Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Law enforcement obtained evidence by tracking Appellant’s cell phone using cell site location information and a stingray. Before tracking Appellant’s cell phone, law enforcement obtained an order approving the procedures used to track Appellant’s cell phone. Appellant pled no contest to first-degree reckless homicide. Appellant then appealed the circuit court’s denial of his motion to suppress, arguing (1) law enforcement violated his constitutional right against unreasonable searches; and (2) the order authorizing the tracking of his cell phone required statutory authority, which the court lacked. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) assuming that law enforcement’s activities constituted a search, the search was reasonable because it was executed pursuant to an order that met the Fourth Amendment’s requirements; and (2) specific statutory authorization was not necessary for the circuit court judge to issue the order that authorized the tracking of Appellant’s cell phone through cell site information and a stingray because the order was supported by probable cause. View "State v. Tate" on Justia Law

In these two cases, State v. Cummings and State v. Smith, the court of appeals affirmed the orders of the circuit courts denying Defendants’ motions to suppress. Defendants appealed, contending that they unequivocally invoked the right to remain silent prior to making incriminating statements to the police, and therefore, their statements should have been suppressed. Cummings argued separately that his sentence was unduly harsh. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals in both cases, holding (1) neither Cummings nor Smith unequivocally invoked the right to remain silent during their interrogations, and therefore, the circuit court properly denied each Defendant’s motion to suppress; and (2) Cummings’ sentence was not unduly harsh. View "State v. Cummings" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with possession of marijuana as a party to a crime. After a preliminary hearing, Defendant filed a timely motion with the circuit court to compel disclosure of the identity of a confidential informer. After a hearing, the circuit court denied Defendant’s motion to disclose the identity of the informer, determining that the defense had not made a sufficient showing to warrant an in camera review. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the circuit court erred in denying Defendant’s motion without first conducting an in camera review of the confidential informer’s expected testimony. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) in order to trigger an in camera review, a defendant must show a reasonable possibility that a confidential informer may have information necessary to the defendant’s theory of defense; and (2) Defendant in this case failed to meet this burden. Remanded. View "State v. Nellessen" on Justia Law

Defendant was a juvenile when he was charged with attempted first-degree intentional homicide, which is an offense enumerated in Wis. Stat. 938.183(1)(am). At the preliminary hearing held pursuant to Wis. Stat. 970.032(1), the circuit court stated that “there is probable cause to believe a felony has been committed” and ordered that the adult court retain original jurisdiction over Defendant. At issue on appeal was whether the adult court failed to find probable cause of a violation of the specific crime charged under section 938.183(1), as required by 970.032(1) for an adult court to retain exclusive original jurisdiction over a juvenile. The Supreme Court concluded that the bindover and prosecution of Defendant in adult court were proper, holding that the circuit court made the finding required by section 970.032(1) that there was probable cause to believe Defendant committed the specific section 938.183(1) crime charged in the complaint. View "State v. Toliver" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to first-degree sexual assault of a child. Thereafter, Defendant filed three postconviction motions for relief. The third postconviction motion was brought under Wis. Stat. 974.06 and alleged ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel for failing to raise a strong argument for plea withdrawal. The circuit court denied Defendant’s section 974.06 motion because it did not demonstrate why postconviction counsel was ineffective. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a defendant who alleges in a section 974.06 motion that his postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to bring certain viable claims must demonstrate that the claims he wishes to bring are clearly stronger than the claims postconviction counsel actually brought; (2) because Defendant did not offer a sufficient reason in his third postconviction motion for failing to raise his section 974.06 claim in his second postconviction motion, Defendant’s section 974.06 claim was barred; and (3) even if the section 974.06 motion was not barred, the motion did not allege sufficient facts that, if true, would entitle Defendant to relief. View "State v. Romero-Georgana" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of second degree sexual assault with force or violence by use of a dangerous weapon. The court of appeals reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the circuit court erred by excluding evidence of prior sexual conduct between Defendant and the complainant because the evidence fit within a statutory exception to Wisconsin’s rape shield law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court’s refusal to admit the proffered evidence of the previous sexual relationship was proper under the rape shield law because Defendant failed to establish that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its inherent prejudice. Remanded. View "State v. Sarfraz" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a law enforcement officer’s knock on a car window constitutes a “seizure.” Defendant argued that he was seized when a sheriff’s deputy knocked on the driver’s side of Defendant’s vehicle and asked Defendant to roll down the window. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence obtained after he rolled down the window and was subsequently found guilty of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that “when a uniformed officer approaches a vehicle at night and directs the driver to roll down his or her window, a reasonable driver would not feel free to ignore the officer.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a law enforcement officer’s knock on a car window does not by itself constitute a show of authority sufficient to give rise to the belief in a reasonable person that the person is not free to leave; and (2) under the totality of the circumstances of this case, the officer did not show a level of intimidation or exercise of authority sufficient to implicate the Fourth Amendment until after Defendant rolled down his window and exposed the grounds for the seizure. View "County of Grant v. Vogt" on Justia Law

Circuit Judge Richard J. Nuss presided over two jury trials, State v. Pinno and State v. Seaton. In both voir dire proceedings, Judge Nuss asked the public to leave the courtroom to make room for large jury panels. Defendants were subsequently convicted after jury trials open to the public. Defendants filed postconviction motions, alleging violations to their right to a public trial. Judge Nuss denied all postconviction motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extends to voir dire, and a judge’s decision to close or limit public access to a courtroom in a criminal case requires the analysis set forth in Waller v. Georgia; (2) the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial may be asserted by the defendant at any time during a trial; (3) because neither Defendant in this case objected to the alleged courtroom closure, Defendants both forfeited their rights to a public trial; (4) defendants must demonstrate prejudice to prove ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel fails to object to the closure of the courtroom, and Defendants in this case failed to prove that their counsel was ineffective; and (5) Seaton was not denied his right to an impartial judge. View "State v. Seaton" on Justia Law

Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped by police officers after the officers observed an unlit light bulb in the vehicle’s tail lamp. The officers searched the vehicle during the stop and discovered a gun. Defendant pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant then sought an order vacating his conviction and guilty plea and suppressing all evidence seized during the stop, contending that the police lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop the vehicle. The circuit court denied Defendant’s motion. At issue on appeal was whether Wis. Stat. 347.13(1) requires every single light bulb in a tail lamp to be lit. The court of appeals reversed, concluding a vehicle’s tail lamps do not need to be fully lit or in perfect condition to be in good working order. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding (1) section 347.13(1) requires only that “a tail lamp emit a red light visible from 500 feet behind the vehicle during hours of darkness”; and (2) because the only basis for the stop of Defendant’s vehicle was the unlit bulb, the stop was unconstitutional, and so too was the search of the vehicle. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with three counts of sexual assault of a child. At trial, Defendant told the court that she wanted to testify to “tell what actually happened. The circuit court concluded that Defendant was not “intelligently and knowingly waiving her right against self-incrimination” and refused to allow Defendant to testify. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court violated her constitutional rights and that she was automatically entitled to a new trial because the denial of a defendant’s right to testify is not subject to harmless error review. The State conceded that the circuit court erred in refusing to allow Defendant to testify but argued that harmless error review applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the harmless error doctrine applies to the denial of a defendant’s right to testify; and (2) given the nature of Defendant’s defense and the overwhelming evidence of her guilt, the alleged error in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Nelson" on Justia Law