Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that disorderly conduct is not a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under federal law and therefore does not disqualify a person from holding a license to carry a concealed weapon (CCW license).At issue was whether a conviction for disorderly conduct under Wis. Stat. 947.01(1) qualifies as a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence." While Wisconsin law provides that an individual who is prohibited from possessing a firearm under federal law may not hold a CCW license, federal law prohibits firearm possession for individuals convicted of a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" under either state or federal law. The circuit court upheld the revocation of Appellant's CCW license, concluding that the Department of Justice did not err in concluding that Defendant's conviction for disorderly conduct constituted a disqualifying misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under federal law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Department of Justice improperly revoked Defendant's CCW license based on its incorrect view that Defendant was prohibited from possessing firearms under federal law. View "Doubek v. Kaul" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part the decision of the court of appeals automatically staying the circuit court's order of commitment for treatment with the involuntary administration of medication after finding Defendant incompetent, holding that the automatic stay of involuntary medication orders pending appeal established in State v. Scott, 914 N.W.2d (Wis. 2018), does not apply to pretrial proceedings.Defendant was charged with first-degree intentional homicide with use of a dangerous weapon. The circuit court found Defendant incompetent and ordered him to be involuntary medicated. Defendant appealed and filed an emergency motion for stay of the involuntary medication order pending appeal. The circuit court automatically granted the motion pursuant to Scott. The court of appeals reversed the involuntary medication order and the order lifting the automatic stay of involuntary medication. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, holding (1) the automatic stay created in Scott shall not be applied during pretrial proceedings; and (2) Wis. Stat. 971.14(5)(a)1. is not subject to tolling in a pretrial context. View "State v. Green" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court granting Defendant's motion collaterally attacking two prior convictions from 1995 and 2002, holding that the lack of a transcript meant that Defendant retained the burden to prove a violation of her right to counsel occurred.Defendant was charged with operating while intoxicated (OWI), and her driving record showed three prior OWI convictions. Defendant collaterally attacked two of those convictions, claiming that she did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive her right to counsel. The relevant documents of the convictions, however, no longer existed, and the State could therefore not produce transcripts from either case at the motion hearing. The circuit court granted Defendant's motion, concluding that Defendant's testimony shifted the burden to the State, which submitted insufficient evidence to refute the testimony. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant retained the burden to demonstrate a violation of her right to counsel. View "State v. Clark" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court suppressing the results of a sheriff's deputy's blood test performed on Defendant but allowing the State to subpoena the hospital for Defendant's medical records, which included the hospital's blood-test results, holding that there was no error.After Defendant crashed his vehicle, he was taken to the hospital. While he was there, two blood tests were performed - the first one by the hospital for treatment purposes and a later one at the direction of the deputy for diagnostic and investigative purposes. Defendant moved to suppress the results of the deputy's blood draw because the deputy had no warrant and no exceptions to the warrant requirement applied. The circuit court granted the motion. Thereafter, the court granted the State's request to issue a subpoena to the hospital for Defendant's medical records. On appeal, Defendant argued that those results should be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hospital's blood-test results were admissible under the independent-source doctrine. View "State v. Linn" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court adopted proposed remedial state senate and state assembly maps submitted by Governor Tony Evers in response to the Court's call for proposed maps for the set of districts where new district boundaries were required due to this Court's holding that maps enacted into law in 2011 were unconstitutional, holding that Governor Evers' maps satisfied all requirements.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) as to the proposed congressional maps, Governor Evers' proposed congressional map most complied with this Court's least-change directive, the federal Constitution, and all other applicable laws; and (2) as to the proposed State legislative maps, the Governor's proposed senate and assembly maps produced less overall change than other submissions, and the Governor's proposals satisfied the requirements of the state and federal constitutions. View "Johnson v. Wisconsin Elections Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the circuit court and court of appeals ordering two not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect (NGI) commitment periods to run consecutively, holding that circuit court properly exercised its authority to impose consecutive NGI commitment periods.In two separate cases, Defendant pleaded guilty to bail jumping and phone harassment. The circuit court accepted Defendant's pleas in both cases at the same hearing. The parties all agreed that Defendant was NGI for all of his offenses. The circuit court ordered a two-year term of commitment for one case and a three-year term of commitment for the second case to run consecutively. Defendant appealed, arguing that the commitment orders must run concurrently. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Wis. Stat. 971.17 provides circuit courts with the statutory authority to impose consecutive periods of NGI commitment. View "State v. Yakich" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentence for his second-degree intentional homicide conviction, holding that Defendant failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the circuit court relied on an improper sentencing factor in mentioning Defendant's lawful gun ownership and conceal-carry (CCW) permit.Defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree intentional homicide. After a sentencing hearing, the circuit court sentenced Defendant to fourteen years of initial confinement followed by six years of extended supervision. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the court's statements at sentencing demonstrated that Defendant was not being punished for exercising his Second Amendment rights but, rather, for his belief that he could unlawfully and lethally shoot an unarmed individual. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the record did not indicate that Defendant received a longer sentence because he purchased a gun or applied for a CCW permit or that those activities formed the basis for Defendant's sentence. View "State v. Dodson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the circuit court extending Defendant's involuntary commitment, holding that the circuit court incorrectly determined that Defendant's demand for a jury trial was untimely.Defendant did not request a jury trial before the first time set for his final hearing, but the final hearing was adjourned and rescheduled. More than forty-eight hours before the rescheduled date, Defendant demanded a jury trial. At issue was whether the request was timely under Wis. Stat. 51.20(11)(a). The Supreme Court held that Defendant's jury demand was timely because (1) section 51.20(11)(a) does not limit the filing of a jury demand to only the first time that a final hearing is set; and (2) rather, when a final hearing is rescheduled, section 51.20(11)(a) allows a jury demand to be filed up until forty-eight hours prior to the rescheduled final hearing. View "Waukesha County v. E.J.W." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming in part and reversing in part the order of the circuit court denying Appellant's motion for sentence credit against his 1992 and 1999 sentences for time he spent incarcerated in Oklahoma between 2006 and 2017, holding that Appellant was not entitled to sentence credit.In his motion for sentence credit, Appellant argued (1) he was "made available" to Oklahoma and that under Wis. Stat. 973.15(5) he was entitled to credit for time served, and (2) under Wis. Stat. 304.072(5) and 973.155 he must receive credit for time he spent detained in Texas and Wisconsin from 2005 to 2006. The court of appeals concluded that sentence credit was due in the 1992 and 1999 cases for Appellant's time spent incarcerated between 2005 and 2006 and between 2006 and 2017. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) both sections 973.15(5) and 304.072(5) incorporate Wisconsin's foundational sentence-credit statute, Wis. Stat. 973.155; and (2) under section 973.155, Appellant was not entitled to credit. View "State v. Lira" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for first-degree intentional homicide, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims that the trial court erred in denying two pre-trial evidentiary orders.At issue was the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress the admission of incriminating cell phone data and the circuit court's discretionary decision to admit evidence from a Fitbit device allegedly worn by the victim's boyfriend at the time of the homicide. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) even if some constitutional defect attended either the initial download of the cell phone data or subsequent accessing of the cell phone data, there was no law enforcement misconduct that would warrant exclusion of that data; and (2) the circuit court permissibly exercised its discretion in admitting the Fitbit evidence where no expert was required and the State sufficiently authenticated the records from Fitbit. View "State v. Burch" on Justia Law