Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case, the court of appeals reversed Defendant Olu Rhodes's conviction of first-degree intentional homicide and first-degree recklessly endangering safety. Defendant had argued that the circuit court violated his constitutional right to confront a witness when it cut off his cross-examination of a prosecution witness, Defendant's sister, Nari. Defendant's cross-examination sought to cast doubt on the State's theory of the motive in the case, that Rhodes had killed the victim because the victim was responsible for Nari being beaten the day before the shooting of the homicide victim. On review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court reasonably limited Defendant's cross-examination of his sister about incidents of domestic abuse against her by the victim of the homicide to avoid confusing the issues and misleading the jury. This limitation did not prevent Defendant from presenting evidence to rebut the State's theory of Defendant's motive for the crime and to make that argument in closing. Remanded. View "State v. Rhodes" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Rickey Denson was found guilty of recklessly endangering safety as a lesser included offense of attempted first-degree intentional homicide and false imprisonment. Denson moved the circuit court for a judgment acquitting him of the charges or, alternatively, an order granting him a new trial on the grounds that the circuit court failed to engage him in an on-the-record colloquy regarding his right not to testify. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied Denson's postconviction motion, concluding that Denson knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right not to testify. The court of appeals affirmed. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) circuit courts are not required to conduct an on-the-record colloquy to determine whether a defendant is knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right not to testify; (2) once a defendant properly raises in a postconviction motion the issue of an invalid waiver of the right not to testify, an evidentiary hearing is an appropriate remedy to ensure the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right not to testify; and (3) the circuit court properly concluded that Denson knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right not to testify. View "State v. Denson" on Justia Law

After Dimitri Henley was convicted of five counts of second degree sexual assault, Henley made several attempts to seek a new trial. Henley also moved Justice Roggensack to recuse herself from the review of his case. Roggensack denied the motion. The current appeal involved a motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Court's decision reversing the circuit court's order granting Henley a new trial. Henley argued that by denying him a new trial and by providing no court procedures for reviewing Justice Roggensack's decision not to recuse, the Court denied Henley's right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court held (1) the motion for reconsideration met none of the criteria for granting a motion for reconsideration and was therefore denied; (2) determining whether to recuse is the sole responsibility of the individual justice for whom disqualification from participation is sought; (3) a majority of the Court does not have the power to disqualify a judicial peer from performing the constitutional functions of a Supreme Court justice on a case-by-case basis; and (4) Henley received due process. View "State v. Henley" on Justia Law

Defendant Esteban Gonzales was convicted of exposing a child to harmful material. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction. At issue on appeal was whether Defendant had shown there was a reasonable likelihood that a jury instruction misled the jury into believing that the State did not need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted knowingly. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) that the jury was not instructed that it had to determine whether Defendant had knowingly exhibited the harmful material to the child, as distinguished from accidentally or unknowingly exhibiting harmful material to the child; and (2) Defendant established a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instruction in a way that relieved the State of its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore applied the instruction in an unconstitutional manner. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, David Funk was found guilty of two counts of sexual assault. The circuit court vacated the jury verdict and ordered a new trial based on its post-trial discovery that one juror had not revealed during voir dire that she had been a victim of two prior incidents of sexual assault, finding that these experiences made the juror biased against Funk and deprived him of his constitutional right to an impartial jury. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the guilty verdict and judgment of conviction, concluding (1) the circuit court's finding that the juror was subjectively biased against Funk was unsupported by facts of record and was clearly erroneous; and (2) the circuit court's conclusion that the juror was objectively biased was erroneous because the facts necessary to ground a court's reasonable legal conclusion that a reasonable person in the juror's position could not be impartial were not developed in this case. View "State v. Funk" on Justia Law

David Rasmussen filed a class-action complaint against several automobile companies, including Nissan Japan and its wholly owned subsidiary, Nissan North America. The complaint alleged that the automobile company defendants violated Wisconsin's antitrust and conspiracy laws. The circuit court dismissed Nissan Japan from the lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court of appeals affirmed the order of dismissal. At issue was whether Wisconsin's long-arm statute granting personal jurisdiction over individuals engaged in substantial and not isolated activities within Wisconsin subjected Nissan Japan to personal jurisdiction in Wisconsin. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statutory prerequisites for general personal jurisdiction were not met because (1) the activities of the subsidiary corporation, Nissan North America, were insufficient to subject its nonresident parent corporation, Nissan Japan, to general personal jurisdiction, and (2) Rasmussen did not meet his burden to show that the corporate separateness of Nissan Japan and Nissan North America should be disregarded such that the activities of Nissan North America in Wisconsin should be imputed to Nissan Japan. View "Rasmussen v. General Motors Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant Charles Lamar pleaded guilty and was sentenced for aggravated battery and misdemeanor bail jumping, both as a habitual offender, for severely beating his girlfriend. One year later, Lamar filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the aggravated battery as a habitual offender charge. The circuit court granted Lamar's motion, and the sentence was vacated. Lamar subsequently pleaded guilty to aggravated battery and a second misdemeanor bail jumping charge. The circuit court resentenced Lamar. Lamar petitioned the circuit court for an order granting additional sentence credit for the days in confinement he previously served pursuant to Wis. Stat. 973.04. The circuit court denied Lamar's motion, ruling that the sentence credit should not be granted for two sentences being served consecutively to each other. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that (1) under State v. Boettcher, Lamar was not entitled to additional sentence credit, and (2) Lamar was not entitled to additional sentence credit by virtue of the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. View "State v. Lamar" on Justia Law

A state trooper pulled defendant Deandre Buchanan's vehicle over when it was traveling in excess of the posted speed limit. The trooper saw Buchanan make a movement indicating he was putting an item out of sight beneath the driver's seat and observed that Buchanan was visibly nervous. The trooper also discovered Buchanan had an arrest record for violent crimes and drug trafficking. The officer then did a protective search of Buchanan and his vehicle and discovered plant material in the car. The officer seized the item, which was marijuana. Buchanan was convicted for possessing marijuana with intent to deliver. The court of appeals affirmed. Buchanan appealed, arguing the evidence he sought to suppress in the trial court was seized in violation of the federal and state constitutional provisions barring unreasonable search and seizure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the initial protective search of Buchanan and his vehicle was valid; and (2) the piece of marijuana plant that the state trooper discovered on the car floor during the protective search was in plain view and there was probable cause to justify seizing it. Therefore there was no basis for suppressing the evidence. View "State v. Buchanan" on Justia Law

While she was present in defendant's apartment, police obtained consent from defendant Brian St. Martin's girlfriend to search the attic in defendant's apartment. Defendant, who was in police custody in a police van parked nearby, refused to consent to the search. The police proceeded to search the attic and found cocaine and currency. A warrant was subsequently obtained and after a second search police seized cell phones, currency, a scale, and documents. Defendant was later charged based on the evidence seized in the searches. Defendant pleaded guilty and was convicted. Defendant then appealed the court's order denying his motion to suppress the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the rule regarding consent to search a shared dwelling in Georgia v. Randolph, which states that a warrantless search cannot be justified when a physically present resident expressly refuses consent, does not apply where the resident remains in close physical proximity to the residence but was not physically present at the residence. Instead, the applicable rule is the one stated in United States v. Matlock, which holds that a co-tenant's consent to search is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting co-tenant. View "State v. St. Martin" on Justia Law

Defendant, 14-years-old at the time of the offense, was convicted of first-degree intentional homicide and physical abuse of a child for the death of a 13-year-old. At issue was whether defendant's sentence of life imprisonment without parole was cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 6 of the Wisconsin Constitution and, in the alternative, whether defendant's sentence should be modified. The court affirmed the sentence, applying a two-step approach employed by the United States Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida, and held that defendant failed to demonstrate that there was a national consensus against sentencing 14-year-olds to life imprisonment without parole when the crime was intentional homicide and that, in the exercise of its own independent judgment, the punishment was not categorically unconstitutional. The court also held that defendant's sentence was not unduly harsh or excessive; that defendant had not demonstrated clear and convincing evidence that the scientific research on adolescent brain development to which he referred constituted a "new factor;" and that defendant had not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the circuit court actually relied on the religious beliefs of the victim's family when imposing defendant's sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's sentence of life imprisonment without parole.