Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioners asked the Supreme Court to take jurisdiction of an original action challenging rules adopted by the Government Accountability Board (GAB). Before the Court accepted the original action, four justices voted to enjoin the GAB from enforcing the rules Petitioners were challenging. The Court then accepted the original action, leaving the injunction in place. The participating justices then unanimously agreed that the order enjoining Respondents from enforcing the rules should be vacated. However, the court was equally divided on the rationale: half of the justices would conclude that the GAB had the authority to promulgate the amendments, and half of the justices would dismiss the action on the ground that an original action was improvidently granted. The action was subsequently dismissed, and the order enjoining Respondents from enforcing the rules was vacated. View "Wis. Prosperity Network v. Myse" on Justia Law

This case required the Supreme Court to answer a threshold question concerning whether an appeal in this insurance company rehabilitation case could go forward. The court of appeals granted the motion of the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance to dismiss the appeal by the United States. The Commissioner had argued that the appeal should be dismissed either on the grounds that the notice of appeal was fundamentally defective such that the court of appeals had no jurisdiction or on the grounds that the United States had waived its right to appeal issues by failing to appear in the circuit court. The court of appeals concluded that the notice of appeal did not include a signature of an "attorney of record" as Wis. Stat. 802.05 required and dismissed on jurisdictional grounds without deciding the waiver issue. The Supreme Court affirmed on the basis of waiver, holding that the U.S.'s failure to litigate any issues involved in the circuit court precluded the U.S. from pursuing relief in the court of appeals. View "Nickel v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2005, after the Town of Linwood assessed property owned by Stupar River for property tax purposes, Stupar River filed an objection with the town Board of Review, arguing that the 2005 assessment was significantly higher than its fair market value in violation of Wis. Stat. 70.32(1). The Board affirmed the assessed value. The circuit court remanded the action to the Board with instructions to reassess the subject property. The circuit court then affirmed the Board's determination. The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the circuit court. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that the assessment upheld by the Board was made according to law and was supported by a reasonable view of the evidence. View "State ex rel. Stupar River L.L.C. v. Town of Linwood Board of Review" on Justia Law

Respondents, Dale and Gudrun Dawson and Edward Thomas, applied to the town boards of Cedarburg and Jackson to vacate part of a jointly owned public highway, which was surrounded by land Respondents owned. At a joint meeting of the town boards, the Jackson board members voted in favor of the application to discontinue the road, but the Cedarburg members voted against it. Respondents sought a declaratory judgment that the joint action of the town board resulted in discontinuance of the road. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Respondents, and the court of appeals affirmed. On review, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, holding (1) the approval of both governing bodies is necessary to approve a joint application like the one from Respondents; (2) Respondents should have proceeded under Wis. Stat. 68.13 to seek a determination that Cedarburg's refusal to issue a highway order was not in accordance with law; and (3) the fact that the circuit court should have dismissed Respondents' request for a declaratory judgment as untimely under section 68.13 did not deprive the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to address an issue of law. View "Dawson v. Town of Jackson" on Justia Law

Charles Swenson sustained a work-related injury while working as a driver for deBoer Transportion. Upon returning to work, Swenson completed the company's orientation requirements with the exception a check-ride, which required him to be away from his terminally ill father. DeBoer then discharged Swenson. Swenson sought benefits under Wis. Stat. 102.35(3), alleging that deBoer unreasonably refused to rehire him. Following a hearing, the ALJ for the Department of Workforce Development concluded deBoer unreasonably refused to rehire Swenson and was, therefore, liable to Swenson for a year of lost wages. DeBoer appealed to the Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC), which concurred with the order of the ALJ and concluded that deBoer failed to show reasonable cause for its refusal to rehire Swenson. On review, the circuit court affirmed, and the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that (1) in reaching its conclusion that deBoer failed to show reasonable cause, LIRC applied an unreasonable interpretation of Wis. Stat. 102.35(3), and (2) LIRC's conclusion that deBoer failed to show reasonable cause based on LIRC's finding that the check-ride policy was pretext was not supported by credible and substantial evidence. Remanded. View "DeBoer Transp., Inc. v. Swenson" on Justia Law

John Steffens, a beneficiary under an ERISA plan provided by BlueCross, required surgery after an automobile accident. BlueCross paid for a significant portion of Steffens' medical expenses as it was required to do under the Plan. Steffens then sued the other individual in the accident, naming BlueCross as a defendant. Steffens asked for a judgment against BlueCross foreclosing any claim it may have had for subrogation. BlueCross filed a counterclaim against Steffens, alleging it had paid $67,477 on behalf of Stevens and that under the Plan, Steffens was obligated to reimburse BlueCross. The circuit court ordered Steffens to reimburse BlueCross $64,751 plus attorney fees. The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's order and remanded, holding that BlueCross must prove that the surgery-necessitating injuries were related to the accident. The Supreme Court granted review and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that it was not arbitrary and capricious for the Plan administrator to interpret the Plan and conclude that BlueCross was entitled to reimbursement because the expenses that BlueCross paid arose from an accident for which a third party may have been liable. View "Steffens v. BlueCross BlueShield" on Justia Law

In the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) issued a permit to the village of East Troy to construct a municipal well. Lake Beulah Management District (LBMD) sought a declaratory action in circuit court seeking to enforce its ordinance, which purports to regulate and require permits for certain wells that withdraw water from the area around Lake Beulah. The village moved for summary judgment, asserting that the ordinance was invalid as preempted by state law. The circuit court granted the village's motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ordinance was preempted by state law. The ordinance was invalid because it conflicted with, defeated the purpose of, and violated the spirit of the legislature's delegation of authority to the DNR to regulate high capacity wells. View "Lake Beulah Mgmt. Dist. v. Village of East Troy" on Justia Law

After the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) issued a permit to the village of East Troy to construct a municipal well, two conservancies challenged the DNR's decision to issue the permit without considering the well's potential impact on nearby Lake Beulah. The circuit court denied the petition for review, concluding that the DNR did not violate its obligations by issuing the permit because there was no evidence that the well would harm Lake Beulah. On appeal, the court of appeals held that (1) the DNR has the duty to consider the environmental impact of a proposed high capacity well if presented with sufficient scientific evidence suggesting potential harm to waters of the state, and (2) the DNR was presented with such evidence in this case. Therefore, the court remanded the case to the circuit court with directions to remand to the DNR. The Supreme Court affirmed the first part of the appellate court decision but reversed the second part, holding that, based on the record, the DNR was not presented with sufficient concrete, scientific evidence of the well's potential harm to waters of the state. Thus, the Court affirmed the DNR's decision to issue the permit. View "Lake Beulah Management District v. DNR" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an appeal and complaint against defendant where defendant claimed outstanding special assessments that were due and payable in full upon the sale of plaintiff's property. At issue was whether Wis. Stat. 66.0703(12)(a)'s 90-day appeal period applied where the special assessments were contingent, were levied after construction of the improvements were completed, or in the alternative, were fraudulent. Also at issue was whether Wis. Stat. 893.72 permitted plaintiff's appeal irrespective of the 90-day period of appeal in section 66.0703(12)(a). The court held that the circuit court properly dismissed the action where plaintiff's appeal and complaint were governed by the 90-day period in section 66.0703(12)(a) and that section 893.72 was inapplicable to the case and where it was undisputed that plaintiff filed its notice of appeal and complaint years after the 90-day period had passed.