Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After refusing to consent to chemical testing to determine his blood alcohol content, Defendant pleaded not guilty to operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) and operating with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC). Defendant failed to request a refusal hearing within the statutory ten-day time limit. A jury acquitted Defendant of the OWI and PAC charges, and the circuit court dismissed the refusal charge due to improper notice. The court of appeals reversed the circuit court’s finding of improper notice and remanded for the circuit court to exercise its discretion as to whether to dismiss the refusal charge. The State appealed, arguing that the court of appeals improperly extended the holding of State v. Brooks when it instructed the circuit court to determine whether it would exercise its discretion to dismiss the refusal charge. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals improperly extended the holding of Brooks when it held that a circuit court could dismiss a refusal charge under the circumstances presented by this case, as a circuit court has no discretionary authority to dismiss a refusal charge when a defendant fails to request a refusal hearing within the statutory ten-day time period. Remanded. View "State v. Bentdahl" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of child pornography after making incriminating statements to his probation agent. The statements led directly to Defendant's conviction. Defendant appealed the circuit court's denial of his motion to suppress the admissions to his probation agent, claiming they were compelled, testimonial, and incriminating in violation of his privilege against self-incrimination. The court of appeals upheld the circuit court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the facts in the record were insufficient to show compulsion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was insufficient evidence in the record to show that Defendant's statements were compelled. View "State v. Sahs" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of fleeing or attempting to elude a traffic officer. Defendant appealed, contending that the jury instructions given in this case required the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant violated Wis. Stat. 346.04(3) "by increasing the speed of the vehicle to flee" and that there was no evidence that Defendant increased the speed of his vehicle after law enforcement officers began to pursue him. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the disputed jury instruction was erroneous because it added a requirement to the statutory definition of the crime; but (2) it was clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found Defendant guilty of the crime of fleeing or attempting to elude an officer, and therefore, there was sufficient evidence to convict Defendant.View "State v. Beamon" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to first-degree sexual assault with a child. Defendant was convicted to a violation of Wis. Stat. 948.02(1)(d). The court of appeals ordered the judgment of conviction to be amended in accordance with the plea agreement and ordered the circuit court to list the correct crime, a violation of Wis. Stat. 948.02(1)(e). The court then remanded for resentencing because a structural error occurred when the circuit court imposed the sentence relying on the penalty provision for a violation of section 948.02(d) instead of the penalty provision for a violation of section 948.02(e). The State appealed. At issue on appeal was whether a circuit court's imposition of a sentence using inaccurate information that Defendant was subject to a mandatory minimum five-year period of confinement is structural error or subject to the application of harmless error analysis. The Supreme Court affirmed, but on different grounds, holding (1) the error in this case was subject to a harmless error analysis and was not a structural error; and (2) the error was not harmless.View "State v. Travis" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to charges of uttering a forgery as a repeater. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to a six-year term of imprisonment for the conviction. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief moving to withdraw his contest plea, arguing that it was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The circuit court denied Defendant's motion without requiring the State to prove that Defendant entered his plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The court stated that since Defendant was informed that he faced a six-year term of imprisonment and he received a six-year term of imprisonment, any error was harmless. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, as Defendant knew the maximum penalty that could be imposed and was verbally informed at the plea hearing of the penalty that he received; and (2) withdrawal of Defendant's plea was not necessary to correct a manifest injustice. View "State v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty and was convicted of child abuse-recklessly causing great bodily harm and neglecting a child resulting in the child's death. Defendant's appealed the denial of his motion to suppress statements he made after he stated that he wanted an attorney on the grounds that an Edwards v. Arizona violation had occurred. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court properly denied the motion to suppress because Defendant was not in custody when he asked for an attorney, and therefore, Miranda's rule requiring that the interrogation cease upon a request for an attorney did not apply, and there was no constitutional violation and no bar to using Defendant's subsequent statements.View "State v. Lonkoski" on Justia Law

Assistant State Public Defender Steven Grunder was appointed as postconviction counsel for Michael Buchanan. On Buchanan's behalf, Grunder successfully filed a motion with the court of appeals seeking permission to cite Buchanan's presentence investigation report (PSI) in his appellate brief. The State filed a motion seeking the same permission to use the PSI for its own appellate brief. The court of appeals placed under seal all copies of Buchanan's brief and denied the State's motion for permission to cite the PSI. The State Public Defender (SPD) petitioned the Supreme Court to issue a supervisory writ vacating the court of appeals' order and clarifying that the parties in Buchanan's case did not need to ask permission before citing the PSI in their appellate briefs. The Supreme Court concluded (1) the SPD did not meet the requirements for issuance of a supervisory writ; and (2) pursuant to the Court's superintending and administrative authority, in a merit appeal, parties who are entitled "to have and keep a copy" of a PSI pursuant to Wis. Stat. 972.15(4m) need not ask any court's permission to reference a PSI in an appellate brief if the information does not reveal confidential information and is relevant to the appeal.View "Office of State Pub. Defender v. Court of Appeals" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of second-degree sexual assault by use of force. Defendant appealed, contending that his right to confrontation was violated when the circuit court allowed a state crime lab analyst to testify that an out-of-state lab produced DNA profiles of semen found on the victims' swabs, which the analyst discovered resulted in a match to Defendant. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Defendant's confrontation rights were not violated because the DNA profiles produced by the out-of-state lab were not testimonial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the expert's testimony did not violate Defendant's right to confrontation; and (2) even assuming that the admission of the expert's testimony violated Defendant's right to confrontation, the error was harmless in light of Defendant's previous admissions of sexual intercourse with the victims. View "State v. Deadwiller" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of reckless homicide and possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant's convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a motion pursuant to Wis. Stat. 974.06, alleging that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. The circuit court dismissed the motion for exceeding the page length limit. Two days later, Defendant filed a Cherry motion to vacate his assessed DNA surcharge, which the circuit court denied as untimely. Defendant subsequently refiled his original section 974.06 motion within the page limit requirement. The circuit court denied the motion on the merits. The court of appeals affirmed but on different grounds, holding that Defendant's second section 974.06 was procedurally barred because Defendant did not raise his ineffective assistance of counsel arguments in his Cherry motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a defendant is not required to raise postconviction ineffective assistance of counsel arguments in a Cherry motion; but (2) Defendant's appellate attorney was not ineffective. View "State v. Starks" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree intentional homicide. Defendant subsequently sought postconviction relief, arguing that his constitutional and statutory rights were violated when the trial judge held separate in-chambers discussions with two jurors regarding a potential bias issue outside Defendant's presence. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the circuit court's decision to exclude Defendant from the in-chambers meetings with the jurors did not deprive Defendant of a fair and just hearing because his attorneys were present at the in-chambers meetings and Defendant would not have been able to contribute anything to the circuit court's inquiry of the jurors; and (2) Defendant's statutory right to be present during voir dire was not violated because, in this case, the trial had already commenced and the jurors had been selected when the in-chambers meeting took place. View "State v. Alexander" on Justia Law