, predominance, and superiority. However, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the decision, arguing that the class would lose on the merits because the pre- and post-shift activities were not compensable, thus failing the commonality and typicality requirements.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and clarified that a court should not consider the merits of the underlying claim when assessing class-certification requirements. The court determined that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in certifying the class. The Supreme Court held that the common question of whether the pre- and post-shift activities are compensable predominates over individual issues and that a class action is a superior method for resolving the controversy. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "McDaniel v. Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Gregory and Jeffrey Cota, employees of the Oconomowoc Area School District, were accused by a coworker of stealing money from the District. An internal investigation by the District was inconclusive, and the case was handed over to the police. The police investigation did not uncover new evidence, but the Cotas were cited for municipal theft. Approximately a year later, the assistant city attorney informed the District that he believed he could obtain a conviction. The next day, the District terminated the Cotas' employment.The Cotas filed claims of arrest-record discrimination under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act, alleging that their termination was due to their arrest records. An administrative law judge initially found in favor of the District, but the Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) reversed this decision, concluding that the District had engaged in arrest-record discrimination. The circuit court affirmed LIRC's decision, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that the Act's definition of "arrest record" did not include non-criminal offenses like municipal theft.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the phrase "any . . . other offense" in the Act's definition of "arrest record" includes non-criminal offenses. The Court found that LIRC's conclusion that the District terminated the Cotas because of their arrest records was supported by substantial evidence. The Court rejected the District's argument that it was protected by the "Onalaska defense," which allows termination based on an internal investigation's findings, because LIRC found that the District relied on arrest-record information. The decision of the court of appeals was reversed, affirming LIRC's decision that the District violated the Act by terminating the Cotas due to their arrest records. View "Oconomowoc Area School District v. Cota" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the arbitrator concluding that the Green Bay Police Department had cause to discipline Andrew Weiss for violating several policies of the Green Bay Police Department and demoted him from his position as a detective to a patrol officer, holding that the arbitrator did not exceed his powers.After an investigation, the Department issued a formal complaint alleging that Weiss violated four Department policies. The Department later issued its disciplinary action determining that Weiss violated several policies and demoting him to a position as a patrol officer. After Weiss's grievance was denied he sought arbitration. The arbitrator concluded that the discipline was warranted and did not violate Weiss's due process rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law when he determined that Weiss was afforded the process he was due under law. View "Green Bay Professional Police Ass'n v. City of Green Bay" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the trial court granting judgment to the Estate of Daniel Keith Huck in this insurance dispute, holding that there was no error.Huck was killed by a motorist while he performed his job duties for the Village of Mount Pleasant. The Estate first received worker's compensation from Huck's employer's worker's compensation insurer (WC insurer) and then a settlement from the tortfeasor's insurer. By receiving the settlement from the tortfeasor the Estate was statutorily obligated to reimburse the WC insurer from the settlement. The Estate did as required and reimbursed the WC insurer $9,718.73 (the disputed amount). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Secura Supreme Insurance Company, from whom Huck had purchased an automobile insurance policy, was not statutorily authorized to reduce its liability limits by the total worker's compensation and tortfeasor settlement payments the Estate initially received but was obligated in part to reimburse. View "Secura Supreme Insurance Co. v. Estate of Huck" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing in part the circuit court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of the Milwaukee Police Supervisors Organization (MPSO) and Milwaukee Professional Firefighters' Association Local 215 (Local 215) in this challenge to a shift in policy by the Milwaukee Employees' Retirement System (MERS), holding that the circuit court properly granted Local 215's motion for summary judgment.Under the Milwaukee City Charter, MERS must pay an eligible beneficiary for duty disability retirement (DDR) a percentage of the "current annual salary for such position which he held at the time of such injury." At issue in this case was the meaning of "current annual salary." In reversing the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to Local 215, the court of appeals concluded that DDR recipients cannot receive a pension offset payment. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the charter, read alongside the relevant collective bargaining agreement, requires MERS to include a 5.8 percent pension offset payment in the "current annual salary" used to calculate DDR benefits for beneficiaries hired before October 3, 2011. View "Milwaukee Police Supervisors Organization v. City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court ruled that Cree, Inc. did not unlawfully discriminate against Derrick Palmer based on his conviction record by rescinding its job offer, holding that Cree sufficiently established that the circumstances surrounding Palmer's prior convictions for domestic violence substantially related to the circumstances of the offered position.In 2013, Palmer was convicted for committing eight crimes of domestic violence against his live-in girlfriend. Palmer later applied to work for Cree as an Applications Specialist. Cree offered Palmer the job subject to a background check, which revealed Palmer's 2013 convictions. Cree then rescinded its offer of employment. Palmer subsequently filed a discrimination complaint. The Labor and Industry Review Commission concluded that the domestic crimes at issue did not substantially related to the Applications Specialist job, and therefore, Cree discriminated against Palmer when it rescinded its job offer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Cree met its burden to establish a substantial relationship between the circumstances of Palmer's convicted offenses and the circumstances of the Applications Specialist position; and (2) therefore, Cree did not unlawfully discriminate against Palmer based on his conviction record. View "Cree, Inc. v. Labor & Industry Review Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Department of Workforce Development rejecting Eden Senior Care's application to succeed the unemployment insurance account of Friendly Village Nursing and Rehab's previous owner, holding that Eden failed to demonstrate excusable neglect for the untimely filing of its application.After purchasing Friendly Village, Eden untimely filed its successorship application. The Labor and Industry Review Commission concluded that the record was insufficient to establish that Eden's application was late because of excusable neglect. Eden appealed, arguing that the Commission erred in failing to consider whether the interests-of-justice factors supported a finding of excusable neglect. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission applied the correct legal standard; and (2) there was no basis on which to excuse Eden's neglect in filing its successorship application after the statutory deadline. View "Friendly Village Nursing and Rehab, LLC v. State, Department of Workforce Development" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court ruling that the exclusive-remedy provision of the Wisconsin Worker's Compensation Act, Wis. Stat. 102.03(2), did not bar Petitioner's tort action against his employer's worker's compensation insurance carrier, holding that the Act provided Plaintiff's exclusive remedy for the injuries alleged in his complaint.In his tort action against Continental Indemnity Company Plaintiff alleged that Continental was negligent in failing to approve payment for a refill of his antidepressant medication that was prescribed after a workplace injury and that, as a result, he attempted suicide. Continental filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that section 102.03(2) barred Plaintiff's tort action. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the Act's exclusive remedy provision did not bar Plaintiff's action. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the allegations in Petitioner's tort action, if proven, would satisfy the conditions for worker's compensation liability, and therefore, the exclusive-remedy provision applied. View "Graef v. Continental Indemnity Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court concluding that Employees' time spent "donning and doffing" personal protective equipment was compensable, holding that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it summarily dismissed Employer's equitable defenses.Employees filed suit seeking unpaid wages for time spent at the start and end of their shifts donning and doffing personal protective equipment. The circuit court denied Employer's motion for summary judgment, concluding (1) the donning and doffing time was compensable; (2) Employees could not modify or eliminate compensation for donning and doffing through collective bargaining; (3) the time was not rendered non-compensable by the de minimis doctrine; and (4) Employer's four equitable defenses did not preclude Employees' recovery of damages. The Supreme Court affirmed with one exception, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion when it dismissed Employer's equitable defenses on the basis of Wis. Stat. 109.03(5). View "Piper v. Jones Dairy Farm" on Justia Law