Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Employee filed state discrimination claims against Employer. Employee first filed her claims with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which dismissed her claims. In the meantime, Employee filed a civil action in the U.S. district court. Employer moved for summary judgment, claiming that Employee's charge was time-barred because it was received by the EEOC more than 300 days after her demotion. Employee argued that the intake questionnaire she submitted to the EEOC constituted a valid charge and was within the 300-day statutory time period. The U.S. district court granted summary judgment for Employer. Employee's claims later went to the Equal Rights Division (ERD) of the Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development, which found concluded that Employee's claims had merit. An ALJ dismissed the proceeding on the basis of claim preclusion. The Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) affirmed. On remand, the ALJ again dismissed, concluding (1) Employee's claims were untimely, and (2) the doctrine of issue preclusion prevented Employee from relitigating the issue of when her charge was filed with the EEOC. LIRC affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that applying the doctrine of issue preclusion in this case did not comport with principles of fundamental fairness. Remanded. View "Aldrich v. Labor & Ind. Review Comm'n" on Justia Law

After Employee suffered a work-related injury and was terminated by Employer due to Employer's inability to accommodate his physical restrictions, Employee filed a worker's compensation claim for permanent and total disability. The Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) determined that Employee was permanently and totally disabled as a result of his work injury. LIRC made this determination after denying Employer's last-minute request to cross-examine or make further inquires of Dr. Jerome Ebert, an independent physician appointed by the Department of Workforce Development to examine Schaefer and report on the cause of his disability. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Employer did not have a statutory right to cross-examine Dr. Ebert, (2) LIRC did not violate Employer's due process rights when it declined to remand for cross-examination, and (3) LIRC did not erroneously exercise its discretion by declining to remand for a third time to allow Dr. Ebert to be questioned further. View "Aurora Consol. Health Care v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Wisconsin Department of Transportation acquired a parcel of land owned by Country Side, a portion of which Country Side leased to the Lamar Company. Country Side and Lamar agreed that all proceeds would be transferred to Country Side, save for $120,000, of which the parties were unable to agree to a division. Consequently, Lamar filed a claim for petition, seeking the full amount on deposit. Country Side responded by petitioning for the full amount. The circuit court granted Country Side's petition and ordered the $120,000 to be disbursed to Country Side, concluding that Lamar had lost its right to seek a share of the award of damages issued to Country Side and Lamar by failing to join in Country Side's appeal of the award. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Lamar had not lost its right to seek a share of the award of damages issued to Country Side and Lamar, and therefore, the circuit court improperly dismissed Lamar's claim for petition. Remanded. View "Lamar Co., LLC v. Country Side Rest., Inc." on Justia Law

Employee was employed by Employer as a driver. Due to lack of work, Employee was laid off indefinitely. Three months later, Employer recalled Employee. Employee was required to submit to a pre-employment drug test, to which he tested positive. Subsequently, Employer discharged Employee. The Labor and Industry Review Commission determined that Employee was eligible for unemployment benefits after rejecting Employer's argument that Employee was discharged for misconduct connected with his work under Wis. Stat. 108.04(5). The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted review but dismissed it as improvidently granted, concluding that a decision by the Court in the instant case would not develop or clarify the law, as a Wis. Stat. 108.04(8)(b), enacted while the case was proceeding, clarified that an employee is ineligible for benefits if the employer withdraws or fails to extend an offer of work due to a positive test result for illegal drugs. View "Michael J. Waldvogel Trucking, LLC v. State Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n" on Justia Law

Petitioners asked the Supreme Court to take jurisdiction of an original action challenging rules adopted by the Government Accountability Board (GAB). Before the Court accepted the original action, four justices voted to enjoin the GAB from enforcing the rules Petitioners were challenging. The Court then accepted the original action, leaving the injunction in place. The participating justices then unanimously agreed that the order enjoining Respondents from enforcing the rules should be vacated. However, the court was equally divided on the rationale: half of the justices would conclude that the GAB had the authority to promulgate the amendments, and half of the justices would dismiss the action on the ground that an original action was improvidently granted. The action was subsequently dismissed, and the order enjoining Respondents from enforcing the rules was vacated. View "Wis. Prosperity Network v. Myse" on Justia Law

This case required the Supreme Court to answer a threshold question concerning whether an appeal in this insurance company rehabilitation case could go forward. The court of appeals granted the motion of the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance to dismiss the appeal by the United States. The Commissioner had argued that the appeal should be dismissed either on the grounds that the notice of appeal was fundamentally defective such that the court of appeals had no jurisdiction or on the grounds that the United States had waived its right to appeal issues by failing to appear in the circuit court. The court of appeals concluded that the notice of appeal did not include a signature of an "attorney of record" as Wis. Stat. 802.05 required and dismissed on jurisdictional grounds without deciding the waiver issue. The Supreme Court affirmed on the basis of waiver, holding that the U.S.'s failure to litigate any issues involved in the circuit court precluded the U.S. from pursuing relief in the court of appeals. View "Nickel v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2005, after the Town of Linwood assessed property owned by Stupar River for property tax purposes, Stupar River filed an objection with the town Board of Review, arguing that the 2005 assessment was significantly higher than its fair market value in violation of Wis. Stat. 70.32(1). The Board affirmed the assessed value. The circuit court remanded the action to the Board with instructions to reassess the subject property. The circuit court then affirmed the Board's determination. The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the circuit court. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that the assessment upheld by the Board was made according to law and was supported by a reasonable view of the evidence. View "State ex rel. Stupar River L.L.C. v. Town of Linwood Board of Review" on Justia Law

Respondents, Dale and Gudrun Dawson and Edward Thomas, applied to the town boards of Cedarburg and Jackson to vacate part of a jointly owned public highway, which was surrounded by land Respondents owned. At a joint meeting of the town boards, the Jackson board members voted in favor of the application to discontinue the road, but the Cedarburg members voted against it. Respondents sought a declaratory judgment that the joint action of the town board resulted in discontinuance of the road. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Respondents, and the court of appeals affirmed. On review, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, holding (1) the approval of both governing bodies is necessary to approve a joint application like the one from Respondents; (2) Respondents should have proceeded under Wis. Stat. 68.13 to seek a determination that Cedarburg's refusal to issue a highway order was not in accordance with law; and (3) the fact that the circuit court should have dismissed Respondents' request for a declaratory judgment as untimely under section 68.13 did not deprive the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to address an issue of law. View "Dawson v. Town of Jackson" on Justia Law

Charles Swenson sustained a work-related injury while working as a driver for deBoer Transportion. Upon returning to work, Swenson completed the company's orientation requirements with the exception a check-ride, which required him to be away from his terminally ill father. DeBoer then discharged Swenson. Swenson sought benefits under Wis. Stat. 102.35(3), alleging that deBoer unreasonably refused to rehire him. Following a hearing, the ALJ for the Department of Workforce Development concluded deBoer unreasonably refused to rehire Swenson and was, therefore, liable to Swenson for a year of lost wages. DeBoer appealed to the Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC), which concurred with the order of the ALJ and concluded that deBoer failed to show reasonable cause for its refusal to rehire Swenson. On review, the circuit court affirmed, and the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that (1) in reaching its conclusion that deBoer failed to show reasonable cause, LIRC applied an unreasonable interpretation of Wis. Stat. 102.35(3), and (2) LIRC's conclusion that deBoer failed to show reasonable cause based on LIRC's finding that the check-ride policy was pretext was not supported by credible and substantial evidence. Remanded. View "DeBoer Transp., Inc. v. Swenson" on Justia Law

John Steffens, a beneficiary under an ERISA plan provided by BlueCross, required surgery after an automobile accident. BlueCross paid for a significant portion of Steffens' medical expenses as it was required to do under the Plan. Steffens then sued the other individual in the accident, naming BlueCross as a defendant. Steffens asked for a judgment against BlueCross foreclosing any claim it may have had for subrogation. BlueCross filed a counterclaim against Steffens, alleging it had paid $67,477 on behalf of Stevens and that under the Plan, Steffens was obligated to reimburse BlueCross. The circuit court ordered Steffens to reimburse BlueCross $64,751 plus attorney fees. The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's order and remanded, holding that BlueCross must prove that the surgery-necessitating injuries were related to the accident. The Supreme Court granted review and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that it was not arbitrary and capricious for the Plan administrator to interpret the Plan and conclude that BlueCross was entitled to reimbursement because the expenses that BlueCross paid arose from an accident for which a third party may have been liable. View "Steffens v. BlueCross BlueShield" on Justia Law