Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The newly enacted Wis. Stat. 970.038 permits hearsay evidence at a preliminary examination, the purpose of which is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a defendant felony has committed a felony. Petitioners in separate actions were charged with several criminal offenses. Both sets of Petitioners sought to preclude hearsay evidence at their preliminary examinations, arguing that section 970.038 violated their constitutional rights. The circuit court denied the motions. The court of appeals accepted and consolidated interlocutory appeals from Petitioners and concluded that the admission of hearsay evidence pursuant to section 970.038 presents no blanket constitutional problems. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there is no constitutional right to confrontation at a preliminary examination; and (2) due to the limited scope of preliminary examinations, the admission of hearsay evidence does not violate defendants’ rights to compulsory process, effective assistance of counsel, or due process. View "State v. Butts" on Justia Law

Petitioner pled guilty to one count of first-degree reckless homicide by use of a dangerous weapon and was sentenced to forty years imprisonment. After the deadline for filing a notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief had passed, Petitioner sought to reinstate the deadline to file a notice of intent through a writ of habeas corpus. The court of appeals denied relief, concluding that Petitioner’s claim was an allegation of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, and therefore, Petitioner should have filed his petition in the circuit court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court lacks the authority to extend the deadline to file a notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief, and therefore, the proper forum for Petitioner to bring his petition is in the court of appeals; (2) where such a claim is made to the court of appeals it should be in the form of a habeas petition; and (3) Petitioner’s habeas petition set forth sufficient facts to entitle him to an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Remanded. View "Kyles v. Pollard" on Justia Law

In Milwaukee County Circuit Court Defendant pled guilty to criminal charges. At the time of her arrest, Defendant was on probation after pleading guilty to three criminal charges in Waukesha County. Consequently, the Waukesha County Circuit Court sentenced Defendant to a term of confinement and a term of probation. The Milwaukee County Circuit Court subsequently sentenced Defendant to a term of confinement and extended supervision. The next day, the Milwaukee County Circuit Court sua sponte recalled the case and modified Defendant’s sentences due to the court’s mistaken belief in the length of Defendant’s Waukesha County sentence. The result was a nine-month increase in Defendant’s overall time of incarceration. Defendant filed a post-conviction motion to reinstate her original sentence, arguing that the circuit court violated her constitutional protection against double jeopardy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of finality, and therefore double jeopardy principles were not implicated, and the circuit court acted appropriately in resentencing Defendant. View "State v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to the manufacture or delivery of THC. After announcing that it would place Defendant on probation, the circuit court declined defense counsel’s request to withhold its discretion on whether to expunge Defendant’s record until the end of the probationary period. In denying the request, the circuit court concluded that its decision whether to expunge an offender’s record must be made at the time of sentencing. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, if a circuit court is going to exercise its discretion to expunge a record, the discretion must be exercised at the time of the sentencing proceeding. View "State v. Matasek" on Justia Law

In 2005, Ardonis Greer pled guilty to criminal charges and was sentenced to terms of imprisonment. In 2007, Greer began serving his period of probation. Subsequently, Greer was erroneously issued a discharge certificate stating that he was discharged from supervision. In 2010, Greer pled no contest to intimidating a witness. Thereafter, the Department of Corrections (DOC) discovered that Greer was still purportedly serving the probation term from his 2004 conviction and initiated revocation proceedings against Greer. The Division of Hearings and Appeals ordered Greer’s probation revoked. Greer filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, arguing that the DOC lost jurisdiction to revoke his probation when it issued the discharge certificate. The circuit court reversed the Division’s decision. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the erroneous issuance of a discharge certificate did not deprive the DOC of jurisdiction to revoke Greer’s probation because his court-ordered term of probation had not expired. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the DOC retained jurisdiction over Greer despite the erroneous issuance of the discharge certificate; (2) Greer’s due process rights were not violated; and (3) the circuit court, sitting in certiorari, was not empowered to equitably estop the DOC from revoking Greer’s probation. View "Greer v. Wiedenhoeft" on Justia Law

On July 3, 2013, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion in State v. Johnson, which affirmed an unpublished decision of the court of appeals and remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. On July 22, 2013, both Defendant and the State filed motions for reconsideration of the Court’s decision. The Court granted Defendant’s motion for reconsideration to clarify that the Court’s previous opinion represented a deadlock. Specifically, because a majority of the Court did not reach consensus under precedent so as to decide the issue presented on appeal and the Court was deadlocked, the court of appeals decision remained the law of the case and must be affirmed. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to six of the twenty-two felony counts of physical abuse of a child filed against her. The circuit court accepted Defendant’s pleas. Before Defendant was sentenced, she moved the court pro se to withdraw her pleas. The circuit court denied Defendant’s motion to withdraw her pleas, concluding that the State would be substantially prejudiced if Defendant were allowed to withdraw her pleas because the State would be preventing from presenting at trial important audiovisual interviews of the victim, who was now over sixteen years old, and without the audiovisual evidence, it would be more difficult for the State to prove its case. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it determined that the State would be substantially prejudiced if Defendant were allowed to withdraw her pleas. View "State v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with sexually assaulting his niece. During trial, the jury asked the circuit court if it needed to agree on the location of the assault, and the court responded, “no.” The court of appeals remanded for a new trial, concluding that this exchange permitted the jury to speculate beyond the evidence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court’s response of “no” did not deprive Defendant of a unanimous verdict because, where the location of the crime was not one of the essential elements of the crime, the jurors did not need to unanimously agree on the location; and (2) Defendant failed to show that the court’s response of “no” was ambiguous or reasonably likely to cause the jury to apply the jury instructions in a manner that violated due process, as the response was unlikely to mislead the jury into believing that the victim’s credibility was irrelevant and that it could speculate beyond the evidence. View "State v. Badzinski" on Justia Law

Mother and Father chose to treat their eleven-year-old daughter's undiagnosed illness with prayer rather than medicine. Their daughter subsequently died from diabetic ketoacidosis resulting from untreated juvenile onset diabetes mellitus. In separate trials with different juries, Mother and Father were each convicted of second-degree reckless homicide. The parents appealed, arguing (1) their convictions for choosing treatment through prayer violated due process fair notice requirements; and (2) their convictions should be reversed because the real controversy was not fully tried due to erroneous jury instructions and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding, inter alia, (1) the second-degree reckless homicide statute and the criminal child abuse statute provided sufficient notice that the parents' conduct could have criminal consequences if their daughter died; (2) the jury instructions on parents' duty to provide medical care were not erroneous, as the statutory provision protecting treatment through prayer does not negate the legal duty to provide medical care in a second degree reckless homicide prosecution; (3) trial counsels did not provide ineffective assistance; and (4) the controversy was fully tried where the circuit court properly refused to instruct the jury on the parents' sincerely held religious belief in prayer.View "State v. Neumann" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree reckless homicide by use of a dangerous weapon. During trial, in support of his self-defense theory, Defendant filed a motion to admit evidence regarding both the victim’s reputation for violence and the victim’s specific violent acts. The circuit court denied the motion in part because Defendant did not know of the victim’s reputation at the time of the offense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant’s motion to admit character evidence because, in a homicide case where a claim of self-defense is raised, character evidence may be admissible so long as Defendant had knowledge of the prior acts at the time of the offense; and (2) the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to admit testimony that the victim had a reputation for violence because Defendant failed to establish a proper foundation for the trial court to determine that evidence of the victim’s reputation for violence was admissible. View "State v. Jackson" on Justia Law